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PREFACE
I am pleased that you are about to read this dissertation. For me, writing this
preface marks the end of an intense period of writing and doing research on
choice functions. It was sometimes hard, but I have really enjoyed it. The
past period feels like a journey, in which I gained experience about how to do
research. I learned a lot about fascinating aspects of mathematics, and other
interesting things.
The person who has taught me the most is without any doubt Gert de
Cooman. He has been my supervisor since ‘the beginning’ in 2011, but he
is also so much more than that. I cannot find words to express my gratitude—
maybe “thank you very much” is the best summary of it—towards him. He
succeeds in creating an environment that consists of people with a passion for
research and mathematics. As a member of this environment, I feel constantly
stimulated to actively do research, and work and think together at the black-
board. Furthermore, all this happens in a relaxed and friendly atmosphere. I
am convinced that such an environment is rare, and I am very grateful to Gert
for being the creator of it.
Gert took me with him to Oviedo to work together with Enrique Miranda.
I returned three times on my own, for a cumulated period of 4 months. En-
rique became my second supervisor. He took care of me, and did this in an
exceptional way: he made me feel at home in Spain, was available every day
to discuss (he even let me work in his own office) and every weekend he took
me out for a trip, very often to the beautiful mountains of the wonderful region
of Asturias. Enrique, you taught me the useful ‘art’ of constructing counterex-
amples, and how looking at examples might provide insight into the problem
at hand. I enjoyed being and working with you immensely. Thank you very
much! Also, I am very grateful to the members of his research group, in par-
ticular Ignacio, Susana D. and Susana M., for guiding me around in Asturias.
Gert and Enrique, I wish you time to fulfil your passion of doing research.
I have mentioned the environment already, and how important it is to me.
The members of the SYSTeMS research group of Ghent University made my
time in the office so much more enjoyable. I especially enjoy the open and
kind atmosphere there, and I am grateful that I have been privileged to witness
this since the start of my research back in 2011. One person has made the
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entire journey together with me: Jasper De Bock. We share many experiences,
such as our first conference, and the road trips together with Gert. Thank you
for always being available to discuss, for bringing life to the party, and for
being such a good friend! There are two other close colleagues (or, actually,
friends) that I would like to express my gratitude to: Stavros and Simon. They
are always ready to assist with all kinds of problems. I enjoy especially our
free moments in which we discuss important, or less important, subjects, or
just have fun. When I started as a PhD student, Erik and Filip, two alumni
members of the SYSTeMS research group, showed me around and helped me
understand some aspects of imprecise probabilities. I will always remember
Filip’s relaxed character, and his willingness to discuss and teach me about
credal networks. Later on, after they had left the SYSTeMS research group,
Erik let me stay in his apartment in Amsterdam for three days, to explore to-
gether the connection between choice functions and sets of desirable gambles.
Filip and Erik, thank you for being such kind and warm people. In a broader
context, I would like to thank all the members of SIPTA, the Society for Im-
precise Probability: Theories and Applications. I wish all of you the best in
your future endeavours.
I also wish to thank the ‘Gentse Roei- en Sportvereniging’ and all its mem-
bers, for providing me with a healthy hobby: rowing. I find it hard to explain
why eight (nine with the coxswain) people are willing to train so hard every
day in an attempt to win “the 8”, but for some reason, everybody, including
me, seems to do it with total devotion. Dear team mates, thank you for the nice
and intense moments, and dear coaches and volunteers, thank you for making
this possible. I wish that we will win “the 8” in many more years to come!
There are two more people that I would like to thank: Machteld en Falk,
for checking parts of this dissertation for language mistakes, and for being the
warm friends they are.
At last I would like to thank my parents and my brother, Felix, just for
being so important to me.
I hope you enjoy your reading.
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SUMMARY
This dissertation presents a study of choice functions as a tool to model un-
certainty. Choice functions constitute a very general uncertainty model that is
capable of representing a rich variety of types of beliefs. In particular, it in-
cludes as a special case sets of desirable gambles, the most general binary—or
pairwise—choice model in imprecise probabilities [82]. So the field of this
dissertation is ‘imprecise probabilities’, which is an umbrella term for mathe-
matical models that are meant to be used in situations of imprecise or incom-
plete information, where it may not be possible (or advisable) to use (precise)
probabilities. With our coherent choice functions, we want to be able to do ev-
erything that can be done within imprecise probabilities, such as conservative
reasoning, updating and conditioning, and also to cope with structural judge-
ments such as independence and exchangeability.
Suppose we have a subject whose beliefs we want to model. A direct way
of doing this, is by looking at the choices he makes between uncertain options.
Such choices can be captured by means of his choice function, which is a func-
tion that maps any set of options (also called option set) to the subset of those
elements that are the chosen or preferred ones. Equivalently, we can consider
rejection functions instead of choice functions, which return the rejected (non-
chosen) options from within any given option set. Rejection functions are often
easier and more intuitive to work with.
In order for a choice function to reflect rational behaviour, it needs to sat-
isfy some rationality criteria. Choice functions that satisfy them are called
coherent. The first thing we do in this dissertation, is identify a set of axioms
that models rational behaviour, and is at the same time weak enough to al-
low for coherent choice functions to be sufficiently general and versatile. The
set of rationality axioms we consider, is based on Kadane et al.’s [45] and
Seidenfeld et al.’s [67] account of coherent choice functions. These authors
introduce a theory of coherent choice functions that is capable of describing
choices that are not necessarily determined by pairwise comparison. Our re-
sulting theory differs from Seidenfeld et al.’s [67] in a number of respects.
First of all, mainly for technical reasons, we only consider finite option sets,
while Seidenfeld et al. [67] also allow for possibly infinite but closed option
sets. Secondly, Seidenfeld et al. [67] require that their choice functions should
xi
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satisfy an Archimedean (continuity) axiom, which prevents them from having
sets of desirable gambles as a special case. As we are particularly interested
in the connection with sets of desirable gambles, we omit their Archimedean
axiom. Furthermore, since their ‘mixtures’ or ‘convexity’ axiom is not com-
patible with Walley–Sen maximality [71, 82] as a decision rule, we disregard
‘convexity’ as an axiom but merely regard it as an additional property that
choice functions may or may not satisfy. A final difference between Seidenfeld
et al.’s [67] approach and ours lies in the uncertain options on which the choice
functions are defined. While they use horse lotteries—which do not constitute
a linear space—we use elements of an abstract pre-determined vector space as
options.
As a first result, we show that under some mild conditions, the choice func-
tions of Seidenfeld et al. [67] can be embedded into our framework. Since this
connection is done through so-called vector-valued gambles [86], every result
we prove for coherent choice functions on vector-valued gambles can also be
related to choice functions on horse lotteries that satisfy the corresponding ra-
tionality axioms.
In order to be able to reason conservatively with choice functions, we in-
troduce a partial order on them that has the interpretation of being ‘at most
as informative as’. The partially ordered set of all coherent choice functions
forms a complete infimum-semilattice under this partial order: the infimum
infC of any collection C of coherent choice functions exists, and is itself co-
herent. This is crucial: it is this property that allows for conservative reasoning
with choice functions, at least in principle. For instance, it allows us to con-
sider the important device of natural extension: the unique least informative
coherent extension of a partially specified choice function. We characterise the
circumstances under which the natural extension is coherent. If it is—we say
then that the partially specified choice function avoids complete rejection—
we obtain an explicit expression for it. The idea of natural extension has an
important role in this dissertation.
Our motivation for using choice functions instead of sets of desirable
gambles—which are those uncertain options that the subject strictly prefers to
the status quo in a pairwise comparison—is that choice functions are versatile
enough to represent choices that are not necessarily based on pairwise compar-
isons of the options only. We relate both models (choice functions and sets of
desirable gambles) to one another through a compatibility relation: an option
u belongs to a set of desirable gambles if and only if the status quo represented
by 0 is rejected from the option set {0,u} consisting of u and 0. Interestingly,
given a coherent choice function, there is exactly one coherent set of desir-
able gambles that is compatible with it, but conversely, given a coherent set
of desirable gambles, there are in general multiple compatible coherent choice
functions. This shows that choice functions are indeed more general than sets
of desirable gambles. We will illustrate this with a type of belief that can be
modelled satisfactorily using choice functions, but not using sets of desirable
xii
gambles.
Seidenfeld et al.’s [67] set of rationality axioms for choice allows for a
representation theorem of coherent choice functions: every coherent choice
function can be written as an infimum of (choice functions corresponding to)
probability–utility pairs belonging to an arbitrary set. This is a very powerful
result, that immediately also shows that their maximal choice functions—the
maximal elements of the partially ordered set of all coherent choice functions
under the partial order of being ‘at most as informative as’—are those that
correspond to a single probability-utility pair. Our axiomatisation does not
allow for such a representation: we show by means of a counterexample that
even restricting ourselves to the class of coherent choice functions that also
satisfy the additional ‘convexity’ property considered in [67], does not suffice.
Once the basic properties of our coherent choice functions, and the natural
extension of local assessments are in place, we move to the study of struc-
tural assessments. By ‘structural’ assessment, we mean an assessment about
the general properties or structure of the choice function. This contrasts with
‘direct’ or ‘local’ assessments, of which a partially specified choice function
constitutes an example. The first kind of structural assessment we study is that
of indifference. Consider a set of options I that the subject assesses as being
indifferent to the option that represents the status quo. I is then called the sub-
ject’s set of indifferent options. To be indifferent between two options means
that these two options are considered to be equivalent to each other, in the sense
that the subject is willing to swap one for another. We introduce a compatibil-
ity relation between coherent choice functions and sets of indifferent options,
and identify the least informative coherent choice function that is compatible
with a given set of indifferent options. As it turns out, choice functions that
describe indifference are simpler, in the sense that they correspond to a unique
representing choice function on a lower dimensional domain. We connect our
account of indifference with an earlier characterisation by Seidenfeld [64].
As mentioned, with our theory of choice we want to be able to deal with
conditioning or updating. If we have a choice function describing the subject’s
beliefs about an uncertain variable X , we need a procedure that takes new in-
formation such as ‘X assumes a value in the non-empty set E’ into account.
Our proposed procedure for conditioning preserves coherence, and, due to the
connection of our choice functions with sets of desirable gambles, it has no
problems with conditioning on events of probability (in the set of probabilities
associated with a choice function) zero. We take this one step further and con-
sider a multivariate context, where we have a finite number of uncertain vari-
ables assuming values in non-empty finite possibility spaces. We introduce an
obvious procedure for marginalisation—given a coherent choice function de-
scribing the subject’s beliefs of a set of variables, how can we derive a choice
function about a subset of them?—and some kind of inverse operation—given
a coherent choice function describing the subject’s beliefs of a set of variables,
how can we extend it to a coherent choice function about a superset of vari-
xiii
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ables, in a least informative manner? Our previously introduced conditioning
rule can be made to deal with a multivariate context. Finally, we investigate
another type of structural assessment: that of irrelevance, which is an asym-
metric variant of independence. We characterise choice functions that satisfy
such assessments, and find the least informative coherent one, called the irrel-
evant natural extension.
This dissertation culminates in our study of exchangeability, where we find
occasion to use most of the previously introduced concepts. Exchangeability
is a structural assessment about a sequence of variables that is important for
statistical inference purposes. Loosely speaking, making a judgement of ex-
changeability means that the order in which the variables are observed is not
relevant. We derive de Finetti-like representation theorems for finite exchange-
able sequences. We take also this one step further and consider a countable
sequence of variables, for which we also find a de Finetti-like representation
theorem. We consider conditioning on observing a finite number of these vari-
ables, show that this conserves exchangeability, and show that counting occur-
rences provides a sufficient statistic for this type of inference.
We conclude by looking back at what has been achieved, and looking ahead
at a number of interesting problems that still remain.
xiv
SAMENVATTING
Dutch summary
Dit proefschrift legt een studie voor van keuzefuncties als een manier om on-
zekerheid te modelleren. Keuzefuncties vormen een zeer algemeen onzeker-
heidsmodel dat ons in staat stelt om een rijke verscheidenheid aan types van
overtuigingen te modelleren. Ze omvatten, als bijzonder geval, verzamelin-
gen van begeerlijke gokken, het meest algemene binaire—of paarsgewijze—
keuzemodel in de imprecieze waarschijnlijkheden [82]. Dit proefschrift si-
tueert zich dus in het veld van de ‘imprecieze waarschijnlijkheden’, wat een
kapstokbenaming is voor wiskundige modellen die kunnen worden gebruikt
bij imprecieze of onvolledige informatie, waar het niet mogelijk (of raadzaam)
is om (precieze) waarschijnlijkheden te gebruiken. We willen met onze co-
herente keuzefuncties alles kunnen doen wat ook met precieze en imprecieze
waarschijnlijkheden kan, zoals conservatief redeneren, conditioneren en up-
daten, en ook omgaan met structurele aannames zoals onafhankelijkheid en
uitwisselbaarheid.
Neem aan dat we iemands onzekerheid willen modelleren. Een directe aan-
pak bestaat erin te kijken naar de keuzes die hij maakt tussen onzekere opties.
Zulke keuzes kunnen worden vastgelegd door zijn keuzefunctie, die een func-
tie is die elke verzameling van opties (ook wel optieverzameling genoemd)
afbeeldt op de deelverzameling die bestaat uit die elementen die verkozen of
geprefereerd zijn. Equivalent hiermee kunnen we ook verwerpingsfuncties be-
schouwen in plaats van keuzefuncties, die de verworpen (niet-verkozen) opties
weergeven in elke optieverzameling. Verwerpingsfuncties zijn vaak makkelij-
ker en intuı¨tiever om ermee te werken.
Opdat een keuzefunctie rationeel gedrag zou weerspiegelen, moet het aan
een aantal rationaliteitscriteria voldoen. Keuzefuncties die hieraan voldoen
noemen we coherent. Het eerste wat we in dit proefschrift doen, is een ver-
zameling van axioma’s identificeren die rationeel gedrag modelleren, en te-
gelijkertijd zwak genoeg zijn om het werken met keuzefuncties voldoende al-
gemeen en veelzijdig te maken. De verzameling van rationaliteitscriteria die
we beschouwen is gebaseerd op de beschijving van coherente keuzefuncties
van Kadane et al. [45] en Seidenfeld et al. [67] . Deze auteurs introduce-
ren een theorie van coherente keuzefuncties die in staat is om keuzes te mo-
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delleren die niet noodzakelijk bepaald worden door paarsgewijze vergelijkin-
gen. De theorie die wij bouwen, verschilt in een aantal aspecten van die van
Seidenfeld et al. [67]. Om te beginnen beschouwen we enkel eindige optie-
verzamelingen, vooral omwille van technische redenen, terwijl Seidenfeld et
al. [67] ook oneindige maar gesloten optieverzamelingen toelaten. Ten tweede
eisen Seidenfeld et al. [67] dat hun keuzefuncties aan een Archimedisch (con-
tinuı¨teits-)axioma voldoen, wat maakt dat hun keuzefuncties verzamelingen
van begeerlijke gokken niet als een bijzonder geval omvatten. Omdat wij
bijzonder geı¨nteresseerd zijn in het verband tussen keuzefuncties en verza-
melingen van begeerlijke gokken, laten we hun Archimedisch axioma in dit
proefschrift achterwege. Bovendien is hun ‘mengings-’ of ‘convexiteitsaxi-
oma’ niet verenigbaar met Walley–Sen-maximaliteit [71, 82] als beslissings-
regel, en daarom behandelen we deze ‘convexiteit’ niet als een axioma, maar
liever als een bijkomende eigenschap waaraan keuzefuncties al dan niet kun-
nen voldoen. Een laatste verschil tussen de aanpak van Seidenfeld et al. [67] en
de onze ligt in de onzekere opties waartussen de keuzefuncties kiezen. Terwijl
zij paardenloterijen—die geen lineaire ruimte vormen—gebruiken, werken wij
met elementen van een abstracte vooraf bepaalde vectorruimte als opties.
Als eerste resultaat tonen we aan dat, onder zwakke voorwaarden, de keu-
zefuncties van Seidenfeld et al. [67] kunnen ingebed worden in ons kader.
Omdat deze inbedding gebeurt met behulp van zogeheten vectorwaardige gok-
ken [86], kan elk resultaat dat wij bewijzen voor coherente keuzefuncties op
vectorwaardige gokken ook gerelateerd worden aan keuzefuncties op paarden-
loterijen die aan de overeenkomstige rationaliteitscriteria voldoen.
Om conservatief te kunnen redeneren met keuzefuncties introduceren we
een partie¨le ordening op de keuzefuncties, die we kunnen interpreteren als ‘is
ten hoogste zo informatief als’. De partieel geordende verzameling van alle
coherente keuzefuncties vormt een complete infimum-semitralie onder deze
partie¨le ordening: het infimum infC van elke verzameling C van coherente keu-
zefuncties bestaat, en is zelf weer coherent. Dat is cruciaal: het is deze eigen-
schap die ons in staat stelt, tenminste in principe, conservatief te redeneren met
keuzefuncties. Het maakt het ons bijvoorbeeld mogelijk om het belangrijke
concept van natuurlijke uitbreiding te beschouwen: de unieke minst informa-
tieve coherente uitbreiding van een onvolledig gespecificeerde keuzefunctie.
We karakteriseren de omstandigheden waaronder die natuurlijke uitbreiding
coherent is. Als ze dat is—we zeggen dan dat de onvolledig gespecificeerde
keuzefunctie volledige verwerping vermijdt—leiden we er een expliciete uit-
drukking voor af. Het idee van natuurlijke uitbreiding speelt in dit proefschrift
een belangrijke rol.
Onze motivering om keuzefuncties te gebruiken in plaats van verzame-
lingen van begeerlijke gokken—begeerlijke gokken zijn die gokken die door
een persoon strikt verkozen worden boven het status quo in een paarsgewijze
vergelijking—is dat keuzefuncties veelzijdig genoeg zijn om keuzes voor te
stellen die niet noodzakelijk alleen maar gegrond zijn op paarsgewijze ver-
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gelijkingen tussen de opties. We brengen de beide modellen (keuzefuncties
en verzamelingen van begeerlijke gokken) met elkaar in verband met behulp
van een verenigbaarheidsrelatie: een optie u behoort tot een verzameling van
begeerlijke gokken als en slechts als het status quo, voorgesteld door 0, ver-
worpen wordt in de optieverzameling {0,u} die bestaat uit u en 0. Voor een
coherente keuzefunctie is er exact e´e´n coherente verzameling van begeerlijke
gokken die ermee verenigbaar is, maar omgekeerd zijn er voor een coherente
verzameling van begeerlijke gokken in het algemeen meerdere verenigbare co-
herente keuzefuncties. Dat toont aan dat keuzefuncties inderdaad algemener
zijn dan verzamelingen van begeerlijke gokken.
De rationaliteitscriteria voor keuze van Seidenfeld et al. [67] stellen hun
in staat om een representatieresultaat voor hun coherente keuzefuncties te be-
wijzen: elke coherente keuzefunctie kan geschreven worden als een infimum
van (keuzefuncties overeenstemmend met) waarschijnlijkheids-utiliteitsparen.
Dit is een zeer krachtig resultaat, dat ook onmiddellijk aantoont dat hun maxi-
male keuzefuncties—de maximale elementen van de partieel geordende ver-
zameling van alle coherente keuzefuncties onder de partie¨le ordening die ‘ten
hoogste zo informatief als’ voorstelt—die keuzefuncties zijn die overeenstem-
men met een enkel waarschijnlijkheids-utiliteitspaar. Onze axiomatisering laat
zulke representatie niet toe: we tonen door middel van een tegenvoorbeeld aan
dat er geen zulke representatie is, zelfs als we ons beperken tot de klasse van
coherente keuzefuncties die ook aan de bijkomende ‘convexiteitseigenschap’
voldoen, beschouwd in Referentie [67].
Als eenmaal de basiseigenschappen van onze coherente keuzefuncties, en
de natuurlijke uitbreiding van lokale aannames, vastgelegd zijn, gaan we ver-
der met de studie van structurele aannames. Met ‘structurele’ aannames be-
doelen we aannames over de algemene eigenschappen of structuur van de keu-
zefunctie. Ze staan tegenover ‘directe’ of ‘lokale’ aannames, waarvan onvol-
ledig gespecificeerde keuzefuncties een voorbeeld zijn. De eerste soort van
structurele aanname die we bestuderen is die van onverschilligheid. Beschouw
een verzameling van opties I die een subject beoordeelt als onverschillend van
het status quo. We noemen I dan zijn verzameling van onverschillige opties.
Onverschillig zijn tussen twee opties betekent dat deze twee opties worden be-
schouwd als equivalent met elkaar, in de zin dat ons subject een van de twee
opties wil ruilen voor de andere. We stellen een verenigbaarheidsrelatie tus-
sen coherente keuzefuncties en verzamelingen van onverschillige opties voor,
en identificeren de minst informatieve coherente keuzefunctie die verenigbaar
is met een gegeven verzameling van onverschillige opties. Het blijkt dat keu-
zefuncties die onverschilligheid uitdrukken eenvoudiger zijn, in de zin dat ze
overeenstemmen met een unieke representerende keuzefunctie op een domein
met een lagere dimensie. We leggen een verband tussen onze aanpak van in-
differentie en een eerdere karakterisatie door Seidenfeld [64].
Zoals gezegd willen we met onze theorie van keuzefuncties kunnen om-
gaan met conditioneren of updaten. Als we een keuzefunctie hebben die de
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overtuigingen van een subject over een onzekere veranderlijke X modelleert,
dan moeten we een methode hebben die nieuwe informatie zoals ‘X neemt een
waarde aan in de niet-lege verzameling E’ in rekening brengt. De methode
die we voorstellen bewaart coherentie, en, door het verband tussen onze keu-
zefuncties en verzamelingen van begeerlijke gokken, heeft ze geen problemen
met conditioneren op gebeurtenissen met waarschijnlijkheid (in de verzame-
ling van waarschijnlijkheden geassocieerd met een keuzefunctie) nul. We ne-
men deze ideee¨n mee naar een multivariate context, waar we een eindig aantal
onzekere veranderlijken hebben die waarden aannemen in niet-lege mogelijk-
hedenruimtes. We stellen een voor de hand liggende methode om te margina-
liseren voor: gegeven een coherente keuzefunctie die de overtuigingen van een
subject beschrijft over een verzameling van veranderlijken, hoe kunnen we dan
een keuzefunctie afleiden over een deelverzameling? Daarnaast bekijken we
ook een soort inverse operatie: gegeven een keuzefunctie die de overtuigingen
van een subject beschrijft over een verzameling van veranderlijken, hoe kun-
nen we die dan uitbreiden naar een coherente keuzefunctie over een grotere
verzameling van veranderlijken, op een zo weinig informatief mogelijke ma-
nier? Onze eerder voorgestelde methode om te conditioneren kunnen we ook
gebruiken in zo’n context met meerdere veranderlijken. Ten slotte onderzoe-
ken we een ander type structurele aanname: irrelevantie, een asymmetrische
variant van onafhankelijkheid. We karakteriseren keuzefuncties die aan deze
aanname voldoen, en we vinden de minst informatieve onder hen: de irrele-
vante natuurlijke uitbreiding.
Dit proefschrift culmineert in onze studie van uitwisselbaarheid, waarbij
we de meeste van de voorheen voorgestelde concepten kunnen gebruiken. uit-
wisselbaarheid is een structurele aanname over een rij van veranderlijken, die
belangrijk is voor statistische gevolgtrekkingen. Een aanname van uitwissel-
baarheid te maken betekent ruwweg dat de volgorde waarin we de verander-
lijken observeren niet relevant is. We leiden de Finetti-achtige representatie-
resultaten af voor eindige uitwisselbare rijen van veranderlijken die waarden
aannemen in een eindige verzameling van categoriee¨n. We nemen deze ideee¨n
mee naar een bredere context, waarbij we een aftelbare rij van veranderlijken
beschouwen, waarvoor we ook een de Finetti-achtig representatieresultaat vin-
den. We bekijken ook conditioneren op het waarnemen van een eindig aantal
veranderlijken, tonen aan dat het proces van conditioneren uitwisselbaarheid
bewaart, en bewijzen dat het tellen van hoeveel keer elke categorie optreedt
een toereikende statistiek oplevert voor dit type van gevolgtrekkingen.
We besluiten dit proefschrift door terug te kijken naar wat we hebben be-
reikt, en vooruit te kijken naar een aantal interessante open problemen.
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INTRODUCTION
1.1 WHAT IS THIS DISSERTATION ABOUT
This dissertation is about choice between uncertain options. We want our no-
tion of ‘choice’, and our theory resulting from it, to be sufficiently general, so
that it (i) allows for ‘imprecise choice’, and (ii) is capable of describing choices
that are not necessarily determined by pairwise comparisons of the options.
Let us first explain what we mean by ‘imprecise choice’. In general, very
often there will be multiple chosen (or preferred) options amongst the set of
available options: the subject (or expert) whose choices we model is unde-
cided between these chosen options, and we then say that these options are
incomparable to him. With ‘imprecise choice’, we mean that the subject does
not need to be indifferent between the incomparable options—to be indifferent
between two options means that these two options are considered equivalent
to each other, in the sense that the subject is equally willing to swap one for
another. If some options are indifferent to the subject, this implies that they
are incomparable to him in the technical sense described above, but the con-
verse implication does not necessarily hold. In other words, with ‘imprecise
choice’ we mean that the subject can have multiple reasons to be undecided
between incomparable options: one of them is that he is indifferent between
them, but there might be other reasons. Indeed, the indecisiveness may for
instance be due to incomplete information (for instance, due to lack of time
or resources to gather more information), or due to cautiousness of the subject
towards specifying too specific choices, etcetera.
One theory that takes the difference between indecisiveness and indiffer-
ence seriously, is that of imprecise probabilities [82]. ‘Imprecise probabilities’
is an umbrella term for mathematical models that are meant to be used in situa-
tions of imprecise or incomplete information, where it may not be possible (or
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advisable) to use (precise) probabilities. In particular, it covers sets of prob-
ability measures and various types of non-additive measures and functionals,
such as coherent lower previsions [51], belief functions [35,70] and possibility
measures [12, 22]. All of these models can be expressed in terms of coherent
sets of desirable gambles [57,64,82,83], which collect the gambles that a sub-
ject, whose beliefs we want to model, strictly prefers to the status quo. Sets
of desirable gambles are not only the most general imprecise-probabilistic bi-
nary choice model, they constitute moreover arguably the most elegant model
to work with, and definitively the model with the clearest and most direct in-
terpretation. They can be—and have been—used to replace probabilities in
Bayesian networks, for predictive inference, and so on [13, 18, 19, 24, 31, 55].
Often, choice cannot be reduced to pairwise (or binary) comparison of the
available options. To make this more specific, for three options u, v and w, it
can happen that u is chosen in the pairwise comparisons with v—so u is cho-
sen from within {u,v}—and with w—so u is chosen from within {u,w}—but,
when considering all three options u, v and w, that u is rejected (not chosen).
An illustration of this will be given in Example 1085. Choices that are not nec-
essarily determined by pairwise comparisons of the options can be modelled
using choice functions: functions that map any set of options (we will call a set
of options an option set) to a subset whose elements are the chosen or preferred
options. Choice functions are related to the fundamental problem in decision
theory: how to make a choice from within a set of available options. In their
book, von Neumann and Morgenstern [81] provide an axiomatisation of choice
based on a pairwise comparison between options only. Later on, as choice
functions gained popularity, many authors, such as Arrow [4], Uzuwa [73] and
Rubin [59], generalised the idea and proposed a theory of choice functions
based on choice between more than two elements.
We have seen that the theory of imprecise probabilities allows for impre-
cise choice, and that the theory of choice functions allows for the choice to
be not necessarily determined by pairwise comparisons of the options only.
But, on the one hand, most of the imprecise-probabilistic models, such as the
very useful model of sets of desirable gambles, reduce to pairwise compar-
isons between the options. On the other hand, most of the choice functions,
such as those in Rubin’s [59] theory, are precise—do not distinguish between
indifference and incomparability. We want to combine the advantages of both
theories (imprecise probabilities and choice functions): we want a theory of
choice functions that has imprecise probabilities, and more specifically sets
of desirable gambles, as a particular case. In order to get there, some of the
axioms of the choice functions that Rubin [59] considers must be weakened.
Furthermore, we want our resulting theory of choice functions to have a clear
interpretation and to be operational.
There already exists at least one such theory of choice functions: Kadane
et al. [45] and Seidenfeld et al. [67] generalise Rubin’s [59] axioms to allow
for incomparability. They introduce an axiomatisation of choice that is weaker
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than Rubin’s [59] and allows for imprecise choice. However, sets of desirable
gambles are no particular case of their choice functions, something that we
consider to be important for our choice functions. We will allow ourselves to
be inspired by their axiomatisation, and will drop those axioms that prevent
sets of desirable gambles to be a particular case.
One important difference between our approach and the approach consid-
ered by Seidenfeld et al. [67] is that they use horse lotteries to represent op-
tions, while we use abstract vectors that belong to some pre-determined vector
space. As the horse lotteries do not form a linear space, at first sight this seems
a crucial difference. However, as we will see in Chapter 29, we can embed the
choice functions considered by Seidenfeld et al. [67] into our framework, un-
der some mild conditions. The advantage of our use of more abstract vectors is
that they are useful for dealing with indifference in a more directly constructive
way than Seidenfeld’s [63] treatment, as we will see in Chapter 5175. Further-
more, since our options belong to a vector space, they can be added to each
other, and multiplied with constants, which is something that will turn out to
be very useful.
All these considerations lead to a theory of choice, presented in this dis-
sertation, that has sets of desirable gambles as a special case. We impose a
system of four rationality axioms—based on those of Seidenfeld et al. [67]—
on the choice functions, that is weak enough in order to have desirability as a
special case. We call choice functions that satisfy the rationality axioms coher-
ent. With our coherent choice functions, we want to be able to do everything
that can be done with imprecise-probabilistic models, such as conservative rea-
soning, updating and conditioning, and coping with structural judgements such
as independence and exchangeability.
To be able to do conservative reasoning, we impose a specific partial order
on the set of all coherent choice functions, having the interpretation of being
‘at most as informative as’. With this partial order, we are able to distinguish
more informative choice functions from less informative ones, and (partially)
order them accordingly. As we will see, the partially ordered set of all co-
herent choice functions under this partial order, forms a complete infimum-
semilattice: the infimum infC (under this partial order) of any collection C of
coherent choice functions exists, and is coherent itself. This is crucial: using
these concepts allows us to reason conservatively, at least in principle. Given a
partially specified choice function, we collect all the coherent choice functions
that are compatible with it in C, and infC will be the least informative coherent
choice function that is compatible with the partially specified choice function
we started with. This choice function infC is important throughout this dis-
sertation: it is the unique coherent extension of the partially specified choice
function that uses the rationality axioms only. It is called the natural extension
of the partially specified choice function, which is the counterpart of the de-
ductive closure of classical propositional logic. Furthermore, we need to have
an expression for infC, as this makes our theory operational. The operational
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aspect of our theory exists in offering a number of option sets to the subject.
In every option set offered, he then can make statements regarding the options
he rejects (does not find preferable). This corresponds to partially specifying a
choice function, and with our expression for infC, we are then able to find its
natural extension.
As mentioned, with our theory of choice we want to be able to deal with
conditioning or updating. Assume that we have a choice function describing
the subject’s beliefs about an uncertain variable X , and suppose that new in-
formation, in the form of ‘X assumes a value in the non-empty set E’ becomes
available. This new information can be taken into account by conditioning the
initial choice function.
An incompletely specified choice function is an example of a direct or
local assessment: it only requires that the choice function that describes the
choices (or preferences) of the subject, identifies certain choices from within
certain sets of options. Besides these direct assessments, our theory of coherent
choice functions also needs to be able to cope with structural assessments:
judgements that a subject makes about global properties of the choice function.
Such structural judgements can for instance be an assessment of indifference,
looking like ‘I am indifferent between the options in some set I’. Special cases
of such assessments are symmetry and exchangeability. Other examples of
structural judgements are related to the irrelevance or independence of two or
more variables. It turns out that our account of choice functions is able to
deal with local and some types of structural assessments. At a later stage, not
treated in this dissertation because outside of its scope, this should allow us to
lay the foundation for a theory of statistical inference with choice functions.
1.2 INFORMATION ABOUT REFERENCES
In this dissertation you will find both external and internal references. Exter-
nal references are bibliographic ones. They are enumerated, and listed in the
Bibliography277. Internal references are used for chapters, sections, equations,
theorems, propositions, corollaries, lemmas and remarks. They have an index
which refers to the page number where the reference can be found. For in-
stance, Theorem 8197 can be found on page 97. The explicit reference to the
page number is omitted when we refer to something on the same double-page
spread, and recto and verso pages are referenced by the symbols ↶ and ↷,
respectively. I would like to thank Gert de Cooman and Matthias Troffaes for
providing me with the LATEX code for the internal reference system used in their
book [72]. The idea of this goes back to Erik Quaeghebeur’s dissertation [56].
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This dissertation consists of 9 chapters. Apart from this introduction and the
conclusions in Chapter 9273, the main results can be found in Chapters 29–8247,
of which we give a concise overview here. The DAG in Figure 1.1 shows the
relation between the chapters. An arrow departing in Chapter i and arriving
in Chapter j means that Chapter j uses concepts introduced in Chapter i or its
ancestors.
Chapter 29
Coherent
choice models
Chapter 4125
Representation
Chapter 389
Natural extension
Chapter 6205
Conditioning
Chapter 5175
Indifference
and symmetry
Chapter 7221
Multivariate
choice functions
Chapter 8247
Exchangeability
Figure 1.1: Relation between the chapters. This relation is transitive.
Chapter 29 introduces choice functions and equivalent models, such as re-
jection functions and choice relations, which are often more elegant to work
with. These models are commonly referred to as choice models. We intro-
duce the rationality axioms for each of the three equivalent choice models, and
establish their connection. At this point, we already have enough tools to con-
nect our notion of choice functions with the choice functions considered by
Seidenfeld et al. [67]. Once this is established, we investigate order-theoretic
properties of the coherent choice models, a crucial step for doing conserva-
tive reasoning with them. As a special class of coherent choice functions, we
take a closer look at purely binary choice functions: choice functions that are
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completely determined by pairwise comparisons only. These choice functions
are in a one-to-one correspondence with sets of desirable gambles. As it turns
out, there is a fourth equivalent choice model, which we call rejection set. It
reveals the connection with desirability in a more direct way, and it has very
nice properties in two-dimensional option spaces. We end this chapter by giv-
ing some examples of coherent choice functions, and link it with the choice
functions that appear in the literature.
In many cases, it will be very difficult for a subject to completely spec-
ify a coherent choice function that describes his beliefs. Instead, mostly he
will resort to a partial (incomplete) specification of his choice function. In
Chapter 389 we consider such a situation, and we look for the least informative
coherent choice function that extends this partially specified choice function.
This least informative coherent choice function is what we call the natural
extension. We will characterise those partial specifications that have a coher-
ent extension. Furthermore, we will find an explicit expression for the natural
extension. Interestingly, this expression allows us to discover a special class
of coherent choice functions: choice functions that are no infimum of purely
binary ones.
Ideally, we would like coherent choice functions to satisfy the following
two desirable properties. First, we want every coherent choice function to
be an infimum of its dominated maximal (under the partial order of being
‘not more informative than’) coherent choice functions. Second, we would
like these maximal coherent choice functions to have an easy description, and,
since the only choice functions with easy description we know are the purely
binary ones, we would ideally want the maximal coherent choice functions to
be purely binary ones. However, none of these two properties is established,
and it is an interesting question whether they hold. In Chapter 4125 we are con-
cerned with such questions. We build on the discovery in the previous chapter
of coherent choice functions that are no infima of purely binary ones, which
already shows that at least one of the two aforementioned desirable properties
does not hold. This inspires us to consider an extra property (called ‘convex-
ity’, or ‘mixtures’) as a rationality axiom, which helps Seidenfeld et al. [67] to
establish that their coherent choice functions satisfy the two aforementioned
desirable properties. In the first part of Chapter 4125, we investigate some of
the consequences of this extra axiom. As it turns out, there is a connection
between such choice functions and lexicographic probability systems. In the
second part of this chapter, we prove the negative result that this extra axiom
is not sufficient to guarantee that our choice functions satisfy the two desir-
able properties mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph. In the remainder
of this dissertation, we will therefore pay no extra attention to this additional
property.
Chapter 5175 investigates the interplay between an assessment of indiffer-
ence and a choice function. We give a characterisation of indifferent choice
functions in terms of (indifferent) equivalence classes of options, and link it
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with the earlier definition of indifference by Seidenfeld [63]. We retrieve the
established treatment of indifference with sets of desirable gambles as a spe-
cial case. Eventually, we find the natural extension of a direct assessment (as
in Chapter 389) combined with an indifference assessment.
Chapter 6205 shows how to condition a choice function. We consider a
variable X whose outcome is uncertain. The options are no longer arbitrary
vectors, but instead vector-valued gambles, which is sufficiently general to
guarantee the connection with Seidenfeld et al.’s [67] choice functions. Sup-
pose that we have a choice function describing the subject’s beliefs about X,
and that new information, in the form of ‘X assumes a value in the non-empty
set E’ becomes available. This can be taken into account by conditioning our
initial choice function.
In Chapter 7221 we take this one step further. We consider a finite num-
ber of variables whose outcomes are uncertain, and consider choice functions
that describe the subject’s beliefs about all these variables at once. This leads
to choice functions in a multivariate context. We generalise the concepts of
marginalisation, weak extension and irrelevant natural extension for sets of de-
sirable gambles in Reference [29] to choice models. Interestingly, as it turns
out, these concepts are not much more involved for coherent choice functions.
Chapter 8247 is the final main chapter of my dissertation. It brings together
most of the concepts of the previous chapters to study exchangeability with
choice functions. Exchangeability is a structural assessment on a sequence of
variables that is important for inference purposes. Loosely speaking, making
a judgement of exchangeability means that the order in which the variables
are observed, is considered irrelevant. This irrelevancy is typically modelled
through an indifference assessment. In the first part of this chapter, we derive
de Finetti-like representation theorems for finite exchangeable sequences. In
the second part we take this one step further, and consider a countable sequence
of variables.
1.4 PUBLICATIONS
This dissertation is the product of research on choice functions, which has
led to six publications. Two of them have been published, or are accepted for
publication, in international journals [77,78]; two of them have been published,
or are accepted for publication, as book chapters [53, 80]; the other two are
published in the proceedings of international conferences [76, 79]:
• Arthur Van Camp, Gert de Cooman and Enrique Miranda. Lexico-
graphic choice functions. Accepted for publication in the International
Journal of Approximate Reasoning [77].
• Arthur Van Camp, Gert de Cooman, Enrique Miranda and Erik
Quaeghebeur. Coherent choice functions, desirability and indifference.
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Accepted for publication in Fuzzy Sets and Systems [78].
• Arthur Van Camp, Gert de Cooman, Enrique Miranda and Erik
Quaeghebeur. Modelling indifference with choice functions. Published
in the proceedings of ISIPTA 2015 [79].
• Arthur Van Camp and Gert de Cooman. Exchangeable choice functions.
Published in the proceedings of ISIPTA 2017 [76].
• Arthur Van Camp, Enrique Miranda and Gert de Cooman. Lexico-
graphic choice functions without Archimedeanicity. Published as a book
chapter in Soft Methods for Data Science. Advances in Intelligent Sys-
tems and Computing, vol 456. Springer, Cham [80].
• Enrique Miranda, Arthur Van Camp and Gert de Cooman. Choice func-
tions and rejection sets. Accepted for publication as a book chapter in
The Mathematics of the Uncertain, 2018 [53].
These publications constitute the core of Chapters 2, 4125, 5175 and 8247.
The results in the other chapters are rather more recent and have therefore not
been published yet.
Besides the references mentioned above, I have been involved in a number
of other publications [20,21,25,36,74,75]. They are related to the subject, but
only in an indirect way, and therefore I have decided to not include them in
this dissertation.
• Jasper De Bock, Arthur Van Camp, Ma´rcio Alves Diniz and Gert de
Cooman. Representation theorems for partially exchangeable random
variables. Published in Fuzzy Sets and Systems [20].
• Ma´rcio Alves Diniz, Jasper De Bock and Arthur Van Camp. Character-
izing Dirichlet priors. Published in The American Statistician [36].
• Cedric De Boom, Jasper De Bock, Arthur Van Camp and Gert de
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COHERENT CHOICE MODELS
This thesis is concerned with choice. The subject’s choice will be captured
using a choice function. Before we can introduce such choice functions, we
first need to know what the objects the subject chooses between will look like.
2.1 WHAT DO WE CHOOSE BETWEEN?
As we will see, a choice function identifies from within every set of options,
those options that are not rejected by a subject. We will collect all the options
in V.
Assumption 2.1. We will assume that the set of all options form a real vector
space V, provided with the vector addition (+) and scalar multiplication.
Let us introduce some basic concepts for vector spaces. Denote the additive
identity of V by 0. For any subsets A1 and A2 of V and any λ in R,1 we let
λA1 ∶= {λu ∶ u ∈ A1} and
A1+A2 ∶= {u+v ∶ u ∈ A1,v ∈ A2},
called the Minkowski sum of A1 and A2.
1R is the set of real numbers. We use R>0 as a shorthand notation for {α ∈ R ∶ α > 0}, and
R≥0 for {α ∈R ∶ α ≥ 0} =R>0 ∪{0}.
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Given any subset A of V, we define its linear hull span(A) as the set of all
finite linear combinations of elements of A:2
span(A) ∶= { n∑
k=1λkuk ∶ n ∈N,λk ∈R,uk ∈ A} ⊆ V,
its positive hull posi(A) as the set of all positive finite linear combinations of
elements of A:
posi(A) ∶= { n∑
k=1λkuk ∶ n ∈N,λk ∈R>0,uk ∈ A} ⊆ span(A) ⊆ V,
and its convex hull conv(A) as the set of convex combinations of elements
of A:
conv(A) ∶= { n∑
k=1αkuk ∶ n ∈N,αk ∈R≥0,
n∑
k=1αk = 1,uk ∈ A} ⊆ posi(A) ⊆ V.
A subset A of V is called a convex cone if it is closed under positive finite
linear combinations, i.e. if posi(A) = A. A convex cone K is called proper
if K∩−K = {0}. With any proper convex cone K ⊆ V, we can associate an
ordering ⪯K on V, defined for all u and v in V as follows:
u ⪯K v⇔ v−u ∈K.
We also write u ⪰K v for v ⪯K u. The ordering ⪯K is actually a vector ordering:
it is a partial order—reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive—that satisfies the
following two characteristic properties:
u1 ⪯K u2⇔ u1+v ⪯K u2+v; (2.1)
u1 ⪯K u2⇔ λu1 ⪯K λu2, (2.2)
for all u1, u2 and v in V, and all λ in R>0. Observe, by the way, that as a
consequence
u ⪯K v⇔ 0 ⪯K v−u⇔ u−v ⪯K 0
for all u and v in V.
Conversely, given any vector ordering ⪯, the proper convex cone K from
which it is derived can always be retrieved by K = {u ∈ V ∶ u ⪰ 0}.
Finally, with any vector ordering ⪯, we associate the strict partial order-
ing ≺ as follows:
u ≺ v⇔ (u ⪯ v and u ≠ v)⇔ v−u ∈K∖{0}, for all u and v in V.
2We define the natural numbers N ∶= {1,2, . . .} as the set of all positive integers. We use
Z≥0 ∶=N∪{0} to denote the non-negative integers.
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We call u positive if u ≻ 0, and collect all positive options in the convex
cone V≻0 ∶= K ∖ {0} = {u ∈ V ∶ u ≻ 0}. We use similar notations V⪰0 ∶= K ={u ∈ V ∶ u ⪰ 0} = V≻0∪{0} for the non-negative vectors, V≺0 ∶= −K∖{0} = {u ∈V ∶ u ≺ 0} = −V≻0 for the negative vectors, and V⪯0 ∶= −K = {u ∈ V ∶ u ⪯ 0} =−V⪰0 = V≺0∪{0} for the non-positive vectors.
Assumption 2.2. From now on, we assume that V is an ordered vector space,
with a generic but fixed vector ordering ⪯K. We will refrain from explicitly
mentioning the actual proper convex cone K we are using, and simply writeV to mean the ordered vector space, and use ⪯ as a generic notation for the
associated vector ordering.
Elements of V are intended as abstract representations of options amongst
which a subject can express his preferences, by specifying, as we will see be-
low, choice functions. We will call such a real vector space an option space.
We will motivate our decisions to use vectors as options further on, in Sec-
tion 2.1.2↷.
2.1.1 Technical lemmas about option spaces
In this section, we collect basic technical lemmas about option spaces, needed
to prove a number of results in this thesis.
Lemma 1. Consider two arbitrary subsets A and A′ of V. Then posi(A∪A′) =
posi(A)∪posi(A′)∪(posi(A)+posi(A′)).
Proof. We first show that posi(A ∪A′) ⊆ posi(A)∪ posi(A′)∪ (posi(A)+ posi(A′)).
Consider any u in posi(A ∪A′). Then u =∑mk=1λkvk +∑n`=1 µ`w` for some m and n in
Z≥0 such that max{m,n} ≥ 1, λ1, . . . , λm, µ1, . . . , µn in R>0, v1, . . . , vm in A, and w1,
. . . , wn in A′. If m = 0 then u ∈ posi(A′), and similarly, if n = 0 then u ∈ posi(A). Finally,
if m > 0 and n > 0, then u ∈ posi(A)+posi(A′). So in any of the three cases, u belongs
indeed to posi(A)∪posi(A′)∪(posi(A)+posi(A′)).
We now prove that posi(A)∪posi(A′)∪(posi(A)+posi(A′)) ⊆ posi(A∪A′). Con-
sider any u in posi(A)∪posi(A′)∪(posi(A)+posi(A′)). If u ∈ posi(A) or u ∈ posi(A′),
then also u ∈ posi(A ∪A′). If u ∈ posi(A)+ posi(A′), then u =∑mk=1λkvk +∑n`=1 µ`w`
for some m and n in N, λ1, . . . , λm, µ1, . . . , µn in R>0, v1, . . . , vm in A, and w1, . . . ,
wn in A′. Then u = ∑m+ni=1 λivi, where we let λn+1 ∶= µ1, . . . , λm+n ∶= µn, vn+1 ∶= w1,
. . . , vm+n ∶= wn, and therefore u ∈ posi(A ∪A′). So in any of the three cases, u indeed
belongs to posi(A∪A′).
Lemma 2 ([58, Lemma 1]). Consider two arbitrary subsets A and A′ of V.
Then 0 ∉ A+A′⇔ A′∩−A =∅.
Proof. We prove 0 ∈A+A′⇔A′∩−A ≠∅. For necessity, assume that 0 ∈A+A′. Then
there are u in A and u′ in A′ such that u+u′ = 0, so u′ = −u belongs to A′∩−A, which is
therefore indeed non-empty.
For sufficiency, assume that A′∩−A ≠∅, then there is some u in A′ such that u ∈−A
or, equivalently, −u ∈ A. Therefore indeed 0 = u−u ∈ A′+A.
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Lemma 3 (See Reference [58, Lemma 2]). Consider three arbitrary subsets
A, A′ and A′′ of V. Then (A′′+A′)∩A =∅⇔ A′∩(A−A′′) =∅.
Proof. Apply Lemma 2↶ twice: (A′′+A′)∩A =∅⇔ 0 ∉A′′+A′−A =A′+(A′′−A)⇔
A′∩(A−A′′) =∅.
Lemma 4. Consider any u and w in V. Then u ∈ posi(V≻0 ∪{w}) if and only
if 0 ≺ u or µw ⪯ u for some µ in R>0.
Proof. For necessity, assume that u ∈ posi(V≻0 ∪{w}). Then u ∈ V≻0 ∪ posi({w})∪(V≻0+posi({w})) using Lemma 1↶, and therefore 0 ≺ u, or µw = u for some µ inR>0,
or µ ′w ≺ u for some µ ′ in R>0. Then indeed 0 ≺ u or µw ⪯ u for some µ in R>0.
For sufficiency, assume that 0 ≺ u or µw ⪯ u for some µ in R>0. Then u ∈ V≻0
or (∃µ ∈ R>0)(µw = u or µw ≺ u), so u ∈ V≻0 ∪ posi({w})∪ (V≻0 + posi({w})), and
therefore indeed u ∈ posi(V≻0∪{w}), using Lemma 1↶.
Lemma 5. Consider any u and w in V. Then u ∈ V≻0 +posi{0,w} if and only
if µw ≺ u for some µ in R≥0.
Proof. Infer the following equivalences. u ∈ V≻0+posi{0,w} is equivalent to v ≺ u for
some v in posi{0,w}. Since by Lemma 1↶ [with A ∶= {0} and A′ ∶= {w}] posi{0,w} =
posi{0}∪ posi{w}∪ (posi{0}+ posi{w}) = {0}∪ posi{w} = {µw ∶ µ ∈ R≥0}, this is
indeed equivalent to µw ≺ u for some µ in R≥0.
2.1.2 Example of option spaces
We will often consider the special case of an uncertain variable X that assumes
values in a possibility space X of mutually exclusive elementary events, one of
which is guaranteed to occur. Here, options will be real-valued maps f on X:
f ∶X→R∶x↦ f (x),
typically bounded3 if X is infinite. We interpret them as uncertain rewards
or risky transactions, and therefore call them gambles. These maps take a
central position in the theory of imprecise probabilities—they are especially
important for coherent lower previsions and coherent sets of desirable gambles,
see References [51,64,72,82]. We collect the set of all bounded gambles on X
in L(X), also denoted as L when it is clear from the context what domain X
the gambles are defined on. The interpretation is as follows: If a subject has
ownership of some gamble f , then, if the actual outcome x in X of X has been
determined, his capital is changed by the—possibly negative—pay-off f (x),
described in a linear utility scale.
3We say that a map f ∶X → R∶x ↦ f (x) is bounded if it is bounded above—its supremum
sup f ∶= sup{ f (x) ∶ x ∈ X} is finite—and bounded below—its infimum inf f ∶= inf{ f (x) ∶ x ∈ X}
is finite.
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The order ≤ on the real numbers induces a natural order on L, also denoted
by ≤: for all f and g in L,
f ≤ g⇔ f (x) ≤ g(x) for all x in X.
Its strict variant < on L is given by f < g⇔ ( f ≤ g and f ≠ g) for f and g inL. The order ≤ on L is clearly a partial order, that furthermore satisfies the
characteristic Properties (2.1)10 and (2.2)10 of a vector ordering. As usual, we
write f > g⇔ g < f and f ≥ g⇔ g ≤ f for all f and g in L, and we denoteL≤0 ∶= { f ∈ L ∶ f ≤ 0}, L<0 ∶= { f ∈ L ∶ f < 0}, L≥0 ∶= { f ∈ L ∶ f ≥ 0}, and L>0 ∶={ f ∈L ∶ f > 0}.
As in Reference [72], we will make no distinction between constant gam-
bles a(x) ∶= a for all x in X, and the real number a. This allows us to write
down f ≤ a to mean f (x) ≤ a for all x in X. Furthermore, we extend any binary
operation ⋆ on R to a binary operation on gambles, as follows:
( f ⋆g)(x) ∶= f (x)⋆g(x) for f and g in L, and x in X.
This allows us to consider f +g, f −g, f g, and − f ∶= 0− f , and define scalar
multiplication with λ , by viewing λ as a constant gamble: (λ f )(x) = λ f (x)
for all f and in L, λ in R, and x in X. This guarantees that L is a linear space
with additive identity 0, that therefore can serve as option space V, whose order⪯ will typically be the point-wise order ≤, but need not be. We also define ∣ f ∣
as the absolute value of a gamble f , given by ∣ f ∣(x) ∶= ∣ f (x)∣ for all x in X.
We now introduce a particular class of gambles. With any subset E of X,
we associate its indicator IE of E, which is the {0,1}-valued gamble given by
IE(x) ∶= ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩1 if x ∈ E0 if x ∉ E for all x in X.
We call IE the indicator of E.
More often than not in the literature, choice functions choose between
horse lotteries rather than the vectors in an option space. It will be useful to
note already that horse lotteries do not form a linear space. As we will see in
Section 2.428 however, under some mild conditions, those choice functions can
be embedded into the choice functions on options. This connection uses the
more general notion of vector-valued gambles [86]: vector-valued maps on the
possibility space. The domain of those gambles is X ×R with R an arbitrary
set, and hence the partial map f (x,⋅) is an element of the vector space L(R).
Let us conclude this section with a small discussion about why we do not
always work with gambles, but instead use the arbitrary vector space V as our
option space. One reason for our working with the more abstract notion of
options is that they are better suited for dealing with indifference: as we will
see in Chapter 5175, this involves working with equivalence classes of options,
which again constitute a vector space. These equivalence classes can no longer
13
COHERENT CHOICE MODELS
be interpreted easily or directly as gambles, or horse lotteries for that matter.
Another reason for using options that are more general than real-valued gam-
bles is that recent work by Zaffalon and Miranda [86] has shown that a very
general theory of binary preference can be constructed using vector-valued
gambles, rather than horse lotteries. Such vector-valued gambles again con-
stitute a real vector, or option, space. In Section 2.428, we will show that the
conclusions of this work [86, Section 4] can be extended from binary prefer-
ences to choice functions.
2.2 CHOICE MODELS
Now that we know what is chosen between, and what the option space looks
like, we are ready to describe what choice between options means. This choice
will be captured by a choice function. Next to choice functions—which we will
define in Definition 1—there are two alternative equivalent models: rejection
functions (see Definition 2) and choice relations (see Definition 3). We call
these functions choice models.
We denote by Q(V) ∶= {A ⋐ V ∶ A ≠ ∅} the set of all option sets: all non-
empty finite subsets of V, where A ⋐ V is taken to mean that A is a finite subset
of V. Q(V) a strict subset of the power set P(V) ∶= {A ∶ A ⊆ V} of V. We
will use the notation Q0(V) ∶= {A ∈Q(V) ∶ 0 ∈ A} to denote those option sets
that include the additive identity 0, and Q0(V) ∶= {A ∈Q(V) ∶ 0 ∉ A} =Q(V)∖Q0(V) to denote those option sets that exclude 0. When it is clear what option
space V we are considering, we will also use the simpler notation Q, Q0, andQ0. Q is the domain of any choice function: elements A of Q are the option
sets: sets amongst whose members a subject can indicate his preferred ones.
2.2.1 Choice and rejection functions
Definition 1 (Choice function). A choice function C on an option space V is a
map
C∶Q→Q∪{∅}∶A↦C(A) such that C(A) ⊆ A.
We collect all the choice functions on V in C(V), often simply denoted as C
when it is clear from the context what the option space is.
The idea underlying this definition is that a choice function C selects the set
C(A) of options in the option set A that are not rejected. C(A) is then called
the choice set of A. Our definition resembles the one commonly used in the
literature [1, 67, 69], except perhaps for a restriction to finite option sets [42,
62, 68].
Equivalently to a choice function, we may consider a rejection function.
14
2.2 CHOICE MODELS
Definition 2 (Rejection function). A rejection function R on an option space V
is a map
R∶Q→Q∪{∅}∶A↦ R(A) such that R(A) ⊆ A.
We collect all the rejection functions on V in R(V), often simply denoted as R
when it is clear from the context what the option space is.
Choice functions and rejection functions can correspond with one another:
given any rejection function R, its corresponding choice function CR is defined
by CR(A) ∶= A ∖R(A) for all A in Q. It returns the options CR(A) that are
not rejected by R. Similarly, given any choice function C, its corresponding
rejection function RC is defined by RC(A) ∶= A∖C(A) for all A in Q.
They are trivially in a one-to-one correspondence:
Proposition 6. Consider any choice function C and any rejection function R.
Then CRC =C and RCR = R.
As we will see, many concepts are more easily described using rejection func-
tions rather than choice functions. Since they are in a one-to-one correspon-
dence, we use them interchangeably, and call any choice function C and rejec-
tion function R corresponding when
R = RC , or by Proposition 6 equivalently, C =CR . (2.3)
2.2.2 Choice relations
Another equivalent notion is that of a choice relation.
Definition 3 (Choice relation). A choice relation ⊲ on an option space V is a
binary relation on Q that satisfies the following two properties for all A, A1
and A2 in Q:
(i) if A1∪A2 = A1∪A then A1 ⊲ A2⇔ A1 ⊲ A;
(ii) if A1∪A2 ⊆ A then (A1 ⊲ A and A2 ⊲ A)⇔ A1∪A2 ⊲ A.
We collect all the choice relations on V in S(V), often simply denoted as S
when it is clear from the context what the option space is.
A1
A2
A
Figure 2.1: Illustration of A1∪A2 = A1∪A in Definition 3(i)
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Choice relations can correspond to a choice function or a rejection function, as
in Reference [67]:
Definition 4 ([67, Section 3]). Given any choice function C, define the binary
relation ⊲C on Q by
A1 ⊲C A2⇔C(A1∪A2) ⊆ A2∖A1, for all A1 and A2 in Q. (2.4)
Given any rejection function R, define the binary relation ⊲R on Q by
A1 ⊲R A2⇔ A1 ⊆ R(A1∪A2), for all A1 and A2 in Q. (2.5)
It turns out that ⊲C and ⊲R are well defined in the sense that it is irrele-
vant whether they are specified using a choice function or its corresponding
rejection function.
Proposition 7. Consider any choice function C and rejection function R. If C
and R correspond (satisfy Equation (2.3)↶), then ⊲C = ⊲R .
Proof. Consider any A1 and A2 in Q, and consider the following equivalences:
A1 ⊲R A2⇔ A1 ⊆ R(A1∪A2) by Definition 4⇔ A1 ⊆ (A1∪A2)∖C(A1∪A2) because C and R correspond⇔ A2∖A1 = (A1∪A2)∖A1 ⊇C(A1∪A2)⇔ A1 ⊲C A2 by Definition 4.
So Equations (2.4) and (2.5) are consistent, in the sense that when C and R
correspond, then ⊲C and ⊲R are equal. This clarifies the intuition behind a
choice relation ⊲ derived from a rejection function, or, for that matter, a choice
function: A1 ⊲ A2 whenever every option in A1 is rejected when presented with
the options in A1∪A2.
However, it is not yet guaranteed that ⊲C and ⊲R are actually choice rela-
tions: they need to satisfy the two requirements of Definition 3↶. Because of
Proposition 7, it suffices to show this for ⊲R alone.
Proposition 8. For any rejection function R, the corresponding binary rela-
tion ⊲R is a choice relation.
Proof. We have to check that ⊲R satisfies the two conditions of Definition 3↶.
For (i)↶, consider any A, A1 and A2 in Q such that A1 ∪A = A1 ∪A2. This sets off
the following cascade of equivalences:
A1 ⊲R A2⇔ A1 ⊆ R(A1∪A2)⇔ A1 ⊆ R(A1∪A)⇔ A1 ⊲R A,
where the first and the last equivalences follow from Equation (2.5). For (ii)↶, consider
any A, A1 and A2 in Q such that A1 ∪A2 ⊆ A. Then A1 ∪A = A2 ∪A = A, which sets off
the following cascade of equivalences:
A1 ⊲R A and A2 ⊲R A⇔ A1 ⊆ R(A1∪A) and A2 ⊆ R(A2∪A)⇔ A1 ⊆ R(A) and A2 ⊆ R(A)⇔ A1∪A2 ⊆ R(A) = R(A1∪A2∪A)⇔ A1∪A2 ⊲R A.
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Therefore, due to Proposition 7, the binary relation ⊲C that corresponds to a
choice function C also is a choice relation. We call ⊲C the choice relation
corresponding to the choice function C, and, similarly, ⊲R the choice relation
corresponding to the rejection function R.
Now we know how to go from choice functions—or rejection functions for
that matter—to choice relations. Let us look for some kind of inverse opera-
tion: given a choice relation, can we associate a choice function with it, in such
a way that its corresponding choice relation is equal to the original one?
Definition 5. Given any choice relation ⊲, define the corresponding choice
function C⊲ and corresponding rejection function R⊲ by
C⊲(A) ∶=⋂{A′ ⊆ A ∶ A∖A′ ⊲ A} for all A in Q
and
R⊲(A) ∶=⋃{A′ ⊆ A ∶ A′ ⊲ A} for all A in Q.
C⊲ and R⊲ are well defined in the sense that they correspond:
Proposition 9. For any choice relation ⊲, its corresponding choice function C⊲
and rejection function R⊲ correspond to one another.
Proof. Due to Proposition 615, it suffices to show that CR⊲ =C⊲ . Consider any A inQ,
then
CR⊲ (A) = A∖R⊲(A) = A∖(⋃{A′ ⊆ A ∶ A′ ⊲ A})=⋂{A∖A′ ∶ A′ ⊆ A and A′ ⊲ A}=⋂{A′′ ∶ A′′ ⊆ A and A∖A′′ ⊲ A} =C⊲(A),
where the second and last equalities are due to Definition 5, the third one to De Mor-
gan’s laws, and the fourth one because set complement relative to A preserves the prop-
erty of being a subset of A.
We know now that Definition 4 is consistent, but there is no guarantee
yet that choice relations and choice functions correspond: do we retrieve the
original choice relation?
Proposition 10. Consider any choice function C, any rejection function R and
any choice relation ⊲. Then C⊲C =C, R⊲R = R, and ⊲C⊲ = ⊲R⊲ = ⊲.
Proof. It suffices to prove that R⊲R =R and ⊲R⊲ =⊲. To see that this suffices, if R⊲R =R,
by Proposition 9 then C⊲R = CR , whence by choosing R to be the rejection function
corresponding to C, by Proposition 7 indeed C⊲C =C. If ⊲R⊲ = ⊲, since by Proposition 9
we have that R⊲ =C⊲ , therefore indeed ⊲C⊲ = ⊲.
To show that R⊲R = R, consider any rejection function R and any A in Q. Use
Definitions 5 and 4 to find that then indeed
R⊲R (A) =⋃{A′ ⊆ A ∶ A′ ⊲R A} =⋃{A′ ⊆ A ∶ A′ ⊆ R(A)} = R(A).
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To show that ⊲R⊲ = ⊲, consider any choice relation ⊲ and any A1 and A2 inQ. Use
Definitions 416 and 5↶ to find that then
A1 ⊲R⊲ A2⇔ A1 ⊆ R⊲(A1∪A2)⇔ A1 ⊆⋃{A′ ⊆ A1∪A2 ∶ A′ ⊲ A1∪A2} =∶ A3. (2.6)
Since A3 =⋃{A′ ⊆ A1∪A2 ∶ A′ ⊲ A1∪A2} is a finite union, infer from Definition 315(ii)
that A3 ⊲ A1 ∪A2. Now if A1 ⊆ A3, then A3 ⊲ A1 ∪A2 implies that A1 ⊲ A1 ∪A2, again
by Definition 315(ii). Conversely, if A1 ⊲ A1∪A2 then, trivially, A1 ⊆ A3. Hence
A1 ⊆ A3⇔ A1 ⊲ A1∪A2⇔ A1 ⊲ A2,
where the last equivalence follows from Definition 315(i). Combining this with the
equivalences in Equation (2.6) completes the proof.
As we will see, Propositions 615 and 9↶ imply that choice functions, re-
jection function and choice relations are in a one-to-one correspondence. This
implies statements as C⊲R = CR , ⊲CR = ⊲R , and so on, where C is a choice
function, R a rejection function, and ⊲ a choice relation. We call any choice
function C, rejection function R and choice relation ⊲ corresponding to each
other when
CR =C⊲ =C, or equivalently, RC = R⊲ = R, and also ⊲C = ⊲R = ⊲. (2.7)
2.2.3 Connection between the choice models
Let us focus on the interplay between the three different choice models and
introduce the following maps between the choice models:
ρ ∶C→R∶C↦ ρ(C) ∶= RC,
ρ ′∶R→C∶R↦ ρ ′(R) ∶=CR ,
σ ∶R→ S∶R↦ σ(R) ∶= ⊲R ,
σ ′∶S→R∶⊲↦ σ ′(⊲) ∶= R⊲ ,
κ ∶S→C∶⊲↦ κ(⊲) ∶=C⊲ ,
κ ′∶C→ S∶C↦ κ ′(C) ∶= ⊲C.
The importance of the different maps ρ , σ , κ , ρ ′, σ ′ and κ ′ lies in the fact
that they are bijections:
Proposition 11. The functions ρ , σ and κ are bijections, with respective in-
verses ρ ′, σ ′ and κ ′.
Proof. The proof has the following structure: we first prove (i) that ρ is a bijection
whose inverse is ρ ′, then (ii) that σ is a bijection whose inverse is σ ′, and finally (iii)
that κ is a bijection whose inverse is κ ′.
For (i), ρ is one-to-one (or injective) since for all C1 and C2 in C, if RC1 = ρ(C1) =
ρ(C2) = RC2 , by Proposition 615 then indeed C1 =C2. It is onto (or surjective) since
for all R in R there is some C in C—namely, using Proposition 615, CR = ρ ′(R)—such
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ρ ′
ρ
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Figure 2.2: The maps ρ , ρ ′, σ , σ ′, κ and κ ′
that indeed R = ρ(C). To show that ρ ′ is the inverse of ρ , it suffices to show that
ρ ○ρ ′ = idR,4 or equivalently, that R = ρ(ρ ′(R)) = RCR for all R in R. Proposition 615
guarantees that this is indeed true.
For (ii), σ is one-to-one since for all R1 and R2 in R, if ⊲R1 =σ(R1) =σ(R2) = ⊲R2 ,
by Proposition 1017 then indeed R1 = R2. It is onto since for all ⊲ in S there is some
R in R—namely, using Proposition 1017, R⊲ = σ ′(⊲)—such that indeed ⊲ = σ(R). To
show that σ ′ is the inverse of σ , it suffices to show that σ ○σ ′ = idS, or equivalently,
that ⊲ = ⊲R⊲ for all ⊲ in S. Proposition 1017 guarantees that this is indeed true.
For (iii), κ is one-to-one since for all ⊲1 and ⊲2 in S, if C⊲1 = κ(⊲1) = κ(⊲2) =C⊲2 ,
by Proposition 1017 then indeed ⊲1 = ⊲2. It is onto since for all C in C there is some⊲ in S—namely, using Proposition 1017, ⊲C= κ ′(C)—such that indeed C = κ(⊲). To
show that κ ′ is the inverse of κ , it suffices to show that κ ○κ ′ = idC, or equivalently,
that C =C⊲C for all C in C. Proposition 1017 guarantees that this is indeed true.
This means that all the types of choice models are in one-to-one correspon-
dences with each other. Therefore, from now on we can focus on any of them.
In any section of this thesis, we will typically choose to work with the type of
choice model that is best suited to what we are doing there.
2.3 RATIONALITY AXIOMS
In order for choice functions to reflect rational behaviour, they should sat-
isfy some rationality requirements. If a choice function satisfies these require-
ments, we call it coherent. To give an example of irrational behaviour, consider
the special option space of gambles V = L, whose interpretation is explained
in Section 2.19. Consider the choice between the two constant gambles 0 and
1. If some choice function C identifies 0 as the choice between 0 and 1—in
other words, if {0} =C({0,1})—then C reflects a choice of the status quo (the
gamble 0) above the certain reward of 1 units of utility, irrespective of the out-
come. This is not considered rational behaviour as it implies a sure loss of 1,
and we need to rule out choice functions that reflect this.
4For arbitrary setA, we let idA∶A→A∶A↦ idA(A) ∶= A ofA be the identity map onA.
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Seidenfeld et al. [67, Section 3] call a choice function C coherent if there
is a non-empty set T of probability-utility pairs such that C(A) is the set of
options in A that maximise expected utility for some element of T . They also
provide an axiomatisation for this type of coherence, based on the one for
binary preferences [3]. In Section 2.428 we will comment on their axiomatisa-
tion, and connect it with ours.
We prefer to define coherence directly in terms of axioms, without refer-
ence to probability and utility. For each of the three choice models, they are:
Definition 6 (Coherent choice function). We call a choice function C on V
coherent if for all A, A1 and A2 in Q, all u and v in V, and all λ in R>0:
C1. C(A) ≠∅;
C2. if u ≺ v then u ∉C({u,v});
C3. a. if C(A2) ⊆ A2∖A1 and A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ A then C(A) ⊆ A∖A1;
b. if C(A2) ⊆ A2∖A1 and A ⊆ A1 then C(A2∖A) ⊆ A2∖A1;
C4. a. if A1 ⊆C(A2) then λA1 ⊆C(λA2);
b. if A1 ⊆C(A2) then A1+{u} ⊆C(A2+{u}).
We collect all coherent choice functions on V in the set C(V), often simply
denoted as C when it is clear from the context which vector space we are
using.
Definition 7 (Coherent rejection function). We call a rejection function R onV coherent if for all A, A1 and A2 in Q, all u and v in V, and all λ in R>0:
R1. R(A) ≠ A;
R2. if u ≺ v then u ∈ R({u,v});
R3. a. if A1 ⊆ R(A2) and A2 ⊆ A then A1 ⊆ R(A);
b. if A1 ⊆ R(A2) and A ⊆ A1 then A1∖A ⊆ R(A2∖A);
R4. a. if A1 ⊆ R(A2) then λA1 ⊆ R(λA2);
b. if A1 ⊆ R(A2) then A1+{u} ⊆ R(A2+{u}).
We collect all coherent rejection functions on V in the set R(V), often simply
denoted as R when it is clear from the context which vector space we are using.
Definition 8 (Coherent choice relation). We call a choice relation ⊲ on V co-
herent if for all A, A1 and A2 in Q, all u and v in V, and all λ in R>0:⊲1. A ⋪ A;⊲2. if u ≺ v then {u} ⊲ {v};⊲3. a. if A1 ⊲ A2 and A2 ⊆ A then A1 ⊲ A;
b. if A1 ⊲ A2 and A ⊆ A1 then A1∖A ⊲ A2∖A;⊲4. a. if A1 ⊲ A2 then λA1 ⊲ λA2;
b. if A1 ⊲ A2 then A1+{u} ⊲ A2+{u}.
We collect all coherent choice relations on V in the set S(V), often simply
denoted as S when it is clear from the context which vector space we are using.
Before we show that these definitions of coherence correspond, let us first
identify a number of equivalent forms of Axioms C4, R4 and ⊲4.
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Lemma 12. Consider any choice function C, any rejection function R and any
choice relation ⊲. Then the following equivalences hold:
C satisfies Axiom C4a20⇔ (∀A ∈Q,u ∈ A,λ ∈R>0)(u ∈C(A)⇒ λu ∈C(λA)) (C4a.1)⇔ (∀A ∈Q,u ∈ A,λ ∈R>0)(u ∈C(A)⇔ λu ∈C(λA)) (C4a.2)⇔ (∀A ∈Q,λ ∈R>0)λC(A) =C(λA), (C4a.3)
R satisfies Axiom R4a20⇔ (∀A ∈Q,u ∈ A,λ ∈R>0)(u ∈ R(A)⇒ λu ∈ R(λA)) (R4a.1)⇔ (∀A ∈Q,u ∈ A,λ ∈R>0)(u ∈ R(A)⇔ λu ∈ R(λA)) (R4a.2)⇔ (∀A ∈Q,λ ∈R>0)λR(A) = R(λA), (R4a.3)
⊲ satisfies Axiom ⊲4a20⇔ (∀A ∈Q,u ∈ V,λ ∈R>0)({u} ⊲ A⇒ λ{u} ⊲ λA) (⊲4a.1)⇔ (∀A ∈Q,u ∈ V,λ ∈R>0)({u} ⊲ A⇔ λ{u} ⊲ λA) (⊲4a.2)⇔ (∀A1,A2 ∈Q,λ ∈R>0)(A1 ⊲ A2⇔ λA1 ⊲ λA2,) (⊲4a.3)
C satisfies Axiom C4b20⇔ (∀A ∈Q,u ∈ A,v ∈ V)(u ∈C(A)⇒ u+v ∈C(A+{v})) (C4b.1)⇔ (∀A ∈Q,u ∈ A,v ∈ V)(u ∈C(A)⇔ u+v ∈C(A+{v})) (C4b.2)⇔ (∀A ∈Q,v ∈ V)C(A)+{v} =C(A+{v}), (C4b.3)
R satisfies Axiom R4b20⇔ (∀A ∈Q,u ∈ A,v ∈ V)(u ∈ R(A)⇒ u+v ∈ R(A+{v})) (R4b.1)⇔ (∀A ∈Q,u ∈ A,v ∈ V)(u ∈ R(A)⇔ u+v ∈ R(A+{v})) (R4b.2)⇔ (∀A ∈Q,v ∈ V)R(A)+{v} = R(A+{v}), (R4b.3)
⊲ satisfies Axiom ⊲4b20⇔ (∀A ∈Q,u ∈ V,v ∈ V)({u} ⊲ A⇒ {u+v} ⊲ A+{v}) (⊲4b.1)⇔ (∀A ∈Q,u ∈ V,v ∈ V)({u} ⊲ A⇔ {u+v} ⊲ A+{v}) (⊲4b.2)⇔ (∀A1,A2 ∈Q,v ∈ V)(A1 ⊲ A2⇔ A1+{v} ⊲ A2+{v}). (⊲4b.3)
Proof. For the equivalences involving Axioms C4a, R4a and ⊲4a, we will establish
the following chain of implications:
C satisfies Axiom C4a20⇒ (C4a.1)⇒ (C4a.2)⇒ (C4a.3)⇒C satisfies Axiom C4a20,
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and similarly for R and ⊲, all at once. Note that the first implication holds simply by
considering A˜1 ∶= {u} and A˜2 ∶=A in the statement of the axiom. The second implication
follows by considering 1λ > 0 instead of λ . The third and fourth implications are then
immediate, for ⊲ taking into account Definition 315(ii).
For the equivalences involving Axioms C4b20, R4b20 and ⊲4b20, we will establish
the following chain of implications:
C satisfies Axiom C4b20⇒ (C4b.1)⇒ (C4b.2)⇒ (C4b.3)⇒C satisfies Axiom C4b20,
and similarly, for Axioms R4b20 and ⊲4b20, all in once. Note that the first implication
holds simply by considering u˜ ∶= v, A˜1 ∶= {u} and A˜2 ∶= A in the statement of the axiom.
The second implication follows by considering −v ∈V instead of v. The third and fourth
implications are then immediate, for ⊲ taking into account Definition 315(ii).
Proposition 13. Consider any corresponding choice function C, rejection
function R and choice relation ⊲ (satisfy Equation (2.7)18). Then for any ax-
iom C∗ in {C120,C220,C3a20,C3b20,C4a20,C4b20}, the following statements
are equivalent:
(i) C satisfies Axiom C∗;
(ii) R satisfies Axiom R∗;
(iii) ⊲ satisfies Axiom ⊲∗,
where we denote by R∗ and ⊲∗ the axiom corresponding to C∗, for all ∗ in{1,2,3a,3b,4a,4b}. As a consequence, the following statements are equiva-
lent:
(iv) C is coherent;
(v) R is coherent;
(vi) ⊲ is coherent.
Proof. The proof has the following structure. For any axiom C∗ in the set{C120,C220,C3a20,C3b20,C4a20,C4b20}, we show that (i)⇔(ii), and that (ii)⇔(iii).
As a consequence, therefore, trivially (iv)⇔(v)⇔(vi).
Since C, R and ⊲ correspond, we may assume that C(A) = A ∖R(A), R(A) = A ∖
C(A) =⋃{A′ ⊆ A ∶ A′ ⊲ A}, and A1 ⊲ A2⇔ A1 ⊆ R(A1∪A2) for all A, A1 and A2 inQ.
We start with Axiom C120, and its corresponding Axioms R120 and ⊲120. To show
that (i)⇔(ii), consider any A in Q and note that, since C and R correspond, indeed
C(A) ≠ ∅⇔ R(A) = A ∖C(A) ≠ A. To show that (ii)⇔(iii), consider any A in Q and
note that indeed R(A) = A⇔ A ⊆ R(A)⇔ A ⊲ A, where the first equivalence is due to
the requirement in Definition 214 that R(A) ⊆ A.
We now turn to Axiom C220, and its corresponding Axioms R220 and ⊲220. To
show that (i)⇔(ii), consider any u and v in V, and infer the following equivalences: u ∉
C({u,v})⇔ u ∈ {u,v}∖C({u,v})⇔ u ∈ R({u,v}). To show that (ii)⇔(iii), consider
any u and v in V, and infer the following equivalence: u ∈ R({u,v})⇔ {u} ⊲ {v},
where we used A1 ⊲ A2⇔ A1 ⊆ R(A1∪A2) with A1 = {u} and A2 = {v}.
Next, consider Axiom C3a20, and its corresponding Axioms R3a20 and ⊲3a20.
To show that (i)⇔(ii), we will first show that (i)⇒(ii). Assume that C satisfies Ax-
iom C3a20 and consider any A, A1 and A2 inQ such that A1 ⊆ R(A2) and A2 ⊆ A. Then
C(A2) ⊆ A2 ∖A1, and also A1 ⊆ A2 by Definition 214. Axiom C3a20 implies that then
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C(A) ⊆ A ∖A1, or in other words, that A1 ⊆ R(A), and hence R indeed satisfies Ax-
iom R3a20. To show that (ii)⇒(i), assume that R satisfies Axiom R3a20 and consider
any A, A1 and A2 in Q such that C(A2) ⊆ A2 ∖A1 and A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ A. Then A1 ⊆ R(A2).
Axiom R3a20 implies that then A1 ⊆ R(A), or, in other words, that C(A) ⊆ A ∖A1, and
hence C indeed satisfies Axiom C3a20.
To show that (ii)⇔(iii), first we will show that (ii)⇒(iii). Assume that R satisfies
Axiom R3a20 and consider any A, A1 and A2 in Q such that A1 ⊲ A2 and A2 ⊆ A. The
first assumption is equivalent to A1 ⊆ R(A1 ∪A2). Let A′ ∶= A ∪A1, then A1 ∪A2 ⊆ A′ =
A′ ∪A1, and hence Axiom R3a20 implies that then A1 ⊆ R(A′ ∪A1), or, in other words,
that A1 ⊲ A∪A1. By Definition 315(i), this is equivalent to A1 ⊲ A, and hence ⊲ indeed
satisfies Axiom ⊲3a20. To show that (iii)⇒(ii), assume that ⊲ satisfies Axiom ⊲3a20
and consider any A, A1 and A2 in Q such that A1 ⊆ R(A2) and A2 ⊆ A. Then A1 ⊲ A2.
Axiom ⊲3a20 implies that then A1 ⊲ A, or, in other words, that A1 ⊆ R(A), where we
used that A1 ⊆ A so A = A∪A1, and hence R indeed satisfies Axiom R3a20.
Next, consider Axiom C3b20, and its corresponding Axioms R3b20 and ⊲3b20.
To show that (i)⇔(ii), first we will show that (i)⇒(ii). Assume that C satisfies Ax-
iom C3b20 and consider any A, A1 and A2 in Q such that A1 ⊆ R(A2) and A ⊆ A1.
Then C(A2) ⊆ A2 ∖A1. Axiom C3b implies that then C(A2 ∖A) ⊆ A2 ∖A1, and since
A ⊆ A1—so A2 ∖A1 ⊆ A2 ∖A—, in other words, that (A2 ∖A)∖(A2 ∖A1) ⊆ R(A2 ∖A).
Now use that (A2∖A)∖(A2∖A1) =A2∩Ac∩(Ac2∪A1) =A1∩A2∩Ac =A1∩Ac =A1∖A
to infer that A1 ∖A ⊆ R(A2 ∖A), and hence R indeed satisfies Axiom R3b20. To show
that (ii)⇒(i), assume that R satisfies Axiom R3b20 and consider any A, A1 and A2 inQ
such that C(A2) ⊆A2∖A1 and A ⊆A1. Then A′1 ⊆R(A2) Axiom R3b20 implies that then
A′1 ∖A ⊆ R(A2 ∖A), or, in other words, that C(A2 ∖A) ⊆ (A2 ∖A)∖(A′1 ∖A). Infer the
following chain of equalities: (A2∖A)∖(A1∖A) = A2∩Ac∩(Ac1∪A) = A2∩Ac∩Ac1 =
A2 ∩Ac1 = A2 ∖A1, and therefore C(A2 ∖A) ⊆ A2 ∖A1, whence C indeed satisfies Ax-
iom C3b20.
To show that (ii)⇔(iii), first we will show that (ii)⇒(iii). Assume that R satisfies
Axiom R3b20 and consider any A, A1 and A2 in Q such that A1 ⊲ A2 and A ⊆ A1.
Let A′2 ∶= A1 ∪A2, then A1 ⊆ R(A′2). Axiom R3b20 implies that then A1 ∖A ⊆ R(A′2 ∖
A), or, in other words, that A1 ∖A ⊲ A′2 ∖A. Since A′2 ∖A = (A2 ∖A)∪ (A1 ∖A), use
Definition 315(i) to infer that A1 ∖A ⊲ A′2 ∖A is equivalent to A1 ∖A ⊲ A2 ∖A, and
hence ⊲ indeed satisfies Axiom ⊲3b20. To show that (iii)⇒(ii), assume that ⊲ satisfies
Axiom ⊲3b20 and consider any A, A1 and A2 in Q such that A1 ⊆ R(A2) and A ⊆ A1.
Then A1 ⊲ A2, and, using Definition 214, A1 ⊆ A2. Axiom ⊲3b20 implies that then
A1∖A ⊲ A2∖A, or, in other words, that A1∖A ⊆R((A1∖A)∪(A2∖A)). Since A1 ⊆A2,
therefore A1 ∖A ⊆ A2 ∖A, whence A1 ∖A ⊆ R(A2 ∖A), and hence R indeed satisfies
Axiom R3b20.
Subsequently, consider Axiom C4a20, and its corresponding Axioms R4a20
and ⊲4a20. To show that (i)⇔(ii)⇔(iii), use Lemma 1221 and the fact that for any
A ∈Q, u ∈ A and λ ∈ R>0, u ∈C(A)⇔ u ∉ R(A)⇔ {u} ⋪ A and λu ∈C(λA)⇔ λu ∉
R(λA)⇔ λ{u} ⋪ λA.
Finally, consider Axiom C4b20, and its corresponding Axioms R4b20 and ⊲4b20.
To show that (i)⇔(ii)⇔(iii), use Lemma 1221 and the fact that for all A ∈Q, u ∈ A and
v ∈V, u ∈C(A)⇔ u ∉ R(A)⇔ {u} ⋪ A and u+v ∈C(A+{v})⇔ u+v ∉ R(A+{v})⇔{u+v} ⋪ A+{v}.
Taking into account Proposition 1118, this means that there are bijections be-
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tween C, R and S,5 by appropriately restricting the bijections between C, R
and S.
Corollary 14. There are bijections between C, R and S.
Proof. Proposition 1118 implies that ρ is a bijection between C and R, σ a bijection
between R and S, and κ a bijection between S and C. To show that ρ defines a bijection
between C and R, note that its restriction to C is in particular injective. To show that ρ is
surjective, it suffices to show that, for any R in R, there is some C in C such that R =RC ,
or, in other words, that ρ−1(R) =CR is coherent. Proposition 1322 guarantees that this
is true. Furthermore, the same proposition guarantees that, for any C in C, ρ(C) is an
element of R. In a similar fashion, we can show that σ is a bijection between R and S,
and that κ is a bijection between S and C.
For all the properties about coherence that we will see, it therefore suffices to
prove the coherence for either choice functions, rejection functions, or choice
relations, since by Proposition 1322, if we have coherence for one choice
model, we automatically have coherence for all the other corresponding choice
models.
2.3.1 Motivation of the rationality axioms
Let us give an informal and intuitive motivation for the rationality axioms,
and the reasons why we think that rational choice must satisfy them. First of
all, it should be noted that, apart from Axiom C220—or its corresponding Ax-
ioms R220 and ⊲220—, our axioms are, after performing the necessary transla-
tion from horse lotteries to linear spaces (which we will do in Section 2.428),
a strict subset6 of Seidenfeld et al.’s [67]. Any motivation to use their axioms
therefore immediately transfers to our setting.
Let us briefly review every axiom. We do so for the axioms of rejection
functions; due to Proposition 1322, this translates to other choice models.
It is implicit in every theory of choice that not every option can be rejected,
or, in other words, that Axiom R120 should hold. In many works (see, amongst
others, References [45, 67, 69]) it is already implicit in the definition of rejec-
tion function—or choice function for that matter—that the rejection cannot be
full. We decided to not require this directly in the definition, since, otherwise
the theory of coherent rejection functions would not be a belief structure [23],
something we consider to be rather important. We discuss this in Section 2.646.
As we will see in Section 2.855, by instead requiring this as a rationality axiom,
our choice functions are a belief structure.
5As we will see in Section 2.646, C, R and S are even order-isomorphic.
6There are two of their axioms that we do not consider as part of the rationality requirements.
One is an ‘Archimedean’ continuity condition, and the other a convexity condition, necessary for
their connection with a set of probability-utility pairs; see Section 2.428 for more information.
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Axiom R220 and R420 are most clear if we attach the interpretation of gam-
bles to our options.
It is clear that some gamble f that is strictly dominated by another gam-
ble g—in other words, f < g—results in a pay-off that is smaller than or equal
to g’s pay-off, irrespective of the actual outcome. Furthermore, for at least one
of the outcomes, f ’s pay-off is (strictly) smaller than g’s, and therefore, f can-
not be chosen—and must hence be rejected—from within the option set { f ,g}
without incurring a partial loss: this is what is required by Axiom R220.
Axiom R4a20 requires that the utility scale in which the pay-off takes place
should not affect our choice. Axiom R4b20 requires that the addition of a fixed
gamble to every element of the option set, should not affect our choice.
Axioms R120, R220 and R420 where concerned with the linearity of the
utility scale, the non-emptiness of the choice, and the (trivial) preference im-
plied by dominance. For us, the two axioms that are really specific to ‘choice’,
are Axioms R3a20—also known as Sen’s condition α [68, 69] or Chernoff’s
condition [11]; see [2] for an overview—and R3b20—also known as Aizer-
man’s condition [1]. Axiom R3a20 requires that a rejected option can never
be promoted to a chosen one by adding more options to the option set. Ax-
iom R3b20 requires that a rejected option can never be promoted to a chosen
one by deleting other rejected options from the option set.
2.3.2 Other properties imposed on choice models
As we have already briefly mentioned, and as we will comment on in more de-
tail in Section 2.428, we have decided to not use two of Seidenfeld et al.’s [67]
rationality axioms. One of these two is a ‘convexity’ or ‘mixture’ axiom, which
is hard to reconcile with Walley–Sen maximality as a decision rule. Indeed, as
we will see in Example 364, there are coherent and ‘non-convex’ choice func-
tions that identify the options that are optimal under Walley–Sen maximality.
Nevertheless, we feel that this ‘convexity’ property is interesting enough to
merit its own mention here. The other property is related to this ‘convexity’
property.
Consider any choice function C. The two extra properties are:
C5. if A ⊆ A1 ⊆ conv(A) then C(A) ⊆C(A1), for all A and A1 in Q;
C6. if 0 ∈C({0,u1, . . . ,un}) then 0 ∈C({0,µ1u1, . . . ,µnun}), for all n in N, u1,
. . . , un in V and µ1, . . . , µn in R>0.
We will commonly refer to Property C5 as ‘mixture’ or ‘convexity’, and to
Property C6 as ‘separate positive homogeneity’. Its corresponding properties
for a rejection function R and a choice relation ⊲ are:
R5. if A ⊆ A1 ⊆ conv(A) then R(A1)∩A ⊆ R(A), for all A and A1 in Q;
R6. if 0 ∈ R({0,u1, . . . ,un}) then 0 ∈ R({0,µ1u1, . . . ,µnun}), for all n in N, u1,
. . . , un in V and µ1, . . . , µn in R>0;⊲5. if A ⊆ A1 ⊆ conv(A) and u ∈ A then {u} ⊲ A1 ⇒ {u} ⊲ A, for all A and A1
in Q and u in A;
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⊲6. if {0} ⊲ {u1, . . . ,un} then {0} ⊲ {µ1u1, . . . ,µnun}, for all n in N, u1, . . . ,
un in V and µ1, . . . , µn in R>0.
The 0 in Property C6↶ is important. As we will see in Section 2.855, it
does not imply that
u ∈C({u,u1, . . . ,un})⇒ u ∈C({u,µ1u1, . . . ,µnun})
for all n in N, u, u1, . . . , un in V and µ1, . . . , µn in R>0.
Let us ascertain that Properties C5↶, R5↶ and ⊲5↶ on the one hand,
and C6↶, R6↶ and ⊲6 on the other hand, indeed correspond:
Proposition 15. Consider any corresponding choice function C, rejection
function R and choice relation ⊲. Then the following statements are equiv-
alent:
(i) C satisfies Property C5↶;
(ii) R satisfies Property R5↶;
(iii) ⊲ satisfies Property ⊲5↶.
Similarly, the following statements are equivalent:
(iv) C satisfies Property C6↶;
(v) R satisfies Property R6↶;
(vi) ⊲ satisfies Property ⊲6.
Proof. Since C, R and ⊲ correspond, we may assume that C(A) = A ∖R(A), R(A) =
A∖C(A) =⋃{A′ ⊆ A ∶ A′ ⊲ A}, and A1 ⊲ A2⇔ A1 ⊆ R(A1∪A2) for all A, A1 and A2 inQ.
For the first statement, we first show that (i)⇔(ii). Consider any A and A1 inQ such
that A ⊆ A1 ⊆ conv(A). It suffices to show that C(A) ⊆C(A1)⇔ R(A1)∩A ⊆ R(A).
Consider the following chain of equivalences:
C(A) ⊆C(A1)⇔C(A) ⊆ A∩C(A1)⇔ R(A) ⊇ A∖(A∩C(A1)) = A∩C(A1)c⇔ R(A) ⊇ A∩R(A1),
where the first equivalence is due to the requirement of Definition 114 that C(A) ⊆ A.
Therefore indeed (i)⇔(ii).
To finish the proof of the first statement, we show that (ii)⇔(iii). Consider any A
and A1 in Q such that A ⊆ A1 ⊆ conv(A). It suffices to show that R(A1)∩A ⊆ R(A)⇔(u ∈ A)({u} ⊲ A1⇒ {u} ⊲ A). Consider the following chain of equivalences:
R(A1)∩A ⊆ R(A)⇔ (∀u ∈ A)(u ∈ R(A1)⇒ u ∈ R(A))⇔ (∀u ∈ A)({u} ⊲ A1⇒ {u} ⊲ A).
Therefore indeed (ii)⇔(iii).
For the second statement, consider any n in N, u1, . . . , un in V, and µ1, . . . , µn in
R>0. Note that by considering 1µ1 > 0, . . . , 1µn > 0, Property C6↶ is equivalent to
0 ∈C({0,u1, . . . ,un})⇔ 0 ∈C({0,µ1u1, . . . ,µnun}).
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Similarly, Property R625 is equivalent to
0 ∈ R({0,u1, . . . ,un})⇔ 0 ∈ R({0,µ1u1, . . . ,µnun}),
and Property ⊲6 to
{0} ⊲ {u1, . . . ,un}⇔ {0} ⊲ {µ1u1, . . . ,µnun}.
Since 0 ∉C({0,u1, . . . ,un})⇔ 0 ∈ R({0,u1, . . . ,un})⇔ {0} ⊲ {0,u1, . . . ,un} and 0 ∉
C({0,µ1u1, . . . ,µnun}) ⇔ 0 ∈ R({0,µ1u1, . . . ,µnun}) ⇔ {0} ⊲ {0,µ1u1, . . . ,µnun},
therefore indeed (iv)⇔(v)⇔(vi).
Therefore, we can focus on the two additional properties for any one of the
choice models, just as for the rationality axioms.
We now show that, under some conditions, Property C625 is implied by
Property C525—and therefore, as a consequence, also that Property R625 is
implied by Property R525, and that Property ⊲6 is implied by Property ⊲525.
Proposition 16. Consider any choice function C that satisfies Axioms C3a20
and C4a20. If C satisfies Property C525, then it also satisfies Property C625.
Proof. Consider any n in N, u1, . . . , un in V, and µ1, . . . , µn in R>0, let A ∶={0,u1, . . . ,un} and µ∗ ∶= max{µ1, . . . ,µn} ∈ R>0, and assume that 0 ∈ C(A). Then
Axiom C4a20 implies that also 0 ∈ C(µ∗A). Moreover, for every k in {1, . . . ,n},
we find that µkuk ∈ conv({0,µ∗uk}) ⊆ conv(µ∗A), so Property C525 guarantees that
0 ∈ C(µ∗A ∪ {µ1u1, . . . ,µnun}). The contraposition of Axiom R3a20 [with A˜ ∶=
µ∗A ∪ {µ1u1, . . . ,µnun}, A˜1 ∶= {0} and A˜2 ∶= {0,µ1u1, . . . ,µnun}] now yields that in-
deed 0 ∈C({0,µ1u1, . . . ,µnun}).
As a consequence, under coherence, Property C525 implies Property C625.
Furthermore, in turn, under Axiom C4b20, Property C625 implies Ax-
iom C4a20:
Proposition 17. Consider any choice function C that satisfies Axiom C4b20.
If C satisfies Property C625, then it satisfies Property C4a20.
Proof. We will prove that C satisfies the equivalent version (C4b.1)21. So consider
any A in Q, any u in A and any λ in R>0 such that u ∈ C(A). We need to prove
that then λu ∈ C(λA). Since u ∈ C(A), by Axiom C4b20, also 0 ∈ C(A − {u}), and
therefore, by Property C625, also 0 ∈C(λ(A−{u})) =C(λA−{λu}) [with µi ∶= λ for
every i in {1, . . . , ∣A∣}]. Another application of Axiom C4b20 implies than then indeed
λu ∈C(λA).
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2.4 THE CONNECTION WITH OTHER DEFINITIONS OF CHOICE
FUNCTIONS
Before we go on with our exploration of choice functions, let us take some
time here to explain why we have chosen to define them in the way we did.
Seidenfeld et al. [67] (see also Kadane et al. [45]) define choice functions on
horse lotteries, instead of options, as this helps them generalise to non-binary
preferences the framework established by Anscombe and Aumann [3] for bi-
nary preferences.
We consider an arbitrary possibility space X, and a finite set R of prizes,
or rewards.
Definition 9 (Vector-valued gamble). When the domain is of the type X ×R,
we call elements f of L(X×R) vector-valued gambles on X. Indeed, for each
x in X, the partial map f (x,⋅) is then an element of the vector space L(R).
We call X the state part of the domain X×R of vector-valued gambles, and R
the reward part.
Horse lotteries are special vector-valued gambles:
Definition 10 (Horse lottery). We call a horse lottery H any map from X ×R
to [0,1] such that for all x in X, the partial map H(x,⋅) is a probability mass
function over R:7
(∀x ∈X)(∑
r∈RH(x,r) = 1 and (∀r ∈R)H(x,r) ≥ 0).
We collect all the horse lotteries on X with reward set R in H(X,R), which
is also denoted more simply by H when it is clear from the context what the
possibility space X and reward set R are.
Let us, for the remainder of this section, fix X and R. It is clear thatH ⊆L(X×R). Seidenfeld et al. [67] consider choice functions whose domain
is Q(H), the set of all finite subsets of H—choice functions on horse lotter-
ies.8 We will call them choice functions on H. Because of the nature of H,
their choice functions are different from ours: they require slightly different ra-
tionality axioms. The most significant change is that for Seidenfeld et al. [67],
choice functions need not satisfy Axioms C4a20 and C4b20. In fact, choice
functions on H cannot even satisfy these axioms, since H is no linear space:
7Note that H(x,⋅) defines a countably additive probability measure, and that this countable
additivity property is necessary for Lemma 1931 below to hold.
8Actually, Seidenfeld et al. [67] define choice functions on a larger domain: all possibly
infinite but closed sets of horse lotteries (non-closed sets may not have admissible options). This
is an extension we see no need for in our present context.
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it is not closed under arbitrary linear combinations, only under convex combi-
nations. Instead, on their approach a choice function C∗ on H is required to
satisfy
C4∗. A∗1 ⊲∗ A∗2 ⇔αA∗1 +(1−α){H} ⊲∗ αA∗2 +(1−α){H}, for all α in (0,1],
all A∗1 and A∗2 in Q(H) and all H in H.
The binary relation ⊲∗ is the choice relation corresponding to C∗, defined in
Definition 416, and R∗ is the corresponding rejection function. Furthermore,
for a choice function C∗ to be coherent, it needs to additionally satisfy (see
Reference [67]):
C1∗. C∗(A∗) ≠∅ for all A∗ in Q(H);
C2∗. for all A∗ inQ(H), all H1 and H2 inH such that H1(⋅,⊺) ≤H2(⋅,⊺) and
H1(⋅,r) =H2(⋅,r) = 0 for all r in R∖{,⊺}, and all H in H∖{H1,H2}:
a. if H2 ∈ A∗ and H ∈ R∗({H1}∪A∗) then H ∈ R∗(A∗);
b. if H1 ∈ A∗ and H ∈ R∗(A∗) then H ∈ R∗({H2}∪A∗∖{H1});
C3∗. for all A∗, A∗1 and A∗2 in Q(H):
a. if A∗1 ⊆ R∗(A∗2 ) and A∗2 ⊆ A∗ then A∗1 ⊆ R∗(A);
b. if A∗1 ⊆ R∗(A∗2 ) and A∗ ⊆ A∗1 then A∗1 ∖A∗ ⊆ R∗(A∗2 ∖A);
C5∗. if A∗ ⊆ A∗1 ⊆ conv(A) then C∗(A) ⊆C∗(A∗1 ), for all A∗ and A∗1 inQ(H);
C6∗. for all A∗, A∗′, A∗′′, A∗i ′ and A∗i ′′ (for i in N) in Q(H) such that the se-
quence A∗i ′ converges point-wise to A∗′ and the sequence A∗i ′′ converges
point-wise to A∗′′:
a. if (∀i ∈N)A∗i ′′ ⊲∗ A∗i ′ and A∗′ ⊲∗ A∗ then A∗′′ ⊲∗ A∗;
b. if (∀i ∈N)A∗i ′′ ⊲∗ A∗i ′ and A∗ ⊲∗ A∗′′ then A∗ ⊲∗ A∗′,
where Seidenfeld et al. [67] assume that there is a unique worst reward  and a
unique best reward ⊺ inR. This is a somewhat stronger assumption than what
we will need: further on in this section, we will only need to assume that there
is a unique worst reward. Axiom C2∗ is the counterpart for choice functions
on horse lotteries of Proposition 3041 further on, which is a consequence of our
Axioms C120–C420. Seidenfeld et al. [67] need to impose this property as an
axiom, essentially because of the absence in their system of a counterpart for
our Axiom C220. Axiom C5∗ corresponds to the ‘convexity’ Property C525.
Axioms C6∗a and C6∗b are Archimedean axioms, hard to reconcile with de-
sirability9 (see Reference [86, Section 4] for a detailed explanation), which is
why will not enforce them here.
We now intend to show that under very weak conditions on the reward
set R, choice functions on horse lotteries that satisfy C4∗ are in a one-to-one
correspondence with choice functions on a suitably defined option space that
satisfy Axioms C4a20 and C4b20.
9Desirability is a very successful and well established imprecise-probabilistic model, and we
will link it with choice models in Section 2.855.
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Let us first study the impact of Axiom C4∗↶. We begin by showing that
an assessment of H ∈C∗(A∗) for some A∗ inQ(H) implies other assessments
of this type.
Proposition 18. Consider any choice function C∗ on Q(H) that satisfies Ax-
iom C4∗↶, any option sets A∗ and A∗′ in Q(H), and any H in A∗ and H′ in
A∗′. If there are λ and λ ′ in R>0 such that λ(A∗ −{H}) = λ ′(A∗′ −{H′}),
then
H ∈C∗(A∗)⇔H′ ∈C∗(A∗′).
Proof. Consider any A∗ and A∗′ in Q(H), H in A∗ and H′ in A∗′, and λ and
λ ′ in R>0, and assume that λ(A∗ − {H}) = λ ′(A∗′ − {H′}). We will show that
H ∈ R∗(A∗)⇔H′ ∈ R∗(A∗′). We infer from the assumption that
λ
λ +λ ′ A∗+ λ ′λ +λ ′ {H′} = λ ′λ +λ ′ A∗′+ λλ +λ ′ {H}.
If we let α ∶= λλ+λ ′ to ease the notation along, then 1−α = λ ′λ+λ ′ and α ∈ (0,1). We now
infer from the identity above that αA∗+(1−α){H′} = (1−α)A∗′+α{H}. Therefore,
infer the following chain of equivalences:
H ∈ R∗(A∗)⇔ {H} ⊲∗ A∗ by Definition 315⇔ α{H}+(1−α){H′} ⊲∗ αA∗+(1−α){H′} using Axiom C4∗29⇔ α{H}+(1−α){H′} ⊲∗ (1−α)A∗′+α{H}⇔ {H′} ⊲∗ A∗′ using Axiom C4∗29⇔H′ ∈ R∗(A∗′) by Definition 315.
For any r inR, we now introduceRr ∶=R∖{r}, the set of all rewards with-
out r. For the connection between choice functions onH and choice functions
on some option space, we need to somehow be able to extend H to a linear
space. The so-called gamblifier ϕr will play a crucial role in this:
Definition 11 (Gamblifier). Consider any r in R. The gamblifier ϕr is the
linear map
ϕr ∶L(X×R)→L(X×Rr)∶ f ↦ ϕr f ,
where ϕr f (x,s) ∶= f (x,s) for all x in X and s in Rr.
This map will be important (using its lifted variant ϕ˜r) for Theorem 2335 where
we will connect Axioms C120–C420 and Property C525 with Axioms C1∗↶,
C3∗↶–C5∗↶ and the notion of having a ‘worst reward r’. In particular, the
gamblifier ϕr maps any horse lottery H in H(X,R) to an element ϕrH of
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L(X×Rr) that satisfies the following two conditions:10
ϕrH(⋅,⋅) ≥ 0 and ∑
s∈RrϕrH(⋅,s) ≤ 1. (2.8)
Application of ϕr to sets of the form λ(A∗ −{H}) essentially leaves the ‘in-
formation’ they contain unchanged:
Lemma 19. Consider any r in R. Then the following two properties hold:
(i) The gamblifier ϕr is one-to-one on H.
(ii) For any A∗ and A∗′ inQ(H), any H in A∗ and H′ in A∗′ and any λ and
λ ′ in R>0:
λ(A∗−{H}) = λ ′(A∗′−{H′})⇔ ϕr(λ(A∗−{H})) = ϕr(λ ′(A∗′−{H′})).
Proof. We begin with the first statement. Consider any H and H′ in H, and assume
that ϕr(H) = ϕr(H′). We infer from Definition 11 that
H(x,s) = H′(x,s) for all x in X and s in Rr,
and therefore also, since H and H′ are horse lotteries,
H(x,r) = 1− ∑
s∈Rr H(x,s) = 1− ∑s∈Rr H′(x,s) = H′(x,r) for all x in X.
Hence indeed H = H′.
The direct implication in the second statement is trivial; let us prove the converse.
Assume that ϕr(λ(A∗ − {H})) = ϕr(λ ′(A∗′ − {H′})). We may write, without loss
of generality, that A∗ = {H,H1, . . . ,Hn} and A∗′ = {H′,H′1, . . . ,H′m} for some n and m
in N. Now, consider any element Hi in A∗, then ϕr(λ(Hi −H)) ∈ ϕr(λ(A∗ −{H})).
Consider any j in {1, . . . ,m} such that ϕr(λ(Hi −H)) = ϕr(λ ′(H′j −H′)). It follows
from the assumption that there is at least one such j. The proof is complete if we can
show that λ(Hi−H) = λ ′(H′j −H′). By Definition 11, we already know that
λ(Hi(⋅,s)−H(⋅,s)) = λ ′(H′j(⋅,s)−H′(⋅,s)) for all s in Rr,
and therefore, since H, H′, Hi and H′j are horse lotteries, also
λ(Hi(⋅,r)−H(⋅,r)) = λ( ∑
s∈Rr H(⋅,s)− ∑s∈Rr Hi(⋅,s))= ∑
s∈Rr λ(H(⋅,s)−Hi(⋅,s)) = ∑s∈Rr λ ′(H′(⋅,s)−H′j(⋅,s))
= λ ′( ∑
s∈Rr H
′(⋅,s)− ∑
s∈Rr H
′
j(⋅,s)) = λ ′(H′j(⋅,r)−H′(⋅,r)),
whence indeed λ(Hi−H) = λ ′(H′j −H′).
10ϕrH(⋅,⋅) ≥ 0 is a particular instance of the notation introduced in Section 2.1.212: it means(∀x ∈X,s ∈Rr)(ϕrH(x,s) ≥ 0). A similar remark holds for∑s∈Rr ϕrH(⋅,s) ≤ 1.
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We now lift the gamblifier ϕr to a map ϕ˜r that turns choice functions on gam-
bles into choice functions on horse lotteries:
ϕ˜r ∶C(L(X×Rr))→C(H(X,R))∶C↦ ϕ˜rC, (2.9)
where ϕ˜rC(A∗) ∶= ϕ−1r C(ϕrA∗) for every A∗ in Q(H(X,R)). This definition
makes sense because we have proved in Lemma 19↶ that ϕr is one-to-one onH, and therefore invertible on ϕrH. The result of applying ϕ˜r to a choice
function C on L(X×Rr) is a choice function ϕ˜rC on H(X,R). Observe that
we can equally well make ϕ˜r apply to rejection functions R, and that for every
A∗ in Q(H(X,R)):
ϕ˜rR(A∗) ∶= ϕ−1r R(ϕrA∗) = ϕ−1r (ϕrA∗∖C(ϕrA∗))= A∗∖ϕ−1r C(ϕrA∗) = A∗∖ ϕ˜rC(A∗), (2.10)
so ϕ˜rR is the rejection function that corresponds with the choice function ϕ˜rC,
when R is the rejection function for C.
One property of the transformation ϕ˜r that will be useful in our subsequent
proofs is the following:
Lemma 20. Consider any r in R and any A in Q(L(X ×Rr)), and define g
by g(x,s) ∶=∑ f ∈A ∣ f (x,s)∣ for all x in X and s inRr. Consider any λ in R such
that11
λ >max{sup
x∈X ∑s∈Rr h(x,s) ∶ h ∈ A+{g}} ≥ 0.
Then 1λ (A+{g}) = ϕrA∗ for some A∗ in Q(H(X,R)).
Proof. Consider any h in A + {g}, and let us show that 1λ h is a horse lottery, i.e.,
satisfies the conditions in Equation (2.8)↶. The first one is satisfied because λ > 0 and
h = f +g for some f in A, so h = f +g = f +∑ f ′∈A ∣ f ′∣ ≥ f + ∣ f ∣ ≥ 0 and therefore indeed
1
λ h ≥ 0. For the second condition, recall that λ ≥ ∑s∈Rr h(⋅,s) by construction and
therefore indeed ∑s∈Rr 1λ h(⋅,s) ≤ 1.
Proposition 21. Consider any r in R. The operator ϕ˜r is a bijection between
the choice functions on L(X ×Rr) that satisfy Axioms C4a20 and C4b20, and
the choice functions on H(X,R) that satisfy Axiom C4∗29.
Proof. We first show that ϕ˜r is injective. Assume ex absurdo that it is not, so there
are choice functions C and C′ on L(X ×Rr) that satisfy Axioms C4a20 and C4b20,
such that ϕ˜rC = ϕ˜rC′ but nevertheless C ≠ C′. The latter means that there are A in
11This is always possible since A consists of a finite number of bounded gambles. Since g is
a finite sum of bounded gambles, it is bounded as well, and hence so are the gambles in A +{g}.
Therefore, for any gamble h in A+{g}, the partial map∑s∈Rr h(⋅,s) is a bounded gamble because
of the finiteness ofRr , so its supremum is finite.
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Q(L(X ×Rr)) and f in A such that f ∈C(A) and f ∉C′(A). Use Lemma 20 to find
some λ in R>0 and g in L(X ×Rr) such that 1λ (A+ {g}) = ϕrA∗ for some A∗ inQ(H(X,R)). If we now apply Axioms C4a20 and C4b20 we find that f+gλ ∈C( 1λ (A+{g})), or equivalently, ϕ−1r ( f+gλ ) ∈ ϕ˜rC(A∗). Similarly, we find that f+gλ ∉C′( 1λ (A +{g})), or equivalently, ϕ−1r ( f+gλ ) ∉ ϕ˜rC′(A∗). But this contradicts our assumption that
ϕ˜rC = ϕ˜rC′.
We now show that application of ϕ˜r to any choice function C on L(X ×Rr) that
satisfies Axioms C4a20 and C4b20, results in a choice function ϕ˜C that satisfies Ax-
iom C4∗29. Consider any A∗1 and A∗2 in Q(H(X,R)), any H in H(X,R), and any α
in (0,1]. Infer the following chain of equivalences:
A∗1 ⊲ϕ˜rC A∗2⇔ A∗1 ⊆ ϕ˜rR(A∗1 ∪A∗2 ) by Definition 416⇔ ϕrA∗1 ⊆ R(ϕr(A∗1 ∪A∗2 )) by Equation (2.9)32⇔ ϕrαA∗1 ⊆ R(ϕrα(A∗1 ∪A∗2 )) by Axiom C4a20⇔ ϕr(αA∗1 +(1−α){H})⊆ R(ϕr(α(A∗1 ∪A∗2 )+(1−α){H})) by Axiom C4b20⇔ αA∗1 +(1−α){H} ⊆ ϕ˜rR(α(A∗1 ∪A∗2 )+(1−α){H}) by Equation (2.10)32⇔ (αA∗1 +(1−α){H}) ⊲ϕ˜rC (αA∗2 +(1−α){H}) by Definition 416,
which tells us that indeed ϕ˜rC satisfies Axiom C4∗29.
The proof is complete if we also show that ϕ˜r is surjective—that for every choice
function C∗ on H(X,R) that satisfies Axiom C4∗29, there is a choice function C onL(X ×Rr) that satisfies Axioms C4a20 and C4b20 such that ϕ˜rC =C∗. So consider
any choice function C∗ onH(X,R) that satisfies Axiom C4∗29. We will show that the
special choice function C on L(X×Rr) based on C∗, defined as
f ∈C(A)⇔ (∃λ ∈R>0,A∗ ∈Q(H(X,R)),H ∈ A∗)(ϕr(A∗−{H}) = λ(A−{ f}) and H ∈C∗(A∗)) (2.11)
for all A inQ(L(X×Rr)) and f in A, satisfies Axioms C4a20 and C4b20 and ϕ˜rC =C∗.
We first show that C satisfies Axioms C4a20 and C4b20. For Axiom C4a20, we use its
equivalent form (C4a.1)21. Consider any A in Q(L(X ×Rr)), any f in A, and any
µ in R>0, and assume that f ∈ C(A). To show that then µ f ∈ C(µA), it suffices to
consider λ ′ ∶= λµ in Equation (2.11), and note that λ(A −{ f}) = λ ′(µA −{µ f}); then
the desired statement follows at once from Equation (2.11). For Axiom C4b20, we use
its equivalent form (C4b.1)21. Consider any A in Q(L(X ×Rr)), any f in A, and any
g in L(X ×Rr), and assume that f ∈C(A). We show that then f +g ∈C(A +{g}). To
this end, it suffices to note that A−{ f} = (A+{g})−{ f +g}; then the desired statement
follows at once from Equation (2.11). So C as defined in Equation (2.11) does indeed
satisfy Axioms C4a20 and C4b20, and is therefore a suitable candidate for showing that
ϕ˜rC =C∗.
We now finish the proof by showing that ϕ˜rC = C∗. To do so, we consider any
A∗ in Q(H(X,R)), and show that ϕ˜rC(A∗) ⊆C∗(A∗) and C∗(A∗) ⊆ ϕ˜rC(A∗). To
show that ϕ˜rC(A∗) ⊆ C∗(A∗), consider any H in ϕ˜rC(A∗). By the definition of ϕ˜r
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(Equation (2.9)32) then H ∈ϕ−1r (C(ϕrA∗)), and therefore ϕrH ∈C(ϕrA∗). Using Equa-
tion (2.11)↶ [with A = ϕrA∗ and f = ϕrH], we find that then
ϕr(A∗′−{H′}) = λ ′(ϕrA∗−{ϕrH}) and H′ ∈C∗(A∗′)
for some λ ′ in R>0, A∗′ in Q(H(X,R)) and H′ ∈ A∗′. By Lemma 1931 and since
λ ′(ϕrA∗−{ϕrH}) = ϕr(λ ′(A∗−{H})), infer that then
A∗′−{H′} = λ ′(A∗−{H}) and H′ ∈C∗(A∗′),
and because C∗ satisfies Axiom C4∗29, and using Proposition 1830 this means that
indeed H ∈C∗(A∗). So we have shown that H ∈C∗(A∗), and since the choice of H was
arbitrary in ϕ˜rC(A∗), therefore indeed ϕ˜rC(A∗) ⊆C∗(A∗).
To show that C∗(A∗) ⊆ ϕ˜rC(A∗), consider any H in C∗(A∗). Let A ∶= ϕrA∗, f ∶=
ϕrH and λ ∶= 1, then
ϕr(A∗−{H}) = λ(A−{ f}),
whence by Equation (2.11)↶ ϕrH = f ∈C(A) =C(ϕrA∗). Since ϕr is one-to-one onH(X,R) (see Lemma 1931), therefore indeed H ∈ ϕ˜rC(A∗). So we have shown that
ϕ˜rC =C∗, which completes the proof.
Specifying a choice function C∗ on H induces a strict preference relation
on the reward set, as follows. With any reward r in R we can associate the
constant and degenerate lottery Hr by letting
Hr(x,s) ∶= ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩1 if s = r0 otherwise for all x in X and s in R.
This is the lottery that associates the certain reward r with all states. Then a
reward r is strictly preferred to a reward s when Hs ∈ R∗({Hr,Hs}).
Definition 12 (C∗ has worst reward r). Consider any reward r in R, and any
choice function C∗ on H(X,R). We say that C∗ has worst reward r if Hr ∈
R∗({H,Hr}) for all H in H(X,R)∖{Hr}.
The worst reward is unique when C∗ satisfies Axiom C1∗29: indeed, if there
were two different worst rewards r and s, by Definition 12 then {Hr,Hs} =
R∗({Hr,Hs}), contradicting Axiom C1∗29.
The notion of having a worst reward is closely related with what would be
the natural translation of Axiom C220 to choice functions C∗ on H(X,R): if
C∗ satisfies
(∀H1,H2 ∈H)((H1 ≠H2 and (∀s ∈Rr)(H1(⋅,s) ≤H2(⋅,s)))⇒H1 ∈ R∗({H1,H2})) (2.12)
for some r inR, then we say that C∗ satisfies the dominance relation for worst
reward r.
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Proposition 22. Consider any r inR and any choice function C on L(X×Rr)
that satisfies Axiom C4b20. Then ϕ˜rC satisfies the dominance relation for worst
reward r (Equation (2.12)) if and only if ϕ˜rC has worst reward r.
Proof. For the direct implication, consider any H inH(X,R)∖{Hr}. Then Hr(⋅,s) =
0 ≤H(⋅,s) for all s inRr, and also H ≠Hr, whence indeed Hr ∈ ϕ˜rR({H,Hr}), because
by assumption ϕ˜rC satisfies Equation (2.12) for r.
For the converse implication, consider any H1 and H2 in H(X,R) such that H1 ≠
H2 and H1(⋅,s) ≤H2(⋅,s) for all s inRr. Then ϕrH1 <ϕrH2, whence 0 <ϕr(H2−H1).
Observe that for the horse lottery H′ in H(X,R) defined by
H′(⋅,s) ∶= ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩H2(⋅,s)−H1(⋅,s) if s ∈Rr1−∑s∈Rr(H2(⋅,s)−H1(⋅,s)) if s = r,
we have that ϕrH′ = ϕr(H2−H1). Because ϕ˜rC is assumed to have worst reward r, we
know that in particular Hr ∈ ϕ˜rR({H′,Hr}), so we infer from Equation (2.9)32 that 0 =
ϕrHr ∈ R({ϕrHr,ϕrH′}) = R({0,ϕrH2 −ϕrH1}). Now use Axiom C4b20 to infer that
ϕrH1 ∈ R({ϕrH1,ϕrH2}), whence indeed H1 ∈ ϕ˜rR({H1,H2}), by Equation (2.9)32.
Applying the lifting ϕ˜r furthermore preserves coherence:
Theorem 23. Consider any reward r in R, and any choice function C onL(X ×Rr) that satisfies Axioms C4a20 and C4b20. Then the following state-
ments hold:
(i) C satisfies Axiom C120 if and only if ϕ˜rC satisfies Axiom C1∗29;
(ii) C satisfies Axiom C220 if and only if ϕ˜rC has worst reward r;
(iii) C satisfies Axiom C3a20 if and only if ϕ˜rC satisfies Axiom C3∗a29;
(iv) C satisfies Axiom C3b20 if and only if ϕ˜rC satisfies Axiom C3∗b29;
(v) ϕ˜rC satisfies Axiom C4∗29;
(vi) C satisfies Property C525 if and only if ϕ˜rC satisfies Axiom C5∗29.
Proof. For the direct implication of (i), assume that C satisfies Axiom C120. Consider
any A∗ in Q(H(X,R)). Then ϕ˜rC(A∗) = ϕ−1r C(ϕrA) ≠∅.
For the converse implication, assume that ϕ˜rC satisfies Axiom C1∗29. Consider
any A in Q(L(X ×Rr)). By Lemma 2032, there are λ in R>0 and g in L(X ×Rr)
such that 1λ (A +{g}) = ϕrA∗ for some A∗ in Q(H(X,R)). Applying Axioms C4a20
and C4b20 and the definition of ϕ˜r [Equation (2.9)32], we infer that indeed
C(A) = λC( 1
λ
(A+{g}))−{g} = λC(ϕrA∗)−{g} = λϕrϕ˜rC(A∗)−{g} ≠∅.
For the direct implication of (ii), assume that C satisfies Axiom C220. Consider
any H1 and H2 in H(X,R) such that H1 ≠ H2 and H1(⋅,s) ≤ H2(⋅,s) for all s inRr. Then ϕrH1 < ϕrH2, so Axiom C220 guarantees that ϕrH1 ∈ R({ϕrH1,ϕrH2}).
Equation (2.9)32 turns this into H1 ∈ ϕ˜rR({H1,H2}). Proposition 22 now tells us that
then ϕ˜rC has worst reward r.
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For the converse implication, assume that ϕ˜rC has worst reward r. Consider any f1
and f2 in L(X×Rr) such that f1 < f2. Let
λ ∶= sup
x∈X ∑s∈Rr( f2(x,s)− f1(x,s)) > 0,
being a real number because f2 − f1 is a bounded gamble, and therefore so is the
partial map ∑s∈Rr( f2(⋅,s)− f1(⋅,s)) because of the finiteness of Rr, so its supre-
mum is finite. Then clearly 1λ ( f2 − f1) = ϕrH for some H in H(X,R). Also,
H ≠ Hr because f1 ≠ f2. Using the assumption that ϕ˜rC has worst reward r, we
find that then Hr ∈ ϕ˜rR({Hr,H}). As a consequence, by Equation (2.9)32, we find
that 0 = ϕrHr ∈ R({0,ϕrH}) = R({0, 1λ ( f2 − f1)}). Using Axiom C4a20 we infer that
0 ∈ R({0, f2− f1}), and using Axiom C4b20 that indeed f1 ∈ R({ f1, f2}).
For the direct implication of (iii)↶, assume that C satisfies Axiom C3a20. Consider
any A∗, A∗1 and A∗2 inQ(H(X,R)) and assume that A∗1 ⊆ ϕ˜rR(A∗2 ) and A∗2 ⊆A∗. Then
ϕrA∗1 ⊆R(ϕrA∗2 ) by Equation (2.9)32, and ϕrA∗1 ⊆ϕrA∗. Use Axiom R3a20 to infer that
then ϕrA∗1 ⊆ R(ϕrA∗), whence indeed A∗1 ⊆ ϕ˜rR(A∗) by Equation (2.9)32.
For the converse implication, assume that ϕ˜rC satisfies Axiom C3∗a29. Consider
any A, A1 and A2 in Q(L(X ×Rr)) and assume that A1 ⊆ R(A2) and A2 ⊆ A. Use
Lemma 2032 to find λ in R>0 and g in L(X ×Rr) such that 1λ (A+{g}) = ϕrA∗ for
some A∗ in Q(H(X,R)). Analogously, we find that 1λ (A2 +{g}) = ϕr(A∗2 ) for some
A∗2 ⊆A∗. A1 ⊆R(A2) implies A1 ⊆A2, so also 1λ (A1+{g}) =ϕr(A∗1 ) for some A∗1 ⊆A∗2 .
Using Axioms C4a20 and C4b20, we infer from the assumptions that
1
λ (A1 + {g}) ⊆
R( 1λ (A2+{g})), or in other words, ϕrA∗1 ⊆ R(ϕrA∗2 ). Equation (2.9)32 then yields that
A∗1 ⊆ ϕ˜rR(A∗2 ). As a result, using Axiom C3∗a29, A∗1 ⊆ ϕ˜rR(A∗), which, again applying
Equation (2.9)32, results in
1
λ (A1+{g}) = ϕrA∗1 ⊆ R(ϕrA∗) = R( 1λ (A+{g})), and as a
consequence, by Axioms C4a20 and C4b20, we find eventually that indeed A1 ⊆ R(A).
For the direct implication of (iv)↶, assume that C satisfies Axiom C3b20. Consider
any A∗, A∗1 and A∗2 inQ(H(X,R)) and assume that A∗1 ⊆ ϕ˜rR(A∗2 ) and A∗ ⊆A∗1 . Then
ϕrA∗1 ⊆R(ϕrA∗2 ) by Equation (2.9)32, and ϕrA∗ ⊆ϕrA∗1 . Use Axiom R3b20 to infer that
then ϕr(A∗1 ∖A∗) = (ϕrA∗1 )∖(ϕrA) ⊆R((ϕrA∗2 )∖(ϕrA∗)) =R(ϕr(A∗2 ∖A∗)), whence
indeed A∗1 ∖A∗ ⊆ ϕ˜rR(A∗2 ∖A∗).
For the converse implication, assume that ϕ˜rC satisfies Axiom C3∗b29. Consider
any A, A1 and A2 in Q(L(X ×Rr)) and assume that A1 ⊆ R(A2) and A ⊆ A1. Use
Lemma 2032 to find λ in R>0 and g in L(X ×Rr) such that 1λ (A2 +{g}) = ϕrA∗2 for
some A∗2 inQ(H(X,R)). A1 ⊆R(A2) implies A1 ⊆A2, whence 1λ (A1+{g}) =ϕr(A∗1 )
for some A∗1 ⊆ A∗2 , and analogously, 1λ (A +{g}) = ϕr(A∗) for some A∗ ⊆ A∗1 . Using
Axioms C4a20 and C4b20 we find that
1
λ (A1 + {g}) ⊆ R( 1λ (A2 + {g})), or in other
words, ϕrA∗1 ⊆R(ϕrA∗2 ). Equation (2.9)32 then tells us that A∗1 ⊆ ϕ˜rR(A∗2 ), which, using
Axiom C3∗b29, results in A∗1 ∖A∗ ⊆ ϕ˜rR(A∗2 ∖A∗). Again applying Equation (2.9)32
results in
1
λ
((A1∖A)+{g}) = 1λ (A1+{g})∖ 1λ (A+{g}) = (ϕrA∗1 )∖(ϕrA∗) = ϕr(A∗1 ∖A∗)⊆ R(ϕr(A∗2 ∖A∗)) = R((ϕrA∗2 )∖(ϕrA∗))= R( 1
λ
(A2+{g})∖ 1λ (A+{g})) = R( 1λ ((A2∖A)+{g})),
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and as a consequence, by Axioms C4a20 and C4b20, we find eventually that indeed
A1∖A ⊆ R(A2∖A).
For (v)35, since by Proposition 2132, ϕ˜r is a bijection between the choice func-
tions on L(X×Rr) that satisfy Axioms C4a20 and C4b20, and the choice functions onH(X,R) that satisfy Axiom C4∗29, therefore indeed ϕ˜rC satisfies Axiom C4∗29.
For the direct implication of (vi)35, assume that C satisfies Property C525. Con-
sider any A∗ and A∗1 in Q(H(X,R)) and assume that A∗ ⊆ A∗1 ⊆ conv(A∗). Then
ϕrA∗ ⊆ϕrA∗1 ⊆ conv(ϕrA∗), whence C(ϕrA∗)⊆C(ϕrA∗1 ) by Property C525. Use Equa-
tion (2.9)32 to infer that then indeed ϕ˜rC(A∗) ⊆ ϕ˜rC(A∗1 ).
For the converse implication, assume that ϕ˜rC satisfies Axiom C5∗29. Con-
sider any A and A1 in Q(L(X ×Rr)) and assume that A ⊆ A1 ⊆ conv(A). Use
Lemma 2032 to find λ in R>0 and g in L(X ×Rr) such that 1λ (A1 +{g}) = ϕrA∗1 for
some A∗1 in Q(H(X,R)), and analogously, 1λ (A +{g}) = ϕr(A∗) for some A∗ ⊆ A∗1 .
From A1 ⊆ conv(A) infer that 1λ (A1 + {g}) ⊆ conv( 1λ (A + {g})), or in other words,
ϕrA∗1 ⊆ conv(ϕrA∗). Then we claim that A∗1 ⊆ conv(A∗). To prove this, consider
any H in A∗1 . Then there are n in N, Hi in A, and αi ≥ 0 such that ∑ni=1αi = 1 and
H(⋅,s) =∑ni=1αiHi(⋅,s) for all s in Rr. Moreover,
H(⋅,r) = 1− ∑
s∈Rr H(⋅,s) = 1− ∑s∈Rr n∑i=1αiHi(⋅,s)
= n∑
i=1αi−
n∑
i=1αi ∑s∈Rr Hi(⋅,s) = n∑i=1αi(1− ∑s∈Rr Hi(⋅,s)) = n∑i=1αiHi(⋅,r),
so indeed H ∈ conv(A∗). Use Axiom C5∗29 to infer that then ϕ˜rC(A∗) ⊆ ϕ˜rC(A∗1 ).
Equation (2.9)32 turns this into C( 1λ (A + {g})) = C(ϕrA∗) ⊆ C(ϕrA∗1 ) = C( 1λ (A1 +{g})), which by Axioms C4a20 and C4b20, results in C(A) ⊆C(A1).
We conclude that our discussion of choice functions on linear spaces
subsumes the treatment of choice functions on horse lotteries satisfying Ax-
iom C4∗29. By combining Proposition 2132 and Theorem 2335, we have the
following important result: the coherent choice functions on vector-valued
gambles L(X ×Rr) are isomorphic to the choice functions on horse lotter-
ies that satisfy Axioms C1∗29, C2∗29, C3∗a29, C3∗b29 and C4∗29, under the
assumption that there is a unique worst reward in r in R. Therefore we have
embedded the choice functions considered in Reference [67] in our account of
choice functions: it suffices to consider as option set a particular set of vector-
valued gambles. Using this connection, all the results that we will prove later
on for coherent choice functions on vector-valued gambles, are also applicable
to choice functions on horse lotteries that satisfy the corresponding rationality
axioms. However, as mentioned, Seidenfeld et al. [67] allow for infinite but
closed option sets, something we don’t allow.
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2.5 CONSEQUENCES OF COHERENCE
In this section, we will investigate some of the consequences of coherence. We
divide the results into three parts.
Note that, due to Proposition 1322, the coherence axioms for the different
types of choice models correspond one by one with each other: it was our
deliberate choice to state them in such an order and form that this should be
the case. However, another choice could be to state more elegant forms of
them, such that the coherence axioms as a whole correspond for different the
choice models. For instance, the requirement in Axiom C220 that u ∉C({u,v}),
is under Axiom C120 equivalent to {v} =C({u,v}), which can be perceived as
more elegant, but cannot be derived from Axiom C220—or Axiom R220 for
its corresponding rejection function—alone. In the first part of this section,
Section 2.5.1, we will collect some more elegant forms of the axioms, which
are equivalent under coherence.
In the second part, Section 2.5.240, we will derive some consequences of
coherence for choice functions—or rejection functions or choice relations for
that matter—that will be useful later on in this thesis.
In the third part, Section 2.5.343, we consider an important preorder on the
option sets, and investigate its connections with coherence for choice func-
tions.
2.5.1 Equivalent forms of the axioms
We have learned from dire experience that in verifying whether a rejection
function is coherent, Axiom R320 is often hardest to check. But under vari-
ous additional conditions, it has a number of equivalent formulations that may
simplify this task, which we consider in the next two propositions.
Proposition 24. Let R be any rejection function on Q, and consider the fol-
lowing statements:
(i) R satisfies Axiom R3a20;
(ii) (∀A ∈Q)(∀u ∈ R(A))(∀v ∈ V)u ∈ R(A∪{v});
(iii) (∀A ∈Q)(∀v ∈ V)(0 ∈ R(A)⇒ 0 ∈ R(A∪{v})).
Then (i) and (ii) are equivalent, and imply (iii). Moreover, if R satisfies Ax-
iom R4b20, then (i), (ii), and (iii) are equivalent.
Proof. That (i) implies (ii), follows immediately from Axiom R3a20 [with A˜ ∶=A∪{v},
A˜1 ∶= {u} and A˜2 ∶= A].
To prove that (ii) implies (i), we assume that (ii) holds, and we prove that R sat-
isfies (i). Let A1 ∶= {u1, . . . ,un}, A2 ∶= A1 ∪ {v1, . . . ,vm} and A ∶= A2 ∪ {w1, . . . ,wr},
where n belongs to N, and m and r to Z≥0, and assume that A1 ⊆ R(A2). Consider any
j in {1, . . . ,n}, then we have to prove that u j ∈ R(A) = R(A2 ∪ {w1, . . . ,wr}). Since
u j ∈ R(A2), it follows from (ii) that u j ∈ R(A2 ∪{w1}), and therefore, again using (ii),
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also that u j ∈ R(A2 ∪{w1,w2}). We can go on in this way until we reach the desired
statement, that u j ∈ R(A2∪{w1, . . . ,wr}), after a finite number of steps.
The last statement is now immediate, once we realise that Axiom R4b20 implies
that u ∈ R(A) is equivalent to 0 ∈ R(A−{u}), for any A in Q and u in A.
Proposition 25. Let R be any rejection function on Q, and consider the fol-
lowing statements:
(i) R satisfies Axiom R3b20;
(ii) (∀A ∈Q)(∀u ∈ R(A))(∀v ∈ R(A)∖{u})u ∈ R(A∖{v});
(iii) (∀A ∈Q)(∀u ∈ R(A))u ∈ R({u}∪A∖R(A));
(iv) (∀A ∈Q)(∀v ∈ R(A)∖{0})(0 ∈ R(A)⇒ 0 ∈ R(A∖{v}));
(v) (∀A ∈Q)(0 ∈ R(A)⇒ 0 ∈ R({0}∪A∖R(A))).
Generally, (i) and (ii) are equivalent, and imply (iii). Moreover, (i), (ii) and (iii)
are equivalent if R satisfies Axiom R3a20. Finally, if R satisfies Axiom R4b20,
then (ii) and (iv) are equivalent, and so are (iii) and (v).
Proof. That (i) implies (ii), follows immediately from Axiom R3b20 [with A˜ ∶= {v},
A˜1 ∶= {u,v} and A˜2 ∶= A].
To prove that (ii) implies (i), we assume that (ii) holds, and we prove that R satisfies
Axiom R3b20. Let A ∶= {u1, . . . ,un}, A1 ∶= A∪{v1, . . . ,vm} and A2 ∶= A1∪{w1, . . . ,wr},
where n ∈N and m,r ∈ Z≥0, and assume that A1 ⊆ R(A2). Consider any j in {1, . . . ,m},
then we have to prove that v j ∈ R({v1, . . . ,vm,w1, . . . ,wr}) = R(A2 ∖ {u1, . . . ,un}).
Since {u1,u2} ⊆R(A2) and {v j,u1} ⊆R(A2), it follows from (ii) that {u2,v j} ⊆R(A2∖{u1}), whence, again using (ii), v j ∈R(A2∖{u1,u2}). Also, {u1,u3} ⊆R(A2), whence
u3 ∈ R(A2 ∖ {u1}) using (ii). Since we already know that also u2 ∈ R(A2 ∖ {u1}),
we infer that u3 ∈ R(A2 ∖ {u1,u2}), again using (ii) . In turn, this implies that
v j ∈ R(A2 ∖{u1,u2,u3}). We can go on in this way until we reach the desired state-
ment, that v j ∈ R(A2∖{u1, . . . ,un}), after a finite number of steps.
That (i) implies (iii), follows immediately from Axiom R3b20 [with A˜ ∶= R(A)∖{u}, A˜1 ∶= R(A) and A˜2 ∶= A].
To prove that (iii) implies (i) under Axiom R3a20, consider any A, A1 and A2 in Q
and assume that A ⊆A1 ⊆R(A2). Then in particular u ∈R(A2), and therefore, using (iii),
u ∈ R({u}∪A2 ∖R(A2)), for every u in A1 ∖A. Applying Axiom R3a20, we infer that
u ∈ R(A2∖A) for every u in A1∖A, whence indeed A1∖A ⊆ R(A2∖A).
The last statement is now immediate, once we realise that Axiom R4b20 implies
that u ∈ R(A) is equivalent to 0 ∈ R(A−{u}), for any A in Q and u in A.
Using Proposition 25, we can find an easy characterisation of Axiom R120
under Axioms R3b20 and R4b20:
Corollary 26. Consider any rejection function R that satisfies Axioms R3b20
and R4b20. Then the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) R satisfies Axiom R120;
(ii) 0 ∉ R({0}).
Proof. That (i) implies (ii) follows immediately by considering A ∶= {0} in Ax-
iom R120. It therefore suffices to show that (ii) implies (i); we will prove the con-
traposition. Assume that R does not satisfy Axiom R120. Therefore, we have that
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A = R(A) for some A in Q. Consider any u in A, then by Proposition 25↶(iii) we find
that u ∈ R({u}∪A ∖R(A)) = R({u}∪A ∖A) = R({u}). By Axiom R4b20 therefore
indeed 0 ∈ R({0}).
As we will see later on, this characterisation will be very helpful in establishing
that a rejection function satisfies Axiom R120.
For Axiom R420, we have the following useful characterisation:
Proposition 27. Consider any choice function R. Then the following state-
ments are equivalent:
(i) R satisfies Axiom R420;
(ii) R(λA+{u}) = λR(A)+{u} for all A in Q, λ in R>0 and u in V.
Proof. To show that (i) implies (ii), consider any rejection function R that satisfies
Axiom R4a20, and any A inQ, λ in R>0 and u in V. Consider the following equalities:
R(λA+{u}) = R(λ(A+ 1/λ{u})) = λR(A+ 1/λ{u}) by Equation (R4a.3)21= λ(R(A)+ 1/λ{u}) by Equation (R4b.3)21= λR(A)+{u}.
To show that (ii) implies (i), infer that, by letting u = 0, R(λA) = λR(A) for all A
inQ and λ in R>0, whence by Lemma 1221 R satisfies Axiom R4a20. Furthermore, by
letting λ = 1, R(A +{u}) = R(A)+{u}, so R satisfies Axiom R4b20 by Lemma 1221.
2.5.2 Consequences
In this section, we collect useful properties of coherent choice models. First,
let us show that a coherent choice function is an idempotent operator on Q:
Proposition 28. Any coherent choice function C is insensitive to the omission
of non-chosen options (see Reference [33, Definition 11]): C(A′) =C(A) for
all A and A′ inQ such that C(A) ⊆ A′ ⊆ A. As an immediate consequence, C is
idempotent: C ○C =C, or, in other words, C(C(A)) =C(A) for all A in Q.
Proof. Consider any A and A′ in Q such that C(A) ⊆ A′ ⊆ A. Let R be the re-
jection function corresponding to C. That C(A) = C(A′) is, by the requirement in
Definition 114 that C(A′) ⊆ A′, equivalent to A′ ∩C(A) = C(A′), and hence also to
R(A′) = A′ ∖ (A′ ∩C(A)) = A′ ∩C(A)c = A′ ∩R(A), and therefore it suffices to prove
that R(A′) =A′∩R(A). Since A′ ⊆A, by Axiom R3a20 we have that R(A′) ⊆R(A), and
by the requirement in Definition 214 that R(A′) ⊆ A′, therefore also R(A′) ⊆ A′∩R(A),
so it suffices to show that A′ ∩R(A) ⊆ R(A′). To establish this, consider any u in
A′∩R(A). Since C(A)⊆A′ ⊆A, infer that A =A′∪A′′ for some A′′ ⊆R(A), and we may
assume without loss of generality that A′′ and A′ are disjoint, and therefore A′ = A∖A′′
and u ∉ A′′. Since u ∈ R(A), by Proposition 25↶(iii) therefore u ∈ R({u}∪A ∖R(A)),
and hence, since A′′ ⊆R(A), by Axiom R3a20 therefore u ∈R({u}∪A∖A′′). Using the
fact that u ∉ A′′, we find that u ∈ A∖A′′ and hence indeed u ∈ R(A∖A′′) = R(A′).
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The following result implies that any coherent choice relation is a strict
partial order:
Proposition 29. Consider any choice relation ⊲. Then the following two state-
ments hold:
(i) If ⊲ satisfies Axiom ⊲120, then is ⊲ irreflexive.
(ii) If ⊲ satisfies Axioms ⊲3a20 and ⊲3b20, then is ⊲ transitive.
As a consequence, if ⊲ satisfies Axioms ⊲120, ⊲3a20 and ⊲3b20, then ⊲ is a
strict partial order on Q.
Proof. For (i), irreflexivity is precisely the rationality Axiom ⊲120.
For (ii), assume that ⊲ satisfies Axioms ⊲3a20 and ⊲3b20, and consider any A1,
A2 and A3 in Q such that A1 ⊲ A2 and A2 ⊲ A3. By Definition 315(i), this implies that
A1 ⊲ A1 ∪A2 and A2 ⊲ A2 ∪A3. Use Axiom ⊲3a20 to infer that then A1 ⊲ A1 ∪A2 ∪A3
and A2 ⊲ A1∪A2∪A3, and hence, by Definition 315(ii) therefore A1∪A2 ⊲ A1∪A2∪A3.
Now, use Axiom ⊲3b20 with A ∶= A2∖(A1∪A3) ⊆ A1∪A2 to infer that (A1∪A2)∖A ⊲(A1 ∪A2 ∪A3)∖A. By repeated application of De Morgan’s laws, infer the following
equalities:
(A1∪A2)∖A = (A1∪A2)∖(A2∖(A1∪A3))= (A1∪A2)∩(Ac2∪A1∪A3)= ((A1∪A2)∩(Ac2∪A1))∪((A1∪A2)∩A3)= A1∪((A1∪A2)∩A3) = A1∪(A1∩A3)∪(A2∩A3) = A1∪(A2∩A3),
and
(A1∪A2∪A3)∖A = (A1∪A2∪A3)∖(A2∖(A1∪A3))= (A1∪A2∪A3)∩(Ac2∪A1∪A3) = A1∪A3,
so A1∪(A2∩A3) ⊲ A1∪A3. Using Definition 315(ii) again, therefore A1 ⊲ A1∪A3, and
by Definition 315(i) therefore indeed A1 ⊲ A3.
For the consequence, if ⊲ satisfies Axioms ⊲120, ⊲3a20 and ⊲3b20, then we have
just shown that it is irreflexive and transitive, being indeed the two characteristic prop-
erties of strict partial orders.
The following basic property—on which many results, such as Proposi-
tion 3444, build—is useful in finding rejected options from other option sets.
Proposition 30. Consider any coherent rejection function R. Then for all u1
and u2 in V such that u1 ⪯ u2, all A in Q and all v in A∖{u1,u2}:
(i) if u2 ∈ A and v ∈ R(A∪{u1}) then v ∈ R(A);
(ii) if u1 ∈ A and v ∈ R(A) then v ∈ R({u2}∪A∖{u1}).
Proof. Consider any u1 and u2 in V such that u1 ⪯ u2, any A in Q and any v in A ∖{u1,u2}. The proof is trivial if u1 = u2, so assume that u1 ≠ u2 and therefore u1 ≺ u2,
whence u1 ∈ R({u1,u2}) by Axiom R220.
To prove (i), assume that u2 ∈A and v ∈R(A∪{u1}), then using Axiom R3a20 [with
A˜ ∶=A∪{u1}, A˜1 ∶= {u1} and A˜2 ∶= {u1,u2}; then A˜2 ⊆ A˜ since u2 ∈A] we infer from u1 ∈
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R({u1,u2}) that u1 ∈ R(A ∪{u1}) and therefore {u1,v} ⊆ R(A ∪{u1}). Axiom R3b20
[with A˜ ∶= {u1}, A˜1 ∶= {u1,v} and A˜2 ∶= A ∪ {u1}] then implies that v ∈ R(A ∖ {u1})
and Axiom R3a20 [with A˜1 ∶= {v}, A˜2 ∶= A ∖{u1} and A˜ ∶= A] then implies that indeed
v ∈ R(A).
For (ii)↶, assume that u1 ∈ A and v ∈ R(A), then by Axiom R3a20 [with A˜ ∶={u2} ∪ A, A˜1 ∶= {u1} and A˜2 ∶= {u1,u2}; then A˜2 ⊆ A˜ since u1 ∈ A] we infer from
u1 ∈ R({u1,u2}) that u1 ∈ R({u2}∪ A). Similarly, using Axiom R3a20 [with A˜ ∶={u2}∪A, A˜1 ∶= {v} and A˜2 ∶= A] we infer from v ∈ R(A) that v ∈ R({u2}∪A) and
therefore {u1,v} ⊆ R({u2}∪A). By Axiom R3b20 [with A˜ ∶= {u1}, A˜1 ∶= {u1,v} and
A˜2 ∶= {u2}∪A], this implies that indeed v ∈ R({u2}∪A∖{u1}).
As mentioned in Section 2.428, the two statements in Proposition 30↶ are im-
posed as Axiom C2∗29 in Reference [67]. Using our rationality axioms, we are
able to prove them as consequences of coherence.
Given any option set, we pay special attention to a particular subset con-
sisting of its undominated options, and derive a useful property of it, necessary
for Proposition 6979 and Lemma 8096, amongst others:
Proposition 31. Consider any option set A, and its subset of maximal, or
undominated, options:
maxA ∶= {u ∈ A ∶ (∀v ∈ A)u⊀ v} ⊆ A.
We have that maxA ≠ ∅. Consider any choice function C that satisfies Ax-
ioms C220 and C320, and its corresponding rejection function R. Then
A∖maxA ⊆ R(A), and (∀u ∈ maxA)(u ∈C(A)⇔ u ∈C(maxA)). As a conse-
quence:
C(A) =C(maxA) and R(A) = (A∖maxA)∪R(maxA). (2.13)
Proof. First, we prove that maxA ≠ ∅. Assume ex absurdo that maxA = ∅ for some
A in Q. Without loss of generality, we may assume that A = {u1, . . . ,um} for some m
in N. Then maxA = ∅ implies that (∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m})(∃ j ∈ {1, . . . ,m})ui ≺ u j. So in
particular u1 ≺ u j1 for some j1 in {1, . . . ,m}, and because ≺ is irreflexive, we have that
j1 ≠ 1 and therefore j1 ∈ {2, . . . ,m}. Without loss of generality, we let j1 = 2 be the
second index, so u1 ≺ u2. Also, u2 ≺ u j2 for some j2 in {1, . . . ,m}, and because ≺ is
irreflexive, we find similarly that j2 ≠ 2. But ≺ is also transitive, and therefore u1 ≺ u j2 ,
whence j2 ≠ 1, so j2 ∈ {3, . . . ,m}. Without loss of generality, we let j2 = 3 be the third
index, so u2 ≺ u3. We can go on the same vein until after m− 1 steps we find that
u1 ≺ u2 ≺ . . . ≺ um−1 ≺ um. Since there is an element that dominates um, we have that
um ≺ u j for some j in {1, . . . ,m}. But, since ≺ is irreflexive, we have that j ≠ m. Also,
since ≺ is transitive, we have that j ∉ {1, . . . ,m−1}, a contradiction. Therefore indeed
maxA ≠∅.
Next, we prove that A ∖maxA ⊆ R(A). Consider any u in A ∖maxA, so we know
that there is some v ∈ A such that u ≺ v, whence, by Axiom R220, u ∈ R({u,v}). Ax-
iom R3a20 then guarantees that indeed u ∈ R(A).
To prove the equivalence, consider any u in maxA. First, assume that u ∈C(A).
Then, by the contraposition of Axiom R3a20 [with A˜ ∶= A, A˜1 ∶= {u} and A˜2 ∶= maxA],
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we have that u ∈ C(maxA). Conversely, assume that u ∈ C(maxA), and assume ex
absurdo that u ∈ R(A). Then also {u}∪A∖maxA ⊆ R(A), using the first statement we
proved above. Now, use Axiom R3b20 [with A˜1 ∶= {u}∪A∖maxA, A˜ ∶= A∖maxA and
A˜2 ∶= A, and observe that A˜2 ∖ A˜ = maxA and A˜1 ∖ A˜ = {u}] to infer that u ∈ R(maxA),
a contradiction. Hence indeed u ∈C(A).
The equalities in Equation (2.13) are now immediate.
The following property will be useful in connecting choice models with
desirability.
Proposition 32. Consider any coherent rejection function R and n ∈ N op-
tions u1, . . . , un in V. If 0 ∈ R({0,uk}) for every k in {1, . . . ,n}, then
0 ∈ R({0,∑nk=1 uk}).
Proof. We will use induction on n. For the base case n = 1, the result follows triv-
ially from the assumption. Consider now the case n > 1. Then by the induction hy-
pothesis, we may assume that 0 ∈ R({0,∑n−1k=1 uk}). Using Axiom R4b20, infer that
un ∈ R({un,∑nk=1 uk}), and therefore, by Axiom R3a20 [with A˜ ∶= {0,un,∑nk=1 uk},
A˜1 ∶= {un} and A˜2 ∶= {un,∑nk=1 uk}], also un ∈R({0,un,∑nk=1 uk}). Since by assumption
0 ∈R({0,un}), by Axiom R3a20 [with A˜ ∶= {0,un,∑nk=1 uk}, A˜1 ∶= {0} and A˜2 ∶= {0,un}]
also 0 ∈ R({0,un,∑nk=1 uk}). Therefore, by Axiom R3b20 [use Proposition 2539(ii)] in-
deed 0 ∈ R({0,∑nk=1 uk}).
2.5.3 An important ordering of the option sets
There is an ordering of the option sets—a set-wise generalisation of ⪯—that
is closely related with coherent choice relations, as we will show in Proposi-
tion 35↷. This order will turn out to be of crucial importance, mainly because
it allows to write the natural extension in a natural way, as we will see in Chap-
ter 389.
Definition 13. We define the ordering ≼ on Q as:
A1 ≼ A2⇔ (∀u ∈ A1)(∃v ∈ A2)u ⪯ v
for all A1 and A2 in Q.
Proposition 33. The ordering ≼ satisfies the following properties:
(i) if A1 ⊆ A2 then A1 ≼ A2;
(ii) ≼ is transitive;
(iii) (A1 ≼ A3 and A2 ≼ A3)⇔ A1∪A2 ≼ A3;
(iv) A ≼maxA;
(v) if A1 ≼ A2 then A1+{u} ≼ A2+{u};
(vi) if A1 ≼ A2 then λA1 ≼ λA2;
(vii) if A1 ≼ A2 then A1∪A3 ≼ A2∪A3,
for all A1, A2 and A3 in Q, u in V and λ in R>0.
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Proof. For Property (i)↶, consider any u1 in A1, so also u1 ∈A2. Then by the reflexivity
of ⪯, u1 ⪯ u1, so trivially A1 ≼ A2.
For Property (ii)↶, consider the arbitrary option sets A1, A2 and A3 and assume that
A1 ≼A2 and A2 ≼A3, so (∀u1 ∈A1)(∃u2 ∈A2)u1 ⪯ u2 and (∀u2 ∈A2)(∃u3 ∈A3)u2 ⪯ u3,
whence indeed (∀u1 ∈ A1)(∃u3 ∈ A3)u1 ⪯ u3.
Property (iii)↶ is a direct consequence of Definition 13↶.
For Property (iv)↶, we know by Property (i)↶ that maxA ≼ maxA. Consider any
element u of A ∖maxA, then by the definition of maxA, there is some v in maxA for
which u ≺ v, and therefore in particular A∖maxA ≼maxA. Then, using Property (iii)↶,
indeed A ≼ maxA.
For Properties (v)↶ and (vi)↶, since A1 ≼ A2, we have that (∀u1 ∈ A1)(∃u2 ∈
A2)u1 ⪯ u2, and because ⪯ is a vector ordering, therefore also (∀u1 ∈A1)(∃u2 ∈A2)u1+
u ⪯ u2+u and (∀u1 ∈ A1)(∃u2 ∈ A2)λu1 ⪯ λu2, whence indeed A1+{u} ≼ A2+{u} and
λA1 ≼ λA2.
For Property (vii)↶, assume that A1 ≼ A2. By Definition 13↶, it suffices for any u
in A1 ∪A3 to find some v in A2 ∪A3 such that u ⪯ v. So consider any u in A1 ∪A3. If
u ∈ A1 then there is some v in A2 such that u ⪯ v by the assumption, and if u ∈ A3, it
suffices to consider v ∶= u in A3 and to note that in particular u ⪯ v.
In particular, Property (i)↶ implies that ≼ is reflexive. So, due to Prop-
erty (ii)↶, ≼ is a preorder—a reflexive and transitive binary relation—, but it is
not antisymmetric: due to Properties (i)↶ and (iv)↶, maxA ≼ A and A ≼maxA
for all A in Q, but maxA might be different from A. So ≼ is not necessarily a
partial order, but it is useful to infer rejected options from other option sets.
Proposition 34. Consider any coherent rejection function, any two option sets
A and A′, and any option u in A∩A′. If u ∈ R(A) and A ≼ A′, then u ∈ R(A′).
Proof. Consider any A and A′ in Q, any u in A ∩A′, and assume that u ∈ R(A) and
A ≼ A′. Let A ∶= {u,u1, . . . ,um} and A′ ∶= {u,v1, . . . ,vn} for some m and n in Z≥0, where
some of the ui’s and some of the v j’s are possible equal to each other. Since A ≼
A′, by Definition 13↶ we have that (∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m})(∃ ji ∈ {1, . . . ,n})ui ⪯ v ji . Use
u1 ⪯ v j1 and Proposition 3041(ii) to infer from u ∈ R({u,u1, . . . ,um}) = R(A) that u ∈
R({u,v j1 ,u2, . . . ,um}) = R({v j1}∪A ∖{u1}). Similarly, use u2 ⪯ v j2 to infer that u ∈
R({u,v j1 ,v j2 ,u3, . . . ,um}) = R({v j1 ,v j2}∪A ∖{u1,u2}). Repeating this procedure m
times, we infer that u ∈ R({u,v j1 , . . . ,v jm}). Since {u,v j1 , . . . ,v jm} ⊆ A′, Axiom R3a20
[with A˜ ∶= A′, A˜1 ∶= {u} and A˜2 ∶= {u,v j1 , . . . ,v jm}] finally tells us that indeed u ∈ R(A′).
As a consequence, if u ∈ R({u}∪A) and A ≼ A′, then u ∈ R({u}∪A′) for all A
and A′ in Q and u in V.
The connection of this order ≼ with choice models is more elegant using
choice relations: as we will see in the next proposition, there is a mixed transi-
tivity [58] property.
Proposition 35. Consider any coherent choice relation ⊲. Then ⊲ and ≼ are
mixed transitive, in the sense that:
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(i) if A1 ⊲ A2 and A2 ≼ A3 then A1 ⊲ A3;
(ii) if A1 ≼ A2 and A2 ⊲ A3 then A1 ⊲ A3,
for all A1, A2 and A3 in Q.
Proof. Consider the rejection function R corresponding to ⊲. For (i) consider any
A1, A2 and A3 in Q such that A1 ⊲ A2 and A2 ≼ A3. Since R and ⊲ correspond, this
implies that A1 ⊆R(A1∪A2), or, in other words, u ∈R(A1∪A2) for every u in A1. Since
A2 ≼A3, by Proposition 3343(vii) therefore A1∪A2 ≼A1∪A3, whence by Proposition 34
u ∈ R(A1∪A3) for every u in A1. Therefore A1 ⊆ R(A1∪A3), or, in other words, indeed
A1 ⊲ A3.
For (ii), consider any A1, A2 and A3 in Q such that A1 ≼ A2 and A2 ⊲ A3. Since R
and ⊲ correspond, this implies that A2 ⊆ R(A2∪A3), or, in other words, v ∈ R(A2∪A3)
for every v in A2. Use Proposition 2539(iii) to infer that then v ∈ R({v}∪ (A2 ∪A3)∖
R(A2∪A3)), and since A2 ⊆R(A2∪A3), by Axiom R3a20 therefore v ∈R({v}∪A3) for
all v in A2. We will show that this implies that u ∈ R({u}∪A3) for all u in A1. Consider
any u in A1. Since A1 ≼A2, therefore u ⪯ v for some v in A2. There are two possibilities:
either (i) u= v, or (ii) u≺ v. If (i) u= v, then u ∈R({u}∪A3). If (ii) u≺ v, by Axiom R220
then u ∈ R({u,v}). Use Axiom R3a20 to infer that then u ∈ R({u,v}∪A3). Since we
already know that v ∈ R({v}∪A3), by Axiom R3a20 therefore v ∈ R({u,v}∪A3), so{u,v} ⊆ R({u,v}∪A3). Use Proposition 2539(ii) to infer that then u ∈ R({u}∪A3).
So in both cases we conclude that u ∈ R({u}∪A3). Use Axiom R3a20 once again to
infer that now u ∈ R(A1 ∪A3), and, since the choice of u in A1 was arbitrary, therefore
A1 ⊆ R(A1∪A3). Since R and ⊲ correspond, therefore indeed A1 ⊲ A3.
There is no weakening, in the sense that, for any A1 and A2 in Q, A1 ≼ A2
need not imply A1 ⊲ A2, nor vice versa.12 For the first statement, it suffices to
consider that ≼ is reflexive and that ⊲ is irreflexive. For the second statement,
it suffices to note, as we will see in Example 465, that undominated options can
be rejected—that R(A)∩maxA need not be empty, for any A inQ. Therefore,
implications like
(iii) if A1 ⊲ A2 and A2 ≼ A3 then A1 ≼ A3;
(iv) if A1 ≼ A2 and A2 ⊲ A3 then A1 ≼ A3,
for all A1, A2 and A3 in Q, do not generally hold.
The following result will be useful, mainly for Chapter 4125:
Corollary 36. Consider any coherent rejection function R, and any A in Q.
Then
0 ∈ R(A)⇔ 0 ∈ R(A∩Vc≺0).
Proof. Note first that both 0 ∈ R(A) and 0 ∈ R(A ∩Vc≺0) imply that 0 ∈ A. For the
converse implication, observe that A∩Vc≺0 ⊆ A and use Axiom R3a20.
12As we will see in Corollary 4250, there is weakening with a strict variant of ≼, based on the
vector order ≺.
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For the direct implication, note that A∩V≺0 ≼ {0}, and therefore maxA ⊆ A∩Vc≺0.
Use Proposition 3343(i) to infer that then maxA ≼ A ∩Vc≺0, and, since by Proposi-
tion 3343(iv) A ≼maxA, by Proposition 3343(ii) therefore A ≼A∩Vc≺0. Now use Propo-
sition 3444 to infer that indeed 0 ∈ R(A)⇒ 0 ∈ R(A∩Vc≺0).
2.6 ORDER-THEORETIC PROPERTIES
We will be concerned with conservative reasoning using choice models: we
will look for the implications of a given assessment that are as uninformative
as possible. In order to do this, we need some binary relation on the choice
models, having the specific interpretation of being ‘at most as informative as’,
‘at most as committal as’, or ‘at least as conservative as’.
2.6.1 Basic relations
Definition 14 (‘At most as informative as’ relation). Given two choice func-
tions C1 and C2 in C, we call C1 at most as informative as C2—and we write
C1 ⊑C C2—if
C1 ⊑C C2⇔ (∀A ∈Q)C1(A) ⊇C2(A).
Given two rejection functions R1 and R2 in R, we call R1 at most as informative
as R2—and we write R1 ⊑R R2—if
R1 ⊑R R2⇔ (∀A ∈Q)R1(A) ⊆ R2(A).
Given two choice relations ⊲1 and ⊲2 in S, we call ⊲1 at most as informative as⊲2—and we write ⊲1 ⊑S ⊲2—if
⊲1 ⊑S ⊲2⇔ ⊲1 ⊆ ⊲2,
or, in other words, if A1 ⊲1 A2 implies A1 ⊲2 A2, for all A1 and A2 in Q.
The idea underlying this natural ordering of choice models in Definition 14
is that rejection function R1 is at most as informative as rejection function R2
whenever any option rejected by R1 is rejected by R2 as well, so R2 rejects
at least as many options as R1. For choice functions, the idea is similar. For
choice relations, a choice relation ⊲1 is at most as informative as choice relation⊲2 when every comparison between option sets that belongs to ⊲1, also belongs
to ⊲2.
Since by Definition 14, the ordering ⊑S is simply a set inclusion, the fol-
lowing result is immediate [17, Example 2.6].
Proposition 37. The structure (S;⊑S) of all choice relations, provided with
the order ⊑S, is a complete lattice:
(i) it is a partially ordered set, or poset, meaning that the binary relation ⊑S
on S is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive;
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(ii) for any subset S of S, its infimum infS and its supremum supS with
respect to the ordering ⊑S exist in S, and are given by infS = ⋂S and
supS =⋃S.
Similarly, since by Definition 14, ⊑C and ⊑R are product orderings of set in-
clusions, the following result is also immediate [17, Section 2.15].
Proposition 38. The structures (C;⊑C) and (R;⊑R) of all choice functions
provided with the order ⊑C, and all rejection functions provided with the order⊑R, are complete lattices:
(i) they are partially ordered sets;
(ii) for any subset C of C, its infimum infC and its supremum supC with
respect to the ordering ⊑C exist in C, and are given by (infC)(A) =⋃C∈CC(A) and supC(A) =⋂C∈CC(A) for all A in Q.
Similarly, for any subset R of R, its infimum infR and its supremum
supR with respect to the ordering ⊑R exist in R, and are given by
infR(A) =⋂R∈R R(A) and supR(A) =⋃R∈R R(A) for all A in Q.
The importance of Propositions 37 and 38 lies in the fact that for any C ⊆ C,
infC is the most informative model that is at least as informative as any of the
models in C, and supC the least informative model that is not less informative
than any of the models in C, and similar for other choice models.
We will also consider the poset (C;⊑C) of all coherent choice functions,
where C ⊆ C inherits the partial order ⊑C from C. Similarly, in the poset(R;⊑R) of all coherent rejection functions, R is assumed to inherit the par-
tial order ⊑R from R, and in the poset (S;⊑S) of all coherent choice relations,
S is assumed to inherit the partial order ⊑S from S.
If there is a bijection between two posets that preserves the order, the two
posets are in some way equivalent to each other. The following definition
formalises this idea.
Definition 15 (Order isomorphism). Two posets (P1;≤1) and (P2;≤2) are
called order-isomorphic if there is a bijective function f from P1 to P2 with
the property that x ≤1 y⇔ f (x) ≤2 f (y) for all x and y in P1.
Also from an order-theoretic point of view, our different types of choice models
are equivalent:
Proposition 39. The posets (C;⊑C), (R;⊑R) and (S;⊑S) are (pairwise) order-
isomorphic. Moreover, the posets (C;⊑C), (R;⊑R) and (S;⊑S) are (pairwise)
order-isomorphic.
Proof. For the first statement, Proposition 1118 already shows that there are bijections
ρ , σ and κ between C, R and S. We prove that those bijections preserve the order. The
proof has the following structure: we first prove that (i) C1 ⊑C C2 ⇒ ρ(C1) = RC1 ⊑R
RC2 = ρ(C2) for all choice functions C1 and C2, then that (ii) R1 ⊑R R2 ⇒ σ(R1) =
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⊲R1 ⊑S ⊲R2 = σ(R2) for all rejection functions R1 and R2, and finally that (iii) ⊲1 ⊑S⊲2⇒ κ(⊲1) =C⊲1 ⊑C C⊲2 = κ(⊲2) for all choice relations ⊲1 and ⊲2.
For (i), consider any C1 and C2 in C such that C1 ⊑C C2, or, in other words,
that C1(A) ⊇C2(A)—and hence RC1(A) ⊆ RC2(A)—for all A in Q. Therefore indeed
RC1 ⊑R RC2 . For (ii), consider any R1 and R2 in R such that R1 ⊑R R2, or, in other words,
that R1(A) ⊆ R2(A) for all A inQ. Therefore A1 ⊆ R1(A1∪A2)⇒ A1 ⊆ R2(A1∪A2)—
using Definition 416, equivalently A1 ⊲R1 A2 ⇒ A1 ⊲R2 A2—for all A1 and A2 in Q,
whence indeed ⊲R1 ⊑S ⊲R2 . For (iii), consider any ⊲1 and ⊲2 in S such that ⊲1 ⊑S ⊲2, or,
in other words, that ⊲1 ⊆ ⊲2. By Definition 517 therefore C⊲1(A) ⊇C⊲2(A) for all A inQ, whence indeed C⊲1 ⊑C C⊲2 .
For the second statement, it suffices to note that, by Corollary 1424, ρ , σ and κ
define bijections between C, R and S, and that we just have shown that they preserve
the order.
Proposition 39↶ implies that we can regard ⊑C, ⊑R and ⊑S as essentially the
same partial orders, each defined on their proper domain, in the sense that one
of the partial orders can be obtained from another one just by renaming. From
now on, we will denote each of the three ‘at most as informative’ relations
simply by ⊑ when it is clear from the context which specific order is meant.
Hence, it is of no importance which of the posets (C;⊑C), (R;⊑R) and (S;⊑S)
we use to prove order-theoretic properties: any given property in one of the
posets, immediately transfer to the other posets. The same remark holds for
the posets (C;⊑C), (R;⊑R) and (S;⊑S).
2.6.2 Intersection structures
In the subsequent sections, we focus on the poset (C;⊑) of coherent choice
functions—or equivalently, on the poset (R;⊑) of coherent rejection functions
or the poset (S;⊑) of coherent choice relations, when it suits our purpose bet-
ter. An important property is that of being an intersection structure, or com-
plete infimum-semilattice [23].
Proposition 40 (Intersection structure). (C;⊑) is an intersection structure (a
complete infimum-semilattice): C is closed under arbitrary non-empty infima,
so infC ∈C for any non-empty subset C of C.
Proof. Consider any collection C of coherent choice functions. We will show that infC
satisfies the rationality axioms of Definition 620:
C120. Consider any C in C [always possible since C ≠ ∅] and any A in Q, then ∅ ⊂
C(A) ⊆ (infC)(A).
C220. Note that, for all C in C, u ∉ C({u,v}) whenever u ≺ v, implying that u ∉⋃C∈CC({u,v}) = (infC)({u,v}).
C3a20. Consider any A, A1 and A2 in Q such that (infC)(A2) = ⋃C∈CC(A2) ⊆ A2 ∖
A1 and A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ A. This implies that for all C in C, C(A2) ⊆ A2 ∖A1 and
by their coherence [Axiom C3a20] therefore also C(A) ⊆ A ∖A1. So indeed(infC)(A) =⋃C∈CC(A) ⊆ A∖A1.
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C3b20. Consider any A, A1 and A2 in Q such that (infC)(A2) = ⋃C∈CC(A2) ⊆ A2 ∖
A1 and A ⊆ A1. This implies that for all C in C, C(A2) ⊆ A2 ∖A1, and by
their coherence [Axiom C3b20] therefore also C(A2 ∖A) ⊆ A2 ∖A1. So indeed(infC)(A2∖A) =⋃C∈CC(A2∖A) ⊆ A2∖A1.
C420. Consider any C in C, λ in R>0, u in V and A in Q, and infer from
Proposition 2740 that λC(A) + {u} = C(λA + {u}). Hence λ(infC)(A) +{u} = λ⋃C∈CC(A) + {u} = ⋃C∈C(λC(A) + {u}) = ⋃C∈CC(λA + {u}) =(infC)(λA+{u}), which implies using Proposition 2740 that infC indeed sat-
isfies axioms C4a20 and C4b20.
Since by Proposition 3947, (C;⊑), (R;⊑) and (S;⊑) are order-isomorphic,
therefore (R;⊑) and (S;⊑) are intersection structures as well. This, for in-
stance, allows us to do conservative inference with choice functions: if we con-
sider that there is a coherent choice function that represents a subject’s beliefs
(coherent choices) and we can only tell that it belongs to a family {Ci ∶ i ∈ I},
the conservative option is to consider its infimum infi∈I Ci. This choice func-
tion is still guaranteed to be coherent, and as a consequence, it satisfies all the
rationality requirements discussed above.
Proposition 40 also guarantees that there is a unique smallest—least
informative—coherent rejection function. We will call it the vacuous rejec-
tion function, and denote it by Rv.
Proposition 41 (Vacuous rejection function). The vacuous rejection func-
tion Rv is given by Rv(A) = A∖maxA = {u ∈ A ∶ (∃v ∈ A)u ≺ v} for all A in Q.
It selects from any set of options the ones that are dominated under the strict
vector ordering ≺.
Proof. See Reference [9, Theorem 3] for an alternative proof by Bradley. First, we
will show that any coherent rejection function must dominate Rv: Rv ⊑ R for all R in R.
So consider any R in R, and any option set A in Q, and any option u in Rv(A). Then
u ∈ A ∖maxA, so u ≺ v for some v in A, and therefore, by Axiom R220, u ∈ R({u,v}).
Use Axiom R3a20 to infer that then u ∈ R(A). Since the choice of u in Rv(A) was
arbitrary, therefore Rv(A) ⊆ R(A), for every A in Q. This means that indeed Rv ⊑ R.
The proof is complete if we also show that Rv is coherent. We will show that R
satisfies the rationality axioms of Definition 720:
R120. Since by Proposition 3142, maxA ≠∅, therefore indeed Rv(A) = A∖maxA ≠ A
for every A in Q.
R220. Consider any u and v in V such that u ≺ v. Let A ∶= {u,v}. Then u ∈ A∖maxA,
whence indeed u ∈ Rv(A) = Rv({u,v}).
R3a20. We will prove the equivalent version of Proposition 2438(ii). Consider any A
in Q, any u in Rv(A) and any v in V. Since u ∈ Rv(A) = A ∖maxA, therefore
u ≺ w for some w in A, whence trivially u ≺ w for some w in A∪{v}. Therefore
indeed u ∈ Rv(A∪{v}).
R3b20. We will prove the equivalent version of Proposition 2539(ii). Consider any A
inQ, any u in Rv(A) and any v in Rv(A)∖{u}. Then u ≺ w1 for some w1 in A
and v ≺ w2 for some w2 in A. If w1 ≠ v, then u ∈ Rv(A ∖{v}) and the proof is
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done, so assume that w1 = v. Then, since v ≺ w2 therefore u ≺ w2, and, trivially,
w2 ≠ v. Therefore indeed u ∈ Rv(A∖{v}).
R420. This follows using Proposition 2740, after observing that u ∈ maxA ⇔ λu+{v} ∈ max(λA+{v}) for all A in Q, u in A, λ in R>0 and v in V.
As a result, the vacuous choice function Cv is given by
Cv(A) =maxA = {u ∈ A ∶ (∀v ∈ A)u⊀ v} for all A in Q, (2.14)
while the vacuous choice relation ⊲v is determined in our next result:
Corollary 42. The vacuous choice relation ⊲v is given by
A1 ⊲v A2⇔ (∀u ∈ A1)(∃v ∈ A2)u ≺ v, for all A1 and A2 in Q.
Proof. Because by Proposition 3947, (R;⊑) and (S;⊑) are order-isomorphic, their
minimal elements correspond, and therefore ⊲v is the choice relation corresponding to
Rv. So A1 ⊲v A2⇔ A1 ⊆ Rv(A1∪A2), or, in other words,(∀u ∈ A1)(∃v ∈ A1∪A2)u ≺ v (2.15)
for any A1 and A2 in Q. We show that this is equivalent to(∀u ∈ A1)(∃v ∈ A2)u ≺ v (2.16)
for any A1 and A2 in Q. That Statement (2.16) implies Statement (2.15) is immediate,
so it suffices to show that Statement (2.15) implies Statement (2.16). Consider any
A1 and A2 in Q. Without loss of generality, let A1 ∶= {u1, . . . ,un}. Consider any u
in A1; without loss of generality let u = u1. By Statement (2.15), u1 ≺ v for some v
in A1 ∪A2. If v belongs to A2, then the proof is done, so assume that v ∈ A1. By the
irreflexivity of ≺, we infer that v ≠ u1 and therefore, without loss of generality, let v = u2.
By Statement (2.15), u2 ≺ v′ for some v′ in A1 ∪A2, by the transitivity of ≺, therefore
u1 ≺ v′. If v′ belongs to A2, then the proof is done, so assume that v′ ∈ A1. By the
irreflexivity of ≺, we infer that v′ ∉ {u1,u2} and therefore, without loss of generality, let
v′ = u3. We can go on in the same vein until we find that u1 ≺ u2 ≺ . . . ≺ uk ≺ w for some
k in {1, . . . ,n} and w in A2, and therefore, by the transitivity of ≺, indeed u1 ≺ w.
Compare this with the set-wise generalisation ≺′ of ≺, defined as
A1 ≺′ A2⇔ (∀u ∈ A1)(∃v ∈ A2)u ≺ v, for all A1 and A2 in Q.
Corollary 42 states that ⊲v = ≺′, and therefore ≺′ ⊆ ⊲ for every coherent choice
relation ⊲.
2.6.3 Maximal coherent choice models
Recall that an element of a poset is maximal if it is not dominated by any other
element of the poset.13
13The definition in Proposition 3142 of maxA is an instance of this: any element of maxA is
maximal in A, under the partial order ⪯.
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Definition 16 (Maximal elements). Consider any poset (P;≤). We denote the
set of all maximal elements in P by Pˆ:14
Pˆ ∶= {p ∈ P ∶ (∀q ∈ P)(p ≤ q⇒ p = q)} = {p ∈ P ∶ (∀q ∈ P)p ≮ q} ⊆ P.
Applying this definition to the poset (C;⊑), we obtain
Cˆ ∶= {C ∈C ∶ (∀C′ ∈C)(C ⊑C′⇒C =C′)} = {C ∈C ∶ (∀C′ ∈C)C /⊏C′} ⊆C
as the collection of all maximal coherent choice functions.15 For rejection
functions, we introduce the notation Rˆ ∶= {R ∈R ∶ (∀R′ ∈R)R ⊑ R′⇒ R = R′} ⊆
R for the collection of maximal elements of the poset (R;⊑). By Proposi-
tion 3947, there is a connection between sets Cˆ and Rˆ: any choice function
belongs to Cˆ if and only if its corresponding rejection function belongs to Rˆ.
A similar remark holds for choice relations.
As we will see in Section 2.855, there is an easy characterisation of the max-
imal coherent sets of desirable options, which are, essentially, coherent choice
functions representing binary choice only. This characterisation will allow us
to prove the important representation result16 in Proposition 5259 that every
coherent set of desirable options is an infimum of such maximal elements.
However, for the more general coherent choice models, no such representation
has been found yet. As a result, it is unknown whether choice models can be
expressed as infima of their dominating maximal models. For more informa-
tion about this, see Chapter 4125.
We cannot take for granted that every coherent choice function is domi-
nated by a maximal one, nor that there are even maximal choice functions.
But, even though we are not yet able to characterise them, we will prove in
Proposition 46↷ that there are maximal choice functions, and, moreover, that
every coherent choice function is dominated by some maximal one. Its proof
relies heavily on Zorn’s Lemma (a version of the Axiom of Choice; see Ref-
erences [38, Section 16] and [17, Section 10.2] for more information), and the
following two concepts of upper bound and chain.
Definition 17 (Upper bound). Consider any poset (P1;≤) and any subset P2 of
P1. An upper bound of P2 is an element p ∈ P1 such that q ≤ p for every q in P2.
Definition 18 (Chain). Consider any poset (P;≤) and any subset K of P. We
say that K is a chain when it is totally ordered by ≤:
p ≤ q or q ≤ p for every p and q in K.
14The right-most equality holds since p ≮ q⇔ ¬(p ≤ q and p ≠ q)⇔ (p ≤ q⇒ p = q).
15Actually, we should call this set Cˆ, but since we will only be concerned with maximal coher-
ent choice functions, we can use Cˆ to denote the maximal elements of (C;⊑) without confusion.
16See Reference [13, Theorem 21] for a constructive proof for finite possibility spaces, and
Reference [31, Corollary 4] for a proof that relies on Zorn’s Lemma for arbitrary possibility spaces.
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Lemma 43. Consider any chain K ⊆C. Then
(∀A ∈Q)(∃C ∈K)(supK)(A) =C(A).
Proof. Consider any A inQ. Since A is finite, therefore so is the set {C(A) ∶C ∈K} ⋐P∅(A), and we let ` ∈N be its cardinality. Denote {C(A) ∶C ∈K}= {A1, . . . ,A`}, where
A j ⊆ A for every j in {1, . . . ,`}. This partitions K into ` classes K1, . . . , K` such that
for every j in {1, . . . ,`}, C(A) = A j for all C in K j. For every choice of C1 in K1, . . . ,
C` in K`, therefore {A1, . . . ,A`} = {C1(A), . . . ,C`(A)}, and since K is a chain, the set{C1(A), . . . ,C`(A)} is also a chain: it is totally ordered by ⊆. Without loss of generality,
let C1(A) ⊆C2(A) ⊆ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⊆C`(A). This implies that {C(A) ∶C ∈K} is a finite chain, so
its infimum exists and is given by ⋂{C(A) ∶ C ∈ K} = ⋂`j=1C j(A) = C1(A). Since(supK)(A) = ⋂{C(A) ∶ C ∈ K}, therefore indeed (supK)(A) = C1(A), for some C1
in K1 ⊆K.
Lemma 44 (Zorn’s Lemma). Consider any poset (P;≤). If every non-empty
chain K ⊆ P has an upper bound (in P), then (P;≤) has at least one maximal
element.
Lemma 45. Consider any chain K ⊆C. Then supK is coherent.
Proof. We will show that supC satisfies the rationality axioms of Definition 620:
C120. Consider any A inQ. By Lemma 43, then (supK)(A) =C′(A) for some C′ inK, and since C′ is coherent, therefore in particular C′(A) ≠ ∅. Hence indeed(supK)(A) ≠∅.
C220. Note that, for all C in K, u ∉ C({u,v}) whenever u ≺ v, implying that u ∉⋂C∈KC({u,v}) = (supK)({u,v}).
C3a20. Consider any A, A1 and A2 inQ such that (supK)(A2)=⋂C∈KC(A2)⊆A2∖A1
and A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ A. By Lemma 43 then there is some C in K such that(supK)(A2)=C(A2), so C(A2)⊆A2∖A1, and by its coherence [Axiom C3a20]
therefore also C(A) ⊆ A∖A1. So indeed (supK)(A) =⋂C∈KC(A) ⊆ A∖A1.
C3b20. Consider any A, A1 and A2 inQ such that (supK)(A2)=⋂C∈KC(A2)⊆A2∖A1
and A ⊆ A1. By Lemma 43 then there is some C in K such that (supK)(A2) =
C(A2), so C(A2) ⊆A2∖A1, and by its coherence [Axiom C3b20] therefore also
C(A2∖A) ⊆ A2∖A1. So indeed (supK)(A2∖A) =⋂C∈KC(A2∖A) ⊆ A2∖A1.
C420. Consider any C in K, λ in R>0, u in V and A in Q, and infer from
Proposition 2740 that λC(A)+ {u} = C(λA + {u}). Hence λ(supK)(A)+{u} = λ⋂C∈KC(A) + {u} = ⋂C∈K(λC(A) + {u}) = ⋂C∈KC(λA + {u}) =(supK)(λA + {u}), which implies using Proposition 2740 that supK indeed
satisfies axioms C4a20 and C4b20.
Now we are ready to show the following important result.
Proposition 46. For any choice function C in C, its set of dominating maxi-
mal coherent choice functions CˆC ∶= {Cˆ ∈ Cˆ ∶C ⊑ Cˆ} is non-empty. As a conse-
quence, Cˆ ≠∅.
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Proof. We will apply Zorn’s Lemma 44 to the poset (↑C;⊑), where ↑C ∶= {C′ ∈C ∶C ⊑
C′}. This set is non-empty because C ∈ ↑C. Consider any non-empty chain K ⊆ ↑C. By
Lemma 45, the upper bound supK ofK is a coherent choice function (that dominates C)
and hence an element of ↑C. Therefore, by Zorn’s Lemma 44, (↑C;⊑) has a maximal
element, that—since every element of ↑C dominates C—therefore indeed dominates C.
For the second statement, that Cˆ ≠∅, it suffices to note that the maximal element Cˆ
of the poset (↑C;⊑) that we have found in the first part of this proof, is also a maximal
element of the poset (C;⊑): indeed, if this was not the case, then by Definition 1651
there is some C′ in C such that Cˆ ⊏C′. But then C ⊑C′, whence C′ ∈ ↑C, a contradiction
with the fact that Cˆ is a maximal element of the poset (↑C;⊑).
Later, in Proposition 6270, we will find explicit expressions for some special
types of elements of Cˆ, but at this point, we content ourselves with the result
that Cˆ is non-empty. Since C, R and S are order-isomorphic, note that there-
fore every coherent rejection function is dominated by some maximal rejection
function, and similarly for choice relations.
2.6.4 What about the other properties imposed on choice models?
In the previous sections, we have shown that (C;⊑) is an infimum-
semilattice—guaranteeing that there is a unique smallest (vacuous) choice
function—and that every element of C is dominated by some maximal one.
Central in those sections, was the set C of coherent choice functions: we dis-
regarded the additional Properties C525 and C625.
In this section we investigate which results of Sections 2.6.248 and 2.6.350
remain valid if we additionally assume Properties C525 and C625.
Let us first focus on infima. It turns out that both Properties C525 and C625
are closed under arbitrary infima:
Proposition 47. Consider any set C of choice functions that satisfy Prop-
erty C525. Then infC satisfies Property C525. Moreover, consider any set C of
choice functions that satisfy Property C625. Then infC satisfies Property C625.
Proof. For the first statement, consider any A and A1 in Q and assume that A ⊆ A1 ⊆
conv(A). Then C(A) ⊆C(A1) for all C in C, whence indeed (infC)(A) =⋃C∈CC(A) ⊆⋃C∈CC(A1) = (infC)(A1).
For the second statement, consider any n in N, u1, . . . , un in V and µ1, . . . ,
µn in R>0 and assume that 0 ∈ (infC)({0,u1, . . . ,un}). Then 0 ∈ C({0,u1, . . . ,un}),
and hence 0 ∈ C({0,µ1u1, . . . ,µnun}) for some C in C, whence indeed 0 ∈⋃C∈CC({0,µ1u1, . . . ,µnun}) = (infC)({0,µ1u1, . . . ,µnun}).
Due to Proposition 47, there is a unique least informative coherent choice func-
tion that is coherent and satisfies Properties C525 and/or C625. Since the fol-
lowing lemma guarantees that the vacuous choice function Cv satisfies Prop-
erty C625, therefore the least informative coherent choice function that satisfies
Property C625 is exactly Cv.
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Lemma 48. The vacuous choice function Cv satisfies Property C625.
Proof. Since by Equation (2.14)50 Cv(A) is given by maxA for all A in Q, it suffices
to show that 0 ∈ max{u1, . . . ,un}⇔ 0 ∈ max{µ1u1, . . . ,µnun} for all n in N, u1, . . . , un
in V and µ1, . . . , µn in R>0. To this end, assume the following chain of equivalences:
0 ∈ max{u1, . . . ,un}⇔ (∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,n})0⊀ ui⇔ (∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,n})0⊀ µiui⇔ 0 ∈ max{µ1u1, . . . ,µnun}.
However, as we will see in Example 364, the vacuous choice function Cv does
not generally17 satisfy Property C525; we will find the least informative coher-
ent choice function that also satisfies Property C525 in Corollary 109146.
Let us establish the counterparts for arbitrary suprema:
Proposition 49. Consider any set C of choice functions that satisfy Prop-
erty C525. Then supC satisfies Property C525. Moreover, consider any set C of
choice functions that satisfy Property C625. Then supC satisfies Property C625.
Proof. This follows readily from the proof of Proposition 47↶, by changing ‘some’ to
‘all’, ‘inf’ to ‘sup’, and ‘⋃’ to ‘⋂’.
Taking Proposition 4652 into account, this implies that every coherent
choice function that satisfies Property C525 and/or C625 is dominated
by some maximal element of the set of all coherent choice functions
that satisfy Property C525 and/or C625: given any coherent choice func-
tion C that satisfies Property C525 and/or C625, its set {Cˆ ∈ Cˆ ∶ C ⊑
Cˆ and Cˆ satisfies Property C525 and/or C625} of dominating maximal coherent
choice functions that satisfy Property C525 and/or C625, is non-empty.
2.7 CHANGE OF OPTION SPACE
Sometimes, for instance in Chapter 8247, it will be useful to consider another
option space W instead of V.
Consider two isomorphic ordered vector spaces V and W, a linear or-
der isomorphism φ—a bijective map that is linear and preserves the order—
between V and W. By letting φ work on sets—by letting, as usual, φA ∶={φu ∶ u ∈ A} for all A in Q(V)—, this induces an isomorphism between Q(V)
and Q(W). Furthermore, by lifting it to C(V), φ defines an isomorphism φ˜
between C(V) and C(W):
φ˜ ∶C(V)→C(W)∶C↦ φ˜C
where (φ˜C)(B) ∶= φ(C(φ−1(B))) for all B in Q(W).
17Cv only satisfies Property C525 if the vector ordering ≺ is lexicographic. This happens pre-
cisely if Kc is a convex cone (i.e., if posi(Kc) =Kc). For more information about lexicographic
orderings, see Section 4.2128.
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Then
u ∈C(A)⇔ φ(u) ∈ φ(C(A)) = φ(C(φ−1(φ(A)))) = (φ˜C)(φ(A)),
for all A in Q(V) and u in A. The rejection function φ˜R corresponding to φ˜C
is determined by
(φ˜R)(B) = B∖(φ˜C)(B) = B∖φ(C(φ−1(B))) = φ(φ−1(B)∖C(φ−1(B)))= φ(R(φ−1(B)))
for all B in Q(W), and the choice relation φ˜⊲ corresponding to φ˜C by
B1(φ˜⊲)B2⇔ B1 ⊆ (φ˜R)(B1∪B2)⇔ B1 ⊆ φ(R(φ−1(B1∪B2)))⇔ φ−1(B1) ⊆ R(φ−1(B1∪B2)) = R(φ−1(B1)∪φ−1(B2))⇔ φ−1(B1) ⊲ φ−1(B2)
for all B1 and B2 in Q(W).
Since φ preserves the order, so does the isomorphism φ˜ . This implies that(C(V);⊑) and (C(W);⊑) are order-isomorphic: C and φ˜C have the same
order-theoretic properties.
Essentially, C and φ˜C are the same choice functions—they represent the
same choices. Note that C is coherent if and only if φ˜C is. Indeed, because
φ is a bijection, C satisfies Axioms C120 and C320 if and only if φ˜C does;
furthermore, because φ is order preserving, C satisfies Axiom C220 if and only
if φ˜C does; and finally, because φ is linear, C satisfies Axiom C420 if and
only if φ˜C does: such isomorphisms preserve coherence. Moreover, C satisfies
Property C525 if and only if φ˜C does, and C satisfies Property C625 if and only
if φ˜C does.
This observation implies moreover that (C(V);⊑) and (C(W);⊑) are
order-isomorphic. Similar remarks can be made for rejection functions and
choice relations as well.
2.8 PURELY BINARY CHOICE FUNCTIONS
In general, a rejection function—or a choice function or choice relation for
that matter—cannot be characterised using only pairwise comparisons of op-
tions, meaning that a binary relation on options will not in general uniquely
determine a choice function. Indeed, in principle none of the rationality Ax-
ioms R120–R420 excludes the following behaviour for a coherent rejection
function R:
u ∉ R({u,v}) u ∉ R({u,w}) u ∈ R({u,v,w})
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where u, v and w are options. This is an instance of a non-binary rejection
function: in every binary (or pairwise) comparison of u with v and w, u is in
the choice set, but u is rejected from {u,v,w}—it is rejected using v and w
together. As shown by Schervish et al. [61], E-admissibility is an example of
an important non-binary decision rule. In this section, we study a special class
of choice functions that are determined by their restrictions to binary option
sets—option sets of cardinality two. Remark already that the corresponding
choice relation of a binary rejection function will be completely determined by
its restriction to {{u} ∶ u ∈ V} ⊆Q.
2.8.1 Motivation
Imprecise probabilities is an umbrella term for mathematical models that are
meant to be used in situations of imprecise or incomplete information, where it
may not be possible (or advisable) to use (precise) probabilities. In particular, it
covers sets of probability measures and various types of non-additive measures
and functionals, such as coherent lower previsions [51], belief functions [35,
70] and possibility measures [12, 22]. All of these models can be expressed
in terms of coherent sets of desirable gambles [57, 64, 82, 83],18 which encode
the gambles that a subject, whose beliefs we want to model, strictly prefers
to the status quo. One of their advantages is that they avoid problems with
conditioning on events of probability zero. They can be—and have been—
used to replace probabilities in Bayesian networks, for predictive inference,
and so on [13, 19, 24, 31, 55].
Sets of desirable gambles are typically a binary concept: they are char-
acterised by pairwise comparisons between the available options, whereas in
practice choice may be more complex. One of the aims of this section is to
study how the more general—not necessarily binary—choice functions relate
to the sets of desirable gambles that are now more commonly used in imprecise
probabilities papers.
2.8.2 Sets of desirable options
Sets of desirable options are a(n obvious and immediate) generalisation of sets
of desirable gambles: instead of working with the linear space L of gambles,
we will work with our general (abstract) vector space V of (abstract) options.
We will see that sets of desirable options amount to a pairwise comparison of
options and therefore correspond to a special kind of choice functions.
Definition 19 (Set of desirable options). A set of desirable options D is simply
a subset of the vector space of options V. We collect all possible such sets of
18In their article from 1990, Reference [64], Seidenfeld et al. use the term ‘favorable gambles’.
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desirable options in the set D(V), often simply denoted as D when it is clear
from the contact what the option space V is.
Its interpretation will be that D contains those options that some subject strictly
prefers to the status quo 0. As we did for choice functions, we pay special
attention to coherent sets of desirable options. The following is an immediate
generalisation of existing coherence definitions [19, 29, 31, 57, 64, 82] from
gambles to abstract options.
Definition 20 (Coherent set of desirable options). We call a set of desirable
options D ⊆ V coherent if for all u and v in V and λ in R>0:
D1. 0 ∉D;
D2. if 0 ≺ u then u ∈D;
D3. if u ∈D then λu ∈D;
D4. if u,v ∈D then u+v ∈D.
We collect all coherent sets of desirable options in the set D(V), often simply
denoted as D when it is clear from the context which vector space we are using.
Axioms D3 and D4 turn coherent sets of desirable options D into convex
cones—meaning that posi(D) = D. They include the positive options due to
Axiom D2, but not the zero option due to Axiom D1. As an immediate conse-
quence, their intersection with V≺0 is empty.
As usual, we may associate with the convex cone D a strict—irreflexive—
vector order ½D—called preference relation—on V, by letting u ½D v⇔ 0 ½D
v− u⇔ v− u ∈ D for all u and v in V [31, 57]. If a preference relation ½ is
equal to ½D , then we say that D and ½ correspond, in the sense that D can be
retrieved from ½D as D = {u ∈ V ∶ 0 ½D u}.
Definition 21 (Coherent preference relation). We call a preference relation ½
on V coherent if for all u, v and w in V and α in (0,1]:½1. u /½ u;½2. ≺ ⊆ ½;½3. u ½ v⇔ αu+(1−α)w ½ αv+(1−α)w;½4. ½ is transitive: if u ½ v and v ½ w then u ½ w.
We collect all coherent preference relations on the linear space V in the set
P(V), often simply denoted as P when it is clear from the context which vector
space we are using.
Axioms ½1 and ½4 turn coherent choice relations into strict partial orders that
include the vector order ≺ (Axiom ½2) and are mixture independent (Ax-
iom ½3). A straightforward verification of the axioms shows that any set of
desirable options is coherent if and only if its corresponding preference rela-
tion is. We therefore focus on either one of them, and use ‘desirability’ as an
umbrella term for sets of desirable options and preference relations.
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More details about coherent sets of desirable gambles (options) and coher-
ent preference relations can be found in a number of papers and books [13,19,
29, 31, 54, 55, 57, 58, 64, 82, 83].
2.8.3 Order-theoretic properties of desirability
Sets of desirable options can be ordered according to an ‘at most as informative
as’ relation, analogously to the ordering introduced for choice functions. None
of the material in this section is new, except for the straight-forward general-
isation to arbitrary option spaces; see References [13, 31, 31, 57, 82] for more
information.
Definition 22. Given two sets of desirable options D1 and D2, we call D1
at most as informative as D2 when D1 ⊆ D2. Similarly, given two preference
relations ½1 and ½2, we call ½1 at most as informative as ½2 when ½1 ⊆ ½2.
Clearly, for any sets of desirable options D1 and D2, and their corresponding
choice relations ½1 and ½2, we have that D1 ⊆ D2 ⇔ ½1 ⊆ ½2, so we can focus
on sets of desirable options for the remainder of this section.
Because the ordering of sets of desirable options (⊆) is just set inclusion, it
is a partial ordering on D, and the poset (D;⊆) is a complete lattice, with supre-
mum operator ⋃, and infimum operator ⋂. Next we investigate the structure
of the set of all coherent sets of desirable options:
Proposition 50. The poset (D;⊆) is a complete infimum-semilattice, or al-
ternatively, D is an intersection structure—closed under arbitrary non-empty
intersections. The unique least informative (smallest) set of desirable options
Dv is given by Dv ∶= V≻0.
Proof. Consider any set of coherent sets of desirable options D ⊆ D, and its infimum
infD =⋂D, which is of course also a set of desirable options. We show that infD is
coherent, meaning that it satisfies the rationality axioms of Definition 20:
D1↶. Since 0 ∉ D for all D in D, also 0 ∉ infD.
D2↶. Consider any u in V≻0, so u ∈ D for all D in D, implying that indeed u ∈ infD.
D3↶. Consider any λ in R>0 and any u ∈ infD, meaning that u ∈ D for all D in D.
Then also λu ∈ D for all D in D, implying that indeed λu ∈ infD.
D4↶. Consider any u and v in infD, meaning that u and v belong to all D inD. Hence
u+v ∈ D for all D in D, implying that indeed u+v ∈ infD.
Now, as a convex cone, V≻0 satisfies Axioms D3↶ and D4↶, and by definition it satis-
fies D1↶ and D2↶. So V≻0 is coherent, and by Axiom D2↶ it is included in any other
coherent set of desirable options.
We will refer to Dv as the vacuous set of desirable options.
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It will be useful to also consider the maximally informative, or maximal,
coherent sets of desirable options.19 They are the undominated elements of the
complete infimum-semilattice (D;⊆); we collect them into a set Dˆ:
Dˆ ∶= {D ∈D ∶ (∀D′ ∈D)(D ⊆D′⇒D =D′)}.
First, the following useful result allows us to characterise these maximal
elements very elegantly.
Proposition 51. Given any coherent set of desirable options D and any non-
zero option u ∉ D, posi(D ∪{−u}) is a coherent set of desirable options. As a
consequence, a coherent set of desirable options D is maximal if and only if
(∀u ∈ V∖{0})(u ∈D or −u ∈D). (2.17)
Proof. Let, to ease the notation, D′ ∶= posi(D ∪ {−u}). It is clear that D′ satisfies
Axioms D257–D457, so we only need to prove that 0 ∉ D′. Assume ex absurdo that
0 ∈D′. Since 0 ∉D and 0 ≠ u, there must be v in D and λ in R>0 such that v+λ(−u) = 0,
implying that u = 1λ v ∈ D [Axiom D357], a contradiction.
Next, consider any maximal coherent set of desirable options D and any option u
in V ∖{0} such that −u ∉ D. Assume ex absurdo that also u ∉ D, then D′ ∶= posi(D ∪{−u}) ⊃ D is a coherent set of desirable options by the first part, contradicting the
maximality of D.
Conversely, consider any coherent set of desirable options D that satisfies Equa-
tion (2.17), and any coherent set of desirable options D′ ⊇ D. Consider any u in D′
then clearly u ≠ 0 [Axiom D157], so we infer from (2.17) that u ∈ D or −u ∈ D. As-
sume ex absurdo that −u ∈D, then also −u ∈D′, which together with u ∈D′ implies that
0 = u+(−u) ∈D′ [Axiom D457], which contradicts the coherence of D′ [Axiom D157].
Hence u ∈ D, which implies that D′ = D, so D is indeed maximal.
This immediately shows that a coherent preference relation is maximal if and
only if it is a total order.
Next, note that the set of all coherent sets of desirable options is dually
atomic, meaning that any coherent set of desirable options is the infimum of
its non-empty set of dominating maximal coherent sets of desirable options:
Proposition 52 (Sets of desirable options are dually atomic). For any coher-
ent set of desirable options D, its set of dominating maximal coherent sets of
desirable options DˆD ∶= {Dˆ ∈ Dˆ ∶D ⊆ Dˆ} is non-empty. Moreover, D = infDˆD .
Proof. We have to prove that the set {Dˆ ∈ D ∶ D ⊆ Dˆ} has a maximal element. This
will follow directly from Zorn’s Lemma 4452 if we can show that any chain K in this
19The discussion in the rest of this section is based on similar discussions about sets of de-
sirable gambles [13, 31, 58]. I repeat the details here mutatis mutandis in order to make this
dissertation more self-contained.
59
COHERENT CHOICE MODELS
poset has a greatest element. It is a matter of straightforward verification of the axioms
to see that ⋃K is a coherent set of desirable options, so ⋃K is this greatest element.
Let us now establish the dual atomicity. By definition, D ⊆⋂DˆD , so we concentrate
on proving that ⋂DˆD ⊆D. Consider any u in ⋂DˆD , meaning that u ∈ Dˆ for all Dˆ ∈ DˆD .
Assume ex absurdo that u ∉ D, then −u ∈ posi(D ∪ {−u}), and posi(D ∪ {−u}) is a
coherent set of desirable options by Proposition 51↶. Consider any maximal coherent
set of desirable options Dˆ that dominates this set [there is such a coherent maximal set
by Proposition 52↶], then also −u ∈ Dˆ and therefore u ∉ Dˆ [use Axioms D457 and D157].
But since the maximal Dˆ also dominates D, this is a contradiction.
As we have seen, the counterpart of this result for choice models is Proposi-
tion 4652, except for the dual atomicity, which I was not able to establish for
choice models.
2.8.4 Connection between choice functions and sets of desirable op-
tions
We now set out to establish a connection between choice functions and sets of
desirable options.
Definition 23 (Compatibility between choice models and desirability). Given
a choice function C, and its corresponding rejection function R and choice
relation ⊲, we say that an option v is chosen over some option u whenever
u ∉C({u,v}), or equivalently, whenever u ∈R({u,v}), or {u} ⊲ {v}. Similarly,
given a set of desirable options D, we say that an option v is preferred to some
option u whenever v−u ∈ D, or equivalently, u ½ v. We call a choice function
C and a set of desirable options D compatible when v is chosen over u if and
only if v is preferred to u for all the options u and v.
Compatibility means that the behaviour of the choice function restricted to
pairs of options reflects the behaviour of the set of desirable options.20 So, a
choice function C will have at most one compatible set of desirable options,
whereas conversely, a set of desirable options D may have many compati-
ble choice functions: compatibility only directly influences the behaviour of a
choice function on doubletons.
Definition 23 means that choice function C and a set of desirable options
D are compatible if
u ∉C({u,v})⇔ v−u ∈D, for all u and v in V.
This is even clearer in terms of the relations: a choice relation ⊲ is compatible
with some preference relation ½ if {u} ⊲ {v}⇔ u ½ v, for all u and v in V.
20See Reference [65] for an axiomatisation of imprecise preferences in the context of binary
comparisons of horse lotteries, rather than gambles.
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Loosely speaking, ⊲ and ½ are compatible if ⊲ extends ½ from options to sets of
options. This observation also sheds light on the necessity of our Axiom C220,
which Seidenfeld et al. [67] uses a weakened version of. Indeed, if a choice
relation does not satisfy Axiom C220 then necessarily 0 /½ u for some 0 ≺ u,
contradicting Axiom D257. So on their account, the relation between choice
functions and desirability is more tenuous.
From choice functions to desirability
We begin by studying the properties of the set of desirable options compatible
with a given coherent choice function. Since compatibility is related to the
restriction of the choice function to pairwise comparisons, it is not surprising
that each choice function has a unique compatible set of desirable options:
Proposition 53. For any coherent choice function C in C (and its correspond-
ing rejection function R and choice relation ⊲), the unique compatible coherent
set of desirable options DC is given by
DC ∶= {u ∈ V ∶ 0 ∉C({0,u})} = {u ∈ V ∶ 0 ∈ R({0,u})} = {u ∈ V ∶ {0} ⊲ {u}}.
(2.18)
Proof. We first show that DC is coherent:
D157. Since 0 ∉C({0}), 0 ∈ DC .
D257. Consider any option u in V≻0, so 0 ≺ u. The coherence of C [Axiom C220]
then implies that {u} =C({0,u}), whence 0 ∉C({0,u}), implying that indeed
u ∈ DC .
D357. Consider any λ in R>0, and any u in DC , meaning that 0 ∉ C({0,u}).
Lemma 1221 then implies that 0 ∉C({0,λu}), whence indeed λu ∈ DC .
D457. Consider any u and v in D, meaning that 0 ∈ R({0,u}) and 0 ∈ R({0,v}). By
Proposition 3243 then 0 ∈ R({0,u+v}), whence indeed u+v ∈ DC .
We complete the proof by showing that C and DC are compatible: v ∈ R({u,v})⇔ u−
v ∈DC for all u and v in V. For the direct implication, consider any u and v in V such that
v ∈ R({u,v}). Lemma 1221 then guarantees that 0 ∈ R({0,u−v}), implying that indeed
u−v ∈DC . For the converse implication, consider any u and v in V such that u−v ∈DC .
Then 0 ∈ R({0,u−v}), implying that indeed v ∉C({u,v}), by Lemma 1221.
Proposition 53 implies that, quite elegantly, the unique preference relation ½⊲
compatible with a coherent choice relation ⊲ is coherent and given by
u ½⊲ v⇔ {u} ⊲ {v}, for all u and u in V. (2.19)
Example 1. Consider the two-dimensional option space V =L of gambles on
the binary possibility space X = {H,T}, ordered by the standard point-wise
ordering ≤. Let C be the choice function given by
C(A) ∶= { f ∈ A ∶ (∀g ∈ A)g(H)+g(T) ≤ f (H)+ f (T)} for all A in Q. (2.20)
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It is easy to check that C is a coherent choice function—it is an example of
what we will call an E-admissible choice function later. Use Proposition 53↶
to infer that
DC = { f ∈L ∶ f (H)+ f (T) > 0} (2.21)
is its unique compatible coherent set of desirable options. ◊
From desirability to choice functions
We collect in CD all the coherent choice functions that are compatible with a
given coherent set of desirable options D:
CD ∶={C ∈C ∶ (∀u,v ∈ V)(v ∉C({u,v})⇔ u−v ∈D)} = {C ∈C ∶DC =D}.
The correspondence between choice functions and sets of desirable options can
be many-to-one, in the sense that several different coherent choice functions
may be compatible with the same coherent set of desirable options: CD is in
general not a singleton. The least informative of them plays an important role:
Proposition 54. Given a coherent set of desirable options D, the infimum—
least informative element—infCD of its set of compatible coherent choice func-
tions CD is the coherent choice function CD , given by
CD(A) ∶={u ∈ A ∶ (∀v ∈ A)v−u ∉D}={u ∈ A ∶ (∀v ∈ A)u /½ v} for all A in Q. (2.22)
Proof. The proof is structured as follows: we show (a) that CD is compatible with D;
(b) that CD is coherent; and (c) that CD ⊑ C for all C ∈ CD .
(a). First, we show that CD is compatible with D: Consider any u and v in V then it
follows from the definition of CD that indeed
v ∉CD({u,v})⇔ (∃w ∈ {u,v})w−v ∈ D⇔ (u−v ∈ D or v−v ∈ D)⇔ u−v ∈ D,
where the last equivalence follows from 0 ∉ D, because D is coherent [Ax-
iom D157].
(b). Next, we show that CD is coherent. Taking Proposition 1322 into account, we will
incidentally, for Axioms R3a20 and R3b20, use RD , given by
RD(A) = {u ∈ A ∶ (∃v ∈ A)v−u ∈ D} = A∖CD(A) for all A in Q. (2.23)
C120. Consider any A in Q. Since A is finite and ½ is a strict partial order, we know
that there is at least one maximal element um for ½, meaning that (∀v ∈A)um /½
v, or equivalently (∀v ∈ A)v−um ∉ D. Hence um ∈CD(A).
C220. Consider any u and v in V such that u ≺ v. Then 0 ≺ v−u, whence v−u ∈D by
Axiom D257. So indeed u ∉CD({u,v}) by compatibility.
R3a20. Consider any option sets A, A1 and A2 inQ such that A1 ⊆RD(A2) and A2 ⊆A.
Then u ∈ RD(A2) for all u in A1, or, equivalently, (∀u ∈ A1)(∃v ∈ A2)v−u ∈D.
Since A2 ⊆ A, this implies (trivially) that (∀u ∈ A1)(∃v ∈ A)v−u ∈ D, whence
indeed A1 ⊆ RD(A).
62
2.8 PURELY BINARY CHOICE FUNCTIONS
R3b20. Consider any option sets A, A1 and A2 in Q such that A1 ⊆ RD(A2)—whence(∀u ∈ A1)(∃v ∈ A2)v−u ∈ D—and A ⊆ A1. It suffices to prove that then (∀u ∈
A1 ∖A)(∃v ∈ A2 ∖A)v− u ∈ D, since this implies that A1 ∖A ⊆ RD(A2 ∖A).
We may assume without loss of generality that A = {v1, . . . ,vn} with n in Z≥0.
Consider any u in A1∖A, then we know that u1−u ∈D for some u1 in A2. Then
either u1 ∈ A2∖A—in which case the proof is finished—or u1 ∈ A, so we may
assume that u1 = v1 without loss of generality. But then, since A ⊆A1, we know
that u2−v1 ∈D for some u2 in A2. By coherence of D [Axiom D157], we know
that u2 ≠ v1, and therefore also that u2 in A2∖{v1}. Then either u2 ∈ A2∖A—
in which case the proof is finished—or u2 ∈ A ∖{v1}, so we may assume that
u2 = v2 without loss of generality. This tells us that v2−v1 ∈D. But then, again,
since A ⊆ A1, we know that u3−v2 ∈D for some u3 in A2. The coherence of D
[Axiom D457] then implies that also u3 −v1 = u3 −v2 +v2 −v1 ∈ D, and hence
that [use Axiom D157 twice] u3 ∉ {v1,v2}, so we know that u3 in A2∖{v1,v2}.
When we proceed in this way, we are guaranteed to find indeed, after k ≤ n+1
steps, some uk in A2∖A such that uk −u ∈ D.
C420. Consider any A1 and A2 in Q such that A1 ⊆ CD(A2), meaning that (∀u ∈
A1)(∀v ∈ A2)v−u ∉ D.
C4a20. It follows that (∀u ∈ A1)(∀v ∈ A2)λv−λu ∉D for any λ in R>0, whence
indeed λA1 ⊆CD(λA2).
C4b20. Also (∀u ∈ A1)(∀v ∈ A2)(v+w)− (u+w) ∉ D for any w in V, whence
indeed A1+{w} ⊆CD(A2+{w}).
(c). Finally, we show that CD ⊑ C for all C ∈ CD : Consider any C in CD and A in Q,
then we have to prove that C(A) ⊆CD(A). Consider any u in A and assume that
u ∉CD(A). Then v−u ∈ D for some v in A, implying that u ∉C({u,v}) because C
is compatible with D. The coherence of C [Axiom C3a20] then implies that also
u ∉C(A).
The coherent choice function CD is the least informative choice function that
is compatible with a coherent set of desirable options D: it is based on the
binary ordering represented by D and nothing else. As we will see in Proposi-
tion 7082, there typically are other coherent choice functions C compatible with
D, but they encode more information than just the binary ordering represented
by D, and coherence.
Proposition 54 is especially interesting because it shows that the most con-
servative choice function based on a strict partial order of options, is the choice
function based on maximality21—the one that selects the undominated options
under the strict partial order ½D corresponding to a coherent set of desirable
options D. Any choice function that is based on maximality under such a strict
partial order is coherent.
Proposition 54 can also be interpreted in terms of rejection functions and
choice relations: given a coherent set of desirable gambles D—or a coherent
preference relation ½—, the least informative compatible rejection function is
21Note that maximility here refers to the optimality decision criterion [71, 82], and it does not
mean that the set of desirable options is a maximal one, in the sense considered in Section 2.8.358.
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already given in Equation (2.23)62, and the least informative compatible choice
relation ⊲D , is by Proposition 3947 equal to ⊲CD , and determined by
A1 ⊲D A2⇔ (∀u ∈ A1)(∃v ∈ A2)u ½ v, for all A1 and A2 in Q.
This shows that the partial order ⊲D is simply the result of lifting ½ from ele-
ments to sets.
Example 2. Let D be the coherent set of desirable options given by Equa-
tion (2.21)62. Its associated coherent choice function CD is given by
CD(A) ∶= { f ∈ A ∶ (∀g ∈ A)g(H)+g(T) ≤ f (H)+ f (T)} for all A in Q.
so it coincides with the choice function given by Equation (2.20)61. ◊
Although in this particular example the two procedures coincide, there is in
general more than one coherent choice function that is compatible with a co-
herent set of desirable options. In other words, a coherent choice function is
not uniquely determined by its restriction to binary comparisons; we will give
an example in Example 1186 further on.
There is an easy characterisation of CD and RD , given any coherent set of
desirable options D:
Proposition 55. Given any coherent set of desirable options D, then
0 ∈CD({0}∪A)⇔D∩A =∅, for all A in Q,
and, as a consequence
0 ∈ RD({0}∪A)⇔D∩A ≠∅, for all A in Q.
Proof. By Equation (2.22)62, 0 ∈CD({0}∪A)⇔ (∀v ∈ {0}∪A)v ∉D⇔ ({0}∪A)∩
D =∅, which is equivalent to A∩D =∅, because 0 ∉ D for any coherent D.
Although CD is coherent when D is, it does not necessarily satisfy the addi-
tional Property C525, as the following counterexample shows.
Example 3. Consider the two-dimensional option space V =L of gambles on
the binary possibility space X = {H,T}, ordered by the standard point-wise or-
dering ≤, and consider the vacuous set of desirable options Dv = {L({H,T}) ∈V ∶ f > 0} =L({H,T})>0, which is coherent. By Proposition 55, 0 ∈CDv({0}∪
A)⇔ A ∩L({H,T})>0 = ∅, for all A in Q. To show that CDv does not satisfy
Property C525, consider A = {0, f ,g}, where f = ( f (H), f (T)) ∶= (−1,2) and
g ∶= (2,−1). We find that 0 ∈CDv(A) because { f ,g}∩L({H,T})>0 = ∅, since
f /> 0 and g /> 0.
However, for the option set A1 = A ∪{ f+g2 } ⊆ conv(A), we find that f+g2 =(1/2,1/2) > 0 and therefore 0 ∉CDv(A1), meaning that the coherent choice func-
tion CDv does not satisfy Property C525. ◊
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For the specific coherent set of desirable options D considered in Example 3,
the corresponding choice function CD fails to satisfy C525. However, as we
will see in Chapter 4125, there are other sets of desirable options D—which we
will call the lexicographic sets of desirable options—for which CD does satisfy
Property C525.
On the other hand, for any coherent set of desirable options D, its least
informative compatible coherent choice function CD is guaranteed to satisfy
the other additional Property C625, as we will show in Proposition 56. Let us
first define a special class of choice functions, the ‘infimum of purely binary
choice functions’. We will come back to this in Section 2.1081, but it will turn
out useful to introduce them now.
Definition 24. For any set of coherent sets of desirable options D ⊆ D, we
define the ‘infimum of purely binary’ choice function as CD ∶= inf{CD ∶D ∈D}.
Proposition 56. Any arbitrary infimum of purely binary rejection functions
satisfies Property C625: consider any D ⊆D, then RD satisfies Property R625.
Proof. Consider any n in N, u1, . . . , un in V and µ1, . . . , µn in R>0, and assume
that 0 ∈ RD({0,u1, . . . ,un}). Consider any D in D, then 0 ∈ RD({0,u1, . . . ,un}), so,
by Proposition 55, there is some iD such that uiD ∈ D. Due to Axiom D357, therefore
also µiD uiD ∈ D. Then, using Equation (2.23)62, 0 ∈ RD({0,µiD uiD }), and using Ax-
iom R3a20, 0 ∈ RD({0,µ1u1, . . . ,µnun}). Hence indeed RD({0,µ1u1, . . . ,µnun}).
Proposition 56 implies that there are coherent choice functions that satisfy
Property C625 but not Property C525: indeed, consider the (vacuous) set of
desirable options Dv from Example 3, then by Proposition 56, RDv satisfies
Property C625, but in Example 3 we have shown that it does not satisfy Prop-
erty C525. This shows that the implication in Proposition 1627 cannot be re-
versed.
Before we investigate the connection between choice models and desir-
ability in more detail, we give the following example, which shows our earlier
claim that it is indeed (and luckily!) possible for an option to be rejected, even
though it is undominated in the option set:
Example 4. To support the claims after Proposition 3544, consider the follow-
ing choice function CD , where D is a non-vacuous set of desirable options, im-
plying that u ∈D for some u ∈V∖V≻0. Then, by Proposition 55, 0 ∈RD({0,u}),
or, in other words, {0} ⊲D {u}, but {0} /≼ {u}. This example proves our earlier
claim that it is indeed possible for an option to be rejected, even though it is
undominated in the option set.
Furthermore, we now support the claim made after that same proposition,
namely that not necessarily
(iii) if A1 ⊲ A2 and A2 ≼ A3 then A1 ≼ A3;
(iv) if A1 ≼ A2 and A2 ⊲ A3 then A1 ≼ A3,
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for all A1, A2 and A3 in Q. For the first one, consider A1 ∶= {0}, A2 ∶= {u}
and A3 ∶= {u,2u}. Then A1 ⊲ A2 and, since A2 ⊆ A3, by Proposition 3343(i)
therefore A2 ≼ A3, even though A1 /≼ A3 because 0 is not dominated by u nor by
2u. For the second one, consider A1 ∶= A2 ∶= {0} and A3 ∶= {u}. Then A1 ≼ A2
and A2 ⊲ A3, but A1 /≼ A3. ◊
Properties of the relation between choice functions and desirability
Since sets of desirable options represent only pairwise comparison, and are
therefore generally less expressive than choice functions, we expect that go-
ing from a choice function to a compatible set of desirable options may lead
to a loss of information, whereas going the opposite route does not. This is
confirmed by Propositions 57 and 58, and in particular by their Corollary 59.
Proposition 57. Consider any non-empty collection of coherent choice func-
tions C ⊆C. Then DinfC = inf{DC ∶C ∈ C} and Cinf{DC ∶C∈C} ⊑ infC, and therefore
also CDinfC ⊑ infC.
Proof. Recall in advance that infC is a coherent choice function by Proposition 4048,
and that inf{DC ∶C ∈ C} is a coherent set of desirable options by Proposition 5058.
For the first statement, consider any u in V, and observe that
u ∈ DinfC⇔ 0 ∉ (infC)({0,u})⇔ 0 ∉ ⋃
C∈CC({0,u})⇔ (∀C ∈ C)0 ∉C({0,u})⇔ (∀C ∈ C)u ∈ DC⇔ u ∈⋂{DC ∶C ∈ C} = inf{DC ∶C ∈ C},
where the first and fourth equivalences follow from Proposition 5361.
For the second statement, consider any A in Q and u in V such that u ∈ (infC)(A).
Then u ∈C(A) for some C in C, from which we infer that (∃C ∈C)(∀v ∈A)u ∈C({u,v}),
by an immediate application of Axiom C3a20 [use the contraposition with A˜1 ∶= {u},
A˜2 ∶= {u,v} and A˜ ∶= A]. By exchanging the quantifiers, we infer as an implication that(∀v ∈ A)(∃C ∈ C)u ∈C({u,v}). Now recall that
u ∈C({u,v})⇔ 0 ∈C({0,v−u}) by Axiom C4b20⇔ v−u ∉ DC by Proposition 5361.
This implies that (∀v ∈ A)v − u ∉ ⋂{DC ∶ C ∈ C}, which is equivalent to u ∈
Cinf{DC ∶C∈C}(A), by Proposition 5462. The rest of the proof is now immediate.
Proposition 58. Consider any set of coherent sets of desirable options D ⊆D.
Then DCD = infD. Moreover, CinfD ⊑CD.
Proof. Recall in advance that CD = inf{CD ∶ D ∈D} is a coherent choice function by
Propositions 5462 and 4048, and that infD is a coherent set of desirable options by
Proposition 5058.
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For the first statement, consider any u in V and observe that:
u ∈ Dinf{CD ∶D∈D}⇔ 0 ∉ (inf{CD ∶D ∈D})({0,u}) = ⋃
D∈DCD({0,u})⇔ (∀D ∈D)0 ∉CD({0,u})⇔ (∀D ∈D)(∃v ∈ {0,u})v ∈ D⇔ (∀D ∈D)u ∈ D⇔ u ∈ infD.
For the second statement, let C ∶= {CD ∶ D ∈D}, then we infer from the first statement
that {DC ∶C ∈ C} =D. Now, use the second statement in Proposition 57.
From these two results we immediately infer the following:
Corollary 59. Consider any coherent set of desirable options D ∈ D and any
coherent choice function C ∈C. Then D =DCD and CDC ⊑C.
Proof. It is an immediate consequence of Propositions 58 and 57, by letting D ∶= {D}
and C ∶= {C}.
If we consider the maps
D⋅∶D→C∶D↦CD as defined by Equation (2.18)61,
C⋅∶C→D∶C↦DC as defined in Equation (2.22)62,
then Corollary 59 essentially states that D⋅ ○C⋅ = idD, the identity map on D,
while (C⋅ ○D⋅)(C) ⊑ C for all C in C. This observation helps us interpret
Propositions 57 and 58 using the following commuting diagrams: Full lines
C infC
{DC ∶C ∈ C} inf{DC ∶C ∈ C} = DinfC Cinf{DC ∶C∈C} =CDinfC
inf
D⋅ D⋅
inf C⋅
D infD = DCD
{CD ∶D ∈D} CD
CinfD =CDCDinf
C⋅ D⋅
inf
C⋅
Figure 2.3: Commuting diagrams for Propositions 57 and 58
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indicate the maps (D⋅, C⋅ or inf), while dashed lines indicate an “is at most
as informative as” (⊑ for choice functions, ⊆ for sets of desirable gambles)
relation.
Example 1085 in Section 2.1081 further on will show that the inequalities
in these results can be strict; this does not seem surprising for the inequal-
ity of Proposition 5766, but is perhaps less intuitively obvious for the one in
Proposition 5866.
This also helps to see that coherent choice functions are indeed more infor-
mative than coherent sets of desirable options, in the sense that two different
coherent choice functions (CinfD and CD) may determine the same coherent set
of desirable options (infD) when restricted to option sets of cardinality two.
Thus, we need to move to this richer model CD in order to fully represent the
beliefs encompassed by {CD ∶ D ∈ D}. Moreover, this happens even if each
of the choice functions in the set D is fully determined by a coherent set of
desirable options.
2.8.5 Order-theoretic properties of purely binary choice functions
As a consequence of the connections established in the previous section, infer
the following basic result:
Proposition 60. Consider any coherent choice functions C1 and C2. If C1 ⊑C2,
then DC1 ⊆DC2 . Conversely, consider any coherent sets of desirable options D1
and D2. Then D1 ⊆D2⇔CD1 ⊑CD2 .
Proof. By Proposition 3947 it suffices therefore to show that R1 ⊑ R2 ⇒ DR1 ⊆ DR2
for all coherent rejection functions R1 and R2, and that D1 ⊆ D2 ⇔ RD1 ⊑ RD2 for all
coherent sets of desirable options D1 and D2.
The first statement—that R1 ⊑ R2 ⇒ DR1 ⊆ DR2 —is a direct consequence of the
definition (Equation (2.18)61) of DR .
For the second statement—that D1 ⊆ D2 ⇔ RD1 ⊑ RD2 —we start with necessity.
Consider any coherent sets of desirable options D1 and D2 such that D1 ⊆ D2, and
any A in Q. We will show that then RD1(A) ⊆ RD2(A). To establish this, consider
any u in RD1(A). Then v−u ∈ D1 for some v in A, whence, since D1 ⊆ D2, therefore
v− u ∈ D2. This implies that u ∈ RD2(A), whence indeed RD1 ⊑ RD2 . For sufficiency,
assume that RD1 ⊑ RD2 . We have already shown in the first part of this proof that
then DRD1 ⊆ DRD2 . By Corollary 59↶ we find that DRD1 = D1 and DRD2 = D2, which
completes the proof.
The converse of the first statement does not hold:
Example 5. This example serves as a counterexample to show that the con-
verse statement of Proposition 60 does not hold—that DC1 ⊆ DC2 does not im-
ply C1 ⊑ C2. Assume ex absurdo that this implication holds for all coherent
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choice functions C1 and C2. This would imply the following stronger condi-
tion:
DC1 =DC2 ⇒C1 =C2 for all coherent choice functions C1 and C2.
To see this, if DC1 = DC2 , then DC1 ⊆ DC2—and hence C1 ⊑ C2—and DC2 ⊆
DC1—and hence C2 ⊑ C1. So we infer that both C1 ⊑ C2 and C2 ⊑ C1, and
therefore indeed C1 =C2.
We will give an example of two different coherent choice functions C1
and C2 that have the same binary behaviour: DC1 = DC2 . We will work with
the special vector space of gambles V = L on a binary possibility space X ={H,T}, ordered by the standard point-wise ordering ≤. Let C1 ∶=CD1 where
D1 ∶= L>0 is the vacuous set of desirable gambles, and let C2 ∶= inf{CD2 ,CD′2},
where D2 ∶=L>0∪{ f ∈L ∶ f (H) > 0} and D′2 ∶=L>0∪{ f ∈L ∶ f (T) > 0} are two
maximal sets of desirable gambles. Note that D1, D2 and D′2 are coherent, and
therefore so are C1 and C2. Furthermore, infer that D2∩D′2 = D1. To establish
this counterexample, it suffices to find that DC1 =DC2 and C1 ≠C2.
For DC1 = DC2 , use Corollary 5967 to infer that DC1 = D1 and use Proposi-
tion 5866 to infer that DC2 = inf{D2,D′2} =D2∩D′2 =D1, so indeed DC1 =DC2 .
To show that C1 ≠C2, it suffices to find one option set A in Q such that
0 ∈C1(A) and 0 ∉C2(A). We state that A ∶= {0, f , f ′} with f = ( f (H), f (T)) =(1,−1) and f ′ = ( f ′(H), f ′(T)) = (−1,1), is such an option set. Note that
indeed 0 ∈C1(A) since A ∩D1 =∅. To see that 0 ∉C2(A), note that f belongs
to D2 and f ′ to D′2. Therefore 0 ∉ CD2(A) and 0 ∉ CD′2(A), whence indeed
0 ∉ (inf{CD2 ,CD′2})(A) =C2(A). ◊
Let us investigate what the least informative coherent choice function CDv
that is compatible with Dv, the vacuous set of desirable options, looks like.
Proposition 61. The least informative coherent choice function CDv that is
compatible with Dv is the vacuous choice function: Cv =CDv .
Proof. By Proposition 5462 and since Dv ∈ D, we have that CDv is a coherent choice
function. Since Dv = V≻0, it is given by u ∈CDv(A)⇔ (∀v ∈ A)u⊀ v for all A inQ and
u in A, and by Equation (2.14)50 therefore indeed equal to Cv.
Example 6. Consider, as a simple example, the case that the vector ordering
is total, meaning that for any u and v in V, either u ≺ v, v ≺ u or u = v. It
then follows from Proposition 61 that, for any coherent choice function C,
C(A) ⊆Cv(A) = maxA for all A ∈Q, where maxA is the singleton containing
the unique largest element of the finite option set A according to the strict total
ordering ≺. But then Axiom C120 guarantees that C(A) =Cv(A) = maxA for
all A ∈Q, so Cv is the only coherent choice function. ◊
So the vacuous set of desirable options Dv induces the vacuous choice func-
tion CDv . Is there a similar relationship for maximal sets of desirable gambles
Dˆ? Indeed, as it turns out, CDˆ is a maximal choice function:
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Proposition 62. Consider any maximal coherent set of desirable vectors Dˆ in
Dˆ. Its least informative coherent compatible choice function CDˆ is a maximal
coherent choice function. As a consequence, {CDˆ ∶ Dˆ ∈ Dˆ} ⊆ Cˆ.
Proof. Since Dˆ is a maximal set of desirable options, we find by Proposition 5159, that(∀u ∈ V∖{0})(u ∈ Dˆ or −u ∈ Dˆ).
By Equation (2.22)62 its least informative compatible choice function CDˆ is given by
CDˆ(A) = {u ∈ A ∶ (∀v ∈ A)v−u ∉ Dˆ}= {u ∈ A ∶ (∀v ∈ A∖{u})v−u ∉ Dˆ} = {u ∈ A ∶ (∀v ∈ A∖{u})u−v ∈ Dˆ}
for all A inQ, where the second equality follows from the fact that 0 ∉ Dˆ by Axiom D157
and the third one because Dˆ is maximal. As an intermediate result, we will show that∣CDˆ(A)∣ = 1 for any A inQ. Consider any A inQ and assume ex absurdo that there are
u1 and u2 in V such that u1 and u2 belong CDˆ(A) and u1 ≠ u2. Then(∀v ∈ A∖{u1})u1−v ∈ Dˆ and (∀v ∈ A∖{u2})u2−v ∈ Dˆ,
so in particular u1−u2 ∈ Dˆ and u2−u1 ∈ Dˆ, whence 0 ∈ Dˆ by Axiom D457, contradicting
Axiom D157. This implies that ∣CDˆ(A)∣ = 1 for all A in Q, because ∣CDˆ(A)∣ = 0 is
impossible since CDˆ is coherent by Proposition 5462.
We finish the proof by showing that then CDˆ is a maximal choice function. Assume
ex absurdo that it is not, then CDˆ ⊏C for some C in C, so C(A) ⊆CDˆ(A) for all A inQ,
and C(A′) ⊂CDˆ(A′) for at least one A′ inQ. Since ∣CDˆ(A′)∣ = 1, therefore ∣C(A′)∣ = 0,
so C(A′) =∅, a contradiction with the coherence [Axiom C120] of C.
Recall that we have shown in Proposition 4652 that Cˆ ≠∅, but we were unable
to find explicit examples of maximal choice functions there. The maximal
choice functions {CDˆ ∶ Dˆ ∈ Dˆ} are the first maximal choice functions we en-
counter, and are therefore interesting in their own right. An important question
is the following: can all the maximal choice functions be written as CDˆ with Dˆ
in Dˆ?
Interestingly, and related to this, Proposition 62 comes in handy in showing
that the class of all choice functions is a belief structure.
Definition 25 (Belief structure [23, Definition 1]). Consider any class of belief
models B, partially ordered by ⊑B, and the set of coherent ones B, inheriting
the partial order ⊑B. The structure (B;B;⊑B) is called a belief structure if it
satisfies the following three properties:
B1. (B;⊑B) is a complete lattice;
B2. (B;⊑B) is an intersection structure, meaning that B is closed under arbi-
trary infima: for any subset B of B, its infimum infB belongs to B;
B3. (B;⊑B) has no top.
Proposition 63. (C;C;⊑) is a belief structure.
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Proof. That (C;⊑) is a complete lattice follows from Proposition 3847. That (C;⊑)
is an intersection structure follows from Proposition 4048. Finally, that (C;⊑) has no
top follows from the fact that sets of desirable options are a belief structure22 [31],
so (D;⊆) has no top. Since by Proposition 62 every maximal element of D induces a
different maximal element of C, therefore indeed (C;⊑) has indeed no top either.
2.8.6 Connection with probability
Desirability is more general than most of the imprecise-probabilistic models,
and therefore also more general than (classical) probability. Below, we give a
concise overview of the relationship between desirability and most of the more
popular (imprecise-)probabilities models, which is summarised in Figure 2.4.
We consider lower previsions, sets of linear previsions, and probability mass
functions, and work with the option space V = L(X) of gambles on the finite
possibility space X, ordered by the standard point-wise ordering ≤. There are
other models, such as full conditional probabilities—that allow for condition-
ing on arbitrary events, just like sets of desirable gambles, as we will see in
Chapter 6205—which we do not consider here.
mass functions p
linear previsions E
lower previsions P
sets of linear previsions K
sets of desirable gambles D
preference relations ½
choice functions C
choice relations ⊲
Figure 2.4: Schematic overview of the relationship between models we con-
sider
Lower previsions
Sets of desirable gambles—and therefore also choice models—are connected
with probability via lower previsions. A lower prevision P∶L(X) → R and
upper prevision P∶L(X)→ R are real-valued functionals whose domains are
the set of all gambles. Consider any gamble f . Its lower prevision P( f ) is
22They are even a strong belief structure, meaning that it is a belief structure that is moreover
dually atomic.
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the subject’s supremum buying price for f , and its upper prevision P( f ) is
the subject’s infimum selling price for f . Since selling f for a price µ ∈ R
is equivalent to buying − f for a price −µ , the lower prevision P and upper
prevision P are related: P( f ) = −P(− f ). We therefore can focus on either one
of them; it is customary to focus on lower previsions.
Historically, lower previsions were first studied in 1975 by Willams [84].
Later on, they were addressed in much more detail in 1991 by Walley [82].
Since then, they are widely used as a very general imprecise-probabilistic
model; see References [51, 52, 72] for an overview.
Given a set of desirable gambles D ⊆ L(X), we associate with it a lower
prevision PD , defined as
PD( f ) ∶= sup{µ ∈R ∶ f −µ ∈D} for all f in L(X). (2.24)
Since finding the gamble f −µ desirable is equivalent to preferring to buy f
for the price µ , over the status quo—not buying nor selling anything—, this
lower prevision indeed specifies the supremum buying price for any gamble.
We call P coherent if there is some coherent set D of desirable gambles such
that P = PD .
Given a coherent choice function C on L(X), it induces through Equa-
tions (2.18)61 and (2.24) a coherent lower prevision PC ∶= PDC , which is given
by
PC( f ) = sup{µ ∈R ∶ 0 ∉C({0, f −µ})} = sup{µ ∈R ∶ {0} ⊲C { f −µ}} (2.25)
for all f in L(X).
We are now looking for some kind of inverse operation: given a coherent
lower prevision P, we want to find a corresponding set of desirable gambles
D that induces P (in other words, such that PD = P), and such that D is as
least informative as possible. Generally speaking, different sets of desirable
gambles may induce the same lower prevision, as illustrated in Figure 2.5,
where we have the binary possibility space {H,T}.
This is why in general coherent sets of desirable gambles are more informative
than coherent lower previsions—and, as we will see below, therefore also more
informative than (sets of) probability mass functions—as a belief model.
Given a coherent lower prevision P on L(X), the least informative—
smallest—coherent set of desirable gambles DP that induces P is given by
(see Reference [82, Section 3.8.1] who also introduces the term set of strictly
desirable gambles for DP )
DP ∶=L(X)>0∪{ f ∈L(X) ∶ P( f ) > 0}, (2.26)
and the least informative coherent choice function CP that induces P through
Equation (2.25) is by Equation (2.26) and Proposition 5462 given by CDP , or
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f
f −µ
PD( f )
H
T
f
f −µ
PD( f )
H
T
H
T
DPD
Figure 2.5: Left and middle: two different sets of desirable gambles inducing
the same lower prevision. Closed border segments are indicated by full lines,
and open ones by dashed lines. Right: set of strictly desirable gambles based
on the lower prevision PD from the left and middle figure.
explicitly, by
CP(A) ∶={ f ∈ A ∶ (∀g ∈ A)g− f ∉DP}={ f ∈ A ∶ (∀g ∈ A)(g /> f and P(g− f ) ≤ 0)} for all A in Q(L(X)).
(2.27)
Probability mass functions and linear previsions
A probability mass function is an element of the unit simplex ΣX in the linear
space RX of all real-valued maps on X:
ΣX ∶= {p ∈RX ∶ (∀x ∈X)p(x) ≥ 0 and ∑
x∈X p(x) = 1}.
A linear prevision—also called expectation operator—is an operator E onL(X) that satisfies:23
(i) E( f ) ≥min f ;
(ii) E( f +g) = E( f )+E(g);
(iii) E(λ f ) = λE( f ),
for all f and g in L(X) and λ in R. We collect all linear previsions on L(X) in
the set PX . Every linear prevision is in particular a coherent lower prevision.
There is a connection between mass functions and linear previsions. With
every mass function p, we let Ep be the corresponding linear prevision Ep be
given by
Ep( f ) ∶= ∑
x∈X p(x) f (x) for all f in L(X).
Ep( f ) is the weighted average of the values of f , according to the (probability)
masses determined by p. The linear prevision Ep satisfies Conditions (i)–(iii).
23Actually, Property (iii) is a consequence of Properties (i) and (ii); see for instance Theo-
rem 2.8.4 of Reference [82] and Theorem 4.16 of Reference [72].
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Conversely, any linear prevision E determines a probability mass function pE
by means of indicators of elementary events:
pE(x) ∶= E(I{x}) for all x in X.
Using some basic algebra, we see that EpE = E and pEp = p for every linear
prevision E and every probability mass function p. So we see that linear previ-
sions and probability mass functions are in a one-to-one correspondence with
each other.
Sets of linear previsions
Equivalent to lower previsions, we can consider closed and convex sets of lin-
ear previsionsK ⊆PX . Given a coherent lower prevision P onL(X), we define
the set of dominated linear previsions:
KP ∶= {P∈ PX ∶ (∀ f ∈L(X))P( f ) ≥ P( f )}.
This is a closed and convex non-empty subset of PX . Conversely, given a
closed and convex non-empty subset K of PX , it can be shown (see Refer-
ence [82, Section 3.3.3]) that PK , defined by
PK( f ) ∶=min{E( f ) ∶ E ∈K} for all f in L(X)
is a coherent lower prevision. Coherent lower previsions and closed and con-
vex non-empty sets of linear previsions are in a one-to-one correspondence
with each other. Moreover, due to the equivalence between linear previsions
and probability mass functions, we can equivalently use a subset M of ΣX to
define a lower prevision PM ∶= PKM , whereKM ∶= {Ep ∶ p ∈M}.
Given a closed and convex set K of linear previsions, or a closed and con-
vex set M of probability mass functions for that matter, the least informa-
tive coherent choice function compatible with it (induces PK or PM by Equa-
tion (2.25)72) is the one given by Equation (2.27)↶ that is based on the coher-
ent lower prevision PK , or PM. In Section 2.1081 we will see other coherent
choice functions that are compatible with a given set of probability mass func-
tionsM, and the assumption thatM needs to be convex or closed can even be
dropped. Interestingly, Seidenfeld et al.’s [67] coherent choice functions are
in a one-to-one correspondence with (arbitrary) non-empty sets of probability
mass functions and utility pairs.
2.8.7 Archimedeanity revisited
Seidenfeld et al.’s [67] extra rationality axiom besides Property C525, which
allows them to prove their well-known representation result for coherent
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choice functions (that their coherent choice functions are dually atomic), is
an Archimedean one, as already mentioned in Section 2.428. In Reference [86,
Proposition 6], Zaffalon and Miranda show that the vacuous set of desirable
options satisfies a pair-wise variant of Archimedeanity only in some patho-
logical cases, and conclude from this that desirability is incompatible with
Archimedeanity. We have adopted their arguments, ignoring the fact that
the result in Reference [86, Proposition 6] holds for a pair-wise variant of
Archimedeanity, and not necessarily for the version of Archimedeanity that
Seidenfeld et al. [67] use.
Using the version of Archimedeanity that Seidenfeld et al. [67] consider,
we set out to do something similar here in the context of choice functions,
thereby strengthening our reasons for not adopting the Archimedean axiom.
Translated from horse lotteries to option spaces, and from choice relations
to rejection functions, Seidenfeld et al.’s [67] Archimedean axiom (see Sec-
tion 2.428) can be written as:
For all A, A′, A′′, A′i and A′′i (for i in N) in Q such that the sequence A′i
converges point-wise to A′ and the sequence A′′i converges point-wise to A′′:
a. if (∀i ∈N)A′′i ⊆ R(A′i ∪A′′i ) and A′ ⊆ R(A∪A′) then A′′ ⊆ R(A∪A′′);
b. if (∀i ∈N)A′′i ⊆ R(A′i ∪A′′i ) and A ⊆ R(A∪A′′) then A ⊆ R(A∪A′).
Example 7. Consider the option space V =L of gambles on a finite possibility
space X, and consider any maximal set of desirable gambles Dˆ ⊆ L. Let f
be a gamble on the boundary of Dˆ that also belongs to Dˆ, so that f ∈ Dˆ and(∀ε ∈R>0) f −ε ∉ Dˆ, and therefore, by Proposition 5159, (∀ε ∈R>0)− f +ε ∈ Dˆ.
We let correspond with Dˆ its least informative coherent compatible rejection
function RDˆ , which, as we will see, is not Archimedean. Consider indeed the
following option sets, for every i in N:
A ∶= {0}, A′i ∶= {− f + 2i }→ A′ ∶= {− f} and A′′i ∶= { f + 1i }→ A′′ ∶= { f}.
Consider any i in N. Then A′′i ⊆ RDˆ(A′i ∪A′′i ) since − f + 2i −( f + 1i ) = −2 f + 1i
belongs to Dˆ. Furthermore, A′ ⊆ RDˆ(A∪A′) since 0−(− f ) = f ∈ Dˆ. But A′′ ⊈
RDˆ(A ∪A′′), contradicting Archimedeanity. Indeed: A′′ ⊆ RDˆ(A ∪A′′) means
f ∈ RDˆ({0, f}) or, in other words, − f ∈ Dˆ, a contradiction. ◊
This shows that (at least some) maximal choice functions (based on binary
choice) are not compatible with the Archimedean axioms considered in Sei-
denfeld et al. [67]. Since it uses the version of Archimedeanity that Seidenfeld
et al. [67] use, this observation is, in our context, all the more a reason to let
go off the Archimedeanity.
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2.9 REJECTION SETS
As we have come to appreciate in the previous sections, one of the drawbacks
of choice models is the technical difficulty in verifying the coherence axioms.
In this section, we try to remedy this situation somewhat by providing an equiv-
alent representation of choice functions in terms of those option sets that allow
a subject to reject the zero option, which may be interpreted as those option
sets that he should consider preferable to the status quo. We call them rejec-
tion sets. As we will see, this representation, in addition to capturing more
intuitively the ideas underlying coherence, also helps simplify the verification
of coherence in a number of particular cases.
2.9.1 A representation in terms of rejection sets
We give an equivalent representation of choice functions in terms of rejection
sets.
Definition 26 (Rejection set). For any option u and any natural number i, let
Ku,i ∶= {A ∈Q ∶ u ∈ R(A) and ∣A∣ = i} and Ku ∶=⋃
i∈NKu,i. (2.28)
We call Ku the rejection set of u.
Ku,i is the collection of those option sets A of cardinality i such that u is re-
jected from A. Definition 26 provides an alternative representation for rejection
functions R (or choice functions for that matter): Given any u in V and A inQ such that u ∈ A, the rejection set Ku determines whether or not u belongs to
R(A). Indeed, u ∈ R(A)⇔ A ∈Ku,∣A∣⇔ A ∈Ku, and checking this for every u
in V and A in Q such that u ∈ A fixes the entire rejection function.
We are going to characterise coherent choice functions in terms of these
rejection sets. We can restrict our attention to the case u = 0:
Proposition 64. Consider any choice function C and the family of rejection
sets {Ku ∶ u ∈ V} it induces by means of Equation (2.28). Then
C satisfies Axiom C4b20⇔ (∀u ∈ V)K0+{u} =Ku.
Proof. For necessity, consider any option set A that includes 0. Then the option set
A +{u} includes u, and since by Axiom R4b20 it holds that R(A +{u}) = R(A)+{u},
we conclude that A ∈K0 if and only if A+{u} ∈K f .
Conversely, for sufficiency, consider any option set A and any option u in V and
any v ∈ R(A), then A ∈Kv, whence by assumption A −{v} ∈K0 and as a consequence
A +{−v+(u+v)} = A +{u} ∈Ku+v. Then indeed u+v ∈ R(A +{u}), so Axiom C4b20
holds.
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Taking this result into account, in what follows we will restrict our attention
to rejection sets for whichK0+{u}=Ku for every u in V. We can then simplify
the notation above to
Ki ∶=K0,i = {A ∈Q ∶ 0 ∈ R(A) and ∣A∣ = i} and K ∶=K0 = {A ∈Q ∶ 0 ∈ R(A)},
(2.29)
respectively. We can think of K as a straightforward generalisation of a set
of desirable options DC: just as every element u of D is strictly preferred to
the zero option, similarly, for every element A of K, the zero option is rejected
from it. Note in particular the correspondence betweenK2 and sets of desirable
options:
K2 = {{0,u} ∶ u ∈ V and 0 ∈ R({0,u})} = {{0,u} ∶ u ∈DC}.
Our next result provides a characterisation of the different coherent axioms in
terms of these sets:
Proposition 65. Consider any choice function C that satisfies Axiom C4b20,
and consider the sets Ki and K defined in Equation (2.29). Then C satisfies
Axiom
(i) C120 if and only if (∀A ∈Q0)(∃u ∈ A)A−{u} ∉K;
(ii) C220 if and only if (∀u ∈ V≻0){0,u} ∈K2;
(iii) C3a20 if and only if (∀A ∈K,A′ ∈Q0)(A ⊆ A′⇒ A′ ∈K);
(iv) C3b20 if and only if (∀A ∈K,u ∈ A∖{0})(A−{u} ∈K⇒ A∖{u} ∈K);
(v) C4a20 if and only if (∀A ∈Q0,λ ∈R>0)(A ∈K⇔ λA ∈K).
Proof. (i) Taking Axiom C4b20 into account, Axiom C120 holds if and only if
C(A) ≠ ∅ for every A ∈Q0. This in turn is equivalent to u ∈C(A) for some u
in A, which by Axiom C4b20 is equivalent to 0 ∈C(A −{u}) or, in other words,
to A−{u} ∉K.
(ii) Under Axiom C4b20, Axiom C220 is equivalent to (∀u ∈ V≻0)0 ∉C({0,u}), or,
in other words, to (∀u ∈ V≻0){0,u} ∈K2.
(iii) This is immediate, taking Proposition 2438 into account.
(iv) This is immediate, taking Proposition 2539 into account.
(v) This is immediate, taking Proposition 2740 into account.
An immediate consequence is:
Corollary 66. A choice function C is coherent if and only if it satisfies Ax-
iom C4b20 and the rejection set K it induces by Equation (2.29) is increasing,
scale invariant, contains {0,u} for every u ∈ V≻0 and satisfies the following
two properties:
(i) (∀A ∈Q0)(∃u ∈ A)A−{u} ∉K;
(ii) (∀A ∈K,∀u ∈ A)(A−{u} ∈K⇒ A∖{u} ∈K).
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The ‘at most as informative as’ relation ⊑ can be expressed very easily
using rejection sets: let K be the rejection set of choice function C, and K′ the
rejection set of choice function C′, then C ⊑C′⇔K ⊆K′. Next we characterise
the two additional Properties C525 and C625.
Proposition 67. Consider any choice function C that satisfies Axiom C4b20.
Then C satisfies Property C525 if and only if(∀A1 ∈K,∀A ∈Q0)(A ⊆ A1 ⊆ conv(A)⇒ A ∈K). (2.30)
Moreover, C satisfies Property C625 if and only if for all n in N, all u1, . . . , un
in V and all µ1, . . . , µn in R>0:{0,u1,u2, . . . ,un} ∈K⇔ {0,µ1u1, . . . ,µnun} ∈K.
Proof. The second statement is immediate, so it suffices to show the first statement.
For necessity, application of Property C525 tells us that, whenever A ⊆ A1 ⊆ conv(A),
then 0 ∈ R(A1) implies that 0 ∈ R(A), or, in other words, that A1 ∈K implies that A ∈K.
Conversely, for sufficiency, consider two option sets A and A1 such that A ⊆ A1 ⊆
conv(A). Consider any u in C(A), then we want to show that u ∈C(A1). From u ∈C(A),
infer using Axiom C4b that 0 ∈C(A−{u}), or, in other words, that A−{u} ∉K. On the
other hand, A ⊆ A1 ⊆ conv(A) implies A −{u} ⊆ A1 −{u} ⊆ conv(A)−{u} = conv(A −{u}). So the assumption and A −{u} ∉ K implies that A1 −{u} ∉ K, or equivalently,
that u ∈C(A1). Hence indeed C(A) ⊆C(A1).
2.9.2 Particular cases
In this section, we consider a number of particular cases of choice functions
for which the representation in terms of rejection sets simplifies somewhat.
Purely binary choice functions
Let us characterise a purely binary choice function CD , with D a set of desirable
options. Quite interestingly, but not surprisingly, its representation in terms of
rejection sets takes a simpler form—we only need the binary rejection set K2
of cardinality two:
Proposition 68. Consider any coherent set of desirable options D and let K
be the rejection set of CD . Then K2 = {{0,u} ∶ u ∈D} and
K = {A ∈Q0 ∶ {0,u} ⊆ A for some u ∈D} = {A ∈Q0 ∶ (∃A1 ∈K2)A1 ⊆ A}.
Proof. Consider any option set A in K. By Proposition 5564, infer that 0 ∈ RD(A) if
and only if A∩D ≠∅ and 0 ∈A. If ∣A∣ = 2, then this implies that A = {0,u} for some u in
D, and as a consequence, infer already that K2 ⊇ {{0,u} ∶ u ∈D}. Conversely, consider
any A′ inK2. Then A′ = {0,v} for some v in V. But since 0 ∈RD(A′), we have v ∈D, so
K2 ⊆ {{0,u} ∶ u ∈ D}, showing that indeed K2 = {{0,u} ∶ u ∈ D}. If, on the other hand,∣A∣ ≥ 3, then A ⊇ {0,u} for some u in D. But then 0 ∈ RD({0,u}), so A ⊇ A′ for some A′
in K2, and therefore indeed K = {A ∈Q0 ∶ (∃A1 ∈K2)A1 ⊆ A}.
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Coherent choice functions on binary spaces
Next, we consider coherent choice functions defined on gambles on binary
possibility spaces. It turns out that, under Property C625, they are determined
by rejection sets of cardinality two or three:
Proposition 69. Consider any coherent choice function C on the set of gamblesL(X) on a binary possibility space X: ∣X∣ = 2. If C satisfies Property C625,
then
K = {A ∈Q0 ∶ (∃A1 ∈K2∪K3)A1 ⊆ A}.
Proof. Let us prove that for every A inK there is some A1 inK2∪K3 for which A1 ⊆A.
Consider any A in K. By applying Proposition 3142 to the option set A ∩L≤0, we
find, since max(A ∩L≤0) = {0} and (A ∩L≤0)∖max(A) = A ∩L<0, that A ∩L<0 ⊆
R(A ∩L≤0), so Axiom R3a20 implies that then A ∩L<0 ⊆ R(A). Since A ∈ K and
therefore also 0 ∈ R(A), by Axiom R3b20 [with A˜ ∶= A∩L<0, A˜1 ∶= {0}∪(A∩L<0) and
A˜2 ∶= A, so A˜1 ∖ A˜ = {0} and A˜2 ∖ A˜ = A ∩Lc<0] we find that then 0 ∈ R(A ∩Lc<0) and
hence also A ∩Lc<0 ∈K, so we can assume without loss of generality that A ∩L<0 =∅.
There are two possibilities.
If A ∩L>0 ≠∅, then for any f in A ∩L>0, Axiom C220 implies that 0 ∈ R({0, f}),
whence the set {0, f} ⊆ A belongs to K2. So we find indeed that A1 ∶= {0, f} in K2 and
A1 ⊆ A.
If A ∩L>0 = ∅, then we have A = { f1, . . . , fn,g1, . . . ,gm} for some n ≥ 0 and m ≥ 0
but max{m,n} ≥ 1, where fi belongs to the second quadrant (i.e., fi(a) < 0 < fi(b)) for
every i in {1, . . . ,n} and g j belongs to the fourth quadrant (i.e., g j(a) > 0 > g j(b)) for
every j in {1, . . . ,m}. Let λi ∶= −1fi(a) > 0 and µ j ∶= 1g j(a) > 0 for every i in {1, . . . ,n} and
j in {1, . . . ,m}. Then, applying Property C625, we find that
0 ∈ R(B) with B ∶= {0,λ1 f1, . . . ,λn fn,µ1g1, . . . ,µmgm}.
Observe that λi fi(a) = −1 for every i in {1, . . . ,n}. Letting i∗ ∶= argmax{λi fi(b) ∶ i ∈{1, . . . ,n}}, we infer that
λk fk(b) < λi∗ fi∗(b)⇒ λk fk ∈ R({λk fk,λi∗ fi∗})⇒ λk fk ∈ R(B) for all k in {1, . . . ,n},
where the first implication follows from Axiom R220 and the last implication follows
from Axiom R3a20. Similarly, µ jg j(a) = 1 for every j in 1, . . . ,m, and letting j∗ ∶=
argmax{µ jg j(b) ∶ j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}}, we infer that
µ`g`(b) < µ j∗g j∗(b)⇒ µ`g` ∈ R({µ`g`,µ j∗g j∗})⇒ µ`g` ∈ R(B) for all ` in {1, . . . ,m},
where again the first implication follows from Axiom R220 and the last implica-
tion follows from Axiom R3a20. If we now apply R3b20, we deduce that 0 ∈
R({0,λi∗ fi∗ ,µ j∗g j∗}), whence 0 ∈ R({0, fi∗ ,g j∗}), applying Property R625. Thus, we
have found a subset {0, fi∗ ,g j∗} of A with cardinality three that also belongs to K.
Proposition 69 depends crucially on the assumption that ∣X∣ = 2, as our next
example shows. This example is heavily based on Reference [53]
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Example 8. Consider a ternary possibility space X, some n in N, and let fk
be the gamble given by fk ∶= (−1, kn ,− k2n2 ), for all k in {1, . . . ,n}. Let us first
show that for each k in {1, . . . ,n} we can find an expectation operator Ek that
satisfies Ek( fk) > 0 > Ek( f j) for every j in {1, . . . ,n}∖{k}.
To find such expectation operators, let E be the expectation operator as-
sociated with the probability mass function (0, 2kn+2k , nn+2k). Then E( fk − f j) =
k− j
n(n+2k)(2k− (k+ j)) = (k− j)2n(n+2k) ≥ 0, whence E( fk − f j) > 0 if k ≠ j. Moreover,
E( fk) = k2n(n+2k) > 0.
If we now consider any λ in (0,1) and define Ek as the expectation operator
associated with the probability mass function (λ ,(1−λ) 2kn+2k ,(1−λ) nn+2k), we
obtain Ek( fk − f j) = (1−λ)E( fk − f j) > 0 whenever k ≠ j. Moreover, Ek( fk) =−λ +(1−λ)E( fk) and Ek( f j) = −λ +(1−λ)E( f j), so24
Ek( fk) > 0⇔ λ < E( fk)1+E( fk) and Ek( f j) < 0⇔ λ > E( f j)1+E( f j) .
Since, for every j in {1, . . . ,n}∖{k}, E( f j)1+E( f j) < E( fk)1+E( fk) because E( f j) <E( fk),
we let λ be an arbitrary element of
( max
j∈{1,...,n}∖{k} E( f j)1+E( f j) , E( fk)1+E( fk)),
and for this λ we find that Ek( fk) > 0 > Ek( f j) for every j ≠ k.
(−1,0,0) fk
Figure 2.6: Illustration of the gambles involved in Example 8
24E( fk) > 0 implies that 1+E( fk) ≠ 0; to prove that 1+E( f j) ≠ 0, note that E( f j) = j(2k− j)n(n+2k) ,
so 1+E( f j) = j(2k− j)+n(n+2k)n(n+2k) is equal to 0 if and only if j(2k− j)+n(n+2k) = 0, because the
denominator of 1+E( f j) is strictly positive. Observe that j(2k− j)+n(n+2k)= j2−2k j−2kn+n2
is equal to 0 if and only if j = 2k±2(k+n)2 = k± (k+ n), which is impossible since j belongs to{1, . . . ,n}.
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Now, let Dk be the coherent set of gambles given by Dk ∶= { f ∈L ∶ Ek( f ) >
0}, and let CDk be its least informative compatible coherent choice function.
Then, by Proposition 4048, the choice function C ∶= inf{CDk ∶ k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}}
is also coherent, and by Proposition 5665 it satisfies Property C625. If we
now consider the option set A = {0, f1, . . . , fn}, we find that CDk(A) = { fk} for
every k in {1, . . . ,n}, since Ek( fk) > 0 > Ek( f j) implies that both fk and fk − f j
belong to Dk, for every j in {1, . . . ,n}∖{k}. As a consequence, we find that
C(A) = { f1, . . . , fn}, whence A ∈K. However, for every k in {1, . . . ,n} it holds
that CDk(A∖{ fk}) = {0}, using again that Ek( f j) < 0 for every j ≠ k, therefore
C(A∖{ fk}) = A∖{ fk}. Therefore A has no proper subset that also belongs to
the rejection set K. ◊
It is a consequence of coherence that a choice function is uniquely deter-
mined by those option sets that allow us to reject the zero option, i.e., those
that are considered preferable to the status quo. In this section, we have inves-
tigated the structure of these sets and shown that the coherence axioms can be
expressed rather elegantly and intuitively in terms of these sets. In addition,
we have shown that all the necessary information is given by option sets of
cardinality two for purely binary choice functions, and with cardinality two
or three when the possibility space is binary and the choice function satisfies
Property C625. Moreover, we have shown that this last result does not extend to
larger possibility spaces: determining an analogous representation for arbitrary
spaces is an important open problem.
2.10 EXAMPLES OF COHERENT CHOICE FUNCTIONS
Given a coherent set of desirable options, we can define a coherent choice
function by selecting undominated elements as in Equation (2.22)62. How-
ever, these are not the only possible coherent choice functions: for instance,
any infimum of such coherent choice functions (see Definition 2465) is still co-
herent. This observation gives a procedure to define coherent choice functions
complying with a sensitivity analysis interpretation, where the underlying un-
certainty model is that of coherent sets of desirable options: we may consider
a set D of possible models and then the set of coherent choice functions they
determine; by taking the infimum of this set we end up choosing those options
that are considered acceptable by at least one of the possible models.
To end this chapter about coherent choice functions, let us give some inter-
esting examples of coherent choice functions that are sometimes considered in
the literature.
Example 9. Consider again the two-dimensional option space V = L of gam-
bles on the binary possibility space X = {H,T}, and let D1 an D2 be the coher-
ent sets of desirable options given by
D1 = { f ∈L(X) ∶ f (H)+ f (T) > 0} and D2 = { f ∈L(X) ∶ 2 f (H)+ f (T) > 0}.
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Then the choice function C = inf{CD1 ,CD2} is coherent. If we denote arbitrary
gambles f in L(X) as f = ( f (H), f (T)), and if we consider for instance the
option set A = {(4,−4),(2,−1),(0,0),(−1,2)}, we obtain
C(A) = inf{CD1 ,CD2}(A) =CD1(A)∪CD2(A) = {(2,−1),(−1,2),(4,−4)}.
The first two options are elements of CD1(A) and the last one is an element of
CD2(A). ◊
As special cases, we may consider ‘infimum of purely binary’ choice func-
tions where some additional condition is imposed on the coherent sets of de-
sirable options. We will investigate two such situations below, although others
are possible. In Definition 27, we focus only on sets of maximal coherent
sets of desirable options, which we introduced in Section 2.646, and found
first instances of in Section 2.855. Their interest lies in the fact that they are
related to probability mass functions, as discussed quite thoroughly in Refer-
ences [13, 31, 58] in the context of gambles.
Definition 27 (M-admissible choice function). If D ⊆ Dˆ is a set of maximal
coherent set of desirable options, the coherent choice function CD is called
M-admissible. We will also denote it by CMD as a reminder that the infimum is
taken over maximal sets.
In particular, we can consider the M-admissible choice functions for the setD = DˆD of all maximal coherent set of desirable options that include a coherent
set of desirable options D. In order not to overburden the notation, we let
CMD ∶=CMDˆD = inf{CDˆ ∶ Dˆ ∈ Dˆ and D ⊆ Dˆ}, (2.31)
and similarly to what we did before, we introduce the map
CM● ∶D→ C∶D↦CMD as defined in Equation (2.31)82.
The following result can be regarded as a particular case of Proposi-
tion 5866, where all the coherent sets of desirable options are maximal ones.
As we have seen there too, the diagram below commutes if we focus on sets
of desirable options, but this is no longer the case if we consider the more
informative model of coherent choice functions.
Proposition 70. Consider any coherent set of desirable options D′ ∈ D. Then
D′ =DCM
D′ and CD′ ⊑CMD′ .
Proof. Consider any u in V, then
u ∈ DCM
D′ ⇔ 0 ∉CMD′({0,u}) by Proposition 5361⇔ (∀Dˆ ∈ DˆD′)0 ∉CDˆ({0,u}) by Definition 2782⇔ (∀Dˆ ∈ DˆD′)u ∈ Dˆ by Proposition 5361⇔ u ∈⋂DˆD′⇔ u ∈ D′ by Proposition 5259,
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D′
CMD′ CD′
CM● Dˆ Cˆ
Figure 2.7: Commuting diagram for M-admissible choice functions
proving the first statement. It then follows from Proposition 5361 that D
′ is compatible
with CMD′ , and therefore from Proposition 5462 that CD′ = infCD′ ⊑ CMD′ .
The inequality in Proposition 70 can be strict—meaning that CD′ ⊏ CMD′ for
some coherent set of desirable options D′—as we will show in Example 1186
below.
As another special case, we consider choice functions associated with
Levi’s notion of E-admissibility [48, Chapter 5]. They are based on a non-
empty set of probability mass functions. Consider a finite possibility spaceX.
With any probability mass function p, we associate (as a special case of
Equation (2.26)72) a set of desirable gambles
Dp ∶=L>0∪{ f ∈L ∶ Ep( f ) > 0} (2.32)
and a choice function Cp defined for all A in Q by
Cp(A) ∶= { f ∈ A ∶ (∀g ∈ A)(Ep( f ) ≥ Ep(g) and f /< g)} for all A in Q. (2.33)
Proposition 71. The set of desirable gambles Dp and the choice function Cp
are coherent and compatible, and moreover Cp =CDp .
Proof. By Proposition 5462, it suffices to prove (a) that Dp is coherent; and (b) that
Cp =CDp .
(a) is proven in Reference [82, Appendix F], for instance. In order to make this
dissertation more self-contained, we provide an explicit proof here. That Axiom D157
holds, follows from 0 ∉ L>0 and Ep(0) = 0. Axiom D257 holds by definition. For
Axiom D357, consider any f in Dp and real λ in R>0, then 0 < f and therefore 0 <
λ f , or Ep( f ) > 0 and therefore Ep(λ f ) = λEp( f ) > 0, whence indeed λ f ∈ Dp . For
Axiom D457, consider any f and g in Dp , then there are three possibilities. The first is
that both f and g belong to L>0, and therefore also f +g ∈L>0. The second is that both
Ep( f ) > 0 and Ep(g) > 0, and therefore also Ep( f +g) = Ep( f )+Ep(g) > 0. And the
third is that, without loss of generality, Ep( f ) > 0 and g ∈ L>0, whence Ep(g) ≥ 0 and
therefore Ep( f +g) = Ep( f )+Ep(g) > 0. In all cases therefore indeed f +g ∈ Dp .
For (b), consider any A in Q, use Equation (2.22)62 to find that CDp (A) = { f ∈
A ∶ (∀g ∈ A)g − f ∉ Dp} and Equation (2.32) to find that g − f ∉ Dp ⇔ (g − f ∉L>0 and Ep(g− f ) ≤ 0). It then follows from Equation (2.33) that indeed Cp(A) =
CDp (A).
83
COHERENT CHOICE MODELS
This result allows us to introduce the following, second special case of ‘infi-
mum of purely binary’ choice functions.
Definition 28 (E-admissible choice function). With any non-empty set of prob-
ability mass functions M,25 we associate the corresponding E-admissible
choice function CEM ∶= inf{Cp ∶ p ∈M} =C{Dp ∶p∈M}.
Proposition 72. Given any non-empty set of probability mass functions M,
we have for all A in Q that
CEM(A) = { f ∈ A ∶ (∃p ∈M)Ep( f ) ∈ argmax
g∈A Ep(g)}∩Cv(A).
Proof. We infer from Definition 28 and Proposition 71↶ that
CEM(A) = ⋃
p∈MCDp (A) = ⋃p∈M{ f ∈ A ∶ (∀g ∈ A)g− f ∉ Dp},
where the last equality follows from Proposition 5462. Now
(∀g ∈ A)g− f ∉ Dp ⇔ (∀g ∈ A)( f /< g and Ep(g− f ) ≤ 0)⇔ f ∈Cv(A) and (∀g ∈ A)Ep(g− f ) ≤ 0),
where the first equivalence follows from Equation (2.32)↶, and the second from Propo-
sition 6169. Hence indeed
CEM(A) = ⋃
p∈M{ f ∈ A ∶ (∀g ∈ A)Ep(g− f ) ≤ 0}∩Cv(A)= { f ∈ A ∶ (∃p ∈M)(∀g ∈ A)Ep(g) ≤ Ep( f )}∩Cv(A).
The following proposition establishes a connection between M-admissible
and E-admissible choice functions.
Proposition 73. For any non-empty set of probability mass functions M,
CEM ⊑CMDˆM , where DˆM ∶=⋃p∈M DˆDp ⊆ Dˆ.
Proof. We consider any p in M and prove that CDp ⊑ CMDˆ{p} . The proof follows by
taking the infimum infp∈M over p ∈M on both sides of this inequality. Consider any
A inQ and assume that f ∈CMDˆ{p}(A), so there is some Dˆ in Dˆ{p} such that f ∈CDˆ(A),
or equivalently, (∀g ∈ A)g− f ∉ Dˆ. Hence (∀g ∈ A)g− f ∉ Dp , because Dp ⊆ Dˆ, and
therefore indeed f ∈CDp (A).
25Although Levi’s notion of E-admissibility was originally concerned with convex closed sets
of probability mass functions [48, Chapter 5], we impose no such requirement here on the setM.
84
2.10 EXAMPLES OF COHERENT CHOICE FUNCTIONS
The key for this result is that, for any probability mass function p, there is
in general more than one coherent set of desirable options D that is associated
with it by means of the formula
Ep( f ) = sup{µ ∈R ∶ f −µ ∈D}. (2.34)
Among all the coherent sets of desirable options satisfying Equation (2.34)
with respect to a fixed p, the least informative one is the one given by Equa-
tion (2.32)83, which is usually referred to as the set of strictly desirable gam-
bles associated with p within the imprecise probabilities literature. This in turn
gives rise to a coherent choice function that will be less informative than one
determined by a maximal set of options that is compatible with p by means of
Equation (2.34).
Thus, the choice between E-admissible and M-admissible coherent choice
functions can be made by considering our attitude towards imprecision, that
determines the use of strictly desirable or maximal sets of options: the former
are as conservative as possible, and make a choice only when it is implied by
the probability mass function p; while the latter are as informative as it can be
considering the axioms of coherence and the probability mass function p.
The following examples show why choice functions are more powerful
than sets of desirable options as uncertainty representations, and elucidate the
difference between E-admissible and M-admissible choice functions.
Example 10. Consider the situation where you have a coin with two identical
sides of unknown type:26 either both sides are heads (H), or both sides are tails
(T). The uncertain variable that represents the outcome of a coin flip assumes
a value in the finite possibility space X ∶= {H,T}. The options we consider are
gambles: real-valued functions on X, which constitute the two-dimensional
vector space RX , ordered by the pointwise order. We model this situation us-
ing (a) coherent sets of desirable gambles, (b) M-admissible choice functions,
and (c) E-admissible choice functions. In all three cases we start from two
simple models: one that describes practical certainty of H and another that
describes practical certainty of T, and we take their infimum—the most in-
formative model that is still at most as informative as either—as a candidate
model for the coin problem.
For (a), we use two coherent sets of desirable gambles DH and DT, express-
ing practical certainty of H and T, respectively, given by the maximal sets of
desirable gambles DH ∶=L>0∪{ f ∈L ∶ f (H)> 0} and DT ∶=L>0∪{ f ∈L ∶ f (T)>
0}. The model for the coin with two identical sides is then DH∩DT =L>0. This
vacuous model Dv is incapable of distinguishing between this situation and the
one where we are completely ignorant about the coin.
26The example can be trivially reformulated to consider an uncertain variable taking values in
a binary possibility space, with only one of those elements occurring; however we think the use of
a coin adds some intuition.
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For an approach (b) that distinguishes between these two situations, we
draw inspiration from Proposition 5766: instead of working with the sets of
desirable gambles themselves, we move to the corresponding choice functions
CH ∶=CDH and CT ∶=CDT , where
CH(A) = { f ∈ A ∶ (∀g ∈ A)g− f ∉DH} = argmax{ f (H) ∶ f ∈ A}∩Cv(A)= argmax{g(T) ∶ g ∈ argmax{ f (H) ∶ f ∈ A}}
CT(A) = argmax{ f (T) ∶ f ∈ A}∩Cv(A)= argmax{g(H) ∶ g ∈ argmax{ f (T) ∶ f ∈ A}}
for all A inQ. We infer that ∣CH(A)∣= ∣CT(A)∣=1 for every A inQ: for instance
in the case of CH, note that amongst all the options attaining the maximum
value on heads, exactly one of them is undominated. The M-admissible choice
function we are looking for is CM{DH,DT} = inf{CH,CT}, which selects at most
two options from each option set. It is given by
CM{DH,DT}(A) = (argmax{ f (H) ∶ f ∈ A}∪argmax{ f (T) ∶ f ∈ A})∩Cv(A)
for all A in Q, and differs from the vacuous choice function Cv. Indeed, con-
sider the particular option set A = { f ,g,h}, where f = (1,0), g = (0,1) and
h = (1/2,1/2). Then CM{DH,DT}(A) = { f ,g} ≠ A =Cv(A).
For (c), the set of probability mass functions M consists of the two de-
generate probability mass functions: M = {pH, pT}, where pH = (1,0) and
pT = (0,1). The corresponding expectations EH ∶= EpH and ET ∶= EpT satisfy
EH( f ) = f (H) and ET( f ) = f (T) for all f in L. So we see that CpH =CH and
CpT =CT, and therefore this approach leads to the same choice function as the
previous one: CE{pH,pT} =CM{DH,DT} = inf{CH,CT}. ◊
The example above shows that the correspondence between desirability
and choice functions is not a complete inf-homomorphism.
Example 11. In this example, we illustrate the difference between E-
admissible and M-admissible choice functions. We consider the same finite
possibility space X ∶= {H,T} as in Example 10↶, with the same option space
and vector ordering. For both E-admissibility and M-admissibility, we each
time consider the least informative choice functions: the E-admissible choice
function CEΣX associated with set of all probability mass functionsM=ΣX , and
the M-admissible choice function CMDv associated with the set of all maximal
sets of desirable gambles DˆDv = Dˆ. Since CEΣX and CMDv are the most conser-
vative E-admissible, respectively M-admissible choice functions, we wonder
about the relationship between them, as well as their relationship with the vac-
uous choice function Cv. We find that CEΣX ⊑CMDv . Indeed, consider any A inQ
and any f in CMDv(A), being equivalent to 0 ∈CMDv(A−{ f}) by Proposition 2740
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whence
f ∈CMDv(A)⇔ (∃Dˆ ∈ Dˆ)(∀g ∈ A−{ f})g ∉ Dˆ⇔ (∃Dˆ ∈ Dˆ)A−{ f}∩ Dˆ =∅.
Since for every Dˆ in Dˆ, there is some probability mass function p in ΣX such
that Dp ⊆ Dˆ [it suffices to consider the probability mass function p correspond-
ing with Dˆ], we find that
f ∈CMDv(A)⇒ (∃p ∈ ΣX)A−{ f}∩Dp =∅⇔ (∃p ∈ ΣX) f ∈CDp (A).
or in other words, f ∈ CMDv(A) implies that f ∈ CEΣX (A), whence CMDv(A) ⊆
CEΣX (A). By the definition of the vacuous choice function, we have as an
intermediate result that Cv ⊑CEΣX ⊑CMDv .
Both inequalities are strict; to show that Cv ≠CEΣX , consider the option set
A ∶= {0, f ,g}, where f = (1,−1/4) and g = (−1/4,1). Because all options in A are
point-wise undominated in A, we find that Cv(A) = A, and in particular, that
0 ∈Cv(A). On the other hand, it follows from Proposition 7284 that
0 ∈CEΣX (A)⇔ (∃p ∈ ΣX)(0 ≥ p(H)− 14 p(T) and 0 ≥ −14 p(H)+ p(T)),
which would imply that (∃p ∈ ΣX)(0 ≥ 34 p(H)+ 34 p(T)), which is impossible.
More importantly, we also have that CEΣX ≠CMDv . Consider the option set A ∶={0, f ,− f}, where f = (1,−1). Then for the specific probability mass function
p ∶= (1/2,1/2) ∈ ΣX , we find that 0 ∈Cp(A), whence 0 ∈CEΣX (A). To show that
0 ∈CEp(A), infer that 0 = Ep(0) = Ep( f ) = Ep(− f ), and use Proposition 7284
as a characterisation for the E-admissible choice functions. On the other hand,
0 ∈CMDv(A) is equivalent to f ∈ Dˆ and − f ∉ Dˆ for some Dˆ in Dˆ. But f ∉ Dˆ and− f ∉ Dˆ implies that − f ∈ Dˆ and f ∈ Dˆ by Proposition 5159, a contradiction. So
0 ∉CMDv(A), whence CEΣX ≠CMDv .
This example shows that Cv =CDv =CD ⊏CEΣX ⊏CDˆ =CMDv . ◊
We can interpret the example above in terms of choice relations, in the fol-
lowing manner: in the case of a complete preference relation we always have
that {0} ⊲C {u,−u} for every option u. This is not the case for those induced
by sets of strictly desirable gambles, such as the coherent choice function Cp
in Example 11, which therefore cannot be obtained as infima of a family of
complete choice relations (as are those given by M-admissibility).
There are other coherent sets of desirable gambles that can be associated
with a probability mass function and that are intermediate between the strictly
desirable and the maximal ones. One example are the so-called lexicographic
sets of desirable gambles, which we will investigate in detail in Chapter 4125.
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Taking into account Proposition 4048, we can also define coherent choice func-
tions by taking the infimum of a family of coherent choice functions deter-
mined by such lexicographic sets. As we will see, this provides another ex-
ample of coherent choice function that admits an axiomatic characterisation in
some cases.
To conclude this section, we want to mention that there are other popular
choice rules besides maximality and E-admissibility, such as, amongst others,
Γ-maximin, Γ-maximax and interval dominance [71]. However, they are not
coherent: none of them is guaranteed to satisfy, amongst others, Axiom C4b20.
88
3
NATURAL EXTENSION
In the previous chapter, we have seen what a coherent choice function is, and
how it relates to other theories of uncertainty, through the connection with de-
sirability. We took for granted that the choice function is given, and coherent.
However, it is somewhat unrealistic to assume that the subject always spec-
ifies an entire choice function C: this means that he would have to specify for
every A in Q and every u in A whether or not he rejects u in A—whether or
not u belongs to R(A), or equivalently, whether or not u belongs to C(A)—
and this in a coherent fashion such that his assessment satisfies Axioms C120–
C420. Rather, a subject will typically specify a choice function only partially,
by specifying the rejection of some u from some A. We call this partial specifi-
cation of a choice function his assessment. Such an assessment can consist of
an arbitrary number of rejection statements; we do not want to rule out here
the possibility that the subject’s assessment consists of an uncountable collec-
tion of rejection statements. What does such an assessment imply about the
choice for other options and other option sets? In other words, given such an
assessment, what is the implied choice between other option sets, using only
the consequences of coherence?
We will define the natural extension, when it exists, as the least committal
coherent choice function that ‘extends’ a given assessment. In the following
section, we describe in more detail what assessments can look like, and what
we mean by ‘extending’ an assessment.
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3.1 ASSESSMENTS
The subject is typically allowed to make statements of the form “I reject u
from the option set B”,1 meaning that his rejection function R should satisfy
u ∈R(B)—and equivalently, that his choice function C should satisfy u ∉C(B).
He can express such a statement for several B in Q, and within one given B,
for several u in B. We do not require that, for a given B in Q, the subject
specifies the complete set R(B), nor that he considers all the option sets inQ to reject options from. Instead, we allow that, for some option sets B, he
provides a subset of R(B)—or equivalently that he precludes some options in
some B from being an element from C(B). From this discussion, it is already
apparent that it is more meaningful or natural to give assessments in terms of
rejection functions than in terms of choice functions.
Indeed, we cannot reverse the role of C and R here: it makes no sense that
the subject provides us with a subset of C(B), since assessing less—specifying
a smaller subset of C(B)—would correspond to a more informative and less
conservative choice. Therefore, he should either provide us with a superset
A of C(B) such that A ⊆ B, or with a subset of R(B). Both approaches are
equivalent, but the latter is more directly interpretable, which is why we will
assume here that the subject specifies his beliefs using rejection statements.
Formally, then, an assessment is a subset of
{(A,v) ∶ A ∈Q,v ∈ A},
whose elements are couples (B,u) whose interpretation is “the subject rejects
u from B”. At this point, we will require that the assessment should satisfy
Axiom R4b20: u is rejected from B if and only if 0 is rejected from B −{u}.
It therefore can be assumed that the subject gives his assessment directly in
the form of “I reject 0 from B”. Any assessment can therefore be reduced to a
subset of {(A,0) ∶ A ∈Q0},
or, equivalently and more directly, any assessment is simply a subset of Q0.
The subject collects option sets from which he rejects 0 in his assessment B ⊆Q0, which we regard as an incomplete specification of the subject’s choice
function. The interpretation is, again, that he rejects 0 from every B in B.
Ideally, we want to ‘extend’ the assessment B to a coherent rejection func-
tion R that reflects the information in B, in the sense that 0 ∈ R(B) for every B
in B:
Definition 29 (Extending an assessment). Given any assessment B ⊆Q0 and
any rejection function R on Q, we say that R extends the assessment B if
0 ∈ R(B) for every B in B.
1Throughout, when such a statement is given, we silently assume that u belongs to B.
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Under certain conditions, it is possible to find an extension that is coherent, as
we will see in the following sections. At this point, we can already mention
that the property of extending an assessment is closed under (arbitrary) infima:
Proposition 74. Consider any assessment B ⊆Q0 and any non-empty collec-
tion R of rejection functions that extend B. Then infR extends B.
Proof. Since R extends B, we have that (∀B ∈ B)(∀R ∈R)0 ∈ R(B), and therefore
also that (∀B ∈ B)0 ∈⋂R∈R R(B) = (infR)(B), so infR indeed extends B.
Some assessments are stronger than others—or, in other words, imply oth-
ers. For instance, a subset of some assessment is again an assessment, which
is implied by—and therefore weaker than—the former one. Let us formalise
this.
Definition 30. Given any two assessments B1 ⊆Q0 and B2 ⊆Q0, we say thatB1 is at least as strong as B2 if (∀B2 ∈ B2)(∃B1 ∈ B1)B1 ≼ B2.
Let us verify whether a subset of an assessment is indeed at least as weak as
its original assessment. If B2 ⊆ B1, then (∀B2 ∈ B2)(∃B1 ∈ B1)B1 = B2, so by
Proposition 3343(i) and Definition 30, B1 is indeed at least as strong as B2. The
importance of this at least as strong as relation for assessments lies in the fol-
lowing proposition, which will be important for the proof of Corollary 88106.
Proposition 75. Consider any two assessments B1 ⊆Q0 and B2 ⊆Q0 such thatB1 is at least as strong as B2, and any coherent rejection function R on Q. If
R extends B1, then R extends B2.
Proof. Consider any B2 in B2. Then B1 ≼B2 for some B1 in B1, and therefore, because
R extends B1, we have that 0 ∈ R(B1). By Proposition 3444 then also 0 ∈ R(B2). Since
the choice of B2 was arbitrary in B2, we infer that 0 ∈ R(B2) for all B2 in B2, so R
indeed extends B2.
3.2 DEFINING THE NATURAL EXTENSION
Now that we have discussed how a subject may specify an incomplete assess-
ment B of his rejection function, we are ready to define the natural extension
of this assessment.
Definition 31 (Natural extension). Given any assessment B ⊆Q0, the natural
extension of B is the rejection function
E(B) ∶= inf{R ∈R ∶ (∀B ∈ B)0 ∈ R(B)} = inf{R ∈R ∶ R extends B},
where we let inf∅ be equal to idQ, the identity rejection function that maps
every option set to itself.
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We can equivalently define the natural extension as a choice function—
or a choice relation for that matter—instead of a rejection function, but that
turns out to be notationally more involved, which is why we have decided to
use rejection functions. The translation to the other types of choice models is
straightforward, also for the remaining results in this section.
Corollary 76. Consider any two assessments B1 ⊆Q0 and B2 ⊆Q0 such thatB1 is at least as strong as B2. Then E(B2) ⊑ E(B1).
Proof. By Proposition 75↶, {R ∈ R ∶ R extends B1} ⊆ {R ∈ R ∶ R extends B2}, and
therefore indeed E(B2) = inf{R ∈ R ∶ R extends B2} ⊑ inf{R ∈ R ∶ R extends B1} =E(B1).
Definition 31↶ is not very useful for practical inference purposes: it does
not provide an explicit constructive expression for E(B). To try and remedy
this, consider the special rejection function RB based on the assessment B,
defined as:
RB(A) ∶= {u ∈ A ∶ (∃A′ ∈Q)(A′ ⊇ A and (∀v ∈ {u}∪(A′∖A))
((A′−{v})∩V≻0 ≠∅ or (∃B ∈ B,∃µ ∈R>0){v}+µB ≼ A′))} (3.1)
for all A in Q.
Although the expression for RB seems involved and, admittedly, inelegant,
its interpretation should be clear. An option u can be rejected from A—is
an element of RB(A)—in two ways: by considering the option set A itself
(corresponding to choosing A′ = A in Equation (3.1)), or some strictly larger
option set A′ (corresponding to choosing A′ ⊃ A in Equation (3.1)).
Let us focus first on the case that A′ = A. Then there are again two ways
to reject an option u from A: trivially, meaning that u ≺ v for some v in A
(and equivalently (A − {u})∩V≻0 ≠ ∅, or equivalently u ∉ maxA), or using
the assessment B, meaning that {u}+µB ≼ A for some B in B and µ in R>0.
Taking into account coherence, and more particularly Axiom R420, 0 ∈ RB(B)
(and therefore also B ∈ B) implies u ∈ RB({u}+µB) for all µ in R>0, whence,
by Proposition 3444, {u}+µB ≼ A implies that u ∈ RB(A).
If on the other hand A′ ⊃ A, then an option u is rejected from A if u is
rejected from A′ and, additionally, all the supplementary options in A′ ∖A are
rejected from A′, using at least one of the two ways as before. The idea is that
then Axiom R3b20 guarantees that u is rejected from A.
The rejection function RB satisfies some interesting properties. For in-
stance, it always satisfies the rationality Axioms R220–R420.
Lemma 77. Consider any assessment B ⊆Q0. Then RB satisfies Axioms R220–
R420.
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Proof. We check Axioms R220–R420 in the following order: Axiom R220, R4a20 and
R4b20, and only then R3a20, and R3b20, because Propositions 2438 and 2539 then allow
us to prove easier equivalent variants of Axiom R320.
For Axiom R220, consider any u and v in V such that u ≺ v. We need to show
that u ∈ RB({u,v}), so consider the option set A ∶= {u,v}, and let A′ be equal to A in
Equation (3.1). Since u ≺ v, also 0 ≺ v−u, so (A′ −{u})∩V≻0 = {0,v−u}∩V≻0 ≠ ∅.
Therefore indeed 0 ∈ RB({u,v}).
For Axiom R4a20, we show that RB satisfies the equivalent version (R4a.1)21. So
consider any A in Q, λ in R>0 and u in A, and assume that u ∈ RB(A). Then there is
some A′ ⊇ A in Q such that
(∀v ∈ {u}∪(A′∖A))((A′−{v})∩V≻0 ≠∅ or (∃B ∈ B,∃µ ∈R>0){v}+µB ≼ A′).
(3.2)
We need to prove that then λu ∈ RB(λA), so consider the option set λA. Note that
λA′ ⊇ λA, and consider any v′ in {λu}∪(λA′ ∖λA)—so v′ = λv for some v in {u}∪(A′ ∖A). Infer that (A′ −{v})∩V≻0 ≠ ∅ implies that (λA′ −{v′})∩V≻0 ≠ ∅. Also,
by Proposition 3343(vi), (∃B ∈ B,∃µ ∈R>0){v}+µB ≼ A′ implies that (∃B′ ∈ B,∃µ ′ ∈
R>0){v′}+ µ ′B′ ≼ λA′ [consider B′ = B and µ ′ = λµ > 0]. Therefore indeed λu ∈
RB(λA).
For Axiom R4b20, we show that RB satisfies the equivalent version (R4b.1)21. So
consider any A inQ, and u and w in A, and assume that u ∈ RB(A). Then there is some
A′ ⊇ A such that Equation (3.2) holds. We need to prove that then u+w ∈ RB(A+{w}),
so consider the option set A+{w}. Note that A′+{w} ⊇A+{w}, and consider any v′ in{u+w}∪((A′+{w})∖(A+{w}))—so v′ = v+w for some v in {u}∪(A′∖A). Infer that
A′+{w}−{v+w} = A′−{v}—so (A′−{v})∩V≻0 ≠∅⇔ (A′+{w}−{v+w})∩V≻0 ≠∅. Also, by Proposition 3343 (v), {v}+µB ≼ A′ implies that {v′}+µB ≼ A′+{w}—so(∃B ∈B,∃µ ∈R>0){v}+µB ≼A′ implies that (∃B ∈B,∃µ ∈R>0){v′}+µB ≼A′+{w}.
Therefore indeed u+w ∈ RB(A+{w}).
For Axiom R3a20, due to Proposition 2438, and because we just have shown that
RB satisfies Axiom R4b20, it suffices to show that 0 ∈ RB(A)⇒ 0 ∈ RB(A ∪{u}) for
all A in Q and u in V. So consider any A in Q and u in V, and assume that 0 ∈ RB(A),
meaning that there is some A′ ⊇ A in Q such that
(∀v ∈ {0}∪(A′∖A))((A′−{v})∩V≻0 ≠∅ or (∃B ∈ B,∃µ ∈R>0){v}+µB ≼ A′).
(3.3)
We need to prove that then 0 ∈ RB(A ∪{u}): we need to find some A′′ ⊇ A ∪{u} in Q
such that
(∀v ∈ {0}∪(A′′∖(A∪{u})))((A′′−{v})∩V≻0 ≠∅ or (∃B ∈ B,∃µ ∈R>0){v}+µB ≼ A′′).
If u ∈ A, then the proof is done: it suffices to consider A′′ = A′, so assume that u ∉ A. We
state that the particular choice A′′ ∶= A′∪{u} ⊇ A∪{u} satisfies the equation above. To
prove this, infer first that {0}∪(A′′∖(A∪{u})) ⊆ {0}∪(A′∖A) [indeed, if u ∉A′, then{0}∪(A′′ ∖(A ∪{u})) = {0}∪(A′ ∖A); if on the other hand u ∈ A′, then {0}∪(A′′ ∖(A ∪{u})) = {0}∪ (A′ ∖ (A ∪{u})) ⊆ {0}∪ (A′ ∖A)]. Consider any v in {0}∪ (A′′ ∖(A∪{u})). Then v ∈ {0}∪(A′∖A), whence, by Equation (3.3) (A′−{v})∩V≻0 ≠∅—
implying that (A′′ −{v})∩V≻0 ≠ ∅ since A′ ⊆ A′′—or (∃B ∈ B,∃µ ∈ R>0){v}+µB ≼
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A′—by Proposition 3343(i) implying that (∃B ∈B,∃µ ∈R>0){v}+µB ≼ A′′. Therefore
indeed 0 ∈ RB(A∪{u}).
For Axiom R3b20, due to Proposition 2539, and because we have already shown that
RB satisfies Axiom R4b20, it suffices to show that 0 ∈ RB(A)⇒ 0 ∈ RB(A∖{u}) for all
A inQ and u in RB(A)∖{0}. So consider any A inQ and u in RB(A)∖{0}, and assume
that 0 ∈RB(A), meaning that there is some A′ ⊇A inQ such that Equation (3.3)↶ holds.
Because also u ∈ RB(A), there is some A′u ⊇ A in Q such that(∀v ∈ {u}∪(A′u∖A))((A′u−{v})∩V≻0 ≠∅ or (∃B ∈ B,∃µ ∈R>0){v}+µB ≼ A′u).
(3.4)
We need to prove that then 0 ∈ RB(A ∖{u}): we need to find some A′′ ⊇ A ∖{u} in Q
such that
(∀v ∈ {0}∪(A′′∖(A∖{u})))((A′′−{v})∩V≻0 ≠∅ or (∃B ∈ B,∃µ ∈R>0){v}+µB ≼ A′′).
We state that the particular choice A′′ ∶= A′ ∪A′u ⊇ A ∖{u} satisfies the equation above.
To prove this, infer first that {0}∪(A′′∖(A∖{u})) = ({0}∪(A′∖(A∖{u})))∪({0}∪(A′u ∖ (A ∖{u}))) = ({0}∪ (A′ ∖A))∪ (A′u ∖ (A ∖{u})) = ({0}∪ (A′ ∖A))∪ ({u}∪(A′u ∖A)). Consider any v in {0}∪ (A′′ ∖ (A ∖ {u})). Then v ∈ {0}∪ (A′ ∖A) or
v ∈ {u}∪(A′u∖A). If v ∈ {0}∪(A′∖A), then by Equation (3.3)↶ (A′−{v})∩V≻0 ≠∅—
implying that (A′′ −{v})∩V≻0 ≠ ∅ since A′ ⊆ A′′—or (∃B ∈ B,∃µ ∈ R>0){v}+µB ≼
A′—by Proposition 3343(i) implying that (∃B ∈B,∃µ ∈R>0){v}+µB ≼A′′. If v ∈ {u}∪(A′u ∖A), then by Equation (3.4) (A′u − {v})∩V≻0 ≠ ∅—implying that (A′′ − {v})∩V≻0 ≠∅ since A′u ⊆ A′′—or (∃B ∈ B,∃µ ∈R>0){v}+µB ≼ A′u—by Proposition 3343(i)
implying that (∃B ∈ B,∃µ ∈ R>0){v}+ µB ≼ A′′. Therefore indeed 0 ∈ RB(A ∖{u}).
A second interesting property of RB is that it extends B. This is necessary if
we want to use RB as a more constructive expression for the natural extension.
Lemma 78. Consider any assessment B ⊆Q0. Then RB extends B.
Proof. By Definition 2990, we need to prove that 0 ∈RB(B) for all B in B. So consider
any B in B. By Equation (3.1)92, it suffices to prove that there is some A ⊇ B inQ such
that(∀v ∈ {0}∪(A∖B))((A−{v})∩V≻0 ≠∅ or (∃B′ ∈ B,∃µ ∈R>0){v}+µB′ ≼ B).
We will show that the particular choice A ∶= B satisfies this condition. Indeed, {0}∪(A∖B) = {0}, so we need only consider v = 0. Let B′ ∶= B and µ ∶= 1, then {v}+µB′ ={0}+1B =B ≼B, using Proposition 3343(i) in the last step. So we have found an option
set A ⊇ B such that, for every v in {0}∪(A∖B), we have {v}+µB′ ≼ B for some B′ inB and µ in R>0, whence indeed 0 ∈ RB(B).
So now we know already that RB satisfies the rationality Axioms R220–
R420 and extends B. In general, there are other rejection functions with these
properties, but we are interested in the least informative one. The following
proposition guarantees that RB is the least informative rejection function with
these properties.
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Proposition 79. Consider any assessment B ⊆Q0. Then RB is the least infor-
mative rejection function that satisfies Axioms R220–R420 and extends B.
Proof. We already know from Lemma 7792 and Lemma 78 that RB satisfies Ax-
ioms R220–R420 and extends B, so it suffices to show that RB is the least informative
such rejection function. Consider any rejection function R′ that satisfies Axioms R220–
R420 and extends B. We will show that RB ⊑ R′, or, in other words, that RB(A) ⊆R′(A)
for all A in Q. Since both RB and R′ satisfy Axiom R4b20, it suffices to show that
0 ∈ RB(A)⇒ 0 ∈ R′(A) for all A in Q. So consider any A in Q and assume that
0 ∈ RB(A). Infer already that then 0 ∈ A. By Equation (3.1)92, there is some A′ ⊇ A
in Q such that
(∀v ∈ {0}∪(A′∖A))((A′−{v})∩V≻0 ≠∅ or (∃B ∈ B,∃µ ∈R>0){v}+µB ≼ A′).
Consider any v in {0}∪(A′∖A). Then, by the equation above, (A′−{v})∩V≻0 ≠∅—
and therefore v ≺ u for some u in A′, whence by Axiom R220, v ∈ R′({u,v}), so by
Axiom R3a20, v ∈ R′(A′)—or {v}+µB ≼ A′ for some B in B and µ in R>0—and there-
fore, since R′ extends B, 0 ∈ R′(B), so by Axiom R4a20, we have that 0 ∈ R′(µB),
and using Axiom R4b20, that v ∈ R′({v}+ µB), and therefore finally, using Proposi-
tion 3444, we infer that v ∈ R′(A′). So we have shown that v ∈ R′(A′) for every v
in {0}∪ (A′ ∖A), and therefore {0}∪ (A′ ∖A) ⊆ R′(A′). Use Axiom R3b20 [with
A˜ ∶= A′ ∖A, A˜1 ∶= {0}∪ (A′ ∖A) and A˜2 ∶= A′; then A˜1 ∖ A˜ = {0} since 0 ∈ A ⊆ A′ and
A˜2∖ A˜ = A since A ⊆ A′] to infer that then indeed 0 ∈ R′(A).
3.3 ASSESSMENTS AVOIDING COMPLETE REJECTION
To investigate under which conditions the natural extension of an assessment
is coherent, we need to know whether the assessment can be extended to a
coherent rejection function. The question we need to answer, is: “When is an
assessment B extendible to a coherent rejection rejection function?”
After inspection of the rationality axioms R120–R420, we see that all ax-
ioms but the first are productive, in the sense that application of these axioms
allows us to identify new rejected options within, possibly, new option sets.
Axiom R120 however is a destructive one: it indicates how far our rejections
can go, and where the inferences should stop. Indeed, it requires that, within
a given option set A, not every element of A may be rejected. In other words,
it requires that, for any given option set, we should choose at least one of its
elements. Therefore we need to be careful and avoid assessments that lead to
a violation of Axiom R120, or to a complete rejection of some option set.
Definition 32 (Avoiding complete rejection). Given any assessment B ⊆Q0,
we say that B avoids complete rejection when RB satisfies Axiom R120.
The reason why we decided to call this property avoiding complete rejection is
clear: given any assessment B ⊆Q0 that avoids complete rejection, the special
rejection function RB satisfies Axiom R120—in other words, RB never returns
the complete option set.
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Example 12. To give an example of an assessment B that does not avoid
complete rejection, consider first B ∶= {{0}} ⊆Q0. By Proposition 79↶ further
on, RB extends B, and therefore 0 ∈RB({0}): RB does not satisfy Axiom R120,
so B does not avoid complete rejection.
Actually, this assessment leads to the trivial rejection function RB = idQ
that, evaluated in any option set A, returns the complete A. Indeed, consider
any A inQ; we will show that u ∈RB(A) for every u in A. By Proposition 79↶
further on, RB satisfies Axioms R220–R420, so in particular, by Axiom R4b20,
u ∈ RB({u}) for every u in A. Therefore, by Axiom R3a20 [with A˜1 ∶= {u},
A˜2 ∶= {u} and A˜ ∶= A; then A˜2 ⊆ A˜ since u ∈ A], we find that indeed u ∈ RB(A)
for every u in A.
As a second example of an assessment that does not avoid complete re-
jection, consider B ∶= {{0,u},{0,−u}} ⊆ Q0 for an arbitrary u in V. Again
by Proposition 79↶ further on, RB extends B—so 0 ∈ RB({0,u}) and 0 ∈
RB({0,−u})—and satisfies Axioms R220–R420. By Axiom R4b20, from
0 ∈ RB({0,−u}) we infer that u ∈ RB({0,u}). Using that 0 ∈ RB({0,u}), we
infer that {0,u} = RB({0,u}), contradicting Axiom R120. Therefore B does
not avoid complete rejection. ◊
There is an interesting characterisation for ‘avoiding complete rejection’.
This characterisation is important: it will for instance help us in Chapter 7221
to study the natural extension of other types of assessments, namely structural
assessments. It also significantly simplifies the task of checking whether an
assessment avoids complete rejection.
Lemma 80. Consider any assessmentB ⊆Q0. ThenB does not avoid complete
rejection if and only if there is some A′ in Q such that
maxA′ = A′ and 0 ∈ A′ and (∀v ∈ A′)(∃B ∈ B,∃µ ∈R>0){v}+µB ≼ A′. (3.5)
Proof. Use Lemma 7792 to infer that RB satisfies Axioms R220–R420. Therefore, by
Corollary 2639, B does not avoid complete rejection if and only if 0 ∈ RB({0}). Use
Equation (3.1)92 to infer that 0 ∈ RB({0}) if and only if there is some A′ inQ such that
0 ∈ A′ and
(∀v ∈ A′)((A′−{v})∩V≻0 ≠∅ or (∃B ∈ B,∃µ ∈R>0){v}+µB ≼ A′). (3.6)
We show that this is equivalent to Equation (3.5). Sufficiency is fairly immediate. If
Equation (3.5) holds, then by definition there is some A′ in Q such that in particular
0 ∈A′ and (∀v ∈A′)(∃B ∈B,∃µ ∈R>0){v}+µB ≼A′, and therefore Equation (3.6) will
definitively hold.
Therefore, it suffices to show necessity. So assume that there is some A′ in Q
such that 0 ∈ A′ and that satisfies Equation (3.6). Let A′′ ∶= maxA′, which is non-empty
because of Proposition 3142. Then (∀v ∈ A′′)(A′′ −{v})∩V≻0 = ∅, so since A′′ ⊆ A′,
Equation (3.6) implies that then (∀v ∈ A′′)(∃B ∈B,∃µ ∈R>0){v}+µB ≼ A′, and using
Proposition 3343(ii)&(iv) therefore (∀v ∈ A′′)(∃B ∈ B,∃µ ∈ R>0){v}+ µB ≼ A′′. If
0 ∈ A′′, then the proof is finished. So assume that 0 ∉ A′′. Consider any u in A′′ and let
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A˜ ∶=A′′−{u}. Then max A˜ = A˜, 0 ∈ A˜ and (∀v ∈ A˜)(∃B ∈B,∃µ ∈R>0){v+u}+µB ≼A′′.
Using Proposition 3343(v) therefore indeed (∀v ∈ A˜)(∃B ∈ B,∃µ ∈ R>0){v}+ µB ≼
A′′−{u} = A˜.
3.4 NATURAL EXTENSION OF ASSESSMENTS THAT AVOID
COMPLETE REJECTION
The discussion after Equation (3.1)92 tells us that the rejection function RB
seems to serve, loosely speaking, as the least committal coherent extension of
the assessment B. Let us formalise this idea, and show the connection between
Equation (3.1)92 and the natural extension E(B).
Theorem 81 (Natural extension). Consider any assessment B ⊆Q0. Then the
following statements are equivalent:
(i) B avoids complete rejection;
(ii) There is a coherent extension of B: (∃R ∈R)(∀B ∈ B)0 ∈ R(B);
(iii) E(B) ≠ idQ;
(iv) E(B) ∈R;
(v) E(B) is the least informative rejection function that is coherent and ex-
tends B.
When any (and hence all) of these equivalent statements hold, then E(B) =RB.
Proof. This proof is structured as follows: we first show that (ii)⇔(iii)⇔(iv)⇔(v);
subsequently that whenever any (and hence all) of these four equivalent conditions hold,
then E(B) = RB, and finally, that (i)⇔(ii).
For the first part, that (ii)⇔(iii)⇔(iv)⇔(v), we will show the circular chain of im-
plications (ii)⇒(iv)⇒(iii)⇒(ii), after which we will prove that (iv) and (v) are equiva-
lent.
To show that (ii) implies (iv), since there is a coherent extension of B, the set{R ∈ R ∶ (∀B ∈ B)0 ∈ R(B)} of coherent rejection functions that extend B is a non-
empty. Use Proposition 4048 to infer that its infimum is indeed a coherent rejection
function.
That (iv) implies (iii) is an immediate consequence of the fact that the rejection
function idQ fails to satisfy Axiom R120 [indeed, idQ(A) = A for every A inQ], and is
therefore not coherent.
To show that (iii) implies (ii), assume that E(B) ≠ idQ and ex absurdo that there is
no coherent extension ofB. Then {R ∈R ∶ (∀B ∈B)0 ∈R(B)}=∅, so by Definition 3191E(B) = idQ, a contradiction.
We finish the first part by showing that (iv)⇔(v). We clearly only have to show
that (iv) implies (v), since (v) states, amongst other things, that E(B) is a coherent
rejection function, and it therefore implies (iv). So assume that (iv) holds—that E(B)
is a coherent rejection function. We first show that E(B) extends B. Since E(B) ∈ R,
we have that {R ∈ R ∶ R extends B} is non-empty, and therefore, by Proposition 7491,
its infimum E(B) extends B. Assume ex absurdo that (v) does not hold—so E(B) is
not the least informative rejection function that is coherent and extends B. We know
already that E(B) is coherent [by (iv)] and that it extends B. So the only possibility
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left, is that there is a less informative coherent rejection function R′ ⊏ E(B) that extendsB. Therefore 0 ∉ R′(A) and 0 ∈ E(B)(A) for some A in Q. Infer that 0 ∈ E(B)(A)⇔
0 ∈ ⋂R∈R,(∀B∈B)0∈R(B) R(A)⇔ (∀R ∈ R)(((∀B ∈ B)0 ∈ R(B))⇒ 0 ∈ R(A)), so in
particular for the coherent rejection function R′, we have that ((∀B ∈ B)0 ∈ R′(B))⇒
0 ∈ R′(A). Since R′ extends B, the implicant is true, so 0 ∈ R′(A), a contradiction.
Therefore indeed (v)↶ holds.
Subsequently, we prove that E(B)=RB whenever any (and hence all) of the equiva-
lent statements (ii)↶–(v)↶ hold. By Proposition 7995, RB is the least informative rejec-
tion function that satisfies Axioms R220–R420 and extends B. Therefore RB ⊑ E(B),
so RB(A) ⊆ E(B)(A) ⊂ A for all A in Q, where the second set inclusion follows by
the coherence of E(B). This implies that RB(A) ⊂ A for all A in Q, so RB satisfies
Axiom R120. We conclude that RB is the least informative rejection function that is
coherent and extends B, so by (v)↶ indeed RB = E(B).
We finish the proof by showing that (i)↶⇔(ii)↶. For necessity, by Proposition 7995
we know that RB satisfies Axioms R220–R420 and extends B. Since B avoids complete
rejection, by Definition 3295 we furthermore know that RB satisfies Axiom R120, and
hence it is a coherent rejection function that extends B. So we showed that (i)↶⇒(ii)↶.
For sufficiency, we already know that (ii)↶ implies that RB = E(B), and that E(B)
is a coherent rejection function (see (iv)↶), so RB is a coherent rejection function,
and hence in particular it satisfies Axiom R120. Therefore B indeed avoids complete
rejection.
If an assessment avoids complete rejection, then so does any weaker as-
sessment:
Corollary 82. Consider any two assessments B1 ⊆Q0 and B2 ⊆Q0 such thatB1 is at least as strong as B2. If B1 avoids complete rejection, then so does B2.
Proof. Since B1 avoids complete rejection, by Theorem 81↶ there is a coherent ex-
tension R of B1. Because B1 is at least as strong as B2, by Proposition 7591 R extends
also B2, whence, again by Theorem 81↶ B2 avoids complete rejection.
Similarly as for other imprecise probabilities models such as desirability,
we will impose no requirements on the completeness of the model; see Ref-
erences [18, 82] for reasons why: even after extending an assessment using
the natural extension, the resulting rejection function is not guaranteed to be
exhaustive. With a rejection function being not necessarily ‘exhaustive’ we
mean that it is a non-exhaustive description of the subject’s beliefs. Further
elicitation may very well result in additional rejections of the zero option, but
the subject may be unwilling or incapable to specify them. Hence, we will
not require a rejection function to be exhaustive, nor will we interpret it in this
way. See Example 14106 for an illustration of a similar idea.
Using Theorem 81↶, we can prove a counterpart of Reference [31, The-
orem 3] explaining the relationship between avoiding complete rejection and
maximal choice models:
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Proposition 83. Consider any assessment B ⊆Q0. Then B avoids complete
rejection if and only if there is some maximal rejection function in Rˆ that ex-
tends B.
Proof. Sufficiency follows readily from Theorem 8197, using that Rˆ ⊆ R.
For necessity, assume that B avoids complete rejection. Infer from Theorem 8197
that E(B) is coherent and extends B. Use Proposition 4652 to infer that E(B) is dom-
inated by a maximal rejection function Rˆ that dominates E(B), and therefore indeed
extends B.
3.5 NATURAL EXTENSION AND DESIRABILITY
Let us compare our discussion of natural extension with the case of binary pref-
erences and desirability, which we introduced in Section 2.855. A desirability
assessment B ⊆V is usually (see for instance Section 1.2 of Reference [57], and
also Reference [31]) a set of options that the agent finds desirable—strictly
prefers to the zero option. Of course, any desirability assessment B ⊆ V can
be transformed into an assessment for rejection functions: we simply assess
that 0 is rejected in the binary choice between 0 and u, for every option u in
B. The assessment based on B is therefore given by BB ∶= {{0,u} ∶ u ∈ B};
clearly B and BB are in a one-to-one correspondence: given an assessmentBB that consist of an arbitrary family of binary option sets, we retrieve B as
B =⋃(BB ∖{0}) = (⋃BB)∖{0}.
Given any desirability assessment B ⊆ V and any set of desirable options
D ⊆ V, we say that D extends B if B ⊆D.
Proposition 84. Consider any desirability assessment B ⊆ V and any set of
desirable options D ⊆ V. Then D extends B if and only if RD extends BB .
Proof. Consider the following equivalences:
D extends B⇔ B ⊆ D⇔ (∀u ∈ B)u ∈ D⇔ (∀u ∈ B)0 ∈ RD({0,u})⇔ (∀B′ ∈ BB)0 ∈ RD(B′)⇔ RD extends BB .
For desirability, the Axioms D257–D457 are the productive ones, while the
only destructive axiom is Axiom D157. The property for desirability that cor-
responds to avoiding complete rejection for choice models, is avoiding non-
positivity, commonly formulated as (see for instance Reference [31, Defini-
tion 1])2
posi(B)∩V⪯0 =∅ (3.7)
2 If the vector space V is the set of all gambles, the condition is called avoiding partial loss;
see Reference [57]. A very similar but slightly weaker condition is called avoiding sure loss; see
also for instance Reference [82, Section 3.7].
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for the desirability assessment B ⊆V. The interpretation is clear: an assessment
must never imply, using scaling and combination—Axioms D357 and D457,3
and hence by applying posi to the assessment B—the desirability of an option
in V⪯0.
Theorem 8197 is the equivalent for choice models of the natural extension
theorem for desirability,4 whose proof inspired our proof of Theorem 8197. To
make this thesis more self-contained, let us state this natural extension theorem
for desirability.
Theorem 85 (Natural extension for desirability [31, Theorem 1]). Consider
any desirability assessment B ⊆ V, and define its natural extension as5
ED(B) ∶= inf{D ∈D ∶ B ⊆D}.
Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) B avoids non-positivity;
(ii) B is included in some coherent set of desirable options;
(iii) ED(B) ≠ V;
(iv) ED(B) ∈D;
(v) ED(B) is the least informative set of desirable options that is coherent
and includes B.
When any (and hence all) of these equivalent statements hold, then ED(B) =
posi(V≻0∪B).
Let us go back to our natural extension Theorem 8197 (for choice models)
and consider a desirability assessment B ⊆V, and its completely binary (choice
models) assessment BB . If B avoids non-positivity, then we wonder whether
we can retrieve, using Theorem 8197, the formula ED(B) = posi(V≻0 ∪B), as
Theorem 85 indicates.
Theorem 86. Consider any desirability assessment B ⊆ V. Then B avoids
non-positivity if and only if BB avoids complete rejection, and if this is the
case, then E(BB) = RED(B).
Proof. We start with the first part, that B avoids non-positivity if and only if BB avoids
complete rejection. For necessity, since B avoids non-positivity, by Theorem 85, we
have that B ⊆ D for some coherent set of desirable options D. Consider the coherent
rejection function RD . Since (∀u ∈ B)u ∈ D, we find that (∀u ∈ B)0 ∈ RD({0,u}), and
therefore (∀B ∈BB)0 ∈RD(B). So we have found a coherent rejection function RD that
extends BB , and therefore, by Theorem 8197, BB indeed avoids complete rejection.
3We leave Axiom D257 out of this discussion since applying it can never result in the addi-
tional desirability of options in V⪯0.
4For a very general form, see Reference [31, Theorem 1].
5We let inf∅ = V.
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For sufficiency, since BB avoids complete rejection, by Theorem 8197 (∀u ∈ B)0 ∈
R({0,u}) for some coherent rejection function R. Consider the coherent set of desirable
options DR = {u ∈ V ∶ 0 ∈ R({0,u})}. Since (∀u ∈ B)0 ∈ R({0,u}), we find that B ⊆
DR . So we have found a coherent set of desirable options DR for which B ⊆ DR , and
therefore, by Theorem 85, B indeed avoids non-positivity.
We now prove the second part, that E(BB)=RED(B). Since B avoids non-positivity,
by Theorem 85, its natural extension is given by the coherent set of desirable op-
tions ED(B) = posi(V≻0 ∪B). Similarly, since BB avoids complete rejection, by Theo-
rem 8197, its natural extension is given by the coherent rejection function E(BB)=RBB .
So it suffices to show that RBB = Rposi(V≻0∪B). Since both rejection functions are co-
herent, what we should prove can be even further reduced: by Axiom R4b20 it suffices
to prove that 0 ∈ RBB (A)⇔ 0 ∈ Rposi(V≻0∪B)(A) for all A in Q.
We first prove that 0 ∈ RBB (A)⇒ 0 ∈ Rposi(V≻0∪B)(A) for all A in Q. So consider
any A inQ such that 0 ∈ RBB (A). Then, by Equation (3.1)92, there is some A′ ⊇ A inQ
such that
(∀v ∈ {0}∪(A′∖A))((A′−{v})∩V≻0 ≠∅ or (∃w ∈ B,∃µ ∈R>0){v}+{0,µw} ≼ A′).
(3.8)
Without loss of generality, let A ∶= {0,u1, . . . ,uk} for some k in N, and A1 ∶= A ∪{v1, . . . ,v`} for some ` in Z≥0. Then {0}∪ (A′ ∖A) = {0,v1, . . . ,v`}, and therefore,
by Equation (3.8),
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(i)
and
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(ii)
For clarity, as indicated we abbreviate the two expressions involved as (i) and (ii), and
find implications for each of them. Observe that Expression (i) is equivalent to
(∃w ∈ B,∃µ ∈R>0,∃w′ ∈ A′)(0 ≺ w′ or µw ⪯ 0 or µw ⪯ w′),
taking into account that 0 ∈ A′. Since B avoids non-positivity, and therefore w⪯̸ 0 for
every w in B, this is equivalent to
(∃w ∈ B,∃µ ∈R>0,∃w′ ∈ A′)(0 ≺ w′ or µw ⪯ w′),
which by Lemma 412 is in turn equivalent to (∃w ∈ B,∃w′ ∈ A′)w′ ∈ posi(V≻0 ∪{w}).
Therefore, since posi(V≻0∪{w}) ⊆ posi(V≻0∪B) for every w in B, this implies that
A′∩posi(V≻0∪B) ≠∅. (3.9)
Observe using Proposition 3343(v) that Expression (ii) is equivalent to(A′−{vi})∩V≻0 ≠∅ or (∃w ∈ B,∃µ ∈R>0){0,µw} ≼ A′−{vi},
and therefore, since 0 ∈ A′−{vi}, this is also equivalent to(A′−{vi})∩V≻0 ≠∅ or (∃w ∈ B,∃µ ∈R>0){µw} ≼ A′−{vi}.
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Taking into account that A′ = {0,u1, . . . ,uk,v1, . . . ,v`}, and therefore also that 0 belongs
to A′−{vi}, we find another equivalent expression:(∃w ∈ B,∃µ ∈R>0,∃w′ ∈ A′)(0 ≺ w′−vi or µw ⪯ w′−vi),
which by Lemma 412 is in turn equivalent to (∃w ∈ B,∃µ ∈ R>0,∃w′ ∈ A′)w′ − vi ∈
posi(V≻0 ∪{w}). Therefore, since posi(V≻0 ∪{w}) ⊆ posi(V≻0 ∪B) for every w in B,
this implies that
A′∩(posi(V≻0∪B)+{vi}) ≠∅. (3.10)
Combining the two Implications (3.9)↶ and (3.10) of Expressions (i) and (ii) respec-
tively, we find that Equation (3.8)↶ implies that
A′∩posi(V≻0∪B) ≠∅ and (∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,`})A′∩(posi(V≻0∪B)+{vi}) ≠∅. (3.11)
We now prove that this implies that A ∩posi(V≻0 ∪B) ≠ ∅. To this end, infer that, by
Equation (3.11), in particular A′ ∩posi(V≻0 ∪B) ≠ ∅, so w1 ∈ posi(V≻0 ∪B) for some
w1 in A
′. If w1 ∈ A, the proof is done, so assume that w1 ∈ A′∖A and therefore w1 = v j1
for some j1 in {1, . . . ,`}.
By Equation (3.11), A′∩(posi(V≻0∪B)+{v j1})≠∅, so w2 ∈ posi(V≻0∪B)+{v j1}
for some w2 in A
′. Remark that posi(V≻0 ∪B)+ {v j1} ⊆ posi(V≻0 ∪B), because v j1
belongs to posi(V≻0 ∪B), and therefore the proof is done if w2 ∈ A, so assume that
w2 ∈ A′ ∖A and therefore w2 = v j2 for some j2 in {1, . . . ,`}. If j2 = j1, then v j1 = v j2 ∈
posi(V≻0∪B)+{v j1} and therefore 0 ∈ posi(V≻0∪B), contradicting the avoiding non-
positivity of B, so j2 ∈ {1, . . . ,`}∖{ j1}.
By another application of Equation (3.11), we find that A′ ∩ (posi(V≻0 ∪ B) +{v j2}) ≠ ∅, so w3 ∈ posi(V≻0 ∪B)+ {v j2} ⊆ posi(V≻0 ∪B)+ {v j1} ⊆ posi(V≻0 ∪B)
for some w3 in A
′. If w3 ∈ A the proof is done, so assume that w3 = v j3 for some j3
in {1, . . . ,`}. If j3 ∈ { j1, j2}, then 0 ∈ posi(V≻0 ∪B), contradicting the avoiding non-
positivity of B, so j3 ∈ {1, . . . ,`}∖{ j1, j2}.
We can go on in the same vein until after ` steps we have shown that A ∩
posi(V≻0∪B) ≠∅—and then the proof is done—or have found some j` in {1, . . . ,`}∖{ j1, . . . , j`−1} such that v j` ∈ posi(V≻0 ∪B)+{v j`−1} ⊆ posi(V≻0 ∪B)+{v j`−2} ⊆ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⊆
posi(V≻0∪B)+{v j1}. Equation (3.11) then tells us that A′∩posi(V≻0∪B)+{v j`} ≠∅,
so w` ∈ posi(V≻0 ∪B)+ {v j`} ⊆ posi(V≻0 ∪B)+ {v j`−1} ⊆ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⊆ posi(V≻0 ∪B)+ {v j1}
for some w` in A
′. Then w` ≠ v j for all j in {1, . . . ,`}, because, otherwise, 0 ∈
posi(V≻0 ∪B), contradicting the avoiding non-positivity of B. Hence w` ∈ A, so in-
deed A∩posi(V≻0∪B) ≠∅.
Since 0 ∈ A, by Proposition 5564 therefore indeed 0 ∈ Rposi(V≻0∪B)(A).
We now prove that 0 ∈ Rposi(V≻0∪B)(A)⇒ 0 ∈ RBB (A) for all A in Q. So consider
any A in Q such that 0 ∈ Rposi(V≻0∪B)(A), whence, by Proposition 5564, 0 ∈ A and
A ∩ posi(V≻0 ∪B) ≠ ∅, and therefore u ∈ posi(V≻0 ∪B) for some u in A. Then u ≻ 0
or u ⪰ ∑ki=1λkvk for some k in N, λ1, . . . , λk in R>0, and v1, . . . , vk in B. Because
we already know from Theorem 8197 that RBB is a coherent rejection function, if u ≻ 0
then by Axiom R120, 0 ∈ RBB ({0,u}). On the other hand, if u ⪰ ∑ki=1λkvk, by the
assessment BB , we have that 0 ∈ RBB ({0,vi}) for all i in {1, . . . ,k}, and therefore by
Axiom R4b20 also that 0 ∈ RBB ({0,λivi}) for all i in {1, . . . ,k}. Use Proposition 3243
to infer that then also 0 ∈ RBB ({0,∑ki=1λivi}), and therefore, by Proposition 3041(ii)
also 0 ∈ RBB ({0,u}). So in any of the two cases, we find that 0 ∈ RBB ({0,u}), whence
by Axiom R3a20 [with A˜ ∶= {0}, A˜1 ∶= {0,u} and A˜2 ∶= A] indeed 0 ∈ RBB (A).
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Actually, Theorem 86100 consists of three remarkable statements: The first
statement is that the natural extension of a purely binary assessment BB , for
some B ⊆ V, is a rejection function that is purely binary itself; the second one
is that its (binary) behaviour is exactly described by the set of desirable op-
tions posi(V≻0∪B); both statements are conditional on BB avoiding complete
rejection—which is furthermore, as a third statement, equivalent to B avoiding
non-positivity.
Focussing on this second statement, for any desirability assessment B ⊆ V
that avoids non-positivity, the natural extension E(BB) (for choice models)
induces the binary choice DE(BB) reflected by posi(V≻0∪B). To see this, The-
orem 86100 guarantees that E(BB) = Rposi(V≻0∪B), where by Theorem 85100,
posi(V≻0 ∪B) is a coherent set of desirable options and by Proposition 5866,
therefore indeed DE(BB) = posi(V≻0∪B).
To summarise these statements, consider the commuting diagram in Fig-
ure 3.1↷, where we have used the mapsED∶P(V)→D∶B↦ ED(B),B⋅∶P(V)→Q0∶B↦ BB ∶= {{0,u} ∶ u ∈ B},E ∶P(Q0)→R∶B↦ E(B),
D⋅∶R→D∶R↦DR ∶= {u ∈ V ∶ 0 ∈ R({0,u})},
R⋅∶D→R∶D↦ RD ,
with ED(B) defined in Theorem 85100, E(B) in Definition 3191 and, as usual,
RD given by RD(A) = {u ∈ A ∶ (∀v ∈ A)v− u ∉ D} for all A in Q. Start with
a desirability assessment B ⊆ V that avoids non-positivity. Taking the natural
extension for desirability commutes with taking the corresponding assessment
(for choice models), then the natural extension, and eventually going back to
the set of desirable options corresponding to this natural extension. Further-
more, taking the natural extension of the corresponding assessment (for choice
models) commutes with taking the natural extension for desirability, and then
going to the corresponding rejection function.
In my opinion, one of the most important consequences of Theorem 86100
is that the natural extension (for choice models) of a purely binary assessment
that avoids complete rejection, is a rejection function that is purely binary it-
self, in the sense that it is derived from a set of desirable options. If the as-
sessment B is not binary, then nothing guarantees that RB is derived from a
set of desirable options. Moreover, it might be that RB is not even an infimum
of such rejection functions: in Example 16109, using a non-binary assessment,
we construct such a coherent rejection function. This shows that our notion
of coherent choice allows for a richer theory than a theory that would model
choice using sets of sets of desirable options.
But what can we say about the binary part DE(B) of the implications of
a non-binary assessment B ⊆Q0? It turns out that the following collection of
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B ED(B) =DE(BB)
BB E(BB) = RED(B)
ED
B⋅ D⋅R⋅E
Figure 3.1: Commuting diagram for the natural extension for binary assess-
ments
desirability assessments is important:6
AB ∶= {{uB ∶ B ∈ B} ∶ (∀B ∈ B)uB ∈ B∖{0}}.
Note that each element of AB has cardinality ∣B∣.
Example 13. To gain a feel for what AB is, consider the assessment B ∶={{0,u,−u}} ⊆ Q0. Then AB = {{u},{−u}}, and we interpret each element
of AB as a desirability assessment. Similarly, consider the assessment B′ ∶={{0,u1,u2},{0,v}} ⊆Q0. Then AB′ = {{u1,v},{u2,v}}. ◊
Proposition 87. Consider any assessment B ⊆Q0. Then7
RB ⊑ inf{RED(A) ∶ A ∈AB and A avoids non-positivity}= inf{Rposi(V≻0∪A) ∶ A ∈AB and A avoids non-positivity}.
As a consequence, DRB ⊆DB, where we let8
DB ∶= inf{ED(A) ∶ A ∈AB and A avoids non-positivity}= ⋂
A∈AB
posi(A)∩V⪯0=∅
posi(V≻0∪A).
Proof. Consider any A in AB. We will first show that the assessment BA = {{0,u} ∶
u ∈ A} is at least as strong as B. By Definition 3091 and Proposition 3343(i), it suffices
to show that (∀B ∈ B)(∃B′ ∈ BA)B′ ≼ B, so consider any B in B. Then by definition,
there is an element uB of B that belongs to A, and therefore, B
′ ∶= {0,uB} ∈ BA . Since
6We assume that ∣B∣ ≥ 2—so that B contains at least one option different from 0—, for every
B in B. If this is not the case, then B does not avoid complete rejection, since it assesses that 0
should be rejected from {0}. This assumption is weaker than avoiding complete rejection, and it
guarantees thatAB is well defined.
7Here we let inf∅ = idQ.
8Here we let inf∅ =⋂∅ = V.
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both 0 and uB belong to B, therefore B
′ ≼ B, and we have shown that BA is indeed at
least as strong as B. Infer already that, by Corollary 7692, therefore E(B) ⊑ E(BA).
There are two possibilities: either (i) {A ∈AB ∶A avoids non-positivity} ≠∅, or (ii){A ∈AB ∶ A avoids non-positivity} =∅.
If (i) {A ∈AB ∶A avoids non-positivity} ≠∅, we will show that then B avoids com-
plete rejection. Consider any A in AB that avoids non-positivity. By Theorem 86100,
then BA avoids complete rejection. Since we have already shown that the assessmentBA is at least as strong as the assessment B, use Proposition 7591 to infer that B indeed
avoids complete rejection.
Since A avoids non-positivity, by Theorem 86100, therefore E(BA) = RED(A). Be-
cause B avoids complete rejection, by Theorem 8197 E(B) = RB, so RB ⊑ RED(A).
Since the choice of A in AB was arbitrary—as long as A avoids non-positivity—
, therefore indeed RB ⊑ inf{RED(A) ∶ A ∈ AB and A avoids non-positivity}. By The-
orem 85100 ED(A) = posi(V≻0 ∪ A), so indeed also RB ⊑ inf{Rposi(V≻0∪A) ∶ A ∈AB and A avoids non-positivity}, proving the first part of the proposition. This also
shows that
DB = ⋂
A∈AB
posi(A)∩V⪯0=∅
posi(V≻0∪A).
Using Propositions 6068 and 5866, we infer from RB ⊑ RED(A) that DRB ⊆ ED(A).
Again, since the choice of A inAB was arbitrary—as long as A avoids non-positivity—,
therefore indeed DRB ⊆ DB, proving the second part of the proposition.
If (ii) {A ∈AB ∶A avoids non-positivity} =∅, then the statements become vacuous:
DRB ⊆ V and RB ⊑ idQ, and therefore indeed true.
Proposition 87 provides an outer—more informative—approximation for
the natural extension, that is especially useful for its pairwise behaviour, cap-
tured by its corresponding set of desirable options. The inequalities can be
strict—meaning that DRB ⊂ DB and similarly for the expression that involves
RB—as we will show in Example 18114.
Note also that the (non-strict) inequalities are tight, in the sense that
they can become equalities. This is for instance the case when the assess-
ment B is a purely binary assessment BB , derived from a desirability as-
sessment B ⊆ V ∖ {0}.9 To see this, Theorem 86100 implies that BB avoids
complete rejection if and only if B avoids non-positivity, and, if this is the
case, then RBB = Rposi(V≻0∪B), what, since ABB = {B}, is indeed equal to
inf{Rposi(V≻0∪A) ∶ A ∈ABB and A avoids non-positivity}. The equality DRBB =
DBB follows then at once.
A consequence of Proposition 87—and therefore of Theorem 86100—is the
following sufficient condition for an assessment to avoid complete rejection,
9The restriction that 0 cannot belong to B is because then BB consists of binary sets, and it
therefore guarantees that ABB is well defined; see Footnote 6. This is a weaker requirement that
avoiding non-positivity: if 0 would belong to B, then B would not avoid non-positivity.
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that is easier to check:10
Corollary 88. Consider any assessment B ⊆Q0. If (∃D ∈D)(∀B ∈B)B∩D ≠∅, then B avoids complete rejection.
Proof. Since (∀B ∈ B)B ∩ D ≠ ∅ for some D in D, there is an element A′
of AB such that A′ ⊆ D. Therefore, by Theorem 85100, A avoids non-
positivity, so {A ∈ AB ∶ A avoids non-positivity} ≠ ∅ and hence inf{RED(A) ∶ A ∈AB and A avoids non-positivity} is a coherent rejection function. Using Proposi-
tion 87104, RB ⊑ inf{RED(A) ∶ A ∈AB and A avoids non-positivity}, so it satisfies Ax-
iom R120. Since by Proposition 7995 it also satisfies Axioms R220–R420 and extendsB, RB is a coherent rejection function. Hence there is a coherent extension of B, so by
Theorem 8197, therefore indeed B avoids complete rejection.
3.6 EXAMPLES
Let us gain more insight in some aspects of the natural extension of a given
assessment, by means of some examples.
The first example is related to the idea of the non-exhaustive interpreta-
tion11 that we generally adopt. When the subject gives an assessment B ⊆Q0,
almost always12 there will be option sets B for which 0 ∈ RB(B) that do not
belong to B. This is as expected, as RB is a coherent extension of B, and due
to some combination of different sets in B, we can infer the rejection of 0 from
other option sets.
In the example we will consider an assessment B that avoids complete
rejection and that consists of only one option set B ∈Q0, and examine whether
this is also possible within this single assessment: are there non-zero options
u in B such that u ∈ RB(B)? Clearly, if max(B ∖{0}) ≠ B ∖{0}, then, since
RB is coherent, by Proposition 3142, this is the case, so we will additionally
assume that max(B ∖ {0}) = B ∖ {0}. At this point, bear in mind that such
additional rejections are impossible for single purely binary—or desirability—
assessments.
Example 14 (Exhaustive interpretation). We will work with the special vector
space of gambles V = L on a binary possibility space X = {H,T}, ordered by
the standard point-wise ordering ≤.
The assessment we consider is B ∶= {B}, where B ∶= {0, f ,g} with f =( f (H), f (T)) ∶= (−1, 15) and g ∶= (− 32 ,2). Note that, by Corollary 88, this as-
sessment avoids complete rejection: for instance, the coherent set of desirable
10It is an open question whether this condition is also necessary.
11See Section 3.497.
12That is, unless the rejection function R defined as (∀B ∈Q)(∀u ∈V)u ∈R(B)⇔B−{u} ∈B
is coherent.
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options D ∶= posi(V≻0∪{ f}) satisfies D∩B = { f ,g} ≠∅. We will show that—
in addition to 0 ∈ RB(B) by the assessment—also f ∈ RB(B), or equivalently,
by Axiom R4b20, 0 ∈ RB(B − { f}), being an implication of the assessment,
but not directly assessed as such. To this end, by Equation (3.1)92, we need to
show that there is some A ⊇ B−{ f} in Q such that
(∀h ∈ {0}∪(A∖(B−{ f})))((A−{h})∩L>0 ≠∅ or (∃µ ∈R>0){h}+µB ≼A).
We will show that the particular choice A =B−{ f} satisfies the equation above.
Indeed, then {0}∪ (A ∖ (B −{ f})) = {0}, so we need only consider h = 0. It
suffices to show that {0,µ f ,µg} = µB ≼ B −{ f} = {− f ,0,g− f} for some µ
in R>0. Clearly, 0 in µB is dominated by 0 in B −{ f}. Also, since f (H) < 0
while µ f (H) > 0 and µg(H) > 0, the only possibility for µ f and µg to be
dominated, is µ f ≤ g− f and µg ≤ g− f . So if we can find some µ in R>0 such
that (−µ, µ5 ) = µ f ≤ g− f = (− 12 , 95) and (− 32µ,2µ) = µg ≤ g− f = (− 12 , 95), then
we have shown that f ∈ RB(B). For instance the choice µ = 12 satisfies the two
inequalities: indeed, (− 12 , 15) ≤ (− 12 , 95) and (− 34 ,1) ≤ (− 12 , 95).
In order to visualise what happens in this example, consider Figure 3.2,
where the gambles involved—0, f and g—are indicated. The assessment B is{{0, f ,g}}; f is indicated in dark because it is the gamble of importance, for
which we find that f ∈ RB({0, f ,g}). ◊
H
T
0
f
g
Figure 3.2: Illustration of the gambles involved in Example 14
As a more technical example, we investigate whether in Equation (3.1)92
the superset A′ ⊇ A can be replaced by A itself: does it suffice to always con-
sider the particular choice A′ = A? We are motivated by the fact that this
would simplify the expression for RB significantly, and we feel strengthened
by the observation that in many cases this clearly suffices—see, for instance,
the proofs of Lemmas 7792 and 7894, and Example 14.
Example 15. Again, we will work with the special vector space of gamblesV =L on a binary possibility space X = {H,T}, ordered by the standard point-
wise ordering ≤.
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The assessment we consider is B ∶= {B}, where B ∶= { f ,0,g} with f =( f (H), f (T)) ∶= (−1,1) and g ∶= (2,−2). Note that, by Corollary 88106, this
assessment avoids complete rejection: for instance, the coherent set of desir-
able options D ∶= posi(V≻0∪{ f}) satisfies D∩B = { f} ≠∅. We are interested
in the particular option set A ∶= {(− 32 , 32),0,g}, and want to know whether we
can derive that 0 ∈ RB(A), or in other words, whether there are A′ ⊇ A in Q
such that
(∀h ∈ {0}∪(A′∖A))((A′−{h})∩V≻0 ≠∅ or (∃µ ∈R>0){h}+µB ≼ A′).
We will first show that this is indeed the case. Let A′ ∶= B ∪ {(− 32 , 32)} ={(− 32 , 32),(−1,1),0,(2,−2)} ⊇ A. Then {0}∪ (A′ ∖A) = {(−1,1),0} = { f ,0},
so it suffices to check that
(A′∩V≻0 ≠∅ or (∃µ ∈R>0)µB ≼ A′) and((A′−{ f})∩V≻0 ≠∅ or (∃µ ∈R>0){ f}+µB ≼ A′).
To see that this holds, since B ⊆ A′ and by Proposition 3343(i) we have that B ≼
A′. Furthermore, infer that { f}+ 12 B = {(− 32 , 32),(−1,1),0} ⊆A′, and therefore,
again by Proposition 3343(i), indeed { f}+ 12 B ≼ A′. So we conclude that 0 ∈
RB(A).
If we only consider A′ = A, then {0}∪ (A′ ∖A) = {0}, so we only need
to check whether µB ≼ A for some µ in R>0, or in other words, whether{(−µ,µ),0,(2µ,−2µ)} = {µ f ,0,µg} ≼ {(− 32 , 32),0,g} = {(− 32 , 32),0,(2,−2)}
for some µ inR>0. For every non-zero element of µB there correspond exactly
one element in A in the same quadrant, so the condition becomes µ ≥ 32 , µ ≤ 32 ,
µ ≤ 1 and µ ≥ 1 for some µ in R>0, which is impossible. So by only consider-
ing the particular choice A′ =A, we would incorrectly conclude that 0 ∉RB(A),
and therefore, it does not suffice to only consider the particular choice A′ = A
in Equation (3.1)92.
In order to visualise what happens in this example, consider Figure 3.3,
where the gambles involved—0, f , g and (− 32 , 32)—are indicated. The assess-
ment is indicated by circles ( ), the option set A by grey disks ( ), and the
additional gamble that defines A′ by a dark disk ( ). ◊
Many important choice functions—or rejection functions or choice rela-
tions for that matter—are infima of purely binary choice models: consider, for
instance, the E-admissible or M-admissible choice functions. It is an important
question whether all the coherent choice functions are infima of purely binary
choice functions, since, if this question answered positively, this would imme-
diately imply a representation theorem of coherent choice functions in terms
of purely binary ones. If this question is answered in the negative, choice
functions would constitute a theory that is more general than sets of desirable
gambles in two ways: not only because it allows for more than binary choice,
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H
T
0
f
g
(− 32 , 32)
Figure 3.3: Illustration of the gambles involved in Example 15107
also because it is capable of expressing preferences that can never be retrieved
as an infimum of purely binary preferences. From this discussion, it should be
clear that this question is a very important one.13
Below we will answer this question in the negative: we will define a special
rejection function RB, based on some particular assessment B ⊆Q0, and prove
that it is no infimum of purely binary rejection functions.14
Example 16 (Is every coherent choice function an infimum of purely binary
choice functions?). As in the previous examples, we will work with the special
vector space of gambles V =L on a binary possibility spaceX = {H,T}, ordered
by the standard point-wise ordering ≤.
We consider a single assessment B ∶= {B}, where B consists of a gamble
and one scaled variant of it, together with 0: The assessment we consider is
B ∶= {0, f ,λ f} with f a gamble and λ an element of R>0 and different from 1.
If f ∈ L≤0 then B does not avoid complete rejection, and if f belongs to L>0,
then the assessment is trivial, and hence RB = Rv. So assume that f belongs to(L≤0∪L>0)c; for convenience assume that f (H) < 0 < f (T).15 Without loss of
generality, we may assume that λ > 1.16 The idea is that B consists of 0 and
13In fact, during my research for this dissertation, the question whether there are coherent
choice functions that are no infima of purely binary choice functions, arose naturally on different
occasions, and was crucial for several properties. It was only when we found the expression of the
natural extension that it became possible for us to answer it.
14This example can be related to Example 3 in Reference [61], where Schervish et al. show
that in the context of E-admissibility, a rejected option may be undominated by any chosen one in
a pairwise comparison (and even by any option in the convex hull of the chosen options), provided
that the set of probabilities is not closed.
15The other possibility is f (T) < 0 < f (H), but the conclusions are analogous.
16If λ < 1, then we can relabel f and λ f : we let f˜ ∶= λ f and λ˜ ∶= 1λ > 1, so B = {0, f ,λ f} ={0, λ˜ f˜ , f˜}.
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two gambles that lie on the same line through 0, and on the same side of that
line; see Figure 3.4 for an illustration of the assessment.
Note that, by Corollary 88106, this assessment indeed avoids complete re-
jection: for instance, the coherent set of desirable options D ∶= posi(V≻0∪{ f})
satisfies D ∩B = { f ,λ f} ≠ ∅. Therefore, RB is a coherent rejection function.
To prove that RB is no infimum of purely binary rejection functions, we first
show the intermediate result that 0 ∉ RB(A), where A ∶= {0, f}. To prove this,
assume ex absurdo that 0 ∈ RB(A), and infer using Equation (3.1)92 that then
there would be some A′ ⊇ A in Q such that
(∀h ∈ {0}∪(A′∖A))((A′−{h})∩L>0 ≠∅ or (∃µ ∈R>0){h}+µB ≼ A′).
(3.12)
At this point, remark already that A′ ≠ A: indeed, if ex absurdo A′ = A, then{0}∪ (A′ ∖A) = {0}, so we need only consider h = 0. Infer that A′ ∩L>0 = ∅
and (∀µ ∈R>0){0,µ f ,µλ f} /≼ {0, f}, a contradiction, and therefore A′ ⊃ A.
span{ f}+L>0
span{ f}
H
T
0
f
λ f
assessment B:
option set A:
Figure 3.4: Illustration of the assessment and some relevant sets of gambles
for Example 16↶
Without loss of generality, we let A′ ∶= {0, f ,h1, . . . ,hn} ⊃ A where n be-
longs to N and h1, . . . , hn to L, so {0}∪ (A′ ∖A) = {0,h1, . . . ,hn}. Then, by
Lemma 89112, we find that (maxA′)∩{0,h1, . . . ,hn} ≠ ∅. As an intermediate
result, we show that (maxA′)∩(span{ f}+L>0)=∅. To see this, since {0, f}∩(span{ f}+L>0) =∅, infer that (maxA′)∩(span{ f}+L>0) ⊆ {h1, . . . ,hn}, and
assume ex absurdo that (maxA′)∩(span{ f}+L>0)≠∅. Let h be an element of
argmax{g(T) ∶ g ∈ (maxA′)∩(span{ f}+L>0)}, then h(T)+µλ f (T) > h(T),
so h+µλ f ∈ {h}+µB is undominated in (maxA′)∩(span{ f}+L>0) whence{h}+µB /≼ (maxA′)∩(span{ f}+L>0) for all µ in R>0. Note that, since h be-
longs to span{ f}+L>0, also h+µλ f belongs to span{ f}+L>0 for every µ in
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R>0. Therefore, since an element of span{ f}+L>0 can never be dominated by
an element of (span{ f}+L>0)c = span{ f}+L≤0,17 also {h}+µB /≼maxA′ for
all µ in R>0. By Proposition 3343(ii)&(iv), therefore also {h}+µB /≼ A′ for all
µ in R>0. Since h belongs to maxA′, also A′ −{h}∩L>0 = ∅, a contradiction
with Equation (3.12). So we have that (maxA′)∩ (span{ f}+L>0) = ∅, and
therefore, again because an element of span{ f}+L>0 can never be dominated
by an element of span{ f}+L≤0, also A′∩(span{ f}+L>0) =∅.
H
T
0
f
h1
h2
h3
h4
Figure 3.5: Illustration of a specific option set A′ ∶= {0, f ,h1, . . . ,h4}, for which
we know that A′∩(span{ f}+L>0) =∅
Now that we know something about the shape of A′—namely, that A′ ∩(span{ f}+L>0) =∅—, we go back to Equation (3.12), and consider first h = 0.
Then A′ ∩L>0 ≠ ∅ or (∃µ ∈ R>0)µB ≼ A′. Since A′ ∩ (span{ f}+L>0) = ∅,
in particular A′ ∩L>0 = ∅, so the only possibility left is (∃µ ∈ R>0)µB ≼
A′, or, in other words, {0,µ f ,µλ f} ≼ {0, f ,h1, . . . ,hn} for some µ in R>0.
There are three possibilities: if (i) µ = 1, then hi ≥ λ f —and therefore, since
A′∩(span{ f}+L>0) =∅, necessarily hi = λ f —for some i in {1, . . . ,n}; if (ii)
µ = 1λ then h j ≥ 1λ f —and therefore, since A′ ∩ (span{ f}+L>0) = ∅, neces-
sarily h j = 1λ f —for some j in {1, . . . ,n}; and finally, if (iii) µ ∉ { 1λ ,1}, then
hk ≥ µ f and h` ≥ µλ f —and therefore, since A′ ∩ (span{ f}+L>0) = ∅, nec-
essarily hk = µ f and h` = µλ f —for some k and ` in {1, . . . ,n}. In any case,
we find that {h1, . . . ,hn}∩posi{ f} ≠ ∅. Without loss of generality, let h1 be
the unique gamble in {h1, . . . ,hn}∩ posi{ f} with highest value in T: {h1} =
argmax{g(T) ∶ g ∈ {h1, . . . ,hn}∩posi{ f}}. Then, since h1 ∈ {0}∪(A′∖A), by
Equation (3.12), we have that (A′−{h1})∩L>0 ≠∅ or (∃µ ∈R>0){h1}+µB ≼
A′. Since A′ ∩ (span{ f}+L>0) = ∅ and h1 ∈ posi{ f}, we find in particular
A′∩({h1}+L>0)=∅, whence, using Lemma 312, (A′−{h1})∩L>0 =∅. There-
17To see this, note that (span{ f}+L>0) is a coherent set of desirable gambles, whence, by
Axioms D257 and D457, any gamble dominating some desirable gamble is desirable itself.
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case (iii): µ ∉ { 1λ ,1}
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Figure 3.6: Illustration of the three different cases mentioned
fore necessarily {h1,h1 +µ f ,h1 +µλ f} = {h1}+µB ≼ A′ for some µ in R>0.
Note that both h1+µ f and h1+µλ f belong to posi{ f}, and have a value in T
that is strictly higher than h1(T). But at least one of h1+µ f or h1+µλ f is not
equal to f , and therefore an element of {h1, . . . ,hn}∩posi{ f}, a contradiction
with the fact that h1 ∈ argmax{g(T) ∶ g ∈ {h1, . . . ,hn}∩ posi{ f}}. Therefore
indeed 0 ∉ RB(A). For an illustration of the argument, see Figure 3.7.
H
T
0
f
λ f
h1
h2
h3
h1+µ fh1+2µ f
Figure 3.7: Illustration of the contradiction, using h1, the gamble in{h1, . . . ,hn}∩ span{ f} with the highest value in T: both h1+µ f and h1+µλ f
have a higher value in T, and at least one of them is not equal to f
So we have found a rejection function RB that does not satisfy Axiom R625
[0 ∈RB({0, f ,λ f}) but 0 ∉RB({0, f})], and therefore, by Proposition 5665, RB
is no infimum of purely binary rejection functions. ◊
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Lemma 89. Consider any option sets A ∶= {0,u1, . . . ,um} such that maxA =
A, and A′ ∶= A ∪ {v1, . . . ,vn}, with m ∈ N and n ∈ Z≥0. Then (maxA′) ∩{0,v1, . . . ,vn} ≠∅.
Proof. For notational convenience, let A′k ∶= A ∪ {v1, . . . ,vk} for all k in {0, . . . ,n}.
Then we need to prove that (maxA′n)∩ {0,v1, . . . ,vn} ≠ ∅. We will use induction
on n. For the base case n = 0, infer that A′0 = A, and therefore 0 ∈ maxA′0 = A′0,
whence indeed (maxA′0)∩{0} ≠ ∅. Consider now the case n > 0. Then by the induc-
tion hypothesis, we may assume that (maxA′n−1)∩{0,v1, . . . ,vn−1} ≠∅, and therefore
maxA′n−1 ⊈ {u1, . . . ,um}, meaning that (i) 0 ∈ maxA′n−1 or (ii) vi ∈ maxA′n−1 for some i
in {1, . . . ,n−1}. Assume now ex absurdo that maxA′n ⊆ {u1, . . . ,um}.
If (i) 0 ∈maxA′n−1, then (∀w ∈A′n−1)0⊀w, and therefore, since 0 ∉maxA′n, necessar-
ily 0 ≺ vn. But, since ≺ is transitive, then (∀w ∈ A′n−1)vn ⊀w, and, since ≺ is irreflexive,
we can extend this to (∀w ∈ A′n)vn ⊀w. Therefore vn ∈ maxA′n, a contradiction. So, if
(i) holds, we infer that maxA′n ⊈ {u1, . . . ,um}.
If (ii) vi ∈ maxA′n−1 for some i in {1, . . . ,n − 1}, then (∀w ∈ A′n−1)vi ⊀ w, and
therefore, since vi ∉ maxA′n, necessarily vi ≺ vn. But, since ≺ is transitive, then(∀w ∈ A′n−1)vn ⊀w, and, since ≺ is irreflexive, we can extend this to (∀w ∈ A′n)vn ⊀w.
Therefore vn ∈ maxA′n, a contradiction. So, also if (ii) holds, we infer that maxA′n ⊈{u1, . . . ,um}.
So we have showed that indeed (maxA′n)∩{0,v1, . . . ,vn} ≠∅.
To gain a feel for what Proposition 87104 means, we will consider two
simple assessments B, and find the outer approximation DB of DRB , mentioned
in Proposition 87104.
Example 17. We will work with the special vector space of gambles V = L
on a binary possibility space X = {H,T}, ordered by the standard point-wise
ordering ≤.
The first example is purely qualitative. Let
B ∶= {{0, f1, f2},{0,g1,g2,g3}} ⊆Q0,
as indicated in Figure 3.8↷. The set AB is given byAB = {{ f1,g1},{ f1,g2},{ f1,g3},{ f2,g1},{ f2,g2},{ f2,g3}},
and its subset that avoids non-positivity is
{{ f1,g1},{ f1,g2},{ f2,g1},{ f2,g2},{ f2,g3}}.
Each of these desirability assessments leads to a coherent sets of desirable
gambles, as indicated in Figure 3.9115. Therefore, since DB is the intersection
of all these sets of desirable gambles, we see that DB =L>0 is the vacuous set
of desirable gambles, shown in Figure 3.10116. Then also DRB = DB = L>0 is
the vacuous set of desirable gambles: the behaviour of RB on pairwise option
sets is vacuous! This does not imply that RB is vacuous: indeed, for instance
0 ∈ RB({0, f1, f2}).
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Figure 3.8: Illustration of the gambles in ⋃B
Without taking care, we might (incorrectly) conclude from this example
that inf{Rposi(V≻0∪A) ∶ A ∈AB and A avoids non-positivity} is the vacuous re-
jection function, and hence, Proposition 87104 would (incorrectly) imply that
RB is the vacuous rejection function. However, this is not true: indeed, con-
sider for instance the option set A′ ∶= {0, f1, f2}. Then A′∩D ≠∅ for all of the
sets of desirable gambles D in Figure 3.9, whence 0 ∈ (inf{Rposi(V≻0∪A) ∶ A ∈AB and A avoids non-positivity})(A′).
As a second, more general, example of Proposition 87104, let B′ ∶={{0, f ,g}}, where f and g are any fixed gambles such that f (H) < 0 < f (T)
and g(T) < 0 < g(H), of which a particular instance is indicated in Fig-
ure 3.11116. By Corollary 88106 B′ avoids complete rejection: indeed, let
D ∶= posi(L>0 ∪{ f}), then D ∩B′ = { f} ≠∅ for the only—and hence every—
B′ = {0, f ,g} in B′.
We wonder what the binary behaviour DRB of RB is. To this end, we will
use Proposition 87104 to find an outer approximation for it. Note that AB′ ={{ f},{g}}, and each of these desirability assessments avoid non-positivity, so
we need to find the infimum of posi(L>0∪{ f}) and posi(L>0∪{g}), whose il-
lustration is drawn in Figure 3.12117. This infimum is DB′ =L>0, and therefore
the only possibility is DRB′ = L>0. So we see that the natural extension of a
single assessment consisting of 0 and a gamble in each of the non-trivial quad-
rants, has vacuous pairwise behaviour! This generalises to bigger possibility
spaces. ◊
This example clearly shows how Proposition 87104 comes in very handy
to find an outer approximation of the implications of a given assessment. The
approximated binary behaviour was found to be exact here.
In the next example, we revisit Example 16109 in the light of Proposi-
tion 87104.
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Figure 3.9: Illustration of the sets of desirable gambles corresponding to the
elements of {A ∈AB ∶ A avoids non-positivity}
Example 18 (Binary behaviour of a non-binary assessment). We consider the
same assessment B ∶= {B}, where B ∶= {0, f ,λ f} with f a fixed gamble on X ={H,T} such that f (H) < 0 < f (T) and λ > 1. We showed that RB is no infimum
of binary rejection functions, and that its behaviour is intrinsically non-binary:
we found that 0 ∉ RB({0, f}) but 0 ∈ RB({0, f ,λ f}). In this example, we are
looking for the binary implications of this assessment, so we wonder what DRB
is. We showed that B avoids complete rejection, so by Theorem 8197 RB is a
coherent rejection function, and using Proposition 5361 we therefore already
know that DRB ∶= {g ∈L ∶ 0 ∈RB({0,g})} is a coherent set of desirable gambles.
Recall also that 0 ∉ RB({0, f}), so, quite surprisingly, f ∉ DRB and, us-
ing Axiom D357 therefore DRB ∩ posi{ f} = ∅, even though the assessmentB = {{0, f ,λ f}} states that 0 is rejected from 0 and two different gambles
on the ray posi{ f}. Considering the purely binary assessments {{0, f}},{{0,λ f}} and {{0, f},{0,λ f}} that avoid complete rejection, note that by
Theorem 86100 the respective sets of desirable gambles based on their natural
115
NATURAL EXTENSION
DB
H
T
0
f1
f2
g1g2
g3
Figure 3.10: Illustration of the gambles in DB
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Figure 3.11: Illustration of the gambles in ⋃B′
extensions are given by posi({ f}∪L>0), posi({λ f}∪L>0) and posi({ f ,λ f}∪L>0) respectively. But these three set of desirable gambles are all equal to
each other, and they all lead to the desirability of f , and therefore differ
from DRB . So a natural question is: ‘What is DRB?’ We will show that
DRB =L>0+posi{0, f}.
To show that DRB ⊆ L>0 + posi{0, f}, first we will show the weaker
statement that DRB ⊆ posi(L>0 ∪ { f}); see Figure 3.13 for an illustration ofL>0 +posi{0, f} and related sets of gambles, where full lines and grey points
are included in the set, and dotted lines and white points excluded. To this end,
use Proposition 87104 to infer that DRB ⊆DB, where
DB = ⋂
A∈AB
posi(A)∩V⪯0=∅
posi(V≻0∪A)
andAB = {{ f},{λ f}}. Therefore DB = posi(L>0∪{ f})∩posi(L>0∪{λ f}) =
posi(L>0 ∪ { f}), whence indeed DRB ⊆ posi(L>0 ∪ { f}), or, in other words,
using Lemma 111, DRB ⊆L>0∪(posi{ f})∪(L>0+posi{ f}). Since we already
know that DRB ∩posi{ f} =∅, therefore indeed DRB ⊆L>0∪(L>0+posi{ f}) =L>0+posi{0, f}.
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Figure 3.12: Illustration of posi(L>0∪{ f}), posi(L>0∪{g}) and its intersec-
tion DB′
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Figure 3.13: Illustration of L>0+posi{ f} ⊂L>0+posi{0, f} ⊂ posi(L>0∪{ f})
Note that this also shows that the inequalities in Proposition 87104 can be
strict. Indeed, DRB ⊆ L>0 + posi{0, f} ⊂ posi(L>0 ∪ f ) = DB. Also, as we
have seen, both of the desirability assessments A in AB lead to the same
set of desirable gambles posi(L>0 ∪ { f}), therefore inf{Rposi(V≻0∪A) ∶ A ∈AB and A avoids non-positivity} = Rposi(L>0∪{ f}). We have shown in Exam-
ple 16109 that 0 ∉ RB({0, f}), while 0 ∈ Rposi(L>0∪{ f})({0, f}), and therefore
indeed RB ⊏ inf{Rposi(L>0∪A) ∶ A ∈AB and A avoids non-positivity}.
To show that L>0 +posi{0, f} ⊆ DRB , consider any g in L>0 +posi{0, f}.
We will show that then g ∈ DRB , or, equivalently, that 0 ∈ RB(A), where A ∶={0,g}. If g belongs to L>0, by Axiom R120 then 0 ∈RB({0,g}), so assume that
g ∉L>0. Then g(H) < 0 < g(T). As a result, in particular g ∈L>0+posi{ f}. To
show that 0 ∈ RB(A), we need to find some A′ ⊇ A in Q such that
(∀h ∈ {0}∪(A′∖A))((A′−{h})∩L>0 ≠∅ or (∃µ ∈R>0){h}+µB ≼ A′).
(3.13)
We state that
A′ ∶= A∪{µ ′βk f ∶ k ∈N and βk−1 < g(H)µ ′ f (H)}
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where we let µ ′ ∶= g(T)λ f(T) > 0 and β ∶N→R∶k↦ βk ∶=∑ki=1(λ−1λ )i−1, and β0 ∶= 0,
satisfies Equation (3.13)↶. Since λ > 1, therefore λ−1λ ∈ (0,1), and, since β
forms a geometric progression, we infer that β satisfies the following proper-
ties: βk = λ −λ(λ−1λ )k for all k in N, so β is increasing and limk→+∞βk = λ .
Before we show that A′ satisfies Equation (3.13)↶, we first show that it
belongs to Q—that it is finite. We need to show that βk−1 < g(H)µ′ f(H) fails to
hold for some k in N: we will show that βk−1 ≥ g(H)µ′ f(H) for some k in N.
Since limk→+∞βk = λ this happens exactly when g(H)µ′ f(H) < λ .18 Infer, using
that f (H) < 0 < f (T) and g(H) < 0 < g(T), that
g(H)
µ ′ f (H) = λ f (T)g(H)f (H)g(T) < λ⇔ f (T)f (H) > g(T)g(H) ⇔ f (T)∣ f (H)∣ < g(T)∣g(H)∣ .
Since g ∈L>0+posi{g}, therefore g > µ f for some µ in R>0. Therefore g(H) ≥
µ f (H)—because g(H) < 0 and f (H) < 0, equivalently ∣g(H)∣ ≤ ∣µ f (H)∣—and
g(T) ≥ µ f (T), with one of the two inequalities strict. Then indeed f(T)∣ f(H)∣ =
µ f(T)∣µ f(H)∣ < g(T)∣g(H)∣ , so we have showed that g(H)µ′ f(H) < λ and therefore indeed that
A′ belongs to Q. For notational convenience, we let k¯ be the biggest k in N
such that βk−1 < g(H)µ′ f(H) , and hk ∶= µ ′βk f for every k in {1, . . . , k¯}. Figure 3.14
shows an illustration of A′, which in this example is {0,g,h1,h2,h3,h4}, since
4 is the first index k for which hk(H) is smaller than g(H); therefore k¯ = 4.
H
T
0
h1 = µ ′ f
λµ ′ f
g
g(H)
λµ ′ f (T) = g(T)
h2 = µ ′β2 fh3 = µ ′β3 fh4 = µ ′β4 f
Figure 3.14: Illustration of A′ = {0,g,h1,h2,h3,h4}
We are now ready to show that A′ satisfies Equation (3.13)↶. Note that{0}∪(A′∖A)= {0,h1, . . . ,hk¯}. So we need to show that A′∩L>0 ≠∅ or µB ≼A′
18To see this, observe that βk−1 ≥ g(H)µ′ f(H) if k ≥ 1+ ln(1− g(H)λµ′ f(H) )ln( λ−1λ ) , being a positive real number
if and only if g(H)λµ′ f(H) < 1.
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for some µ ∈ R>0, and, for every k in {1, . . . , k¯}, that (A′ − {hk})∩L>0 ≠ ∅
or {hk}+ µkB ≼ A′ for some µk in R>0. We start with h = 0. We will show
that µB ≼ A′ for some µ ∈ R>0. Let µ = µ ′, then µB = {0,µ ′ f ,λµ ′ f} ={0,h1,λµ ′ f}. Since µ ′ = g(T)λ f(T) , therefore λµ ′ f (T) = g(T), and since g be-
longs to L>0 + posi{ f}, therefore also λµ ′ f (H) < g(H), so λµ ′ f < g, and
hence µB ≼ {0,h1,g}. But {0,h1,g} ⊆ A′, whence by Proposition 3343(i)&(ii)
indeed µB ≼ A′. Next, we will show that (A′ −{hk¯})∩L>0 ≠ ∅. We state that
hk¯ < g. To see this, since k¯ is the biggest k inN such that βk−1 < g(H)µ′ f(H) , we have
that βk¯ ≥ g(H)µ′ f(H) , or, in other words, that hk¯(H) ≤ g(H). Furthermore, since we
have already shown that βk <λ for all k inN, and that λµ ′ f (T)=g(T), we have
that hk(T) = µ ′βk f (T) < λµ ′ f (T) = g(T), so indeed hk¯ < g. Since g belongs to
A′, this proves that indeed (A′−{hk¯})∩L>0 ≠∅. Finally, we will prove, for all
k in {1, . . . , k¯ − 1}, that there is some µk in R>0 such that {hk}+ µkB ≼ A′.
Consider any k in {1, . . . , k¯ − 1} and let µk = µ′λ (λ − βk) > 0. Note that
µk = µ′λ (λ −βk)= µ ′(1− βkλ )= µ ′(1−(1−(λ−1λ )k))= µ ′(λ−1λ )k = µ ′(βk+1−βk).
Then {hk}+µB = {hk,hk +µk f ,hk +µkλ f}
= {hk,µ ′βk f +µ ′(βk+1−βk) f ,µ ′βk f + µ ′λ (λ −βk)λ f}= {hk,µ ′βk+1 f ,µ ′λ f} = {hk,hk+1,µ ′λ f}.
We already know that µ ′λ f is dominated by g, whence {hk} + µkB ≼{hk,hk+1,g}. But {hk,hk+1,g} ⊆ A′, whence by Proposition 3343(i)&(ii) in-
deed {hk} + µkB ≼ A′. So we have shown that Equation (3.13)117 holds,
whence 0 ∈ RB({0,g}), and therefore indeed L>0 + posi{0, f} ⊆ DRB . Since
we already know that DRB ⊆ L>0 + posi{0, f}, this means that indeed DRB =L>0+posi{0, f}: this is the binary behaviour that is incorporated in RB.
Compare this with the purely binary assessments B′ ∶= {{0, f}} ⊆Q0 andB′′ ∶= {{0, f +ε} ∶ ε ∈R>0} ⊆Q0, where f is the same fixed gamble as before.
Both B′ and B′′ avoid complete rejection, since, with D ∶= posi(L>0∪{ f}) we
have ((∀B′ ∈ B′)B′∩D ≠∅)⇔ {0, f}∩D ≠∅⇔ { f} ≠∅ and((∀B′′ ∈ B′′)B′′∩D ≠∅)⇔ ((∀ε ∈R>0){0, f +ε}∩D ≠∅)⇔ ((∀ε ∈R>0){ f +ε} ≠∅),
which are both true. Therefore, by Corollary 88106, indeed B′ and B′′ avoid
complete rejection, and by Theorem 8197, their respective natural extensions
RB′ and RB′′ are coherent. Since both the assessments B′ and B′′ are binary
assessments, by Theorem 86100, therefore RB′ and RB′′ are binary rejection
functions, derived from posi(L>0∪B′) and posi(L>0∪B′′) respectively, where
B′ ∶=⋃(B′ ∖{0}) = { f} and B′′ ∶=⋃(B′′ ∖{0}) = { f + ε ∶ ε ∈R>0}. Therefore
RB′ = Rposi(L>0∪{ f}) and, using Lemma 90121, RB′′ = RL>0+posi{0, f}.
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We will show that RB is strictly bounded by RB′′ and RB′ , in the sense that
RB′′ ⊏ RB ⊏ RB′ . First, we will show that RB′′ ≠ RB ≠ RB′ . Note that RB does
not satisfy Axiom R625, as we have shown in Example 16109, while, using
Proposition 5665 and since they are derived from a set of desirable gambles,
both RB′′ and RB′ do satisfy Axiom R625. Therefore indeed RB′′ ≠ RB ≠ RB′ .
So it suffices to prove that RB′′ ⊑ RB ⊑ RB′ . Since all three rejection functions
involved are coherent, it suffices to show that 0 ∈ RB′′(A)⇒ 0 ∈ RB(A) and
0 ∈ RB(A)⇒ 0 ∈ RB′(A) for every A in Q. To show that RB′′ ⊑ RB, consider
any A inQ and assume that 0 ∈RB′′(A). Therefore, since RB′′ =RL>0+posi{0, f},
equivalently 0 ∈ A and A ∩ (L>0 + posi{0, f}) ≠ ∅, whence there is some h
in A such that h belongs to L>0 + posi{0, f}. Since we have shown earlier
in this example that DRB = L>0 +posi{0, f}, therefore 0 ∈ RB({0,h}). Using
Axiom R3a20 [with A˜ ∶= A, A˜1 ∶= {0} and A˜2 ∶= {0,h}] then indeed 0 ∈ RB(A).
Since the choice of A was arbitrary, we have shown that RB′′ ⊑ RB, and since
they are not equal, therefore indeed RB′′ ⊏ RB. To show that RB ⊑ RB′ , note
that the assessment B′ is at least as strong as B: indeed, {0, f} ≼ {0, f ,λ f}, so
by Definition 3091 B′ is indeed at least as strong as B. By Proposition 7692,
then RB ⊑ RB′ and since they are not equal, therefore indeed RB ⊏ RB′ . So we
conclude that RB′′ ⊏ RB ⊏ RB′ : RB is strictly bounded by RB′′ and RB′ .
We summarise our comparison in the next table, where A is any element ofQ such that 0 ∈ A.
R6? Binary behaviour 0 rejected from A
RB′′ yes DRB′′ =L>0+posi{0, f} ⇔ A∩(L>0+posi{0, f}) ≠∅
RB no DRB =L>0+posi{0, f} ⇒ A∩posi(L>0∪{ f}) ≠∅⇐ A∩(L>0+posi{0, f}) ≠∅
RB′ yes DRB′ = posi(L>0∪{ f}) ⇔ A∩posi(L>0∪{ f}) ≠∅
For RB′ = Rposi(L>0∪{ f}) and RB′′ = RL>0+posi{0, f}, the rightmost column fol-
lows from Proposition 5564, and for RB, this is a consequence from the fact
that RB′′ ⊏ RB ⊏ RB′ .
I want to highlight that the difference between RB, RB′ and RB′′ shows
itself in option sets that have parts in common with posi(L>0 ∪{ f}) but not
with L>0+posi{0, f}, so in option sets A such that
A∩(posi(L>0∪{ f})) ≠∅ and A ⊆ (L>0+posi{0, f})c.
Indeed, for such option sets, 0 ∉ RB′′(A), 0 ∈ RB′(A), and it is undetermined
whether 0 belongs to RB(A). Let us investigate what this means. Since A ∩(posi(L>0∪{ f})) ≠∅, by Lemma 111,
A∩posi( f ) ≠∅ or A∩(L>0+posi{0, f}) ≠∅,
but since A ⊆ (L>0+posi{0, f})c, therefore
A∩posi( f ) ≠∅,
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so the border posi{ f} is the important part of A ⊆ (L>0 +posi{0, f})c to de-
termine whether 0 ∈ RB′(A) and 0 ∈ RB(A). This shows that RB has complex
border behaviour—more complex behaviour than desirability can model. We
see that, besides their generalisation towards non-binary choice, choice models
are capable of modelling even more complex border behaviour than desirabil-
ity.
As a final remark, I would like to draw attention to some subtlety, by
comparing with Example 14106: in that setting, there we found that f ∈
RB({0, f ,g}), where f and g are two specific gambles such that f (H) < 0 <
f (T) and g(H) < 0 < g(T)—just as in this example, but they do not lie on the
same ray through 0. We found that f ∈ RB({0, f ,g}), which, taking into ac-
count that 0 ∈ RB({0, f ,g}), by Axiom R3b20 means that 0 ∈ RB({0,g}), and
therefore DRB ⊇ posi(L>0 ∪{g}). By combining this with Proposition 87104,
we find that DRB = posi(L>0 ∪{g}). So in Example 14106, the outer approx-
imation of the binary behaviour given in Proposition 87104 is exact, while in
Example 16109, it is not. This observation hints at the reason why it is difficult
to find an exact connection between B and the binary behaviour DRB of RB,
other than the outer approximation of Proposition 87104 or by calculating RB
explicitly: even in these easy examples where ∣X∣ = 2 and the assessments are
relatively small, it is hard to predict when Proposition 87104 gives DRB exactly,
and when it gives an outer approximation for it—and it is even harder to see
the reason for this. ◊
Lemma 90. Consider the possibility space X ∶= {H,T} and the linear spaceL of gambles on X. Consider any h in (L>0 ∪L<0)c, and let A ∶= {h+ ε ∶ ε ∈
R>0} ⊆L. Then posi(L>0∪A) =L>0+posi{0,h}.
Proof. We first show that posi(L>0 ∪ A) ⊆ L>0 + posi{0,h}. Consider any f in
posi(L>0 ∪A). By Lemma 111 then f ∈ L>0 ∪ posi(A)∪ (L>0 + posi(A)). If f be-
longs to L>0, then it belongs to L>0 + posi{0,h} since 0 ∈ posi{0,h}. If f belongs
to posi(A)∪ (L>0 + posi(A)) = L≥0 + posi(A) then f ≥ ∑nk=1λkhk, where n is an el-
ement of N, λ1, . . . , λn are elements of R>0 and h1, . . . , hn belong to A. For every
k in {1, . . . ,m} therefore hk = h+ εk for some εk in R>0, so f ≥ ∑nk=1(λkh+λkεk) =(∑nk=1λkh)+∑nk=1λkεk, and because ∑nk=1λkεk > 0, then f > ∑nk=1λkh. Therefore
f ∈L>0+posi{h}, so in particular indeed f ∈L>0+posi{0,h}.
Conversely, to show that L>0+posi{0,h} ⊆ posi(L>0∪A), consider any f in L>0+
posi{0,h}. By Lemma 512 then f ∈ L>0 or µh < f for some µ in R>0. If f ∈ L>0
then f ∈ posi(L>0 ∪A) which proves the desired statement, so assume that µh < f for
some µ in R>0. If h = 0, then f ∈ L>0 and the proof is done, so assume that h ≠ 0.
We therefore may assume that f belongs to the same quadrant as h—if this is not the
case, then necessarily f ∈ L>0, for which we have just shown that then the desired
statement holds. Note that then either (i) f (H) < 0 < f (T) and h(H) < 0 < h(T), or (ii)
f (H) > 0 > f (T) and h(H) > 0 > h(T).
We will show that f belongs to posi(L>0 ∪A). To do so, we will show that f =
λµh+ε for some λ and ε in R>0, whence f ∈ posi{h+ ελµ } ⊆ posi(A) ⊆ posi(L>0∪A).
We state that λ ∶= f(H)− f(T)µ(h(H)−h(T)) and ε ∶= f(T)h(H)− f(H)h(T)h(H)−h(T) both belong to R>0 and
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satisfy f = λµh+ε . Since f and h belong to the same quadrant, it is clear that λ belongs
to R>0. To show that also ε belongs to R>0, infer from f > µh that f (H) ≥ µh(H) and
f (T) ≥ µh(T), where at least one of the inequalities is strict.
If (i) f (H) < 0 < f (T) and h(H) < 0 < h(T), then ∣ f (H)∣ ≤ ∣µh(H)∣ and f (T) ≥
µh(T), where at least one of the inequalities is strict, and every term involved
is non-negative. Therefore f (T)∣µh(H)∣ > ∣ f (H)∣µh(T), whence f (T)∣h(H)∣ >∣ f (H)∣h(T), so f (T)h(H) < f (H)h(T). Since h(H) < h(T), this implies that indeed
ε = f(T)h(H)− f(H)h(T)h(H)−h(T) belongs to R>0. On the other hand, if (ii) f (H) > 0 > f (T) and
h(H) > 0 > h(T), then f (H) ≥ µh(H) and ∣ f (T)∣ ≤ ∣µh(T)∣, where at least one of the in-
equalities is strict, and every term involved is non-negative. Therefore ∣ f (T)∣µh(H) <
f (H)∣µh(T)∣, whence ∣ f (T)∣h(H) < f (H)∣h(T)∣, so f (T)h(H) > f (H)h(T). Since
h(H) > h(T), this implies that indeed ε = f(T)h(H)− f(H)h(T)h(H)−h(T) belongs to R>0.
The proof is complete if we prove that f = λµh+ε . To show this, note that indeed
λµh(H)+ε = f (H)− f (T)
h(H)−h(T) h(H)+ f (T)h(H)− f (H)h(T)h(H)−h(T)
= f (H)h(H)− f (T)h(H)+ f (T)h(H)− f (H)h(T)
h(H)−h(T)
= f (H)h(H)− f (H)h(T)
h(H)−h(T) = f (H)h(H)−h(T)h(H)−h(T) = f (H)
and
λµh(T)+ε = f (H)− f (T)
h(H)−h(T) h(T)+ f (T)h(H)− f (H)h(T)h(H)−h(T)
= f (H)h(T)− f (T)h(T)+ f (T)h(H)− f (H)h(T)
h(H)−h(T)
= f (T)h(H)− f (T)h(T)
h(H)−h(T) = f (T)h(H)−h(T)h(H)−h(T) = f (T).
3.7 DISCUSSION
In this chapter, we have investigated the natural extension of choice functions,
found an expression for it, and characterised the assessments that have coher-
ent extensions. We made the connection with binary choice, and showed how
the well-known natural extension for desirability follows from our natural ex-
tension.
One of the open problems is whether the condition in Corollary 88106 is
also necessary for an assessment to avoid complete rejection. This is impor-
tant, because it would imply that Proposition 87104 always obtains a non-trivial
outer approximation of RB. Furthermore, it would imply the following useful
property of any coherent rejection function R:19(∃D ∈D)(∀A ∈Q)(0 ∈ R(A)⇒ A∩D ≠∅),
19If the converse statement of Corollary 88106 would hold, then we could derive this property
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which I feel is a crucial property to find a representation of coherent choice in
terms of desirability.
At this point, it is unknown whether this converse statement of Corol-
lary 88106 holds. What is hopeful, is that some ‘obvious’ counterexamples fail.
Indeed, taking Example 16109 in mind, we could focus our hope on the assess-
ment B = {{0, f ,λ f},{0,− f}}. Since D∩{0, f ,λ f}=∅ or D∩{0,− f}=∅ for
all D in D,20 this might serve as a counterexample. The only thing we need to
show for it to be a valid counterexample, is that RB satisfies Axiom R120. Since
RB satisfies Axioms R3b20 and R4b20 [by Lemma 7792], by Corollary 2639 it
suffices to check whether or not 0 ∈ RB({0}), or equivalently, using Equa-
tion (3.1)92, that there is some A′ in Q0 such that
(∀g ∈ A′)(A′∩V≻0 ≠∅ or (∃B ∈ B,∃µ ∈R>0){g}+µB ≼ A′).
The option set A′ ∶= {0, f ,λ f} satisfies this equation: for g = 0, take B ={0, f ,λ f} and µ = 1, then {g}+µB = {0, f ,λ f} ≼ {0, f ,λ f} = A′; for g = f ,
take B = {0,− f} and µ = 1, then {g}+µB = { f ,0}≼ {0, f ,λ f}=A′; and finally,
for g = λ f , take B = {0,− f} and µ = λ , then {g}+µB = {λ f ,0} ≼ {0, f ,λ f} =
A′. So RB does not avoid complete rejection, and therefore this assessment B
cannot serve as a counterexample. Furthermore, this reasoning also rules as-
sessments like B′ ∶= {{0, f},{0,− f}} out as valid counterexamples: since the
assessment B′ is at least as strong as B, by the contraposition of Corollary 8298
also B′ does not avoid complete rejection.
simply by considering the assessment BR ∶= {A ∈Q ∶ 0 ∈ R(A)} ⊆Q0. Since R is the smallest
coherent extension of itself, Theorem 8197 then implies that RBR = R, so BR avoids complete
rejection.
20To see this, if ex absurdo D ∩{0, f ,λ f} ≠ ∅ and D ∩{0,− f} ≠ ∅ for some D in D, then{ f ,− f} ⊆ D or {λ f ,− f} ⊆ D. By Axioms D357 and D457 therefore 0 ∈ D, a contradiction with
Axiom D157.
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In Chapter 29 we have seen that the coherent choice functions, or coherent
rejection functions or coherent choice relations for that matter, form a belief
structure (see Proposition 6370). However, many of the imprecise probability
models (see Section 2.8.671) extant in the literature satisfy the additional prop-
erty of being dually atomic (see Proposition 5259 for sets of desirable options),
making them strong belief structures [23].
The relevance of strong belief structures is discussed at length by De
Cooman in Reference [23]. They guarantee that every coherent model is the
infimum of its dominating maximal models. Often, the maximal models are
easy to work with, and have nice properties. For instance, as shown in Propo-
sition 5159, every maximal set of desirable options Dˆ has the very useful prop-
erty that either u or −u belongs to Dˆ, for every u in V∖{0}. This is of crucial
importance for many results—like the result in Proposition 6270 showing that
CDˆ is a maximal choice function whenever Dˆ is a maximal set of desirable
options.
The coherent choice functions considered by Seidenfeld et al. [67]—whose
rationality axioms and their relation with our notion of coherence we dis-
cussed in Section 2.428—do form a strong belief structure [67, Theorem 4].
Their maximal choice functions are exactly those that are representable by a
probability–utility pair, and every coherent (in their notion) choice function is
an infimum of such choice functions.
Up to now, for our notion of coherence, we have ignored the question of
whether they can be represented in terms of maximal (or ‘easy’) choice func-
tions. To answer this question, we need to take a closer look at two related
questions. First, we need to know which are the maximal choice functions,
and second, we need to find out whether every coherent choice function is in-
deed represented in terms of those maximal choice functions—is an infimum
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of its dominating maximal choice functions. With respect to the first question,
in Proposition 6270 we have already found a subset of the maximal choice
functions: we have shown that {CDˆ ∶ Dˆ ∈ Dˆ} ⊆ Cˆ. Furthermore, its proof relies
on the useful property that CDˆ identifies exactly one option to be chosen, from
within any option set: (∀A ∈Q)∣CDˆ(A)∣ = 1. Ideally, we would like to have
that these CDˆ constitute all the maximal choice functions, since this would
guarantee that all of them satisfy this nice property.
However, in Example 16109, we have essentially already shown that in gen-
eral we cannot expect to have representation in terms of maximal choice func-
tions that represent only binary choice:
Example 19. Consider the rejection function RB that is the natural exten-
sion of the assessment B = {0, f ,λ f} where 0 < λ ≠ 1. In Example 16109,
we have shown that RB is no infimum of purely binary rejection functions. A
fortiori, it therefore is no infimum of RDˆ , with Dˆ in Dˆ. This shows that, if
Rˆ = {RDˆ ∶ Dˆ ∈ Dˆ}, then not every coherent rejection function R is an infimum
of its dominating rejection functions in Rˆ: indeed, consider for instance RB.
Furthermore, it shows that, if every coherent rejection function is an infimum
of its dominating rejection functions in Rˆ, then Rˆ ⊃ {RDˆ ∶ Dˆ ∈ Dˆ}: indeed, if
RB = inf{Rˆ ∈ Rˆ ∶ RB ⊑ Rˆ}, then, since RB is no infimum of RD , with D in D,
necessarily there are R in Rˆ that are not purely binary. ◊
This clearly shows that coherence is not sufficient to obtain a representation
for our choice functions in terms of maximal elements that represent binary
choice. We will therefore need to add additional properties (or axioms) in order
to try and guarantee such a representation. Since Seidenfeld et al.’s [67] choice
functions do have this nice representation, we seek inspiration in their two
additional axioms (Archimedeanity and the convexity Property C525). Because
Archimedeanity is hard to reconcile with desirability (see Reference [86] and
Section 2.8.774), we will focus initially on their convexity axiom only.
In the first part of this chapter—Sections 4.1–4.3143—, we investigate in
detail the implications of Seidenfeld et al.’s [67] convexity axiom in our con-
text. We will prove that, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, for purely binary
choice functions, convexity is equivalent to being representable by means of a
lexicographic probability measure. This is done by first establishing the im-
plications of convexity in terms of the binary comparisons associated with a
choice function, giving rise to what we will call lexicographic sets of desir-
able gambles. These sets include as particular cases the maximal (see Sec-
tion 2.8.358) and the strictly desirable (see Section 2.8.671) sets of desirable
gambles. Although in the particular case of binary possibility spaces these are
the only two possibilities, for more general spaces lexicographic sets of gam-
bles allow for a greater level of generality, as one would expect considering the
above-mentioned equivalence.
126
4.1 PURELY BINARY CHOICE FUNCTIONS AND PROPERTY C5
A consequence of our equivalence result is that we can consider infima
of choice functions associated with lexicographic probability measures, and
in this manner generalise, or subsume as special cases, the examples of E-
admissibility and M-admissibility discussed in Section 2.1081. It will follow
from the discussion that these infima also satisfy the convexity axiom. As one
particularly relevant application of these ideas, we prove that the most conser-
vative convex choice function associated with a binary preference relation can
be obtained as the infimum of its dominating lexicographic choice functions.
In the second part of this chapter, we will prove the negative result that
the coherent choice functions that satisfy the convexity property C525 are not
representable by {CDˆ ∶ Dˆ ∈ Dˆ}, and not even by lexicographic choice functions.
We will present a counterexample in the case of a binary possibility space.
4.1 PURELY BINARY CHOICE FUNCTIONS AND PROPERTY C5
We have seen in Example 364 that not every purely binary choice function
satisfies Property C525: for the specific coherent set of desirable options D
considered there, the corresponding choice function CD fails to satisfy this
property. However, there are other sets of desirable options D for which CD
does satisfy the convexity axiom. They are identified in the next proposition.
Proposition 91. Consider any coherent set of desirable options D. Then the
corresponding coherent choice function CD satisfies Property C525 if and only
if Dc is a convex cone, or in other words, if and only if posi(Dc) = Dc, or
equivalently, posi(Dc)∩D =∅.
Proof. Proposition 5462 guarantees that CD is a coherent choice function.
For necessity, assume that posi(Dc) ≠ Dc, or equivalently, that posi(Dc)∩D ≠ ∅.
Then there is some option u in D such that u ∈ posi(Dc), meaning that there are n in N,
λ1, . . . , λn in R>0 and u1, . . . , un in Dc such that u =∑nk=1λkuk. Let A ∶= {0,u1, . . . ,un}
and A1 ∶= A ∪{u}. Due to the coherence of D [more precisely Axiom D357], we can
rescale u ∈ D while keeping the uk fixed, in such a way that we achieve that ∑nk=1λk =
1, whence A ⊆ A1 ⊆ conv(A). We find that 0 ∈ CD(A) by Proposition 5564, because
A∩D =∅, but 0 ∉CD(A1) because u ∈D, so A1∩D ≠∅. This tells us that CD does not
satisfy Property C525, because clearly CD(A) ⊈CD(A1).
For sufficiency, assume that CD does not satisfy Property C525. Therefore, there
are A and A1 inQ such that A ⊆A1 ⊆ conv(A) and CD(A) ⊈CD(A1), or, in other words,
such that u ∈CD(A) and u ∉CD(A1) for some u in A. Consider such A and A1 in Q,
and u in A. Due to Axiom C4b20, we find that 0 ∈CD(A −{u}) and 0 ∉CD(A1 −{u}),
or equivalently, by Proposition 5564, that A − {u} ⊆ Dc and A1 − {u}∩D ≠ ∅. But
A1 −{u} ⊆ conv(A)−{u} = conv(A −{u}) ⊆ posi(A −{u}) ⊆ posi(Dc), so posi(Dc)∩
D ≠∅.
This proposition seems to indicate that there is something special about coher-
ent sets of desirable options whose complement is a convex cone too. We give
them a special name that will be motivated and explained in the next section.
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Definition 33. A coherent set of desirable options D is called lexicographic if
posi(Dc) =Dc, or, equivalently, if posi(Dc)∩D =∅.
We collect all the lexicographic coherent sets of desirable options in DL.
Any maximal coherent set of desirable options is also a lexicographic one:1
Proposition 92. We have that Dˆ ⊆DL.
Proof. Consider any maximal set of desirable gambles D, and arbitrary n in N, u1,
. . . , un in Dc and λ1, . . . , λn in R>0. Then since all −uk ∈ D∪{0} by Proposition 5159,
we infer that −∑nk=1λkuk ∈ D ∪ {0}, because the coherent D is in particular a con-
vex cone. If ∑nk=1λkuk = 0, then ∑nk=1λkuk ∈ Dc by Axiom D157. If ∑nk=1λkuk ≠ 0,
then −∑nk=1λkuk ∈ D, and since coherence [more specifically, a combination of Ax-
ioms D157 and D457] implies that a coherent set of gambles cannot include both a
gamble and its opposite, we conclude that, here too, ∑nk=1λkuk ∈ Dc. Therefore, Dc is
indeed a convex cone, so D belongs to DL.
4.2 LEXICOGRAPHIC PROBABILITY SYSTEMS AND DESIR-
ABILITY
In this section, we embark on a more detailed study of lexicographic sets of
desirable options, and amongst other things, explain where their name comes
from. We will restrict ourselves here to the special case where V is the linear
space L(X) of all gambles on a finite possibility space X, provided with the
component-wise order ≤ as its vector ordering.
We first show that the lower expectation functional associated with a lexi-
cographic D is actually a linear prevision (we refer to Section 2.8.671 and Ref-
erences [51, 72, 82] for more information about lower and linear previsions):
Proposition 93. For any D in DL, the coherent lower prevision PD on L(X)
defined by
PD( f ) ∶= sup{µ ∈R ∶ f −µ ∈D} for all f in L(X)
is a linear prevision.
Proof. Consider any f in L and ε in R>0, then we first prove that f ∈ D or ε − f ∈ D.
Assume ex absurdo that f ∉ D and ε − f ∉ D. Then, because by assumption posi(Dc) =
Dc is a convex cone, we also have that f +ε− f = ε ∉D, which contradicts Axiom D257.
Now, Walley [82, Theorem 3.8.3] guarantees that for any such D, the corresponding
functional PD is indeed a linear prevision.
1This can actually be obtained as a corollary to a result by Hammer [40, Theorem 2], by taking
into account that maximal sets of desirable gambles are semispaces and that lexicographic sets of
desirable gambles correspond to hemispaces. To make this thesis more self-contained, we give a
proof using the coherence axioms of sets of desirable gambles we are employing in this paper.
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4.2.1 Binary possibility spaces
To get some feeling for what these lexicographic models represent, we first
look at the special case of binary possibility spaces {H,T}, leading to a two-
dimensional option space V = L({H,T}) provided with the point-wise order.
It turns out that lexicographic sets of desirable options (gambles) are easy to
characterise there, so we have a simple expression for DL.
Proposition 94. All lexicographic coherent sets of desirable gambles on the
binary possibility space {H,T} are given by (see also Figure 4.1↷):
DL ∶= {Dρ ,DHρ ,DTρ ∶ ρ ∈ (0,1)}∪{D0,D1} = {Dρ ∶ ρ ∈ (0,1)}∪ Dˆ,
where
Dρ ∶= {λ(ρ − I{H}) ∶ λ ∈R}+L>0 = span({ρ − I{H}})+L>0
DHρ ∶=Dρ ∪{λ(ρ − I{H}) ∶ λ ∈R<0} =Dρ ∪posi({I{H}−ρ})
DTρ ∶=Dρ ∪{λ(ρ − I{H}) ∶ λ ∈R>0} =Dρ ∪posi({ρ − I{H}})
D0 ∶= { f ∈L ∶ f (T) > 0}∪L>0
D1 ∶= { f ∈L ∶ f (H) > 0}∪L>0
for all ρ in (0,1).
Proof. We first observe that every set of desirable options in {Dρ ,DHρ ,DTρ ∶ ρ ∈(0,1)}∪{D0,D1} is coherent. Indeed, for any ρ in (0,1), Dρ is the smallest coherent
set of desirable gambles corresponding to the linear prevision Ep , with p ∶= (ρ,1−ρ),
while DHρ and D
T
ρ are maximal coherent sets of desirable gambles corresponding to the
same linear prevision Ep . Finally, D0 is the maximal (and only) coherent set of desir-
able gambles corresponding to Ep with p ∶= (0,1), while D1 is the maximal (and only)
coherent set of desirable gambles corresponding to Ep with p ∶= (1,0).
We now prove that we recover all lexicographic coherent sets of desirable gambles
in this way. Consider any lexicographic coherent set of desirable gambles D. Then PD
is a linear prevision, by Proposition 93, so PD is characterised (i) by the mass function(1,0), (ii) by the mass function (0,1), or (iii) by the mass function (ρ,1−ρ) for some
ρ in (0,1). If (i), the only coherent set of desirable gambles that induces the linear
prevision with mass function (1,0) is D1 ∈DL. If (ii), the only coherent set of desirable
gambles that induces the linear prevision with mass function (0,1) is D0 ∈ DL. If (iii),
there are only three coherent sets of desirable gambles that induce the linear prevision
with mass function (ρ,1−ρ): Dρ , DHρ and DTρ , and all are elements of DL.
In the language of sets of desirable gambles (see for instance Section 2.855
or Reference [57]), this means that in the binary case lexicographic sets of
desirable gambles are either maximal (see Section 2.8.358) or strictly desirable
(see Section 2.8.671) with respect to a linear prevision.
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Figure 4.1: The lexicographic coherent sets of desirable gambles on the binary
possibility space {H,T}, with ρ ∈ (0,1).
4.2.2 Finite possibility spaces
We now turn to the more general finite-dimensional case. We assume that the
number of different outcomes—the cardinality of X—is n in N, throughout
this section.
Recall that a lexicographic order <L on a vector space V of finite dimen-
sion ` is defined by
u <L v⇔ (∃k ∈ {1, . . . ,`})(uk < vk and (∀ j ∈ {1, . . . ,k−1})u j = v j),
and denote, as usual, its reflexive version ≤L as u ≤L v⇔ (u <L v or u = v) for
any two vectors u = (u1, . . . ,u`) and v = (v1, . . . ,v`) in V.
Definition 34 (Lexicographic probability system). A lexicographic probabil-
ity system is an `-tuple p ∶= (p1, . . . , p`) of probability mass functions on a
possibility space X. We associate with this tuple p an expectation operator
Ep ∶= (Ep1 , . . . ,Ep`), and a (strict) preference relation ≺p on L(X), defined by:
f ≺p g⇔ Ep( f ) <L Ep(g), for all f and g in L(X), (4.1)
where, for every h in L(X), we let Ep(h) ∶= (Ep1(h), . . . ,Ep`(h)), an element
of an `-dimensional vector space. We call ` the number of layers of the lexico-
graphic probability system.
We refer to work by Blume et al. [7], Fishburn [37] and Seidenfeld et al. [64]
for more details on generic lexicographic probability systems. The connection
130
4.2 LEXICOGRAPHIC PROBABILITY SYSTEMS AND DESIRABILITY
between lexicographic probability systems and sets of desirable gambles has
also been studied by Cozman [16] and Benavoli et al. [6], and the connection
with full conditional measures by Halpern [39] and Hammond [41]. Below,
we first recall a number of relevant basic properties of lexicographic orders in
Propositions 95 and 97↷. We then provide a characterisation of lexicographic
sets of desirable gambles in terms of lexicographic orders in Theorem 101135.
Remark that the reflexive version2 ⪯p of ≺p defined by f ⪯p g⇔Ep( f ) ≤L
Ep(g) for all f and g in L is a total order on L (see Reference [7]).
An important feature of preference relations ≺p based on lexicographic
probability systems is the incomparability relation ∥p , defined by: f ∥p g if
and only if f /≺p g and g /≺p f , for all f and g in L. Since ⪯p is a total order, it
follows that
f ∥p g⇔ Ep( f ) = Ep(g)⇔ (∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,`})Epk( f ) = Epk(g), (4.2)
for all f and g in L. Finally, it also follows that
f /≺p g⇔ g ≺p f or g ∥p f ⇔ Ep(g) ≤L Ep( f ), for all f and g in L. (4.3)
Proposition 95. Consider any lexicographic probability system p with ` lay-
ers. Then ≺p is a strict weak order, meaning that ≺p is irreflexive, and both ≺p
and ∥p are transitive. As a consequence, the binary relation /≺p is transitive as
well.
Proof. This is a consequence of Equations (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3), taking into account
that <L and ≤L are transitive, and that <L is irreflexive.
In what follows, we will restrict our attention to lexicographic probability
systems p that satisfy the following condition:3
(∀x ∈X)(∃k ∈ {1, . . . ,`})pk(x) > 0. (4.4)
This condition requires that there should be no possible outcome in X that has
zero probability in every layer. It is closely related to the notion of a Savage-
null event [60, Section 2.7]:
Definition 35 (Savage-null events). An event E ⊆ X is called Savage-null if(∀ f ,g ∈ L)IE f ⪯p IEg. The event ∅ is always Savage-null, and is called the
trivial Savage-null event.
2This is not the usual way of deriving an irreflexive relation from a reflexive one: usually, we
define f ⪯p g⇔ ( f ≺p g or f = g) for all f and g in L.
3This condition is weaker than the requirement in Reference [6] that the stochastic matrix
identified with p has full rank.
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Proposition 96. Consider any lexicographic probability system p with ` lay-
ers. Then Condition (4.4)↶ holds if and only if there are no non-trivial Savage-
null events.
Proof. For the direct implication, assume that p satisfies Condition (4.4)↶, and con-
sider any non-empty event E ⊆ X. Consider any x in E, then IE ≥ I{x} so Epk(IE) ≥
Epk(I{x}) for every k ∈ {1, . . . ,`}. Also, Ep(0) <L Ep(I{x}) by Condition (4.4)↶, so
0IE ≺p 1IE whence 1IE /⪯p 0IE and hence, by Definition 35↶, E is indeed no Savage-
null event.
For the converse implication, assume that p fails Condition (4.4)↶. Then there is
some x∗ in X such that pk(x∗) = 0 for all k in {1, . . . ,`}, and therefore Epk( f I{x∗}) =
0 = Epk(gI{x∗}) for all f and g in L and k in {1, . . . ,`}, so Ep( f I{x∗}) = Ep(gI{x∗})
for all f and g in L. This implies that f I{x∗} ⪯p gI{x∗} for all f and g in L, so indeed
there is a non-trivial Savage-null event {x∗}.
We now link the lexicographic ordering ≺p with the preference relation ½D
based a set of desirable gambles D, as defined in Section 2.855. We begin
with an auxiliary result, showing that ≺p also—just like ½D—is a strict vector
ordering compatible with the natural order < on gambles.
Proposition 97. Consider any lexicographic probability system p with ` lay-
ers. Then ≺p is a (strict) vector order compatible with <: it is irreflexive,
transitive and
(i) f ≺p g⇔ f +h ≺p g+h⇔ λ f ≺p λg;
(ii) if there are no non-trivial Savage-null events, then f < g⇒ f ≺p g,
for all f , g and h in L and λ in R>0.
Proof. It is clear from Proposition 95↶ that ≺p is irreflexive and transitive. Let us
prove the remaining statements.
(i) This follows from the definition of ≺p and the linearity of expectation operators.
(ii) Assume that there are no non-trivial Savage-null events. Use Proposition 96 to
infer that then Condition (4.4)↶ holds. Consider any f in L such that 0 < f . Then
0 ≤ f —so 0 ≤ Epk( f ) for every k in {1, . . . ,`}—and 0 < f (x∗) for some x∗ in X.
Then pk(x∗)> 0 for some k in {1, . . . ,`} by Condition (4.4)↶, so 0<L Ep(I{x∗}).
Use f (x∗)I{x∗} ≤ f to infer that then also 0 <L Ep( f ), whence indeed 0 ≺p f .
Since we just have showed that (i) holds, this immediately implies the desired
result.
We will establish a link between lexicographic probability systems and
preference relations associated with lexicographic sets of desirable gambles.
We refer to papers by Cozman [16, Section 2.1] and Seidenfeld et al. [64] for
other relevant discussion on the connection between lexicographic probabil-
ities and partial preference relations. Our proof is somewhat reminiscent of
the representation of conditional probabilities by Krauss [46], and will make
repeated use of the following separation theorem [43], in the form stated in
Reference [82, Appendix E1]:
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Theorem 98 (Separating hyperplane theorem). LetW1 and W2 be two convex
subsets of a finite-dimensional linear topological space B. If 0 ∈W1∩W2 and
int(W1)∩W2 =∅, then there is a non-zero continuous linear functional Λ onB such that
Λ(w) ≥ 0 for all w in W1 and Λ(w′) ≤ 0 for all w′ in W2.
If W1 and W2 are finite, W1 non-empty, and ∑mi=1λiwi−∑nk=1 µkw′k ≠ 0 for all
m and n in N, all λ1, . . . , λm in R≥0 with λi > 0 for at least one i in {1, . . . ,m},
all µ1, . . . , µn in R≥0, all w1, . . . , wm in W1, and all w′1, . . . , w′n in W2, then
there is a non-zero continuous linear functional Λ on B such that
Λ(w) > 0 for all w in W1 and Λ(w′) ≤ 0 for all w′ in W2.
Two clarifications here are (i) that we will apply the theorem to linear sub-
spaces of L, which is a linear topological space [82, Appendix D] that is finite-
dimensional because X is finite, and (ii) that when the linear topological space
is finite-dimensional, the assumption int(W1) ≠ ∅ that is mentioned in Refer-
ence [82, Appendix E1] is not necessary for the separating hyperplane theorem
to hold, as shown in Reference [43, Theorem 4B].
Our proof will also make use of the following two lemmas.
Lemma 99. Consider any coherent set D of desirable gambles on a fi-
nite possibility space X, and consider any linear subspace Λ ⊆ L. Then
int(cl(D ∩Λ))∩Dc = ∅, where int is the topological interior and cl the topo-
logical closure.
Proof. We first prove int(cl(D))∩Dc = ∅. To show this, we will use the fact that D,
and therefore also cl(D), is a convex set. Since the interior of a convex set is always
included in the relative interior ri of that convex set (see Reference [10, Section 1.3]),
we find that int(cl(D)) ⊆ ri(cl(D)). A well-known result [10, Theorem 3.4(d)] states
that ri(cl(C)) = ri(C) for any convex set C in a finite-dimensional vector space, whence
int(cl(D)) ⊆ ri(D). But ri(D) is a subset of D, so int(cl(D)) ⊆ D, and hence indeed
int(cl(D))∩Dc =∅.
Now consider D ∩Λ, a subset of D. Since both cl and int respect set inclusion, we
find that int(cl(D∩Λ)) ⊆ int(cl(D)) ⊆D, whence indeed int(cl(D∩Λ))∩Dc =∅.
Lemma 100. Consider any non-zero real linear functional Λ1 on the n-
dimensional real vector space L, and any sequence of non-zero real linear
functionalsΛk defined on the n−k+1-dimensional real vector space kerΛk−1 ∶={ f ∈ L ∶ Λk−1( f ) = 0} for all k in {2, . . . ,`}, where ` ∈ {2, . . . ,n}. Assume that
all Λk are positive in the sense that (∀ f ∈ L≥0 ∩domΛk)(Λk( f ) ≥ 0),4 for all
k ∈ {1, . . . ,`}. Then for each k in {2, . . . ,`} the real linear functional Λk on
kerΛk−1 can be extended to a real linear functional Γk on L with the following
properties:
4We let domΛk be the domain of the functional Λk .
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(i) for all f in L≥0: Γk( f ) ≥ 0;
(ii) Γk(1) > 0;
(iii) kerΓk ∩kerΛk−1 = kerΛk;
(iv) for all f in kerΛk−1: Γk( f ) > 0⇔Λk( f ) > 0.
Proof. Consider any k in {2, . . . ,`}. Since the real functional Λk on the n− k + 1-
dimensional real vector space kerΛk−1 is non-zero, there is some hk in kerΛk−1 such
that Λk(hk) > 0. We will consider the quotient space V/I, a k-dimensional vector space
whose elements [ f ] = { f}+ kerΛk are the affine subspaces through f , parallel to the
subspace kerΛk, for every f in L(X). We first show that it follows from Theorem 98↶
that there is a non-zero linear functional Γ˜k on V/I such that
Γ˜k(u) ≤ 0 for all u in W2k ∶= {[−I{x}] ∶ x ∈Xk}, and
Γ˜k(u) > 0 for all u in W1k ∶= {[hk]}∪{[I{x}] ∶ x ∈Xk}, (4.5)
where we let Xk ∶= {x ∈X ∶ I{x} ∉ kerΛk} ⊆X. The set Xk is non-empty: since kerΛk is
n− k-dimensional, at most n− k of the linearly independent indicators I{x}, x ∈X may
lie in kerΛk, so ∣Xk ∣ ≥ k. To show that we can apply Theorem 98↶, we prove that the
condition for it is satisfied: ∑ni=1λiw1i −∑mk=1 µkw2k ≠ 0 for all m and n in N, all λ1, . . . ,
λm in R≥0 with λi > 0 for at least one i in {1, . . . ,m}, all µ1, . . . , µn in R≥0, all w11, . . . ,
w1n in W1k , and all w21, . . . , w2m in W2k . Since W1k and W2k are finite, it is not difficult
to see that it suffices to consider ∑ni=1λiw1i = λ [hk]+∑x∈Xk λx[I{x}] and ∑mj=1 µ jw2j =−∑x∈Xk µx[I{x}]. So assume ex absurdo that λ [hk]+∑x∈Xk(λx + µx)[I{x}] = 0, or
equivalently, that λhk +∑x∈Xk(λx +µx)I{x} ∈ kerΛk for some µx ≥ 0, λx ≥ 0 and λ ≥ 0
for all x in Xk, where λ or at least one of {λx ∶ x ∈Xk} are positive. Let X′k ∶= {x ∈Xk ∶
λx +µx > 0} and g ∶=∑x∈X′k(λx +µx)I{x}, then we know that λhk +g ∈ kerΛk.
There are now a number of possibilities. The first is that λ = 0, whence X′k ≠ ∅
and therefore g ∈ kerΛk ⊆ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⊆ kerΛ1. This implies that 0 = Λ1(g) = ∑x∈X′k(λx +
µx)Λ1(I{x}). Since I{x} > 0 and Λ1 is positive, we find that I{x} ∈ kerΛ1 = domΛ2
for all x in X′k. This in turn allows us to conclude that 0 = Λ2(g) = ∑x∈X′k(λx +
µx)Λ2(I{x}). Since I{x} > 0 and Λ2 is positive, we find that I{x} ∈ kerΛ2 = domΛ3
for all x in X′k. We can go on in this way until we eventually conclude that 0 =Λk(g) =∑x∈X′k(λx +µx)Λk(I{x}). Since I{x} > 0 and Λk is positive, we find that I{x} ∈ kerΛk
for all x in X′k, a contradiction.
The second possibility is that λ > 0. If now X′k = ∅, we find that λhk ∈ kerΛk,
whence λΛk(hk) = 0, a contradiction. If X′k ≠ ∅, we find that λhk +g ∈ kerΛk ⊆ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⊆
kerΛ1. Since hk ∈ kerΛk−1 ⊆ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⊆ kerΛ1, this implies that g ∈ kerΛk−1 ⊆ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⊆ kerΛ1
too. This implies that 0 = Λ1(g) =∑x∈X′k(λx +µx)Λ1(I{x}). Since I{x} > 0 and Λ1 is
positive, we find that I{x} ∈ kerΛ1 = domΛ2 for all x in X′k. This in turn allows us to
conclude that 0 = Λ2(g) =∑x∈X′k(λx +µx)Λ2(I{x}). Since I{x} > 0 and Λ2 is positive,
we find that I{x} ∈ kerΛ2 = domΛ3 for all x in X′k. We can go on in this way until we
eventually conclude that 0 =Λk−1(g) =∑x∈X′k(λx+µx)Λk−1(I{x}). Since I{x} > 0 and
Λk−1 is positive, we find that I{x} ∈ kerΛk−1 = domΛk for all x in X′k. This now allows
us to rewrite λhk+g ∈ kerΛk as 0 =Λk(λhk+g) = λΛk(hk)+∑x∈X′k(λx +µx)Λk(I{x}).
Since I{x} > 0 and Λk is positive, this implies that λΛk(hk) ≤ 0, a contradiction. We
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conclude that, indeed, there is a non-zero linear functional Γ˜k on V/I that satisfies
Equation (4.5).
We now define the new real linear functional Γk on L(X) by letting
Γk( f ) ∶= Γ˜k([ f ]) for all f in L(X).
Observe that, since f =∑x∈X f (x)I{x}, this leads to
Γk( f ) = ∑
x∈X f (x)Γ˜k([I{x}]) = ∑x∈Xk f (x)Γ˜k([I{x}]),
where the second equality follows from I{x} ∈ kerΛk, and therefore [I{x}] = 0, for all
x ∈X∖Xk. If we also take into account Equation (4.5), this proves in particular that (i)
and (ii) hold.
For the rest of the proof, consider any f in kerΛk−1 and λ ∶= Λk( f)Λk(hk) , a well-defined
real number because Λk(hk) > 0. Then 0 = Λk( f )−λΛk(hk) = Λk( f −λhk), so f −
λhk ∈ kerΛk. As a result, [ f ] = [λhk] and therefore Γk( f ) = Γ˜k([ f ]) = Γ˜k([λhk]) =
λ Γ˜k([hk]). Substituting back for λ , we get the equality:
Γk( f )Λk(hk) = Γ˜k([hk])Λk( f ).
Since both Λk(hk) > 0 and Γ˜k([hk]) > 0 [by Equation (4.5)], we see that Γk( f ) and
Λk( f ) are either both zero, both (strictly) positive, or both (strictly) negative. This
proves (iii) and (iv).
Theorem 101. Consider any lexicographic probability system p = (p1, . . . , p`)
that has no non-trivial Savage-null events. Then the set of desirable gambles
Dp ∶= { f ∈ L ∶ 0 ≺p f} corresponding with the preference relation ≺p , is an
element of DL—a coherent and lexicographic set of desirable gambles. Con-
versely, consider any lexicographic set of desirable gambles D in DL. Then
its corresponding preference relation ½D is a preference relation based on
some lexicographic probability system p = (p1, . . . , p`) that has no non-trivial
Savage-null events.
Proof. We begin with the first statement. We first show that Dp is coherent. For
Axiom D157, infer from 0 /≺p 0 by the irreflexivity of ≺p [see Proposition 95131] that
indeed 0 ∉ Dp . For Axiom D257, consider any f in L>0. Use Proposition 97132 to
infer that 0 ≺p f , whence indeed f ∈ Dp . For Axiom D357, consider any f in Dp and
λ in R>0. Then 0 ≺p f , and hence 0 ≺p λ f using Proposition 97132. Therefore indeed
λ f ∈ Dp . For Axiom D457, consider any f and g in Dp , whence 0 ≺p f and 0 ≺p g.
From 0 ≺p g infer that f ≺p f +g by Proposition 97132, and using 0 ≺p f , that 0 ≺p f +g
by the transitivity of ≺p [see Proposition 95131]. Therefore indeed f +g ∈ Dp .
So it only remains to show that posi(Dcp) = Dcp . Consider any f and g in Dcp and
any λ1 and λ2 in R>0, then we must prove that λ1 f +λ2g ∈ Dcp . Since by assumption
0 /≺p f and 0 /≺p g, Equation (4.3)131 guarantees that
Ep( f ) ≤L Ep(0) = 0 and Ep(g) ≤L Ep(0).
By the linearity of the expectation operators,
Ep(λ1 f +λ2g) ≤L Ep(0) = 0,
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whence 0 /≺p λ1 f +λ2g. Therefore indeed λ1 f +λ2g ∈ Dcp .
For the second statement, we consider any D in DL, and we construct a lexico-
graphic probability system p with no non-trivial Savage-null events and such that ≺p
equals ½D . Define the real functionalΛ1 onL by lettingΛ1( f ) ∶= sup{α ∈R ∶ f −α ∈D}
for all f in L. Proposition 93128 guarantees that Λ1 is a linear functional. Its kernel
kerΛ1 is an n− 1-dimensional linear space,5 where, as usual in this section, n is the
finite dimension of the real vector space L—the cardinality of X. Since both Dc and
kerΛ1 are convex cones, so is their intersection Dc ∩kerΛ1, and it contains 0 because
0 ∈ Dc and 0 ∈ kerΛ1. Using similar arguments, we see that D ∩kerΛ1 is either a con-
vex cone or empty. When D ∩kerΛ1 =∅, let ` ∶= 1, and stop. When D ∩kerΛ1 ≠∅, it
follows from Theorem 98133 that there is some non-zero (continuous) linear functional
Λ2 on kerΛ1 such that
Λ2( f ) ≤ 0 for all f in Dc∩kerΛ1 and Λ2( f ) ≥ 0 for all f in D∩kerΛ1.
[Apply Theorem 98133 with B = kerΛ1,W2 =Dc∩kerΛ1 andW1 = cl(D∩kerΛ1) (the
topological closure of D ∩kerΛ1 in kerΛ1); then int(W1)∩W2 =∅ by Lemma 99133,
and 0 ∈W1∩W2.] kerΛ2 is a n−2-dimensional linear space. Also, D∩kerΛ2 is either
empty or a non-empty convex cone. If it is empty, let ` ∶= 2; otherwise, we repeat
the same procedure again: it follows from Theorem 98133 that there is some non-zero
(continuous) linear functional Λ3 on kerΛ2 such that
Λ3( f ) ≤ 0 for all f in Dc∩kerΛ2 and Λ3( f ) ≥ 0 for all f in D∩kerΛ2.
[Apply Theorem 98133 with B = kerΛ2,W2 =Dc∩kerΛ2 andW1 = cl(D∩kerΛ2) (the
topological closure of D ∩kerΛ2 in kerΛ2); then int(W1)∩W2 =∅ by Lemma 99133,
and 0 ∈W1∩W2.] kerΛ3 is a n−3-dimensional linear space. Also, D∩kerΛ3 is either
empty or a non-empty convex cone. If it is empty, let ` ∶= 3; if not, continue in the same
vein. This leads to successive linear functionals Λk defined on the n−k+1-dimenional
linear spaces kerΛk−1 such that
Λk( f ) ≤ 0 for all f in Dc∩kerΛk−1 and Λk( f ) ≥ 0 for all f in D∩kerΛk−1. (4.6)
This sequence stops as soon as D∩kerΛk =∅, and we then let ` ∶= k. Because the finite
dimensions of the successive kerΛk decrease with 1 at each step, we are guaranteed
to stop after at most n repetitions: should D ∩kerΛk ≠ ∅ for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,n−1} then
kerΛn will be the 0-dimensional linear space {0}, and then necessarily D∩kerΛn =∅.
For the last functional Λ`, we have moreover that
Λ`( f ) > 0 for all f in D∩kerΛ`−1. (4.7)
To see this, recall that by construction Λ`( f ) ≥ 0 for all f in D ∩ kerΛ`−1, and that
D∩kerΛ` =∅.
In this fashion we obtain ` linear functionals Λ1, . . . , Λ`, each defined on the kernel
of the previous functional—except for the domain L of Λ1. We now show that we can
5To see that kerΛ1 is a linear space, note that by Proposition 93128, Λ1 = PD is a linear
prevision—so Λ1 is a linear map from the n-dimensional linear space L to R. Since Λ1 is a linear
map, its kernel is closed under addition and scalar multiplication, so it is a linear space, and by the
rank-nullity theorem, its dimension is (dimL)−dimR = n−1.
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turn the Λ2, . . . , Λ` into expectation operators: positive and normalised linear function-
als on the linear space L. Indeed, consider their respective extensions Γ2, . . . , Γ` toL from Lemma 100133, and let Γ1 ∶= Λ1. They satisfy Γk(1) > 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,`};
see Proposition 93128 and Lemma 100133(ii). Now consider the real linear functionals
on L defined by E1 ∶= Γ1, and Ek( f ) ∶= Γk( f)Γk(1) for all k in {2, . . . ,`} and f in L. It is
obvious from Proposition 93128 and Lemma 100133(i) that these linear functionals are
normalised and positive, and therefore expectation operators onL. Indeed each Ek is the
expectation operator associated with the mass function pk defined by pk(x) ∶=Ek(I{x})
for all x in X. In this way, p ∶= (p1, . . . , p`) defines a lexicographic probability system.
We now prove that p has no non-trivial Savage-null events, using Proposition 96132.
Assume ex absurdo that there is some x∗ in X such that pk(x∗) = Ek(I{x∗}) = 0 for all
k in {1, . . . ,`}. Then I{x∗} ∈ kerΓ1 = kerΛ1 and I{x∗} ∈ kerΓk for all k in {2, . . . ,`}.
Invoke Lemma 100133(iii) to find that I{x∗} ∈ kerΛ1 ∩ kerΓ2 = kerΛ2. Repeated ap-
plication of this same lemma eventually leads us to conclude that I{x∗} ∈ kerΛ`−1 and
I{x∗} ∈ kerΛ`. Since also I{x∗} ∈ D and hence I{x∗} ∈ D ∩ kerΛ`−1 [Axiom D257],
Equation (4.7) implies that Λ`(I{x∗}) > 0, a contradiction.
It now only remains to prove that ½D is the lexicographic ordering with respect to
this lexicographic probability system, or in other words that
f ∈ D⇔ 0 <L (E1( f ), . . . ,E`( f )), for all f in L.
For necessity, assume that f ∈D. Then E1( f )≥ 0 by the definition ofΛ1. If E1( f )>
0, then we are done. So assume that E1( f ) = 0. Then f ∈ kerΛ1 and Λ2( f ) ≥ 0 by
Equation (4.6). Again, if Λ2( f ) > 0, we can invoke Lemma 100133(iv) to find that
Γ2( f ) > 0 and hence E2( f ) > 0, and we are done. So assume that Λ2( f ) = 0. Then
f ∈ kerΛ2 and Λ3( f ) ≥ 0 by Equation (4.6). We can go on in this way, and we call k
the largest number for which E j( f ) = 0 for all j in {1, . . . ,k−1}, or in other words, the
smallest number for which Ek( f )> 0. Then k ≤ ` by construction—see Equation (4.7)—
, whence indeed 0 <L (E1( f ), . . . ,E`( f )).
For sufficiency, assume that 0 <L (E1( f ), . . . ,E`( f )), meaning that there is some
k in {1, . . . ,`} for which E j( f ) = 0 = Γ j( f ) for all j in {1, . . . ,k− 1} and Ek( f ) > 0,
whence also Γk( f ) > 0. So f ∈ kerΓ j for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,k− 1} and therefore repeated
application of Lemma 100133(iii) tells us that f ∈ kerΛ j for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,k−1}. Since
Γk( f ) > 0, we infer from Lemma 100133(iv) that also Λk( f ) > 0, whence indeed f ∈ D
by Equation (4.6).
We conclude that the sets of desirable options in DL are exactly the ones
that are representable by a lexicographic probability system that has no non-
trivial Savage-null events. This is, of course, the reason why we have called
the coherent sets of desirable options in DL ∶= {D ∈ D ∶ posi(Dc) = Dc} lexico-
graphic.
This does not mean, however, that the correspondence between the two
families is bijective:6 Indeed, consider the binary possibility space X = {H,T}
6That two different lexicographic systems (represented as stochastic matrices of full rank)
may be associated with the same coherent set of desirable gambles can also be inferred from an
example by Benavoli et al. [6, Example 1].
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and the lexicographic systems p = (p1, p2) and p′ = (p1, p′2), associated with
the respective mass functions p1 = (1/2,1/2), p2 = (0,1) and p′2 = (1/4,3/4) on{H,T}. Then p and p′ have no non-trivial Savage-null events. However, Dp =
Dp′ = { f ∈L ∶ f (a)+ f (b)> 0 or f (b)=− f (a)> 0}, so we see that there are two
different lexicographic probability systems that map to the same lexicographic
set of desirable gambles. Note, however, that ≺p and ≺p′ are both equal to½D—and therefore equal to each other, so ≺p = ≺p′—, as is also guaranteed by
the following corollary.
Corollary 102. Consider any coherent lexicographic set of desirable gambles
D in DL and any lexicographic probability system p that has no non-trivial
Savage-null events. Then ½D = ≺p ⇔ D = Dp . As a consequence, given any
coherent lexicographic set of desirable gambles D in DL, then ½D = ≺p for
all lexicographic probability systems p that have no non-trivial Savage-null
events such that Dp =D.
Proof. For the first statement, infer the following chain of equivalences:
½D = ≺p ⇔ (∀ f ∈L)(0 ½D f ⇔ 0 ≺p f ) by Proposition 97132(i)⇔ (∀ f ∈L)( f ∈ D⇔ f ∈ Dp) by the definitions of ½D and Dp⇔D = Dp .
The second statement now follows immediately.
This corollary is important, since it guarantees that ½p and ½p′ differ if and
only if Dp and Dp′ differ: it rules out that two different preference relations ½p
and ½p′ (based on two different lexicographic probability systems p and p′ that
have no non-trivial Savage-null events) map to the same coherent lexicographic
set of desirable gambles Dp = Dp′ . More information about this relation—and
also taking updating into account—can be found in work by Benavoli et al. [6],
which builds on the important lexicographic separation theorem by Martı´nez-
Legaz [49].
The second part of our Theorem 101135 can also be obtained as a conse-
quence of an earlier result by Martı´nez-Legaz and Vincente-Pe´rez [50, Corol-
lary 3.5], considering that lexicographic sets of desirable gambles are hemis-
paces and relying on the representation of lexicographic probability systems
as stochastic matrices. This result was also used by Benavoli et al. [6] in
their study of the connection between sets of desirable gambles and sets of
lexicographic probability systems. It makes use of the aforementioned lexi-
cographic separation theorem [49], which is arguably more directly suited for
our purpose than the more general separation results (see Theorem 98133) we
borrowed from Walley [82]. However, we feel that there is value in our more
direct proof, since it is more directly tailored to, and ‘translated’ in, the lan-
guage of sets of desirable gambles.
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We can also characterise the maximal sets of desirable gambles elegantly
using lexicographic probability systems.7 Introduce kerEp
kerEp ∶= `⋂
k=1kerEpk (4.8)
as the intersection of the kernels associated with the expectation operators as-
sociated with p: it is the set of gambles that have expectation zero for every
expectation operator in p.
Proposition 103. Consider any lexicographic probability system p with ` lay-
ers, and let Dp ∶= { f ∈ L ∶ 0 ≺p f} be a (not necessarily coherent) set of desir-
able gambles.8 Then kerEp = (Dp ∪−Dp)c. As a consequence, the following
two statements are equivalent:
(i) Dp ∈ Dˆ;
(ii) kerEp = {0}.
In any of these equivalent cases, ` ≥ n, and p has no non-trivial Savage-null
events.
Proof. For the first statement, that kerEp = (Dp ∪−Dp)c, consider any f in L and the
following equivalences:
f ∈ kerEp ⇔ Ep( f ) = 0⇔ (0 /≺p f and f /≺p 0)⇔ (0 /≺p f and 0 /≺p − f )⇔ ( f ∉ Dp and − f ∉ Dp)⇔ ( f ∈ Dcp and f ∈ −Dcp)⇔ f ∈ Dcp ∩−Dcp = (Dp ∪−Dp)c,
where third equivalence follows from Proposition 97132.
We now prove that kerEp = {0} implies that p has no non-trivial Savage-null
events. Assume ex absurdo that p has a non-trivial Savage-null event. By Proposi-
tion 96132, there is some x in X such that pk(x) = 0, implying that Epk(I{x}) = 0, for
all k in {1, . . . ,`}. But then I{x} ∈ kerEp , contradicting kerEp = {0}.
To prove that (i) implies (ii), assume that kerEp ≠ {0}. Because every Epk is a linear
operator, 0 ∈ kerEp , and therefore f ∈ kerEp for some f ∈L∖{0}. We have just shown
that kerEp =Dcp ∩−Dcp , so f ∉Dp and − f ∉Dp for some f in L∖{0}. Proposition 5159
guarantees that then indeed Dp ∉ Dˆ.
To prove that (ii) implies (i), assume that kerEp = {0}. Then we know already that
p has no non-trivial Savage-null events, so by Theorem 101135, Dp is a coherent set
of desirable gambles. Since kerEp = {0}, we see that Ep( f ) ≠ 0, so 0 <L Ep( f )—and
7The characterisation in Proposition 103 can also be obtained as a consequence of work by
Benavoli et al. [6, Proposition 8], by noting that the lexicographic probability systems p for which
kerEp = {0} are exactly those whose corresponding stochastic matrices are orthonormal.
8Since in Theorem 101135 we only have defined such sets of desirable gambles for lexico-
graphic probability systems that have no non-trivial Savage-null events, we need to define it here
in this more general context as well.
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hence 0 ≺p f , so f ∈Dp—or 0 <L Ep(− f )—and hence 0 ≺p − f , so − f ∈Dp—for every
f in L∖{0}. Use Proposition 5159 to infer that then Dp is indeed a maximal set of
desirable gambles.
To show, finally, that then ` ≥ n, assume that kerEp = ⋂`k=1 kerEpk = {0}, so
dimkerEp = 0. Note that dimkerEpk = n− 1 for every k in {1, . . . ,`}, and therefore,
by the dimension theorem [5, Theorem 2.18]
dim(kerEp1 ∩kerEp2) = dimkerEp1 +dimkerEp2 −dim(kerEp1 +kerEp2)≥ (n−1)+(n−1)−n = n−2,
and similarly
dim(kerEp1 ∩kerEp2 ∩kerEp2)= dim(kerEp1 ∩kerEp2)+dimkerEp3 −dim((kerEp1 ∩kerEp2)+kerEp3)≥ (n−2)+(n−1)−n = n−3.
Going on in this way, we eventually find that dim⋂`k=1 kerEpk ≥ n− `. This shows that
dimEp = 0 indeed implies that ` ≥ n.
4.2.3 Savage-null events revisited
That there are no non-trivial Savage-null events in this representation should
not surprise us. To gain some insight as to why, we consider a lexicographic
probability system p = (p1, . . . , p`) that has some non-trivial Savage-null event
E, so conditioning on E is ill-defined. However, there are coherent sets of
desirable gambles D that correspond with it, in the sense that f ≺p g⇒ f ½D g
(or equivalently, 0 ≺p f ⇒ f ∈D) for all f and g in L: indeed, consider9
D′p ∶=L>0∪{ f ∈L ∶ 0 ≺p f} =L>0∪ `⋃
k=1{ f ∈ k−1⋂j=1 kerEp j ∶ Epk( f ) > 0}, (4.9)
which is coherent due to Lemma 104.
Lemma 104. Consider D′p as defined in Equation (4.9). Then D′p is a coherent
set of desirable gambles, and f ≺p g⇒ f ½D′p g for all f and g in L.
Proof. We first prove that D′p is coherent. For Axiom D157, recall that Epk(0) = 0 for
all k in {1, . . . ,`}, and that 0 ∉L>0, so indeed 0 ∉ D′p . Axiom D257 is trivially satisfied,
because of the definition (4.9) of D′p . For Axiom D357, consider any f in L and λ in
R>0 and recall that f ∈⋂k−1j=1 kerEp j ⇔ λ f ∈⋂k−1j=1 kerEp j , Epk( f ) > 0⇔ Epk(λ f ) > 0,
and f > 0⇔ λ f > 0, so f ∈ D implies that indeed λ f ∈ D. Finally, for Axiom D457,
consider any f and g in D′p . If f > 0 and g > 0 then f +g > 0 so f +g ∈ D′p . If f > 0
and there is some k in {1, . . . ,`} such that g ∈⋂k−1j=1 kerEp j and Epk(g) > 0, then, since
9We let ⋂∅ ∶=L in this expression.
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Ep j( f +g) ≥ Ep j(g) for all j in {1, . . . ,`}, we see that there is some k′ ≤ k in {1, . . . ,`}
such that f +g ∈⋂k′−1j=1 kerEp j and Epk′ ( f +g) > 0, so f +g ∈ D′p . If the role of f and g
are switched, then a similar reasoning shows that, again, f +g ∈ D′p . Finally, if both f
and g belong to ⋃`k=1{h ∈⋂k−1j=1 kerEp j ∶ Epk(h) > 0}, then let k′ be the smallest number
in {1, . . . ,`} for which Epk′ ( f ) > 0 and k′′ the smallest number in {1, . . . ,`} for which
Epk′′ (g) > 0. Define k ∶=min{k′,k′′}, then Epk( f +g) > 0 and Ep j( f +g) = 0 for all j in{1, . . . ,k−1}, so indeed f +g ∈ D′p .
The second statement is immediate from the definition in Equation (4.9).
D′p extends ≺p in the least informative way: it is the smallest coherent set of
desirable gambles such that ½D′p ⊇ ≺p . Since conditioning is never problematic
for coherent sets of desirable gambles [31], using D′p we can condition on ev-
ery non-trivial event—even the Savage-null event E: conditioning on E yields
the vacuous set of desirable gambles.
To develop our understanding even further, we look at kerEp as defined in
Equation (4.8)139. Since every kerEpk is a n−1-dimensional linear subspace,
kerEp is a linear subspace whose dimension is not higher than n− 1. Since
for every x in E, I{x} ∈ kerEpk for every k in {1, . . . ,`}, we have that I{x} ∈
kerEp , so kerEp includes span{I{x} ∶ x ∈ E}, and therefore dimkerEp ≥ ∣E ∣.
We distinguish between two cases: dimkerEp ≥ 2 and dimkerEp = 1.
If dimkerEp ≥ 2 then the following lemma guarantees that D′p cannot be a
lexicographic set of desirable gambles.
Lemma 105. If dimkerEp ≥ 2 then D′p is no lexicographic set of desirable
gambles.
Proof. If ∣E ∣ = 1—say E = {x}—then consider any f ≠ 0 in kerEp such that f (x) = 0.
This is always possible since dimkerEp ≥ 2. Let g1 ∶= I{x} + f and g2 ∶= I{x} − f . We
claim that g1 ∉ L>0 and g2 ∉ L>0. To see that g1 ∉ L>0, assume ex absurdo that g1 =
I{x} + f ∈ L>0, and therefore f (x′) ≥ 0 for all x′ in X. This implies that Epk( f ) ≥ 0
for all k in {1, . . . ,`}. Since f ≠ 0 and f (x) = 0, there is some x∗ in X ∖{x} for which
f (x∗) > 0. But since x∗ ∉ E = {x}, we find that Epk( f ) > 0 for some k in {1, . . . ,`},
contradicting that f ∈ kerEp . The proof that g2 ∉L>0 is completely similar. Since both
I{x} and f are elements of kerEp , so are g1 and g2, and therefore Epk(g1) = 0 =Epk(g2)
for all k in {1, . . . ,`}. This tells us that g1 ∈ D′cp and g2 ∈ D′cp , but their sum g1 +g2 =
2I{x} ∈L>0, so f +g ∉ D′cp . Hence D′p is not lexicographic.
If ∣E ∣ ≥ 2, consider any two different x and y in E and let g1 ∶= 2I{x}−I{y} and g2 ∶=
2I{y}− I{x}. Then g1 ∉L>0, g2 ∉L>0, and Epk(g1) = 0 = Epk(g2) for all k in {1, . . . ,`},
so g1 ∈D′cp and g2 ∈D′cp , but their sum g1+g2 = I{x}+I{y} ∈L>0, so f +g ∉D′cp . Hence,
here too, D′p is not lexicographic.
In its turn, this non-lexicographic D′p can be extended to some lexicographic
set of desirable gambles in a number of ways. For instance, the extension
should contain at least one of g1 and g2 (defined in the proof of Lemma 105),
indicating already one choice to be made.
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On the other hand, if dimkerEp = 1 then necessarily ∣E ∣= 1—say E = {x}—
and then kerEp = span{I{x}}. Then D′p is a lexicographic set of desirable gam-
bles, despite the fact that p has non-trivial Savage-null events, by the following
lemma.
Lemma 106. If dimkerEp = 1 then D′p is a lexicographic set of desirable
gambles.
Proof. Consider any f and g in D′cp . Then f ∉ L>0, g ∉ L>0, 0 /≺p f and 0 /≺p g. By
Proposition 97132(i) we infer that f /≺p f + g and hence, using the transitivity of /≺p
[see Proposition 95131], 0 /≺p f + g. Assume ex absurdo that f + g ∉ D′cp , then it can
now only be that f +g ∈L>0 and therefore Epk( f +g) ≥ 0 for every k in {1, . . . ,`}, and
f (x∗)+g(x∗)> 0 for some x∗ inX. If x∗ ∉E then Epk( f +g)> 0 for some k in {1, . . . ,`}
and therefore 0 ≺p f +g, a contradiction. This tells us that necessarily x∗ = x, and also
that f (z)+g(z) = 0 for all z in X∖{x∗} We infer from this that Epk( f +g) = 0 for all k
in {1, . . . ,`}, whence f +g ∈ kerEp = span{I{x}}. There are now two possibilities. The
first is that both f and g belong to span{I{x}}. Since f +g ∈L>0, this implies that either
f ∈ posi{I{x}} or g ∈ posi{I{x}}. But then f ∈ L>0 or g ∈ L>0, a contradiction. The
second possibility is that neither f nor g belong to span{I{x}} = kerEp . This implies
that there is some k1 in {1, . . . ,`} such that Ep j( f ) = 0 for all j in {1, . . . ,k1 −1} and
Epk1 ( f ) ≠ 0, and therefore Epk1 ( f ) < 0, because 0 /≺p f . Similarly, there is some k2 in{1, . . . ,`} such that Ep j(g) = 0 for all j in {1, . . . ,k2−1} and Epk2 (g) ≠ 0, and therefore
Epk2 (g) < 0, because 0 /≺p g. If we now let k ∶=min{k1,k2}, we see that Epk( f +g) < 0,
whence f +g ∉ kerEp , a contradiction.
Interestingly, when we start out with some p that has non-trivial Savage-
null events, this argument leads us to its least informative coherent extension
D′p , which is a lexicographic set of desirable gambles: it is representable by a
lexicographic probability system that has no non-trivial Savage-null events, by
Theorem 101135.
When dimkerEp ≥ 2, we have seen that D′p is not lexicographic, but it can
be extended in a number of ways to a lexicographic set of desirable gambles.
When dimkerEp = 1, then its smallest coherent extension D′p is also lexico-
graphic. By Lemma 107, then ½D′p = ≺p′ where p is the lexicographic proba-
bility system (p1, . . . , p`−1, p`, p`+1) and p`+1 is any probability mass function
such that kerEp ∩kerEp`+1 = {0}, for instance p`+1 = I{x}. So we have found
a lexicographic probability system p′ without non-trivial Savage-null events
that represents D′p : it suffices to add a well-chosen layer. In other words, when
importing the language of sets of desirable gambles, we can regard p as having
an extra layer that avoids problems with conditioning.
Lemma 107. Consider any lexicographic probability system p = (p1, . . . , p`),
and assume that E = {x} is the only non-trivial Savage-null event. Import the
notation above, then ½D′p = ≺p′ where p′ is some new lexicographic probability
system p′ = (p1, . . . , p`−1, p`, p`+1), and p`+1 is any probability mass function
such that kerEp ∩kerEp`+1 = {0}.
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Proof. To prove that ½D′p ⊆ ≺p′ , consider any gamble f in L for which 0 ½D′p f . Then
f ∈ D′p whence 0 < f or 0 ≺p f . If 0 ≺p f then 0 ≺p′ f and the proof is done, so assume
that 0 /≺p f . Then 0 < f implies that f (x′) = 0 for all x′ in X∖{x}—and hence Epk( f ) =
0 for all k in {1, . . . ,`}—, so f (x) > 0. Therefore, f ∈ kerEp , so f ∉ kerEp`+1 , whence
Ep`+1( f ) > 0 and therefore indeed 0 ≺p′ f .
To prove that ≺p′ ⊆½D′p , consider any gamble f in L such that 0 ≺p′ f . Then 0 ≺p f ,
in which case f ∈ D′p , whence 0 ½D′p f and the proof is done, or Epk( f ) = 0 for all k in{1, . . . ,`} and Ep`+1( f ) > 0. Then f ∈ kerEp = span{I{x}}, so f = λ I{x} for some λ in
R. But Ep`+1(λ I{x}) > 0 implies that λ > 0, so f ∈L>0, and indeed f ∈ D′p .
When dimkerEp =1, there is only one coherent way of defining the initially
ill-defined conditionals on E = {x}. Indeed, when there is only one outcome
x, the unique conditional set of desirable gambles on E is the vacuous set of
desirable gambles. This should be contrasted with the case where dimkerEp ≥
2: now there are multiple ways of defining the conditionals on E, all leading
to non-vacuous conditional sets of desirable gambles.
4.3 LEXICOGRAPHIC CHOICE FUNCTIONS
Lexicographic probability systems can now also be related to specific types of
choice functions, through Proposition 91127: given a coherent set of desirable
options D, the most conservative coherent choice function C whose binary
choices are represented by DC =D satisfies the convexity property C525 if and
only if D is a lexicographic set of desirable options. We will call CL ∶= {CD ∶
D ∈DL} the set of lexicographic choice functions.
Looking first at the most conservative coherent choice function that corre-
sponds to D and then checking whether it is ‘convex’, leads rather restrictively
to lexicographic choice functions, and is only possible for lexicographic D:
convexity and choice based on Walley–Sen maximality are only compatible
for lexicographic binary choice. But suppose we turn things around some-
what, first restrict our attention to all ‘convex’ coherent choice functions from
the outset, and then look at the most conservative such choice function that
makes the same binary choices as present in some given D:
inf{C ∈C ∶C satisfies Property C525 and DC =D}.
We infer from Propositions 4048 and 4753 that this infimum is still ‘convex’
and coherent. It will, of course, no longer be lexicographic, unless D is. But
the following theorem tells us it still is an infimum of lexicographic choice
functions, and therefore adds further weight to our growing suspicion that lex-
icographic choice functions have a central part in a theory of ‘convex’ coherent
choice functions without Archimedeanity.
Theorem 108. Consider an arbitrary coherent set of desirable options D. The
most conservative coherent choice function C that satisfies Property C525 and
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DC = D is the infimum of all lexicographic choice functions CD′ with D′ in DL
such that D ⊆D′:
inf{C ∈C ∶C satisfies C525 and DC =D} = inf{CD′ ∶D′ ∈DL and D ⊆D′}.
Proof. Denote the choice function on the left-hand side by Cleft, and the one on the
right-hand side by Cright. Both are coherent, and so by Axiom C4b20 completely char-
acterised by the option sets from which 0 is chosen. Consider any A in Q0, then we
have to show that 0 ∈Cleft({0}∪A)⇔ 0 ∈Cright({0}∪A).
For the direct implication, we assume that 0 ∈Cleft({0}∪A), meaning that there
is some C∗ in C that satisfies Property C525, DC∗ = D and 0 ∈C∗({0}∪A). We have
to prove that there is some D∗ in DL such that D ⊆ D∗ and D∗ ∩A = ∅ [by Proposi-
tion 5564], and we will do so by constructing a suitable lexicographic probability sys-
tem, by a repeated application of an appropriate version of the separating hyperplane
theorem [Theorem 98133], as in the proof of Theorem 101135.
To prepare for this, we prove that posi({0}∪A)∩D =∅. Indeed, assume ex absurdo
that posi({0}∪A)∩D ≠ ∅, so there is some f ∈ D such that f ∈ posi({0}∪A). Then
there is some λ in R>0 such that g ∶= λ f ∈ conv({0}∪A). Let A′ ∶= A ∪{g}, so {0}∪
A′ ⊆ conv({0}∪A), whence 0 ∈C∗({0}∪A′) by Property C525, if we recall that 0 ∈
C∗({0}∪A). But f ∈ D implies that g ∈ D, and since DC∗ = D, also that g ∈ DC∗ , or
equivalently, 0 ∈ R∗({0,g}), by Proposition 5564. Axiom R3a20 then guarantees that
0 ∈ R∗({0}∪A′), a contradiction.
It follows from this observation that we can apply Theorem 98133 to show that there
is some non-zero linear functional Λ1 on L such that
Λ1( f ) ≤ 0 for all f in posi({0}∪A) and Λ1( f ) ≥ 0 for all f in D. (4.10)
[Apply Theorem 98133 with B = L, W2 = posi({0} ∪ A) and W1 = D ∪ {0}, then
int(W1)∩W2 =∅ since int(W1) ⊆ D, and 0 ∈W1 ∩W2.] Its kernel kerΛ1 is an n−1-
dimensional linear space, where n is the dimension of L—the cardinality of X. Since
both D and kerΛ1 are convex cones, their intersection kerΛ1 ∩D is either empty or a
convex cone. When kerΛ1∩D =∅, we let ` ∶= 1, and stop.
When kerΛ1∩D ≠∅, it follows from the same version of the separating hyperplane
theorem that there is some non-zero linear functional Λ2 on kerΛ1 such that
Λ2( f ) ≤ 0 for all f in kerΛ1∩posi({0}∪A) and Λ2( f ) ≥ 0 for all f in kerΛ1∩D.
[Apply Theorem 98133 withB = kerΛ1,W2 = posi({0}∪A)∩kerΛ1 andW1 = (kerΛ1∩
D)∪ {0}, then int(W1)∩W2 = ∅ since W2 ⊆ posi({0}∪A) and int(W1) ⊆ D, and
0 ∈W1∩W2.] kerΛ2 is a n−2-dimensional linear space. As before, D∩kerΛ2 is either
empty or a non-empty convex cone. If it is empty, let ` ∶= 2; otherwise, repeat the same
procedure over and over again, leading to successive non-zero linear functionals Λk on
kerΛk−1 such that
Λk( f ) ≤ 0 for all f in kerΛk−1∩posi({0}∪A) and Λk( f ) ≥ 0 for all f in kerΛk−1∩D,
(4.11)
until eventually we get to the first k such that D∩kerΛk =∅, and then let ` ∶= k and stop.
We are guaranteed to stop after at most n repetitions, since kerΛn is the 0-dimensional
linear space {0}, for which D∩kerΛn =∅. For the last functional Λ`, we have that
Λ`( f ) > 0 for all f in D∩kerΛ`−1. (4.12)
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To see this, recall that by construction Λ`( f ) ≥ 0 for all f in D ∩ kerΛ`−1, and that
D∩kerΛ` =∅.
In this fashion we obtain ` linear functionals Λ1, . . . , Λ`, each defined on the kernel
of the previous functional—except for the domain L of Λ1. We now show that we can
turn the Λ1, . . . , Λ` into expectation operators: positive and normalised linear function-
als on the linear space L. Indeed, consider their respective extensions Γ2, . . . , Γ` to L
from Lemma 100133, and let Γ1 ∶= Λ1. They satisfy Γk(1) > 0 for all k in {1, . . . ,`};
see Proposition 93128 and Lemma 100133(ii). Now consider the real linear functionals
on L defined by Ek( f ) ∶= Γk( f)Γk(1) for all k in {1, . . . ,`} and f in L. It is obvious from
Lemma 100133(i) that these linear functionals are normalised and positive, and there-
fore expectation operators on L. Indeed, each Ek is the expectation operator associated
with the mass function pk defined by pk(x) ∶= Ek(I{x}) for all x in X. In this way,
p ∶= (p1, . . . , p`) defines a lexicographic probability system.
We now prove that p has no non-trivial Savage-null events, using Proposition 96132.
Assume ex absurdo that there is some x∗ in X such that pk(x∗) = Ek(I{x∗}) = 0 for all
k in {1, . . . ,`}. Then I{x∗} ∈ kerΓ1 = kerΛ1 and I{x∗} ∈ kerΓk for all k in {2, . . . ,`}.
Invoke Lemma 100133(iii) to find that I{x∗} ∈ kerΛ1 ∩ kerΓ2 = kerΛ2. Repeated ap-
plication of this same lemma eventually leads us to conclude that I{x∗} ∈ kerΛ`−1 and
I{x∗} ∈ kerΛ`. Since also I{x∗} ∈ D and hence I{x∗} ∈ D ∩ kerΛ`−1 [Axiom D257],
Equation (4.12) implies that Λ`(I{x∗}) > 0, a contradiction.
If we now let D∗ ∶= { f ∈ L ∶ 0 <L (E1( f ), . . . ,E`( f ))}, then D∗ ∈ DL by Theo-
rem 101135. If we can show that D ⊆D∗ and A∩D∗ =∅, we are done. So first, consider
any f in D. Then Λ1( f ) ≥ 0 by Equation (4.10). If Λ1( f ) > 0 then also E1( f ) > 0
by Lemma 100133(ii), and therefore f ∈ D∗. If Λ1( f ) = 0 then Λ2( f ) ≥ 0 by Equa-
tion (4.11). If Λ2( f ) > 0 then also E2( f ) > 0 by Lemma 100133(ii)&(iv), and therefore
f ∈ D∗. We can go on in this way until we get to the first k for which Λk( f ) > 0, and
therefore also Ek( f ) > 0 by Lemma 100133(ii)&(iv), whence therefore f ∈ D∗. We are
guaranteed to find such a k because we infer from Equation (4.12) that Λ`( f ) > 0. This
shows that indeed D ⊆ D∗.
Secondly, consider any f in A. Then Λ1( f ) ≤ 0 by Equation (4.10). If
Λ1( f ) < 0 then also E1( f ) < 0 by Lemma 100133(ii), and therefore f ∉ D∗. If
Λ1( f ) = 0 then Λ2( f ) ≤ 0 by Equation (4.11). If Λ2( f ) < 0 then also E2( f ) < 0 by
Lemma 100133(ii)&(iv), and therefore f ∉ D∗. If we go on in this way, only two things
can happen: either there is a first k for which Λk( f ) < 0, and therefore also Ek( f ) < 0
by Lemma 100133(ii)&(iv), whence therefore f ∉ D∗. Or we find that Λk( f ) ≤ 0, and
therefore also Ek( f ) ≤ 0 by Lemma 100133(ii)&(iv), for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,`}, whence again
f ∉ D∗. This shows that indeed A∩D∗ =∅.
For the converse implication, assume that 0 ∈Cright({0}∪A). We must prove that
there is some C˜ in C that satisfies Property C525, DC˜ =D and 0 ∈ C˜({0}∪A). We claim
that C˜ ∶=Cright does the job. Because we know by assumption that 0 ∈Cright({0}∪A),
and from Propositions 91127 and 4753 that Cright is coherent and satisfies Property C525,
it only remains to prove that DCright = D. To this end, consider any f in L and recall the
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following equivalences:
f ∈ DCright ⇔ 0 ∈ Rright({0, f}) [Proposition 5361]⇔ (∀D′ ∈ DL)(D ⊆ D′⇒ 0 ∈ RD′({0, f})) [definition of inf]⇔ (∀D′ ∈ DL)(D ⊆ D′⇒ f ∈ D′) [Proposition 5564]⇔ f ∈ D, [Propositions 5259 and 92128]
which completes the proof.
As a consequence of this result, we also have that, for any coherent set of
desirable options D,
inf{C ∈C ∶C satisfies C525 and D ⊆DC} = inf{CD′ ∶D′ ∈DL and D ⊆D′}.
(4.13)
This also allows us to find the unique least informative choice function that
is coherent and satisfies Property C525, to which we referred in Section 2.6.453:
Corollary 109. The unique least informative coherent choice function that
satisfies Property C525—and therefore also Property C625—is given by
inf{C ∈C ∶C satisfies C525} = inf{C ∈C ∶C satisfies C525 and C625}= inf{CD ∶D ∈DL}.
Proof. That
inf{C ∈ C ∶C satisfies C525} = inf{C ∈ C ∶C satisfies C525 and C625}
follows at once from Proposition 1627. To show that inf{C ∈ C ∶ C satisfies C525} =
inf{CD ∶ D ∈ DL}, infer from Propositions 5058 and 5361 that Dv ⊆ DC for all C in
C. Therefore inf{C ∈C ∶C satisfies C525} = inf{C ∈C ∶C satisfies C525 and Dv ⊆ DC},
which is, using Equation (4.13), equal to inf{CD ∶ D ∈ DL and Dv ⊆ D}. Proposi-
tion 5058 guarantees that Dv ⊆ D for every D in D, and therefore also in particular
for every D in DL. Hence indeed inf{C ∈ C ∶C satisfies C525} = inf{CD ∶D ∈ DL}.
4.4 NO LEXICOGRAPHIC REPRESENTATION FOR BINARY POS-
SIBILITY SPACES
In the previous sections, we have studied some of the consequences of Prop-
erty C525 on coherent choice functions. We have characterised the purely bi-
nary choice functions that satisfy Property C525: they are those choice func-
tions that are represented by a lexicographic probability system. But is Prop-
erty C525 enough to guarantee representation in terms of an appropriately cho-
sen subset of {CDˆ ∶ Dˆ ∈ Dˆ}?
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Example 20. Consider any mass function p that assigns positive probability
to every outcome in X, and its corresponding set of strictly desirable gambles
D ∶=L>0∪{ f ∈L ∶Ep( f )>0}={ f ∈L ∶Ep( f )>0}, where the (second) equality
holds because p(x) > 0 for every x in X. Clearly, Dc = { f ∈ L ∶ Ep( f ) ≤ 0} is
a convex cone, so D is a lexicographic set of desirable gambles, and hence, by
Proposition 91127, CD is coherent and satisfies Property C525.
Is CD representable by a subset of {CDˆ ∶ Dˆ ∈ Dˆ}? To answer this, consider
an option set A in Q0 that consists of m ≥ 1 gambles f1, . . . , fm such that
0 ∈ posi(A) and Ep( fk) = 0 for every k in {1, . . . ,m}. Then fk ∉D for every k in{1, . . . ,m}, whence by Proposition 5564, 0 ∈CD(A). We claim that A∩ Dˆ ≠∅,
for every Dˆ in Dˆ. To see this, assume ex absurdo that A ∩ Dˆ = ∅ for some
Dˆ in Dˆ, then by Proposition 5159 − fk ∈ Dˆ for every k in {1, . . . ,m}. Since
0 ∈ posi{ f1, . . . , fm}, we have that ∑mk=1λk fk = 0 for some λ1, . . . , λm in R>0.
Since, by Axiom D357, −λk fk ∈ Dˆ for every k in {1, . . . ,m}, we would find by
Axiom D457 that their sum∑mk=1−λk fk = 0 would belong to Dˆ, in contradiction
with Axiom D157. So we see that A ∩ Dˆ ≠ ∅, and therefore 0 ∈ RDˆ(A), for
every Dˆ in Dˆ. This implies that, for every subset D ⊆ Dˆ, also 0 ∈ RD(A). Since
we already know that 0 ∈CD(A), this means that CD is not representable by
subsets of Dˆ, even though CD satisfies Property C525. ◊
This example shows that representation in terms of appropriately chosen{CDˆ ∶ Dˆ ∈ Dˆ} is impossible. But since we have seen in Theorem 108143 that
lexicographic choice functions seem to fulfil at least some representing role in
our theory without Archimedeanity, it seems at least possible that there might
be a representation result in terms of CL—in terms of lexicographic choice
functions. This brings us to the central question of this section: is, in parallel
with the result by Seidenfeld et al. [67], every coherent choice function C on
option spaces that satisfies the corresponding Property C525 an infimum of
lexicographic choice functions, or in other words, is C = inf{C′ ∈ CL ∶C ⊑ C′},
or equivalently,
C(A) =⋃{C′(A) ∶C′ ∈CL and C ⊑C′} for all A in Q?
We will show in this section that, unfortunately and perhaps somewhat surpris-
ingly, this is generally not the case, by studying in more detail the special case
of coherent choice functions on two-dimensional option spaces.
In the remainder of this section, we concentrate on the two-dimensional op-
tion space V =L(X) of gambles on an uncertain variable that can assume only
two possible values X ∶= {H,T}. Note that, by Proposition 1627, the choice
functions that we consider—the coherent and ‘convex’ choice functions—
satisfy Property C625. As we have seen in Section 2.976, coherent choice
functions are uniquely determined by their rejection set, and since the choice
functions we consider also satisfy Property C625, Proposition 6979 guarantees
that for binary possibility spaces, its rejection set consists of sets of cardinality
two or three.
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4.4.1 An equivalent characterisation: coordinate rejection sets
It will be useful to give a slightly different characterisation of rejection sets, tai-
lored towards two-dimensional option spaces. Instead of describing the gam-
bles that reject 0 directly, this new characterisation will rather use Axiom C4a20
to rescale gambles in the second and fourth quadrants
LII ∶= { f ∈L(X) ∶ f (H) < 0 < f (T)} and LIV ∶= { f ∈L(X) ∶ f (T) < 0 < f (H)},
obtaining variants that can be described more easily. Indeed, every gamble
f1 in LII can be uniquely described as f1 = λ1(k1 −1,k1) with λ1 in R>0 and
k1 in (0,1), and similarly, every gamble f2 in LIV as f2 = λ2(k2,k2 −1) with
λ2 in R>0 and k2 in (0,1), as indicated by Figure 4.2. With this different
characterisation, we will be able to prove useful additional properties, specific
to two-dimensional vector spaces.
H
T
f1
f2
1
1
−1
−1
k1 k2
1
1
(k1,k2)
Figure 4.2: Scaling of the gambles (left) and coordinate rejection set (right)
Definition 36 (Coordinate rejection set). Given any coherent rejection func-
tion R, we define its coordinate rejection set KR ⊆ [0,1)2 as10,11
KR ∶= {(k1,k2) ∈ [0,1)2 ∶ 0 ∈ R({(k1−1,k1),0,(k2,k2−1)})}.
We will call any subset K ⊆ [0,1)2 a coordinate rejection set. It will be useful
to consider a number of potential properties of coordinate rejection sets K:
K1. monotonicity: if (k1,k2) ∈K, k′1 ≥ k1 and k′2 ≥ k2, then also (k′1,k′2) ∈K, for
all (k1,k2) and (k′1,k′2) in [0,1)2;
10In order to distinguish them from rejection sets, which we denoted generically byK, we will
use the generic notation K for coordinate rejection sets. As we have seen in Proposition 6979, the
binary coordinate rejection set K is related to K2 ∪K3.
11I want to remind the reader at this point that in the present context 0 = (0,0) is the null vector
in V. Both notations will be used interchangeably.
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K2. non-triviality: (0,0) ∉K;
K3. a. for all a, b and c in [0,1) such that c < a, a+ b < 1, (b,a) ∈ K and(1−a,c) ∈K:
(x,c) ∈K for all x in (b,1) and (b,y) ∈K for all y in (c,1);
b. for all a and c in [0,1) such that c < a, (0,a) ∈K and (1−a,c) ∈K:
(0,c) ∈K;
c. for all a and b in [0,1) such that 0 < a, a+b < 1, (b,a) ∈ K and (1−
a,0) ∈K: (b,0) ∈K;
K4. if k1+k2 > 1 then (k1,k2) ∈K, for all (k1,k2) in [0,1)2.
1
1
a
1−a
c
b
Figure 4.3: Illustration of Property K3a
Properties K2 and K3 imply the following useful property:
Lemma 110. Consider any coordinate rejection set K ⊆ [0,1)2. If K satisfies
Properties K2 and K3, then
(∀a ∈ [0,1])((0,a) ∉K or (1−a,0) ∉K).
Proof. If a = 0 then (0,a) = (0,0) ∉ K by Property K2. Analogously, if a = 1 then(1−a,0) = (0,0) ∉ K by Property K2. Assume therefore that a ∈ (0,1), and assume ex
absurdo that both (0,a) and (1−a,0) are elements of K. Use Property K3b [with c ∶= 0;
then indeed c = 0 < a, (0,a) ∈ K and (1−a,c) = (1−a,0) ∈ K] to infer that (0,0) ∈ K,
which contradicts Property K2.
The coherence of R—and the two extra Properties R525 and R625—implies a
number of corresponding properties of its coordinate rejection set KR :
Proposition 111. Consider any coherent rejection function R. Then its co-
ordinate rejection set KR satisfies Properties K1 and K2. Furthermore, if R
satisfies Property R625, then KR satisfies Property K3. Finally, if R satisfies
Property R525, then KR satisfies Properties K3 and K4.
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Proof. We first prove that KR satisfies Property K1148. Consider any (k1,k2) in KR ,
and any (k′1,k′2) in [0,1)2 such that k′1 ≥ k1 and k′2 ≥ k2. Then (k1,k2) ∈ KR simply
means that 0 ∈ R({(k1 − 1,k1),0,(k2,k2 − 1)}), and k′1 ≥ k1 and k′2 ≥ k2 implies that(k′1−1,k′1) ≥ (k1−1,k1) and (k′2−1,k′2) ≥ (k2−1,k2). Proposition 3041(ii) tells us that
then 0 ∈ R({(k′1−1,k′1),0,(k′2,k′2−1)}), whence indeed (k′1,k′2) ∈ KR .
To prove that KR satisfies Property K2↶, assume ex absurdo that 0 ∈ KR ,
or equivalently, that 0 ∈ R({(−1,0),0,(0,−1)}). Since (−1,0) < 0, we infer
from Axiom R220 that (−1,0) ∈ R({(−1,0),0}), and therefore also that (−1,0) ∈
R({(−1,0),0,(0,−1)}), by Axiom R3a20. A similar argument leads from (0,−1) < 0
to (0,−1) ∈ R({(−1,0),0,(0,−1)}). Combining these three statements leads to the
conclusion that {(−1,0),0,(0,−1)} = R({(−1,0),0,(0,−1)}), which contradicts Ax-
iom R120.
Next, assume that R satisfies Property R625. To prove that KR then satisfies Prop-
erty K3↶, we first prove that it satisfies Property K3a↶. Consider any a, b and c in[0,1) and assume that c < a, a+b < 1, and that (b,a) and (1−a,c) belong to KR . We
are going to prove that (b,y) ∈ KR for every y in (c,1); the proof that also (x,c) ∈ KR
for every x in (b,1) is similar. Consider any λ in R>0, then Property R625 guarantees
that
0 ∈ R({(b−1,b),0,λ(a,a−1)}) and 0 ∈ R({λ(−a,1−a),0,(c,c−1)}) (4.14)
By Axiom R4b, we then find that⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩−λ(a,a−1) ∈ R({(b−λa−1,b−λa+λ),−λ(a,a−1),0})λ(a,a−1) ∈ R({0,λ(a,a−1),(c+λa,c+λa−λ −1)}),
and applying Axiom R3a20 then leads to
{−λ(a,a−1),λ(a,a−1)}⊆ R({(b−λa−1,b−λa+λ),−λ(a,a−1),0,λ(a,a−1),(c+λa,c+λa−λ −1)}).
(4.15)
Now use Equations (4.14) and (4.15) together with Axiom R3a20 to infer that
{−λ(a,a−1),0,λ(a,a−1)} ⊆ R({(b−λa−1,b−λa+λ),−λ(a,a−1),0,(c,c−1),λ(a,a−1),(c+λa,c+λa−λ −1)}).
Applying Axiom R3b20 leads to
−λ(a,a−1)∈ R({(b−λa−1,b−λa+λ),−λ(a,a−1),(c,c−1),(c+λa,c+λa−λ −1)})
and by Axiom R4b this implies that
0 ∈ R({(b−1,b),0,(c+λa,c+λa−λ −1),(c+2λa,c+2λa−2λ −1)}). (4.16)
Let us call u ∶= (c+λa,c+λa−λ −1) and v ∶= (c+2λa,c+2λa−2λ −1), and µ1 ∶= 1c+λa
and µ2 ∶= 1c+2λa ; these real numbers are both positive since 0 ≤ c < a and λ > 0. Then
0 ∈ R({(b− 1,b),0,u,v}) by Equation (4.16), and 0 ∈ R({(b− 1,b),0,µ1u,µ2v}) by
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Property R625. But µ1u < µ2v since µ1u = (1, c+λa−λ−1c+λa ) and µ2v = (1, c+2λa−2λ−1c+2λa ),
and c+λa−λ−1c+λa < c+2λa−2λ−1c+2λa because this statement is equivalent to
c2+2λac+λac+2λ 2a2−λc−2λ 2a−c−2λa< c2+λac+2λac+2λ 2a2−2λc−2λ 2a−c−λa,
which is in turn equivalent to c < a, which is one of the assumptions. Then µ1u ∈
R({µ1u,µ2v}) by Axiom R220, whence {0,µ1u} ⊆ R({(b − 1,b),0,µ1u,µ2v}) by
Axiom R3a20. Then 0 ∈ R({(b− 1,b),0,µ2v}) by Axiom R3b20, and 0 ∈ R({(b−
1,b),0,µ3v}) by Property R625 with µ3 = 12λ+1 > 0, whence
(b, c+2λa
1+2λ ) ∈ KR .
Now, by varying λ in R>0 the number c+2λa1+2λ can take any value in the interval (c,a).
We conclude that (b,y) ∈KR for every y ∈ (c,1), after also recalling that we have already
proved that KR satisfies Property K1148.
To prove that KR satisfies Property K3b149, assume that 0 ≤ c < a < 1, (0,a) ∈ KR
and (1− a,c) ∈ KR . Because KR already satisfies Property K3a149 [with in particular
b ∶= 0], we know that (x,c) ∈KR for every x in (0,1) and (0,y) ∈KR for every y in (c,1).
We have to show that (0,c) ∈ KR . To this end, consider the gambles u ∶= ( 1−c2 −1, 1−c2 )
and v ∶= (c,c−1). Because in particular (x,c) ∈ KR for x = 1−c2 ∈ (0,1), we have that
0 ∈ R({u,0,v}). Similarly, because in particular (0,y) ∈ KR for y = 1+c2 ∈ (c,1), we
have that 0 ∈ R({(−1,0),0,−u}). Since also (−1,0) ∈ R({(−1,0),0})—and there-
fore (−1,0) ∈ R({(−1,0),0,−u}) by Axiom R3a20—because (−1,0) < 0 and by Ax-
iom R220, this leads us to conclude that {(−1,0),0} ⊆ R({(−1,0),0,−u}), and there-
fore also 0 ∈ R({0,−u}) by Axiom R3b20. Hence, u ∈ R({u,0}), by Axiom R4b,
and therefore u ∈ R({u,0,v}), by Axiom R3a20. Hence {0,u} ⊆ R({u,0,v}), so Ax-
iom R3b20 leads to 0 ∈ R({0,v}). Now Axiom R3a20 implies that indeed (0,c) ∈ KR ,
so Property K3b149 is satisfied. Property K3c149 can be shown to hold in a similar way.
To conclude, assume that R satisfies Property R525. Since this implies that
Property R625 holds, by Proposition 1627, we already know that Property K3149 is
satisfied, so it only remains to prove that KR satisfies Property K4149. Consider
any (k1,k2) in [0,1)2 such that k1 + k2 > 1. Then ( k1+k2−12 , k1+k2−12 ) > 0, whence
0 ∈ R({0,( k1+k2−12 , k1+k2−12 )}) by Axiom R220. By Axiom R3a20, we get
0 ∈ R({(k1−1,k1),0,(k2,k2−1),( k1+k2−12 , k1+k2−12 )}).
Since ( k1+k2−12 , k1+k2−12 ) ∈ conv({(k1 −1,k1),(k2,k2 −1)}), Property R525 leads us to
conclude that 0 ∈ R({(k1−1,k1),0,(k2,k2−1)}), so indeed (k1,k2) ∈ KR .
4.4.2 From coordinate rejection sets to rejection functions
Conversely, we now show how to associate a rejection function with any coor-
dinate rejection set K ⊆ [0,1)2. Taking into account Property K2149, we only
consider sets K that do not contain 0.
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Definition 37. Given any subset K ⊆ [0,1)2∖{0}, we define its corresponding
rejection function RK as follows. We let
RK({0}) =∅. (4.17)
Next, for any A in Q0, we let 0 ∈ RK(A ∪{0}) if at least one of the following
conditions holds:
A∩L>0 ≠∅ (4.18)(∃λ1 ∈R>0,(k1,0) ∈K)λ1(k1−1,k1) ∈ A (4.19)(∃λ2 ∈R>0,(0,k2) ∈K)λ2(k2,k2−1) ∈ A (4.20)(∃λ1,λ2 ∈R>0,(k1,k2) ∈K∩(0,1)2){λ1(k1−1,k1),λ2(k2,k2−1)} ⊆ A,
(4.21)
and finally, we allow for R(A) to contain non-zero gambles by imposing the
following condition:
(∀A ∈Q)(∀ f ∈ A) f ∈ RK(A)⇔ 0 ∈ RK(A−{ f}). (4.22)
The intuition behind this is that the elements of K of the type (k1,0) or (0,k2)
determine gambles—(k1−1,k1) and (k2,k2−1), respectively—that allow us to
reject 0; the other possibility of rejecting 0 is by means of the combined action
of a gamble in the second quadrant—(k1 −1,k1) for k1 in (0,1)—and one in
the fourth quadrant—(k2,k2−1) for k2 in (0,1).
Alternatively, as shown in Lemma 112, we can summarise Condi-
tions (4.19)–(4.21) as
(∃λ1,λ2 ∈R>0,(k1,k2) ∈K){λ1(k1−1,k1),λ2(k2,k2−1)} ⊆ A∪{(−1,0),(0,−1)}. (4.23)
Lemma 112. For any K ⊆ [0,1)2 ∖ {0} and any A in Q, at least one of the
Conditions (4.19)–(4.21) holds if and only if Condition (4.23) holds.
Proof. If Condition (4.19) holds, then
{λ1(k1−1,k1),(0,−1)} ⊆ A∪{(−1,0),(0,−1)},
so Condition (4.23) holds with λ2 ∶= 1 and k2 ∶= 0. Similarly, if Condition (4.20) holds,
then {(−1,0),λ2(k2,k2 −1)} ⊆ A ∪{(−1,0),(0,−1)}, so Condition (4.23) holds with
λ1 ∶= 1 and k1 ∶= 0. If Condition (4.21) holds, then Condition (4.23) holds trivially.
Conversely, assume that Condition (4.23) holds. If both k1 ≠ 0 and k2 ≠ 0, then
Condition (4.21) holds trivially, so assume that either k1 = 0 or k2 = 0—they cannot
both be zero, because 0 ∉ K. So assume that k1 = 0 and k2 > 0, then we infer from
the assumption that {λ1(−1,0),λ2(k2,k2 − 1)} ⊆ A ∪{(−1,0),(0,−1)}. Since k2 > 0
implies that λ2(k2,k2−1)≠ (−1,0) and λ2(k2,k2−1)≠ (0,−1) for any choice of λ2 > 0,
it must be that λ2(k2,k2−1) ∈ A, so Condition (4.20) holds. The case k2 = 0 and k1 > 0
can be treated similarly, and leads to the conclusion that Condition (4.19) holds.
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Now that we know how to associate with a coordinate rejection set K a
rejection function RK , let us determine which conditions on K ensure the co-
herence of RK . We begin by showing that a number of coherence axioms
follow directly from the definition, irrespective of the choice of the coordinate
rejection set K ⊆ [0,1)2∖{0}:
Proposition 113. Consider any subset K ⊆ [0,1)2 ∖ {0}. Then the rejection
function RK given by Definition 37 satisfies Axioms R220, R3a20, R4a, R4b
and Property R625.
Proof. For Axiom R220, consider any f and g in L such that f < g. Then 0 < g− f , so
we infer from Condition (4.18) that 0 ∈ RK({0,g− f}), and then from Condition (4.22)
that indeed f ∈ RK({ f ,g}).
For Axiom R3a20, assume that A1 ⊆ RK(A2) and A2 ⊆ A. Then we need to prove
that A1 ⊆ RK(A). Consider any f ∈ A1, then also f ∈ A2 and f ∈ A, so we can let A′2 ∶=
A2 −{ f} and A′ ∶= A −{ f}, where A′2 ⊆ A′. We then infer from Condition (4.22) that
0 ∈ RK(A′2), which means that at least one of the Conditions (4.18)–(4.21) holds. But
any of these conditions implies that also 0 ∈ RK(A′). Condition (4.22) then guarantees
that f ∈ RK(A) and therefore that, indeed, A1 ⊆ RK(A).
That Axioms R4a and R4b are satisfied follows immediately from Condi-
tions (4.18)–(4.22).
For Property R625, consider any option set A = { f1, . . . , fn} ∈Q, where n is a natural
number, and any positive real numbers µ1, . . . , µn. Assume that 0 ∈ RK({0}∪A). First
of all, if fi ∈ L>0 for some i in {1, . . . ,n}, then also µi fi ∈ L>0 since µi > 0, whence
indeed 0 ∈ RK({0,µ1 f1, . . . ,µn fn}), by Condition (4.18). So assume that fi ∉ L>0
for all i in {1, . . . ,n}. There are now only three possibilities. The first is that there
are λ1 in R>0 and (k1,0) in K such that λ1(k1 − 1,k1) = fi for some i in {1, . . . ,n}.
Then (λ1µi)(k1 − 1,k1) = µi fi ∈ {µ1 f1, . . . ,µn fn}, and Condition (4.19) guarantees
that indeed 0 ∈ RK({0,µ1 f1, . . . ,µn fn}). The second possibility is that there are λ2
in R>0 and (0,k2) in K such that λ2(k2,k2 − 1) = f j for some j in {1, . . . ,n}. Then(λ2µ j)(k2,k2 −1) = µ j f j ∈ {µ1 f1, . . . ,µn fn}, and Condition (4.20) guarantees that in-
deed 0 ∈ RK({0,µ1 f1, . . . ,µn fn}). And the final possibility is that there are λ1 and λ2
in R>0 and (k1,k2) in K∩(0,1)2 such that λ1(k1−1,k1) = fi and λ2(k2,k2−1) = f j for
some i and j in {1, . . . ,n}. Then (λ1µi)(k1−1,k1) = µi fi and (λ2µ j)(k2,k2−1) = µ j f j,
and Condition (4.21) guarantees that indeed 0 ∈ RK({0,µ1 f1, . . . ,µn fn}).
It turns out that Properties K1148–K3149 are sufficient for coherence:
Proposition 114. Consider any subset K of [0,1)2 that satisfies Proper-
ties K1148–K3149. Then the rejection function RK given by Definition 37 satis-
fies Axioms R3b20 and R120.
Proof. We begin by proving that RK satisfies Axiom R3b20. Assume ex absurdo that it
does not, then Proposition 2539 guarantees that there are A in Q and g in A ∖{0} such
that {0,g} ⊆ RK(A) and 0 ∉ RK(A ∖{g}) [because Proposition 113 guarantees that RK
satisfies, amongst other things, Axiom R4].
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Because 0 ∈ RK(A), we infer from Definition 37152 and Lemma 112152 that
there are two possibilities: (i) A ∩L>0 ≠ ∅, or (ii) {λ1(k1 − 1,k1),λ2(k2,k2 − 1)} ⊆
A∪{(−1,0),(0,−1)} for some λ1 and λ2 in R>0 and some (k1,k2) in K.
g
Case (i)
λ1(k1 −1,k1)
λ2(k2,k2 −1)
Case (ii)
We first deal with case (i). Here we can assume without loss of generality that
A ∩L>0 = {g} because, otherwise A ∖ {g} ∩L>0 ≠ ∅ and we could apply Condi-
tion (4.18)152 to conclude that 0 ∈ RK(A ∖{g}), a contradiction. We will use the no-
tation g = (x,y) > 0.
Because also g ∈RK(A), Condition (4.22)152 guarantees that 0 ∈RK(A−{g}), and a
similar argument as before shows that there are now two possibilities: (i.a) (A−{g})∩L>0 ≠ ∅; and (i.b) {λ3(k3 −1,k3),λ4(k4,k4 −1)} ⊆ (A −{g})∪{(−1,0),(0,−1)} for
some λ3 and λ4 in R>0 and some (k3,k4) in K.
g
Case (i.a)
g
g+λ3(k3 −1,k3)
g+λ4(k4 ,k4 −1)
Case (i.b)
But in fact (i.a) is impossible, because it would contradict our earlier conclusion that A∩L>0 = {g}. So we can restrict our attention to case (i.b) with (A−{g})∩L>0 =∅. There
are now 3 possibilities: (i.b.1) k3 ≠ 0 ≠ k4 corresponding to Condition (4.21)152, (i.b.2)
k3 = 0 ≠ k4 corresponding to Condition (4.20)152, and (i.b.3) k3 ≠ 0 = k4 corresponding
to Condition (4.19)152—k3 = 0 = k4 is impossible because 0 ∉ K.
g
g+λ3(k3 −1,k3)
g+λ4(k4 ,k4 −1)
Case (i.b.1)
gg+λ3(k3 −1,k3)
g+λ4(k4 ,k4 −1)
Case (i.b.2)
g
g+λ3(k3 −1,k3)
g+λ4(k4 ,k4 −1)
Case (i.b.3)
For case (i.b.1), it must be that {λ3(k3−1,k3),λ4(k4,k4−1)}⊆A−{g}, or equivalently,{g+λ3(k3−1,k3),g+λ4(k4,k4−1)} ⊆ A, so{(λ3k3+x−λ3,λ3k3+y),(λ4k4+x,λ4k4+y−λ4)} ⊆ A.
Since λ3 > 0, we have that (λ3k3 + x−λ3,λ3k3 + y) ≠ g and, similarly, since λ4 > 0, we
have that (λ4k4+x,λ4k4+y−λ4) ≠ g. Therefore,{(λ3k3+x−λ3,λ3k3+y),(λ4k4+x,λ4k4+y−λ4)} ⊆ A∖{g}.
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But (A∖{g})∩L>0 =∅, so (λ3k3+x−λ3,λ3k3+y) ∉L>0 and (λ4k4+x,λ4k4+y−λ4) ∉L>0. First, we focus on (λ3k3 + x−λ3,λ3k3 + y) and wonder in what quadrant it lies.
Its second component λ3k3 + y is positive, since λ3 > 0, k3 > 0 and y ≥ 0. Therefore,
since it is no element of L>0, it must lie in the second quadrant, so its first component
λ3k3+x−λ3 must be negative: λ3k3 < λ3−x. But λ3k3 > 0, so 0 < λ3−x, and combining
this with −y ≤ 0, we find that −y < λ3 − x, so y− x+λ3 > 0. Next, we turn to (λ4k4 +
x,λ4k4 + y−λ4) and wonder it what quadrant it lies. Its first component λ4k4 + x is
positive, since λ4 > 0, k4 > 0 and x ≥ 0. Therefore, since it is no element of L>0, it
must lie in the fourth quadrant, so its second component λ4k4+y−λ4 must be negative:
λ4k4 < λ4 − y. But λ4k4 > 0, so 0 < λ4 − y. Combining this with −x ≤ 0, we find that−x < λ4 − y, so x− y+λ4 > 0. In summary, we have shown that λ∗3 ∶= y− x+λ3 > 0 and
λ∗4 ∶= x−y+λ4 > 0, and therefore
{(y−x+λ3)(λ3k3+x−λ3y−x+λ3 , λ3k3+yy−x+λ3 ),(x−y+λ4)( λ4k4+xx−y+λ4 , λ4k4+y−λ4x−y+λ4 )}⊆ A∖{g}.
If we let k∗3 ∶= λ3k3+yy−x+λ3 and k∗4 ∶= λ4k4+xx−y+λ4 , then λ3k3+x−λ3y−x+λ3 = k∗3 −1 and λ4k4+y−λ4x−y+λ4 = k∗4 −1,
so {λ∗3 (k∗3 −1,k∗3 ),λ∗4 (k∗4 ,k∗4 −1)} ⊆ A∖{g}. (4.24)
We claim that k∗3 > k3. Indeed, infer from k3 ∈ (0,1) and (x,y) > 0 that k3x+(1−k3)y >
0, and therefore
y > k3y−k3x⇒ λ3k3+y > λ3k3+k3y−k3x = k3(y−x+λ3)⇒ k∗3 = λ3k3+yy−x+λ3 > k3.
Similarly, we claim that k∗4 > k4. Indeed, k4 ∈ (0,1) and (x,y) > 0 imply that (1−k4)x+
k4y > 0, and therefore
x > k4x−k4y⇒ λ4k4+x > λ4k4+k4x−k4y = k4(x−y+λ4)⇒ k∗4 = λ4k4+xx−y+λ4 > k4.
Therefore (k∗3 ,k∗4 ) > (k3,k4). Since we already know that K is increasing [Prop-
erty K1148] and (k3,k4) ∈ K, we conclude from this that (k∗3 ,k∗4 ) ∈ K, and therefore
also, by Condition (4.21)152 and Equation (4.24), that 0 ∈RK(A∖{g}), a contradiction.
For case (i.b.2), it must be that λ4(k4,k4 − 1) ∈ A − {g}, or equivalently, that g+
λ4(k4,k4 − 1) ∈ A, so (λ4k4 + x,λ4k4 + y−λ4) ∈ A. Since λ4 > 0 and k4 > 0, we may
conclude that (λ4k4+x,λ4k4+y−λ4) ≠ g, and therefore(λ4k4+x,λ4k4+y−λ4) ∈ A∖{g}.
But (A ∖ {g})∩L>0 = ∅, so (λ4k4 + x,λ4k4 + y−λ4) is no element of L>0. Its first
component λ4k4+x is positive, since λ4 > 0, k4 > 0 and y ≥ 0. It must therefore lie in the
fourth quadrant, so its second component λ4k4+y−λ4 must be negative: λ4k4 < λ4−y.
But 0 < λ4k4, and therefore 0 < λ4 − y. Combining this with −x ≤ 0, we conclude that−x < λ4−y, so λ∗4 ∶= x−y+λ4 > 0, and therefore
(x−y+λ4)( λ4k4+xx−y+λ4 , λ4k4+y−λ4x−y+λ4 ) ∈ A∖{g}.
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If we let k∗4 ∶= λ4k4+xx−y+λ4 , then λ4k4+y−λ4x−y+λ4 = k∗4 −1, so
λ∗4 (k∗4 ,k∗4 −1) ∈ A∖{g}. (4.25)
We claim that k∗4 > k4. Indeed, infer from k4 ∈ (0,1) and (x,y) > 0 that (1−k4)x+k4y >
0, and therefore
x > k4x−k4y⇒ λ4k4+x > λ4k4+k4x−k4y = k4(x−y+λ4)⇒ k∗4 = λ4k4+xx−y+λ4 > k4.
Therefore (0,k∗4 ) > (0,k4). Since we already know that K is increasing [Prop-
erty K1148] and (0,k4) ∈ K, we conclude from this that (0,k∗4 ) ∈ K, and therefore also,
by Condition (4.20)152 and Equation (4.25), that 0 ∈ RK(A∖{g}), a contradiction.
For case (i.b.3), we obtain a contradiction in a similar fashion as in case (i.b.2).
We see that we get a contradiction is all cases (i.b.1)–(i.b.3), so case (i.b) always
leads to a contradiction, as did case (i.a). This allows us to conclude that case (i) always
leads to a contradiction.
We now turn to case (ii), where we assume that A ∩L>0 = ∅ and that there
are λ1 and λ2 in R>0 and (k1,k2) in K such that {λ1(k1 − 1,k1),λ2(k2,k2 − 1)} ⊆
A ∪ {(−1,0),(0,−1)}. Here we distinguish between three possibilities: (ii.a) g ∉{λ1(k1 − 1,k1),λ2(k2,k2 − 1)}, (ii.b) g = λ1(k1 − 1,k1), and (ii.c) g = λ2(k2,k2 − 1).
They are mutually exclusive because it is impossible that λ1(k1−1,k1) = λ2(k2,k2−1)
[because that would imply λ1+λ2 = 0].
λ1(k1 −1,k1)
λ2(k2 ,k2 −1)
g
Case (ii.a)
g = λ1(k1 −1,k1)
λ2(k2 ,k2 −1)
Case (ii.b)
λ1(k1 −1,k1)
g = λ2(k2 ,k2 −1)
Case (ii.c)
But we see at once that case (ii.a) is impossible, because it implies by Condi-
tion (4.23)152 that 0 ∈ RK(A ∖ {g}), a contradiction. So we now concentrate on the
cases (ii.b) and (ii.c), where it is by the way obvious that indeed
A∩L>0 =∅. (4.26)
We begin with the discussion of case (ii.b). We first of all claim that now k1 > 0.
Indeed, if k1 = 0 then (k1,k2) = (0,k2) ∈ K, and Property K2149 implies that k2 > 0.
Since we know that in this case λ2(k2,k2 − 1) ∈ A ∖ {g} [since g = λ1(k1 − 1,k1) ≠
λ2(k2,k2−1)], Condition (4.20)152 guarantees that 0 ∈ RK(A∖{g}), a contradiction.
So we may assume that k1 > 0, and the assumption that g ∈RK(A), or in other words,
that 0 ∈ RK(A−{g}), leaves us with two possibilities: that (ii.b.1) (A−{g})∩L>0 ≠∅,
or that (ii.b.2) {λ3(k3−1,k3),λ4(k4,k4−1)} ⊆ (A−{g})∪{(−1,0),(0,−1)} for some
λ3 and λ4 in R>0 and (k3,k4) in K [use Condition (4.22)152, Definition 37152 and
Lemma 112152].
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g = λ1(k1 −1,k1)
λ2(k2 ,k2 −1)
f = λ∗3 (k∗3 −1,k∗3 )
Case (ii.b.1)
g = λ1(k1 −1,k1)
λ2(k2,k2 −1)
g+λ3(k3 −1,k3)
g+λ4(k4 ,k4 −1)
Case (ii.b.2)
For case (ii.b.1), there is some h ∶= (x′,y′) > 0 such that f ∶= g+ h ∈ A. Since the
second component λ1k1 + y′ of f is positive and f ∉ L>0 by Equation (4.26), we find
that f must lie in the second quadrant, and therefore its first component λ1k1−λ1+x′ is
negative: λ1k1 < λ1−x′ and therefore λ∗3 ∶= λ1−x′+y′ > 0. If we now let k∗3 ∶= λ1k1+y′λ1−x′+y′ ,
then f =λ∗3 (k∗3 −1,k∗3 ). Moreover, k∗3 < 1 because this is equivalent to λ1k1−λ1+x′ < 0,
which we have already found to be true. Similarly, k∗3 ≥ k1 because this is equivalent
to x′k1 + y′(1− k1) ≥ 0. Then (k∗3 ,k2) ∈ K because (k1,k2) ∈ K and K is increasing
[Property K1148]. Since we now know that {λ∗3 (k∗3 −1,k∗3 ),λ2(k2,k2 −1)} ⊆ A ∖{g},
Condition (4.21)152 guarantees that 0 ∈ RK(A∖{g}), a contradiction.
For case (ii.b.2), {g + λ3(k3 − 1,k3),g + λ4(k4,k4 − 1)} ⊆ A ∪ {g + (−1,0),g +(0,−1)}, or in other words,
{(λ1k1+λ3k3−λ1−λ3,λ1k1+λ3k3),(λ1k1+λ4k4−λ1,λ1k1+λ4k4−λ4)}⊆ A∪{g+(−1,0),g+(0,−1)} (4.27)
We claim that here
k3 < k1. (4.28)
To prove this, assume ex absurdo that k3 ≥ k1, then also k∗3 ∶= λ1k1+λ3k3λ1+λ3 ≥ k1 > 0. More-
over, k∗3 < 1 because it is a convex combination of k1 < 1 and k3 < 1, and therefore(k∗3 ,k2) ∈ [0,1)2 ∖{0} and (k∗3 ,k2) ≥ (k1,k2). Then (k∗3 ,k2) ∈ K because (k1,k2) ∈ K
and K is increasing [Property K1148]. Moreover, if we also let λ∗3 ∶= λ1 +λ3 > 0, then
Equation (4.27) tells us that
λ∗3 (k∗3 −1,k∗3 ) = g+λ3(k3−1,k3) ∈ A∪{g+(−1,0),g+(0,−1)},
and since we know that λ3(k3 − 1,k3) ∉ {(−1,0),0,(0,−1)} [because λ3 > 0 and
k3 ≥ k1 > 0], this leads us to conclude that {λ∗3 (k∗3 − 1,k∗3 ),λ2(k2,k2 − 1)} ⊆ A ∖{g},
so Condition (4.21)152 together with (k∗3 ,k2) ∈ K guarantees that 0 ∈ RK(A ∖ {g}), a
contradiction.
Since Equation (4.28) rules out the possibility that k1 = 0, we find that k1 > 0 as an
intermediate result. In the remainder of this case (ii.b), note that nothing depends on
whether k2 = 0 or k2 > 0. We can now distinguish between three distinct possibilities:
(ii.b.2.1) k3 > 0 and k4 > 0, (ii.b.2.2) k3 = 0 and k4 > 0, and (ii.b.2.3) k3 > 0 and k4 = 0,
which correspond to Conditions (4.21)152, (4.20)152 and (4.19)152, respectively—k3 =
0 = k4 is impossible because 0 ∉ K.
In case (ii.b.2.1) we see that {λ3(k3−1,k3),λ4(k4,k4−1)}∩{(−1,0),0,(0,−1)} =∅, and therefore Equation (4.27) leads to{(λ1k1+λ3k3−λ1−λ3,λ1k1+λ3k3),(λ1k1+λ4k4−λ1,λ1k1+λ4k4−λ4)} ⊆ A∖{g}.
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We distinguish between two possibilities, which will determine in what quadrants these
points lie: λ4 ≤ λ1 and λ4 > λ1.
g = λ1(k1 −1,k1)
λ2(k2 ,k2 −1)
g+λ3(k3 −1,k3)
g+λ4(k4 ,k4 −1)
Case (ii.b.2.1)
λ4 ≤ λ1
k1+k2 < 1
g = λ1(k1 −1,k1)
λ2(k2 ,k2 −1)
g+λ3(k3 −1,k3)
g+λ4(k4 ,k4 −1)
Case (ii.b.2.1)
λ4 ≤ λ1
k1+k2 ≥ 1
g = λ1(k1 −1,k1)
λ2(k2 ,k2 −1)
g+λ3(k3 −1,k3)
g+λ4(k4 ,k4 −1)
Case (ii.b.2.1)
λ4 > λ1
If λ4 ≤ λ1, then we claim that
k4 ≤ 1−k1. (4.29)
To prove this, assume ex absurdo that k4 > 1 − k1, so k1 + k4 − 1 > 0. If λ1 = λ4,
then (λ1k1 +λ4k4 −λ1,λ1k1 +λ4k4 −λ4) = λ1(k1 + k4 − 1,k1 + k4 − 1) > 0, contradict-
ing Equation (4.26)156, so indeed λ4 < λ1. We wonder in what quadrant (λ1k1 +
λ4k4 − λ1,λ1k1 + λ4k4 − λ4) ≠ 0 lies. Infer from k1 + k4 > 1 and 0 < λ4 < λ1 that
λ1k1 +λ4k4 −λ4 > λ4(k1 + k4)−λ4 > 0. Since A ∩L>0 = ∅ by Equation (4.26)156, we
find that (λ1k1+λ4k4−λ1,λ1k1+λ4k4−λ4) must lie in the second quadrant, and there-
fore its first component λ1k1 +λ4k4 −λ1 must be negative: λ1k1 +λ4k4 < λ1. This tells
us that k∗4 ∶= λ1k1+λ4k4−λ4λ1−λ4 < 1. Moreover, k∗4 > k1 because this is equivalent to k4 > 1−k1.
Hence (k∗4 ,k2) ∈ [0,1)2∖{0} and (k∗4 ,k2) > (k1,k2). This tells us that (k∗4 ,k2) ∈K be-
cause (k1,k2) ∈K and K is increasing [Property K1148]. If we now let λ∗4 ∶= λ1−λ4 > 0,
then we see that λ∗4 (k∗4 −1,k∗4 ) = (λ1k1+λ4k4−λ1,λ1k1+λ4k4−λ4) ∈ A∖{g}. Hence
also {λ∗4 (k∗4 −1,k∗4 ),λ2(k2,k2−1)} ⊆A∖{g}, and Condition (4.21)152 now guarantees
that 0 ∈ RK(A∖{g}), a contradiction.
So we see that 0 < k4 ≤ 1 − k1 < 1, and hence, because K is increasing [Prop-
erty K1148], we infer from (k3,k4) ∈ K that (k3,1− k1) ∈ K. We distinguish between
two further possibilities: k1+k2 < 1 and k1+k2 ≥ 1.
If k1 + k2 < 1 then we can use Property K3a149 with a = 1− k1, b = k3 and c = k2.
Observe that a+ b = 1− k1 + k3 < 1 by Equation (4.28)↶, that c = k2 < 1− k1 = a by
assumption, that (b,a) = (k3,1− k1) ∈ K has been proved above, and that (1− a,c) =(k1,k2) ∈ K also by assumption, whence(∀k′3 ∈ (k3,1))(k′3,k2) ∈ K.
In particular, let k′3 ∶= λ1k1+λ3k3λ1+λ3 . Then k′3 > min{k1,k3} = k3 > 0, where the first in-
equality follows from λ1 > 0 and λ3 > 0, and the equality from Equation (4.28)↶.
Moreover, k′3 < 1 because it is a convex combination of k1 < 1 and k3 < 1. Hence
k′3 ∈ (k3,1) and therefore (k′3,k2) ∈ K. If we now let λ ′3 ∶= λ1 + λ3 > 0, then we
see that λ ′3(k′3 − 1,k′3) = (λ1k1 + λ3k3 − λ1 − λ3,λ1k1 + λ3k3) ∈ A ∖ {g}, whence also{λ ′3(k′3−1,k′3),λ2(k2,k2−1)} ⊆ A∖{g}, and Condition (4.21)152 now guarantees that
0 ∈ RK(A∖{g}), a contradiction.
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If k1+k2 ≥ 1 then we have that k2 ≥ 1−k1 ≥ k4, where the second inequality is due to
Equation (4.29). Also k∗3 ∶= λ1k1+λ3k3λ1+λ3 > min{k1,k3} = k3 > 0, where the first inequality
follows from λ1 > 0 and λ3 > 0, and the equality from k1 > k3 [Equation (4.28)157].
Moreover, k∗3 < 1 because it is a convex combination of k1 < 1 and k3 < 1. This tells us
that (k∗3 ,k2) ∈ [0,1)2 ∖{0} and (k∗3 ,k2) > (k3,1− k1). We then find that (k∗3 ,k2) ∈ K
because (k3,1−k1) ∈ K and K is increasing [Property K1148]. If we now let λ∗3 ∶= λ1+
λ3 > 0 then we find that λ∗3 (k∗3 −1,k∗3 ) = (λ1k1+λ3k3−λ1−λ3,λ1k1+λ3k3) ∈ A∖{0},
and therefore also {λ∗3 (k∗3 −1,k∗3 ),λ2(k2,k2 −1)} ⊆ A ∖{g}, and Condition (4.21)152
now guarantees that 0 ∈ RK(A∖{g}), a contradiction.
If λ4 > λ1, then we claim that
k4 ≤ 1−k1.
To prove this, assume ex absurdo that k4 > 1 − k1. We wonder in what quadrant
the vector (λ1k1 + λ4k4 − λ1,λ1k1 + λ4k4 − λ4) lies. Infer from k1 + k4 > 1, k4 > 0
and λ4 > λ1 > 0 that λ1k1 + λ4k4 − λ1 > λ1(k1 + k4)− λ1 > 0. Since A ∩L>0 = ∅ by
Equation (4.26)156, we find that (λ1k1 + λ4k4 − λ1,λ1k1 + λ4k4 − λ4) must lie in the
fourth quadrant, and therefore its second component λ1k1+λ4k4−λ4 must be negative:
λ1k1 +λ4k4 < λ4. This tells us that k∗4 ∶= λ1k1+λ4k4−λ1λ4−λ1 < 1. Moreover, k∗4 > k4 because
this is equivalent to k4 > 1− k1. Let k∗3 ∶= λ1k1+λ3k3λ1+λ3 . Then k∗3 > min{k1,k3} = k3 > 0,
where the first inequality follows λ1 > 0 and λ3 > 0 and the equality from k1 > k3 [Equa-
tion (4.28)157]. Moreover, k
∗
3 < 1 because it is a convex combination of k1 < 1 and
k3 < 1. This tells us that (k∗3 ,k∗4 ) ∈ [0,1)2 ∖ {0} and that (k∗3 ,k∗4 ) > (k3,k4). Hence(k∗3 ,k∗4 ) ∈ K because (k3,k4) ∈ K and K is increasing [Property K1148]. If we now
let λ∗3 ∶= λ1 +λ3 > 0 and λ∗4 ∶= λ4 −λ1 > 0, then λ∗3 (k∗3 − 1,k∗3 ) = (λ1k1 +λ3k3 −λ1 −
λ3,λ1k1 +λ3k3) and λ∗4 (k∗4 ,k∗4 −1) = (λ1k1 +λ4k4 −λ1,λ1k1 +λ4k4 −λ4), and there-
fore {λ∗3 (k∗3 −1,k∗3 ),λ∗4 (k∗4 ,k∗4 −1)} ⊆A∖{g}, so Condition (4.21)152 now guarantees
that 0 ∈ RK(A∖{g}), a contradiction.
So we see that 0 < k4 ≤ 1−k1 < 0, and hence, because K is increasing, we infer from(k3,k4) ∈K that (k3,1−k1) ∈K. We now have the same two possibilities k1+k2 < 1 and
k1 +k2 ≥ 1 as before, and for each of them, we can construct a contradiction in exactly
the same way as for the case when λ4 ≤ λ1.
This shows that we always arrive at a contradiction in case (ii.b.2.1).
In case (ii.b.2.2) we see that λ4(k4,k4 − 1) ∉ {(−1,0),0,(0,−1)}, and therefore
Equation (4.27)157 leads to
(λ1k1+λ4k4−λ1,λ1k1+λ4k4−λ4) ∈ A∖{g}.
We distinguish between two possibilities, which will determine in what quadrant this
point lies: λ4 ≤ λ1 or λ4 > λ1.
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g = λ1(k1 −1,k1)
λ2(k2,k2 −1)
g+λ3(k3 −1,k3)
g+λ4(k4,k4 −1)
Case (ii.b.2.2)
λ4 ≤ λ1
k1+k2 < 1
g = λ1(k1 −1,k1)
λ2(k2 ,k2 −1)
g+λ3(k3 −1,k3)
g+λ4(k4 ,k4 −1)
Case (ii.b.2.2)
λ4 ≤ λ1
k1+k2 ≥ 1
g = λ1(k1 −1,k1)
λ2(k2 ,k2 −1)
g+λ3(k3 −1,k3)
g+λ4(k4 ,k4 −1)
Case (ii.b.2.2)
λ4 > λ1
If λ4 ≤ λ1, then we claim that
k4 ≤ 1−k1. (4.30)
To prove this, assume ex absurdo that k4 > 1− k1, so k1 + k4 − 1 > 0. If λ1 = λ4, then(λ1k1 + λ4k4 − λ1,λ1k1 + λ4k4 − λ4) = λ1(k1 + k4 − 1,k1 + k4 − 1) > 0, a contradiction
with Equation (4.26)156, so we may assume that λ4 < λ1. We now wonder in what
quadrant the vector (λ1k1 +λ4k4 −λ1,λ1k1 +λ4k4 −λ4) ≠ 0 lies. We infer from k1 > 0,
λ1 > λ4 > 0 and k1+k4 > 1 that λ1k1+λ4k4−λ4 > λ4(k1+k4)−λ4 > 0. Since A∩L>0 =∅
by Equation (4.26)156, we find that (λ1k1 +λ4k4 −λ1,λ1k1 +λ4k4 −λ4) must lie in the
second quadrant, and therefore its first component λ1k1 +λ4k4 −λ1 must be negative:
λ1k1 +λ4k4 < λ1. This tells us that k∗4 ∶= λ1k1+λ4k4−λ4λ1−λ4 < 1. Moreover, k∗4 > k1 because
this is equivalent to k4 > 1−k1. Hence (k∗4 ,k2) ∈ [0,1)2∖0 and (k∗4 ,k2) > (k1,k2). This
tells us that (k∗4 ,k2) ∈ K because (k1,k2) ∈ K and K is increasing [Property K1148]. If
we now let λ∗4 ∶= λ1−λ4 > 0, then we see that λ∗4 (k∗4 −1,k∗4 ) = (λ1k1+λ4k4−λ1,λ1k1+
λ4k4 −λ4) ∈ A ∖{g}. Hence also {λ∗4 (k∗4 −1,k∗4 ),λ2(k2,k2 −1)} ⊆ A ∖{g}, and Con-
dition (4.21)152 now guarantees that 0 ∈ RK(A∖{g}), a contradiction.
So we see that 0< k4 ≤ 1−k1 < 1, so (0,1−k1) ∈ [0,1)2∖{0} and (0,1−k1)> (0,k4)
and hence, because K is increasing [Property K1148], we infer from (0,k4) = (k3,k4) ∈
K that also (0,1−k1) ∈K. We distinguish between two further possibilities: k1+k2 < 1
and k1+k2 ≥ 1.
If k1 + k2 < 1 then we can use Property K3b149 with a = 1− k1 and c = k2. Observe
that c = k2 < 1−k1 = a by assumption, that (0,a) = (0,1−k1) ∈K was derived above, and
that (1−a,c) = (k1,k2) ∈ K also by assumption, and therefore we find that (0,k2) ∈ K.
Since λ2(k2,k2−1) ∈A∖{g}, Condition (4.20)152 now guarantees that 0 ∈RK(A∖{g}),
a contradiction.
If k1 +k2 ≥ 1 then we have that k2 ≥ 1−k1 ≥ k4, where the second inequality is due
to Equation (4.30). Then (0,k2) ∈ K because (0,k4) ∈ K and K is increasing [Prop-
erty K1148]. Since λ2(k2,k2 − 1) ∈ A ∖ {g}, Condition (4.20)152 now guarantees that
0 ∈ RK(A∖{g}), a contradiction.
If λ4 > λ1, then we claim that, here too,
k4 ≤ 1−k1.
To prove this, assume ex absurdo that k4 > 1− k1. We wonder in what quadrant the
vector (λ1k1+λ4k4−λ1,λ1k1+λ4k4−λ4) lies. Infer from 0 < 1−k1 < k4 and 0 < λ1 < λ4
that λ1k1+λ4k4−λ1 >λ1(k1+k4)−λ1 > 0. Since A∩L>0 =∅ by Equation (4.26)156, we
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find that the vector (λ1k1+λ4k4−λ1,λ1k1+λ4k4−λ4) must lie in the fourth quadrant,
and therefore its second component λ1k1+λ4k4−λ4 must be negative: λ1k1+λ4k4 <λ4.
This tells us that k∗4 ∶= λ1k1+λ4k4−λ1λ4−λ1 < 1. Moreover, k∗4 > k4 because this is equivalent
to k4 > 1− k1. Hence (0,k∗4 ) ∈ [0,1)2 ∖ {0} and (0,k∗4 ) > (0,k4). This tells us that(0,k∗4 ) ∈ K because (0,k4) ∈ K and K is increasing [Property K1148]. If we now let
λ∗4 ∶= λ4−λ1 > 0, then we see that λ∗4 (k∗4 ,k∗4 −1)= (λ1k1+λ4k4−λ1,λ1k1+λ4k4−λ4) ∈
A∖{g}, and Condition (4.20)152 now guarantees that 0 ∈ RK(A∖{g}), a contradiction.
So we see that 0 < k4 ≤ 1−k1 < 0, and hence, because K is increasing, we infer from(k3,k4) ∈K that (k3,1−k1) ∈K. We now have the same two possibilities k1+k2 < 1 and
k1 +k2 ≥ 1 as before, and for each of them, we can construct a contradiction in exactly
the same way as for the case when λ4 ≤ λ1.
We conclude that case (ii.b.2.2) always leads to a contradiction.
g = λ1(k1 −1,k1)
λ2(k2 ,k2 −1)
g+λ3(k3 −1,k3)
g+λ4(k4 ,k4 −1)
Case (ii.b.2.3)
In case (ii.b.2.3) we see that λ3(k3 − 1,k3) ∉ {(−1,0),0,(0,−1)}, and therefore
Equation (4.27)157 leads to (λ1k1 +λ3k3 −λ1 −λ3,λ1k1 +λ3k3) ∈ A ∖{g}, or if we let
λ∗3 ∶= λ1+λ3 > 0 and k∗3 ∶= λ1k1+λ3k3λ1+λ3 > 0,
λ∗3 (k∗3 −1,k∗3 ) ∈ A∖{g}.
Observe that also k∗3 < 1 because it is a convex combination of k1 < 1 and k3 < 1. This
tells us that (k∗3 ,0) ∈ [0,1)2∖{0}. Moreover, we have that k∗3 >min{k1,k3}= k3 > 0 [the
strict inequality holds because λ1 > 0 and λ3 > 0, and the equality holds because k1 >
k3 by Equation (4.28)157]. Hence (k∗3 ,0) > (k3,0) and therefore (k∗3 ,0) ∈ K, because
also (k3,0) ∈ K and K is increasing [Property K1148]. Since λ∗3 (k∗3 −1,k∗3 ) ∈ A ∖{g},
Condition (4.19)152 now guarantees that 0 ∈ RK(A∖{g}), a contradiction.
We have now found a contradiction in cases (ii.b.2.1)–(ii.b.2.3), which tells us that
case (ii.b.2) always leads to a contradiction. Since case (ii.b.1) also led to a contradic-
tion, we may conclude that case (ii.b) always leads to a contradiction.
The discussion of the last remaining case (ii.c) is completely similar to that of
case (ii.b): we can distinguish between similar cases, and in each of them we can
construct a contradiction in the same manner, by exchanging the roles of k1 and k2, and
of k3 and k4.
Since we have now arrived at a contradiction in all possible cases, we conclude that
RK indeed satisfies Axiom R3b20.
We finish the proof by establishing that RK also satisfies Axiom R120. Since we
have already shown that RK satisfies Axiom R4b [see Proposition 113153] and Ax-
iom R3b20 [see the argumentation above], by Corollary 2639 it suffices to show that
0 ∉ RK({0}). By Condition (4.17)152, this is indeed the case.
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Corollary 115. Consider any subset K of [0,1)2 that satisfies Proper-
ties K1148–K3149. Then the rejection function RK given by Definition 37152
is coherent and satisfies Property R625.
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Propositions Proposition 113153
and Proposition 114153.
4.4.3 The correspondence between rejection functions and coordinate
rejection sets
We conclude from the preceding discussion that any coherent rejection func-
tion determines a coordinate rejection set via Definition 36148, which, in turn,
can be used to determine a rejection function via Definition 37152. Our next
proposition shows that these two procedures commute, or, in other words, that
a coherent rejection function is uniquely determined by its associated coordi-
nate rejection set, and the other way around. In order to get there, we first
observe that the proof of Proposition 6979 immediately implies the following
lemma:
Lemma 116. Consider any coherent rejection function R on Q(L({H,T}))
that satisfies Property R625. Consider the option sets { f1, . . . , fm} ⊆ LII and{g1, . . . ,gn} ⊆ LIV, for some m and n in N. Then the following equiva-
lences hold for any i in argmax{ fk(T)fk(T)− fk(H) ∶ k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}} and any j in
argmax{ gk(H)gk(H)−gk(T) ∶ k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}}:
(i) 0 ∈ R({0, f1, . . . , fm,g1, . . . ,gn})⇔ 0 ∈ R({0, fi,g j});
(ii) 0 ∈ R({0,g1, . . . ,gn})⇔ 0 ∈ R({0,g j});
(iii) 0 ∈ R({0, f1, . . . , fm})⇔ 0 ∈ R({0, fi}).
Incidentally, Proposition 1627 ensures that this lemma applies in particular to
coherent rejection functions that satisfy Property R525. We are now ready to
prove the characterisation of rejection functions in terms of coordinate rejec-
tion sets, as the counterpart of Proposition 6577 for the characterisation in terms
of rejection sets.
Proposition 117. For any coherent rejection function R onQ(L({H,T})) that
satisfies Property R625, R = RKR . Conversely, for any coordinate rejection set
K satisfying Properties K1148–K3149, K =KRK .
Proof. For the first statement, assume that R is coherent and satisfies Property R625.
Then we infer from Proposition 111149 that KR satisfies Properties K1148–K3149, and
therefore Corollary 115 guarantees that RKR is coherent and satisfies Property R625 as
well. To prove that R = RKR , we consider any A in Q and f in A, and show that f ∈
R(A)⇔ f ∈RKR (A). Since both R and RKR satisfy Axiom R4b20 [Proposition 113153],
we can assume without loss of generality that f = 0.
For the direct implication, assume that 0 ∈ R(A). If A ∩L>0 ≠ ∅ then 0 ∈ RKR (A)
by Condition (4.18)152. If A∩L>0 =∅ then 0 ∈ R(A) implies that g(H) > 0 or g(T) > 0
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for some g in A. To see this: if ex absurdo A ⊆ L≤0 then A ∖{0} ⊆ R(A) by Propo-
sition 3142, and therefore also R(A) = A, contradicting Axiom R120. If we use the
notation LII ∩A = {g1, . . . ,gm} and LIV ∩A = {g′1, . . . ,g′n} with m and n in Z≥0, this
tells us that max{n,m} > 0. Also, because of Proposition 3142 we may assume with-
out loss of generality that A ∩L<0 = ∅. By Lemma 116 we infer that there are three
possibilities:
(i) 0 ∈R({0, g˜, g˜′}), and hence 0 ∈R({0,h,h′}) [use Property R625], when n ≥ 1 and
m ≥ 1, with g˜ ∈ A∩LII and g˜′ ∈ A∩LIV;
(ii) 0 ∈R({0, g˜}), and hence 0 ∈R({0,h}) [use Property R625], when n > 0 =m, with
g˜ ∈ A∩LII;
(iii) 0 ∈ R({0, g˜′}), and hence 0 ∈ R({0,h′}) [use Property R625], when m > 0 = n,
with g˜′ ∈ A∩LIV,
where we let, to ease the notation, h ∶= 1g˜(T)−g˜(H) g˜ and h′ ∶= 1g˜′(H)−g˜′(T) g˜′. For each of
these possible cases, we find respectively:
(i) (h(T),h′(H)) ∈ KR , which tells us that 0 ∈ RKR ({0,h,h′}) by Condi-
tion (4.21)152, and hence indeed 0 ∈ RKR ({0, g˜, g˜′}), because RKR satisfies Prop-
erty R625 by Proposition 113153;
(ii) (h(T),0) ∈KR [use a suitable and by now familiar combination of Axioms R220,
R3a20 and R3b20], from which we infer that 0 ∈ RKR ({0, g˜}) by Condi-
tion (4.20)152;
(iii) (0,h′(H)) ∈ KR [use a similar, suitable and by now familiar combination of Ax-
ioms R220, R3a20 and R3b20], from which we infer that 0 ∈ RKR ({0, g˜′}) by
Condition (4.19)152.
In all three cases we can now conclude that, indeed, 0 ∈ RKR (A), by Axiom R3a20.
For the converse implication, assume that 0 ∈RKR (A). If A∩L>0 ≠∅, then 0 ∈R(A)
by Axioms R220 and R3a20, so assume that A∩L>0 =∅. There are three possibilities:
If Condition (4.19)152 holds, then there is some k1 in (0,1) and some λ1 in R>0
such that (k1,0) ∈KR and λ1(k1−1,k1) ∈A. The first statement means that 0 ∈R({(k1−
1,k1),0,(0,−1)}), whence, after applying a familiar combination of Axioms R220,
R3a20 and R3b20, also 0 ∈ R({(k1 − 1,k1),0}). Applying Property R625, the second
statement, and Axiom R3a20 now leads us to deduce that indeed 0 ∈ R(A).
If Condition (4.20)152 holds, a similar argument leads us to the conclusion that,
here too, 0 ∈ R(A).
Finally, if Condition (4.21)152 holds, then {λ1(k1 − 1,k1),λ2(k2,k2 − 1)} ⊆ A
for some (k1,k2) in KR ∩ (0,1)2 and λ1 and λ2 in R>0. (k1,k2) in KR ∩ (0,1)2
implies that 0 ∈ R({(k1 − 1,k1),0,(k2,k2 − 1)}), and therefore also 0 ∈ R({λ1(k1 −
1,k1),0,λ2(k2,k2 − 1)}) by Property R625. Hence 0 ∈ R(A) by Axiom R3a20. This
concludes the proof of the first statement.
For the second statement, assume that K satisfies Properties K1148–K3149, then
we infer from Corollary 115 that RK is coherent and satisfies Property R625. Proposi-
tion 111149 then guarantees that KRK satisfies Properties K1148–K3149 as well. To show
that K = KRK , consider any (`1,`2) in [0,1)2 ∖{0}. First assume that (`1,`2) ∈ KRK ,
meaning that 0 ∈ RK({(`1−1,`1),0,(`2,`2−1)}), by the definition of a coordinate re-
jection set of a rejection function. We have to prove that this implies that (`1,`2) ∈
K. The definition of RK [Definition 37152] now tells us that Condition (4.18)152,
Condition (4.19)152, Condition (4.20)152, or Condition (4.21)152 must obtain, with
A ∶= {(`1 − 1,`1),(`2,`2 − 1)}. Since (`1,`2) ∈ [0,1)2 ∖ {0}, we infer that Condi-
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tion (4.18)152 cannot be fulfilled, and we therefore have three remaining: (a) Condi-
tion (4.19)152, (b) Condition (4.20)152, or (c) Condition (4.21)152 is satisfied.
In case (a) there are λ1 in R>0 and (k1,0) in K such that λ1(k1 −1,k1) ∈ A. But,
because A = {(`1 − 1,`1),(`2,`2 − 1)} with (`1,`2) ∈ [0,1)2 ∖ {0}, this implies that
λ1 = 1 and k1 = `1. To see this, recall that λ1(k1 − 1,k1) lies in the second quadrant,
while (`2,`2 −1) lies in the fourth quadrant, so the only remaining possibility is that
λ1(k1 −1,k1) = (`1 −1,`1), implying that indeed λ1 = 1 and k1 = `1. This guarantees
that (`1,0) ∈K and, since K is increasing [Property K1148], indeed also that (`1,`2) ∈K.
In case (b) there are λ2 in R>0 and (0,k2) in K such that λ2(k2,k2 −1) ∈ A. But,
because A = {(`1 − 1,`1),(`2,`2 − 1)} with (`1,`2) ∈ [0,1)2 ∖ {0}, this implies that
λ2 = 1 and k2 = `2. To see this, recall that λ2(k2,k2 − 1) lies in the fourth quadrant,
while (`1,`1 −1) lies in the second quadrant, so the only remaining possibility is that
λ2(k2,k2 −1) = (`2,`2 −1), implying that indeed λ2 = 1 and k2 = `2. This guarantees
that (0,`2) ∈K and, since K is increasing [Property K1148], indeed also that (`1,`2) ∈K.
Finally, in case (c) there are λ1 and λ2 in R>0, and (k1,k2) in K ∩ (0,1)2 such
that {λ1(k1 − 1,k1),λ2(k2,k2 − 1)} ⊆ A. But, because A = {(`1 − 1,`1),(`2,`2 − 1)}
with (`1,`2) ∈ [0,1)2 ∖{0}, this implies that λ1 = λ2 = 1, k1 = `1 and k2 = `2. To see
this, observe that λ1(k1 − 1,k1) and (`1 − 1,`1) are the only elements in the second
quadrant—and therefore must be equal—and that λ2(k2,k2−1) and (`2,`2−1) are the
only elements in the fourth quadrant—and therefore must be equal. In a similar way
as above, this then implies that indeed λ1 = λ2 = 1, k1 = `1 and k2 = `2. Hence, indeed,(`1,`2) ∈ K.
Conversely, assume that (`1,`2) ∈ K, then Condition (4.23)152 guarantees that in
particular 0 ∈ RK({(`1−1,`1),0,(`2,`2−1)}), which implies that (`1,`2) ∈ KRK .
4.4.4 Coordinate rejection sets and convexity
To conclude our preliminary discussion of the relation between coordinate re-
jection sets and rejection functions, we characterise the conditions under which
the rejection function RK determined by a coordinate rejection set K satisfies
the ‘convexity’ Property R525. We begin with a lemma that will simplify the
argument.
Lemma 118. Consider (k1,k2) in [0,1)2. Let A ∶= {(k1−1,k1),0,(k2,k2−1)},
then
posi(A) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
B+L≥0 if k1+k2 > 1
B if k1+k2 = 1
B+L≤0 if k1+k2 < 1,
where B ∶= {λ(k1−1,k1) ∶ λ ∈R≥0}∪{λ(k2,k2−1) ∶ λ ∈R≥0}.
Proof. Visual proof: see the three possible situations depicted below.
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a
b
1
1
k1
k2
k1+k2 > 1
a
b
1
1
k1
k2
k1+k2 = 1
a
b
1
1
k1 k2
k1+k2 < 1
In particular, it follows from this result for A = {(k1−1,k1),0,(k2,k2−1)} that
posi(A)∩L>0 =∅⇔ k1+k2 ≤ 1, for all (k1,k2) in [0,1)2. (4.31)
Proposition 119 (Characterisation of Property R525). Consider any coordi-
nate rejection set K ⊆ [0,1)2 ∖{0}, and the corresponding rejection function
RK on Q(L({H,T})) that satisfies Properties K1148–K3149. Then the follow-
ing two statements are equivalent:
(i) RK satisfies Property R525,
(ii) K satisfies Property K4149.
Proof. We first prove that (i)⇒(ii). Assume that RK satisfies Property R525, and con-
sider any (k1,k2) in [0,1)2 ∖{0} such that k1 + k2 > 1. It then follows that (k1,k2) ∈(0,1)2, and also that ( k1+k2−12 , k1+k2−12 ) > 0, whence 0 ∈ RK({0,( k1+k2−12 , k1+k2−12 )})
by Condition (4.18)152. By Proposition 113153, RK satisfies Axiom R3a20, whence
0 ∈ RK({(k1−1,k1),0,(k2,k2−1),( k1+k2−12 , k1+k2−12 )}).
Also, ( k1+k2−12 , k1+k2−12 ) ∈ conv({(k1 − 1,k1),(k2,k2 − 1)}). But then Property R525
implies that 0 ∈ RK({(k1−1,k1),0,(k2,k2−1)}), whence indeed (k1,k2) ∈ K.
Next, we prove that (ii)⇒(i). Consider arbitrary A and A1 in Q such that A ⊆
A1 ⊆ conv(A), and let us show that RK(A1)∩A ⊆ RK(A). Let A ∶= { f1, . . . , fn} and
A1 ∶= A ∪{ fn+1, . . . , fn+k} for some n and k in N. Assume that fi ∈ RK(A1) for some i
in {1, . . . ,n}. We then have to prove that fi ∈ RK(A). We can assume without loss of
generality that fi = 0, because also A − { fi} ⊆ A1 − { fi} ⊆ conv(A)− { fi} = conv(A −{ fi}). To ease the notation along, let `k ∶= fk(T)fk(T)− fk(H) and λk ∶= fk(T)− fk(H) for
every k such that fk ∈ LII [there might be no such k] and verify that λk > 0 and fk =
λk(`k −1,`k) for every gamble fk in A ∩LII. Similarly, for every k in {1, . . . ,n} such
that fk ∈ LIV [there might be no such k], let `k ∶= fk(H)fk(H)− fk(T) and λk ∶= fk(H)− fk(T);
then λk > 0 and fk = λk(`k,`k −1) for every gamble fk in A∩LIV.
First of all, we see that A ∩L>0 ≠ ∅ implies that indeed 0 ∈ RK(A), by Condi-
tion (4.18)152. We may therefore in the remainder of this proof assume that A∩L>0 =∅.
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Next, we observe that conv(A)∩L>0 ≠ ∅ also implies that 0 ∈ RK(A). To see
this, if conv(A)∩L>0 ≠∅—say, g ∈ conv(A)∩L>0, so g =∑nk=1αk fk > 0 for some α1,
. . . , αn in R≥0 such that ∑nk=1αk = 1—, then, as an intermediate result, A ∩LII ≠ ∅
and A ∩LIV ≠ ∅. Indeed, assume ex absurdo that A ∩LIV = ∅, then, since we have
assumed that A∩L>0 =∅, therefore A ⊆L≤0∪LII. But then g=∑nk=1αk fk ≤ 0 or g(H)=∑nk=1αk fk(H) < 0, contradicting the assumption that g > 0. Assuming that A ∩LII =∅
leads to a similar contradiction. It therefore follows that
0 < g = n∑
k=1αk fk ≤
n∑
k=1
fk∈LII∪LIV
αk fk. (4.32)
Without loss of generality, we may assume by Lemma 116162 that f1 ∈LII is a gamble
in
argmax{ h(T)
h(T)−h(H) ∶ h ∈ A∩LII}
and that f2 ∈LIV is a gamble in
argmax{ h(H)
h(H)−h(T) ∶ h ∈ A∩LIV}.
We now claim that, as a consequence,
λ ′1 f1 ≥ n∑
k=1
fk∈LII
αk fk and λ
′
2 f2 ≥ n∑
k=1
fk∈LIV
αk fk for some λ
′
1 and λ
′
2 in R≥0. (4.33)
To prove the statement involving f1, observe that `k ≤ `1 for every k in {1, . . . ,m} for
which fk ∈ A∩LII, and therefore
n∑
k=1
fk∈LII
αk fk = n∑
k=1
fk∈LII
αkλk(`k −1,`k) ≤ n∑
k=1
fk∈LII
αkλk(`1−1,`1)
= n∑
k=1
fk∈LII
αk
λk
λ1
λ1(`1−1,`1) = f1 n∑
k=1
fk∈LII
αk
λk
λ1
,
so we see that λ ′1 ∶=∑k∈{1,...,n}, fk∈LII αk λkλ1 ≥ 0 does the job nicely. The statement in-
volving f2 holds because of a similar argument.
We can now combine Equations (4.32) and (4.33) to infer that 0 < λ ′1 f1 + λ ′2 f2,
which can be rewritten as
0 < (λ1λ ′1(`1−1)+λ2λ ′2`2,λ1λ ′1`1+λ2λ ′2(`2−1)).
But, this implies that `1 + `2 > 1. Indeed, assume ex absurdo that `1 + `2 ≤ 1, then we
infer from the inequality above that both `2(λ2λ ′2−λ1λ ′1) ≥ 0 and `1(λ1λ ′1−λ2λ ′2) ≥ 0,
and therefore also λ2λ2 ≥ λ1λ ′1 and λ2λ ′2 ≤ λ1λ ′1, where at least one of these inequalities
must be strict, a contradiction.
Hence indeed `1+`2 > 1, and applying (ii)↶ allows us to infer that (`1,`2) ∈K and
therefore 0 ∈RK({ f1,0, f2}). This proves our statement that conv(A)∩L>0 ≠∅ implies
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that 0 ∈ RK(A), so we may also assume without loss of generality that conv(A)∩L>0 =∅, and return to the main line of the proof.
Since we have assumed that fi = 0 ∈ RK(A1), Definition 37152 tells us that there are
four possibilities: one of the four Conditions (4.18)152–(4.21)152 must hold for A1.
Condition (4.18)152 for A1 amounts to A1∩L>0 ≠∅, contradicting our assumption
that conv(A)∩L>0 =∅, because A1 ⊆ conv(A).
If Condition (4.21)152 holds for A1, then {λ∗1 (k∗1 −1,k∗1 ),λ∗2 (k∗2 ,k∗2 −1)} ⊆ A1 for
some λ∗1 and λ∗2 in R>0 and (k∗1 ,k∗2 ) in K ∩(0,1)2. Let h1 ∶= λ∗1 (k∗1 −1,k∗1 ) and h2 ∶=
λ∗2 (k∗2 ,k∗2 −1). Then A ∩LII ≠∅ and A ∩LIV ≠∅ [otherwise, if A ∩LII =∅, since we
already know that A∩L>0 =∅, every convex combination of elements of A would have
a non-positive value in T, which contradicts that h1 = λ∗1 (k∗1 −1,k∗1 ) ∈ A1 ⊆ conv(A),
since h1(T) = λ∗1 k∗1 > 0; a similar argument leads us to conclude that A∩LII ≠∅], so we
may assume again without loss of generality that f1 is a gamble in argmax{ h(T)h(T)−h(H) ∶
h ∈ A ∩LII} and that f2 is a gamble in argmax{ h(H)h(H)−h(T) ∶ h ∈ A ∩LIV}. Since we
have assumed that conv(A)∩L>0 = ∅, we see that conv({h1,0,h2})∩L>0 = ∅—and
therefore also posi({h1,0,h2})∩L>0 =∅—whence, by Equation (4.31)165, k∗1 +k∗2 ≤ 1.
If (k∗1 ,k∗2 ) = (`k,`m) for some k and m in {1, . . . ,n} such that fk ∈LII and fm ∈LIV, then
0 ∈ RK(A) by Condition (4.21)152. If this is not the case, then we distinguish between
three possibilities: (i) k∗1 ≠ `k for all k in {1, . . . ,n} such that fk ∈ LII and k∗2 = `m for
some m in {1, . . . ,n} such that fm ∈ LIV, (ii) k∗1 = `k for some k in {1, . . . ,n} such that
fk ∈LII and k∗2 ≠ `m for all m in {1, . . . ,n} such that fm ∈LIV, and (iii) k∗1 ≠ `k for all k
in {1, . . . ,n} such that fk ∈LII and k∗2 ≠ `m for all m in {1, . . . ,n} such that fm ∈LIV.
In case (i), we already find that λ(k∗2 ,k∗2 − 1) ∈ A for some λ in R>0. If k∗1 ≤ `1,
then (k∗1 ,k∗2 ) ∈ K implies that (`1,k∗2 ) ∈ K because K is increasing. Since we know
that f1 = λ1(`1 −1,`1) ∈ A, this guarantees that 0 ∈ RK(A), by Condition (4.21)152. If
k∗1 > `1, then we claim that necessarily also `1 + `2 > 1, and therefore (`1,`2) ∈ K by
Property K4149, so indeed 0 ∈ RK(A) by Condition (4.21)152. To see that `1 + `2 > 1,
assume ex absurdo that (a) `1+ `2 < 1 or (b) `1+ `2 = 1.
If (a) `1 + `2 < 1, then we infer from Lemma 118164 and k∗1 > `1 that h1 ∉
posi({ f1,0, f2}) = posi(A) [this equality holds because every element fk of A ⊆Lc>0 belongs either to L≤0 ⊆ posi({ f1,0, f2}), to LII—and then `k ≤ `1 so fk ∈
posi({ f1,0, f2})—, or to LIV—and then `k ≤ `2 so fk ∈ posi({ f1,0, f2})], so a fortiori
also h1 ∉ conv(A), a contradiction.
If (b) `1 + `2 = 1, then we infer from Lemma 118164 that posi({ f1, f2}) =
span({ f1}). Since it follows from the assumptions that every element of A is
dominated by some element of posi({ f1, f2}) = span({ f1}), we see that posi(A) ⊆
span({ f1})+L≤0. Since k∗1 > `1, we conclude that h1 ∉ span({ f1})+L≤0, so a fortiori
also h1 ∉ conv(A), again a contradiction.
In case (ii), a completely similar argument leads us to conclude that 0 ∈RK(A) here
as well.
In case (iii) there are, again, three possibilities: (α) k∗1 < `1 and k∗2 < `2, so (`1,`2) ∈
K because K is increasing, and therefore 0 ∈ RK(A) by Condition (4.21)152; (β ) k∗1 > `1
and k∗2 < `2, and its symmetric counterpart k∗1 < `1 and k∗2 > `2; and (γ) k∗1 > `1 and k∗2 >
`2, and therefore `1 + `2 < k∗1 + k∗2 ≤ 1, so `1 + `2 < 1 and Lemma 118164 guarantee that
h1 ∉ posi({ f1,0, f2}) = posi(A), and therefore a fortiori h1 ∉ conv(A), a contradiction.
It therefore suffices to consider case (β ), and show that k∗1 > `1 and k∗2 < `2 implies
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that 0 ∈ RK(A), since the case that k∗1 < `1 and k∗2 > `2 can be covered by a completely
symmetrical argument. So assume that k∗1 > `1 and k∗2 < `2. Since h1 ∈ conv(A) ⊆
posi(A), Lemma 118164 and k∗1 > `1 guarantee that necessarily `1+`2 > 1, so (`1,`2) ∈
K by Property K4149, and therefore once again 0 ∈ RK(A), by Condition (4.21)152.
If Condition (4.20)152 holds for A1, then λ∗2 (k∗2 ,k∗2 −1) ∈ A1 for some λ∗2 in R>0
and (0,k∗2 ) ∈ K. Let h2 ∶= λ∗2 (k∗2 ,k∗2 −1). Then A∩LIV ≠∅ [otherwise, if A∩LIV =∅,
since we already know that A ∩L>0 = ∅, every convex combination of elements of A
would have a non-positive value in H, which contradicts that h2 = λ∗2 (k∗2 ,k∗2 −1) ∈ A1 ⊆
conv(A), since h2(H) = λ∗2 k∗2 > 0], and we may therefore assume without loss of gen-
erality that f2 is a gamble in argmax{ h(H)h(H)−h(T) ∶ h ∈ A ∩LIV}. If k∗2 = `m for some
m in {1, . . . ,n} such that fm ∈ LIV, then 0 ∈ RK(A) by Condition (4.20)152. If this is
not the case, then k∗2 ≠ `m for all m in {1, . . . ,n} such that fm ∈ LIV, and in particu-
lar also k∗2 ≠ `2. If k∗2 < `2, then (0,k∗2 ) ∈ K implies that (0,`2) ∈ K because K is in-
creasing, any we may therefore again conclude that 0 ∈ RK(A), by Condition (4.20)152.
If k∗2 > `2, then A ∩LII ≠ ∅ [otherwise, if A ∩LII = ∅, since we already know that
A ∩L>0 = ∅, by Lemma 118164 we have that posi(A) ⊆ posi({(−1,0),0, f2}), and
since h2 ∈ LIV ∩ conv(A), this implies that k∗2 = h2(H)h2(H)−h2(T) ≤ f2(H)f2(H)− f2(T) = `2, a con-
tradiction]. We may therefore assume without loss of generality that f1 is a gamble in
argmax{ h(T)h(T)−h(H) ∶ h ∈ A∩LII}. Because h2 ∈ conv(A), we find that `1+`2 > 1: if not,
then `1 + `2 ≤ 1, and by a completely similar reasoning as under (a) and (b) above, we
find that h2 ∉ conv(A), a contradiction. But `1+`2 > 1 implies that (`1,`2) ∈K by Prop-
erty K4149, and therefore we again conclude that 0 ∈ RK(A), by Condition (4.21)152.
Finally, if Condition (4.19)152 holds for A1, then a completely similar argument to
the one above for Condition (4.19)152 leads us to conclude again that 0 ∈ RK(A).
The results in this section so far can be succinctly summarised as follows:
Theorem 120. Consider a two-dimensional option space V. There is a one-
to-one correspondence between coherent rejection functions on V satisfying
Property R625 and subsets of [0,1)2 satisfying Properties K1148–K3149.
Moreover, there is a one-to-one correspondence between coherent rejec-
tion functions on V satisfying Property R525 and subsets of [0,1)2 satisfying
Properties K1148–K4149.
4.4.5 Counterexample
Let us call lexicographic coordinate rejection set a coordinate rejection set
corresponding to a lexicographic choice function. In order to find a coordinate
rejection set that is no infimum of such lexicographic coordinate rejection sets,
we first need to find out what these lexicographic coordinate rejection sets look
like. Recall from Proposition 94129 that all the lexicographic coherent sets of
desirable gambles on a binary possibility space {H,T} are given by
DL ∶= {Dρ ,DHρ ,DTρ ∶ ρ ∈ (0,1)}∪{D0,D1} = {Dρ ∶ ρ ∈ (0,1)}∪ Dˆ,
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and the lexicographic rejection functions onL({H,T}) are RL = {RD ∶D ∈DL}.
We determine the corresponding coordinate rejection sets. For any D in DL, we
let KD be the coordinate rejection set that corresponds to the rejection function
RD . For any ρ in (0,1) and (k1,k2) ∈ [0,1)2, observe that(k1,k2) ∈KDρ ⇔ 0 ∈ RDρ ({(k1−1,k1),0,(k2,k2−1)})⇔ {(k1−1,k1),(k2,k2−1)}∩Dρ ≠∅⇔ (k1−1,k1) ∈Dρ or (k2,k2−1) ∈Dρ⇔ k1 > ρ or k2 > 1−ρ, (4.34)
and similarly,
(k1,k2) ∈KDHρ ⇔ (k1−1,k1) ∈DHρ or (k2,k2−1) ∈DHρ⇔ k1 > ρ or k2 ≥ 1−ρ, (4.35)
and
(k1,k2) ∈KDTρ ⇔ (k1−1,k1) ∈DTρ or (k2,k2−1) ∈DTρ⇔ k1 ≥ ρ or k2 > 1−ρ. (4.36)
Finally, also for D0 and D1,(k1,k2) ∈KD0 ⇔ (k1−1,k1) ∈D0 or (k2,k2−1) ∈D0⇔ k1 > 0 (4.37)
and
(k1,k2) ∈KD1 ⇔ (k1−1,k1) ∈D1 or (k2,k2−1) ∈D1⇔ k2 > 0. (4.38)
Look at Figure 4.4↷ for a graphical representation of these coordinate rejection
sets for a generic ρ .
We also need to keep in mind that taking infima of rejection functions
corresponds to taking intersections of coordinate rejection sets: consider any
collection R of coherent rejection functions and any (k1,k2) in [0,1)2, then(k1,k2) ∈KinfR⇔ 0 ∈ ⋂
R∈RR({(k1−1,k1),0,(k2,k2−1)})⇔ (∀R ∈R)0 ∈ R({(k1−1,k1),0,(k2,k2−1)})⇔ (∀R ∈R)(k1,k2) ∈KR⇔ (k1,k2) ∈ ⋂
R∈RKR ,
so ⋂R∈RKR is the coordinate rejection set that corresponds to the rejection
function infR.
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Figure 4.4: Illustration of lexicographic coordinate rejection sets
We are now, finally, ready to provide an example of a coordinate rejection
set that satisfies Properties K1148–K4149 but is no intersection of lexicographic
coordinate rejection sets.
Example 21. Consider any `1 and `2 in (0,1) such that `1 + `2 < 1, and the
coordinate rejection set K`1,`2 ⊆ [0,1)2 depicted in Figure 4.5, and defined by
K`1,`2 ∶={(k1,k2) ∈ [0,1)2 ∶ k1+k2 > 1 or(k1 ≥ `1 and k2 ≥ `2 and (k1,k2) ≠ (`1,`2))}={(k1,k2) ∈ [0,1)2 ∶ k1+k2 > 1 or (k1,k2) > (`1,`2)}. (4.39)
We show that it corresponds to a rejection function that is coherent and satisfies
Property R525. By Theorem 120168 it suffices to show that K`1,`2 satisfies Prop-
erties K1148–K4149. That it satisfies Properties K1148, K2149 and K4149 is clear
from its definition. We show that it also satisfies Property K3149. Note that(0,a) ∉ K`1,`2 and (1−a,0) ∉ K`1,`2 for all a in [0,1], so the Properties K3b149
and K3c149 are trivially satisfied for K`1,`2 . It therefore only remains to prove
that Property K3a149 is satisfied for K`1,`2 . Consider any a, b and c in [0,1)
such that c < a, a+b < 1, (b,a) ∈K`1,`2 and (1−a,c) ∈K`1,`2 . We need to show
that then
(x,c) ∈K`1,`2 for all x in (b,1) and (b,y) ∈K`1,`2 for all y in (c,1),
so consider any x in (b,1) and y in (c,1). Since (b,a) ∈ K`1,`2 and a+b < 1,
Equation (4.39) tells us that (b,a) > (`1,`2), so x > b ≥ `1. Similarly, since
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(1−a,c) ∈K`1,`2 and c< a (or equivalently, 1−a+c< 1), Equation (4.39) tells us
that (1−a,c) > (`1,`2), so y > c ≥ `2. Then (x,c) > (`1,`2) and (b,y) > (`1,`2),
whence indeed (x,c) ∈ K`1,`2 and (b,y) ∈ K`1,`2 . So we see that K`1,`2 satisfies
Properties K1148–K4149. It therefore corresponds to a coherent and ‘convex’
rejection function.
k1
k2
`1
`2
K`1,`2
Figure 4.5: The rejection set K`1,`2
We show that K`1,`2 is no intersection of lexicographic coordinate rejection
sets. Assume ex absurdo that it is an intersection ⋂KD of some non-empty
collection of lexicographic coordinate rejection sets KD ∶= {KD ∶D ∈D}, withD ⊆ DL. Then, since (`1,`2) ∉ K`1,`2 , there must be some D in D such that(`1,`2) ∉ KD . There are a number of possibilities: (i) D = Dρ for some ρ
in (0,1), (ii) D = DHρ for some ρ in (0,1), or (iii) D = DTρ for some ρ in(0,1)—D ∈ {D0,D1} is impossible since (`1,`2) belong to both KD0 [by Equa-
tion (4.37)169] and KD1 [by Equation (4.38)169].
In case (i), since (`1,`2) ∉KDρ , we infer from Equation (4.34)169 that `1 ≤ρ
and `2 ≤ 1−ρ , or in other words, that ρ ∈ [`1,1−`2]. From `1+`2 < 1, we infer
that `1 < ρ or `2 < 1−ρ . We consider the case that `1 < ρ; if `2 < 1−ρ , a
symmetrical argument leads to a similar result. From Equation (4.34)169 we
infer, using `2 ≤ 1−ρ , that on the one hand (ρ,`2) ∉ KDρ . On the other hand,
we infer from (ρ,`2) > (`1,`2) that (ρ,`2) ∈ K`1,`2 , by Equation (4.39). This
leads us to conclude that K`1,`2 ≠KDρ .
In case (ii), then, since (`1,`2) ∉ KDHρ , we infer from Equation (4.35)169
that `1 ≤ ρ and `2 < 1−ρ , or in other words, that ρ ∈ [`1,1− `2). This implies
that `2 < 1−ρ+`22 < 1−ρ: indeed, 1−ρ+`22 is a convex mixture of `2 and 1−ρ .
From Equation (4.35)169, we infer, using
1−ρ+`2
2 < 1−ρ , that on the one hand(`1, 1−ρ+`22 ) ∉ KDHρ . On the other hand, we infer from (`1, 1−ρ+`22 ) > (`1,`2)
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that (`1, 1−ρ+`22 ) ∈K`1,`2 , by Equation (4.39)170. This leads us to conclude that
K`1,`2 ≠KDHρ .
In case (iii), a completely symmetrical argument leads to the conclusion
that K`1,`2 ≠KDHρ .
This tells us that none of the remaining possibilities can obtain, a contra-
diction. ◊
To conclude, the rejection function that corresponds to K`1,`2 is coherent
and satisfies Property R525 by Theorem 120168, but it is no infimum of lexico-
graphic rejection functions. This answers the initial question in this section—
is C = inf{C′ ∈ CL ∶C ⊑ C′} for every coherent choice function C that satisfies
Property C525?—in the negative: in the restrictive case of two possible out-
comes, we have found a counterexample.
4.5 DISCUSSION
In the first part of this chapter—Sections 4.1127–4.3143—we have investigated
the implications of Seidenfeld et al.’s [67] convexity axiom. We have obtained
a nice representation of purely binary ‘convex’ choice functions in terms of
lexicographic probability systems, which we have studied in some detail.
The central question of this chapter, however, was whether there is a rep-
resentation for choice functions in terms of maximal (or other) ‘representing
models’ that are easy to describe. We have shown that, when considering{CDˆ ∶ Dˆ ∈ Dˆ} as the ‘representing’ models, coherence alone is not sufficient,
and, moreover, that adding Property C525 does not help, even if we resort to
the larger set CL of lexicographic choice functions rather than the maximal
ones {CDˆ ∶ Dˆ ∈ Dˆ} as possible representing models.
There are several open problems that the discussion in this chapter now
allows us to identify. First and foremost, the characterisation of the maximal
coherent choice functions Cˆ is a very important open problem. Let us elaborate
a bit. In Proposition 6270 we have already identified a subset of Cˆ: every max-
imal coherent set of desirable options Dˆ, induces a choice function CDˆ that is
maximal: {CDˆ ∶ Dˆ ∈ Dˆ} ⊆ Cˆ. Consider the seemingly straightforward proposi-
tion that, for any maximal coherent choice function Cˆ, its corresponding set of
desirable options DCˆ is maximal as well: {DCˆ ∶ Cˆ ∈ Cˆ} ⊆ Dˆ. If we were able to
establish this proposition, it would imply that CDCˆ = Cˆ for every Cˆ in Cˆ. To see
why, consider any Cˆ in Cˆ, then assuming that DCˆ is a maximal set of desirable
options, by Proposition 6270 CDCˆ is a maximal choice function. But CDCˆ ⊑ Cˆ by
Corollary 5967, and therefore CDCˆ = Cˆ, since CDCˆ is a maximal choice function.
This would allow us to conclude that every maximal coherent choice function
is purely binary, and therefore imply that {CDˆ ∶ Dˆ ∈ Dˆ} = Cˆ. However, the
proof of the above-mentioned proposition has proved to be very elusive, and
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it therefore remains to be seen whether all maximal coherent choice functions
are purely binary.
There is another open problem related to this: it remains to be established
whether the coherent choice functions constitute a dually atomic complete
meet-semilattice, and therefore a strong belief structure. As already mentioned
in Example 19126, if we could establish that Cˆ = {CDˆ ∶ Dˆ ∈ Dˆ}, then the coher-
ent choice functions would have no representation in terms of maximal choice
functions, and would therefore not constitute a strong belief structure.
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INDIFFERENCE AND SYMMETRY
In this chapter, we add a different type of assessment to the picture: that of
indifference. We will see what it means to be indifferent between two options,
and how an uncertainty model can represent such indifference.
First, we move in Section 5.1 to a definition and closer investigation of
the property of indifference between two options. This is, by the way, also a
crucial step towards enabling uncertainty models to represent symmetry [27],
which we allude to in Section 5.8191. For example, as we will see in Chap-
ter 8247, when modelling exchangeability and proving de Finetti-type repre-
sentation theorems, an appropriate notion of indifference is essential. After
the definition of indifference and some of its properties are in place, we derive
representation results for desirability (Section 5.3178) and for choice models
(Section 5.4179). For desirability, such a representation already exists (see, for
instance, References [20, 31, 58]), but we give an equivalent formulation in
terms of equivalence classes of options, as we perceive this as more elegant,
and as it introduces the notations we will need later on for choice models.
Eventually, in Section 5.9193 we will find the natural extension of a direct as-
sessment (as in Chapter 389) combined with an indifference assessment.
For choice functions, indifference was introduced by Seidenfeld [63], and
for sets of desirable gambles by De Cooman and Quaeghebeur [31]. This chap-
ter is based on earlier work of mine, together with Gert de Cooman, Enrique
Miranda and Erik Quaeghebeur [78].
5.1 INDIFFERENCE AND DESIRABILITY
For sets of desirable gambles, there is a systematic way of modelling indif-
ference [20, 31, 58]. In what follows, we recall how it works, but formulate
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everything in terms of the more abstract notion of options, rather than gam-
bles.
In addition to a subject’s set of desirable options D—the options he strictly
prefers to the zero option—we also consider the options that he considers to
be equivalent to the zero option. We call these options indifferent. A set of in-
different options I is simply a subset of V, but as before with desirable options,
we pay special attention to coherent sets of indifferent options.
Definition 38 (Coherent set of indifferent options). We call a set of indifferent
options I coherent if for all u and v in V and all λ in R:
I1. 0 ∈ I;
I2. if u ∈ V≻0∪V≺0 then u ∉ I;
I3. if u ∈ I then λu ∈ I;
I4. if u,v ∈ I then u+v ∈ I.
We collect all coherent sets of indifferent options in I.
Taken together, Axioms I3 and I4 are equivalent to imposing that span(I) = I,
and due to Axiom I1, I is non-empty and therefore a linear subspace of V.
The interaction between indifferent and desirable options is subject to ra-
tionality criteria as well: they should be compatible with one another.
Definition 39 (Compatibility for desirability). Given a set of desirable options
D and a coherent set of indifferent options I, we call D compatible with I if
D+ I ⊆D.
The idea behind this is that adding an indifferent option to a desirable one
should result in a desirable option. Since D ⊆ D+ I, due to Axiom I1, compat-
ibility of D and I is equivalent to D+ I = D: the set of indifferent gambles acts
as a neutral element with respect to the Minkowski addition.
The smallest such compatible coherent set of indifferent options is always
the trivial one, given by the null space I = {0}. The idea behind Definition 39
is that adding an indifferent option to a desirable option does not make it non-
desirable, or also, that adding a desirable option to an indifferent one makes it
desirable.
An immediate consequence of compatibility between a coherent set of de-
sirable options D and a coherent set of indifferent options I is that D ∩ I = ∅,
meaning that no option can be assessed as desirable—strictly preferred to the
zero option—and indifferent—equivalent to the zero option—at the same time.
To see this, if ex absurdo D∩ I ≠∅, then there would be some u in D such that
u ∈ I. But then, by Axiom I3, also −u ∈ I, so compatibility of D with I would
imply that u+(−u) = 0 ∈D, which contradicts Axiom D157.
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5.2 INDIFFERENCE AND QUOTIENT SPACES
In order to introduce indifference for choice functions, we build on a coherent
set of indifferent options I, as defined in Definition 38. Two options u and v are
considered to be indifferent to a subject whenever v−u is indifferent, or in other
words whenever v−u ∈ I. The underlying idea of our notion of indifference will
be that we identify indifferent options, and choose between equivalence classes
of indifferent options, rather than between single options. We formalise this
intuition below.
We collect all options that are indifferent to an option u ∈ V into the equiv-
alence class, or quotient class
[u] ∶= {v ∈ V ∶ v−u ∈ I} = {u}+ I.
We also denote the set [u] as u/I. Of course, [0] = {0}+ I = I is a linear sub-
space, and the [u] = {u}+ I are affine subspaces of V. The set of all these
equivalence classes is the quotient space
V/I ∶= {[u] ∶ u ∈ V} = {{u}+ I ∶ u ∈ V} = {u/I ∶ u ∈ V}.
This quotient space is a vector space under the vector addition, defined by
[u]+ [v] = {u}+ I+{v}+ I = {u+v}+ I = [u+v] for all u and v in V,
and the scalar multiplication, defined by
λ [u] = λ({u}+ I) = {λu}+ I = [λu], for all u in V and λ in R.
[0] = I is the additive identity of V/I.
That we identify indifferent options, and therefore express preferences be-
tween equivalence classes of indifferent options, essentially means that we de-
fine choice functions on Q(V/I). But in order to characterise coherence for
such choice functions, we need to introduce a convenient vector ordering onV/I that is appropriately related to the vector ordering on V; see Section 2.319.
For two elements [u] and [v] of V/I, we define
[u] ⪯ [v]⇔ (∃w ∈ I)u ⪯ v+w, (5.1)
and as usual, the strict variant of the vector ordering on V/I is characterised by
[u] ≺ [v]⇔ ([u] ⪯ [v] and [u] ≠ [v]) for all [u] and [v] in V/I.
We begin by showing that this is indeed a vector ordering:
Proposition 121. The ordering ⪯ on V/I is a vector ordering, and [u] ≺ [v]⇔(∃w ∈ I)u ≺ v+w for any u and v in V.
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Proof. For the first statement, we show that ⪯ is a partial order—meaning that it is
reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive—that satisfies the two characteristic Proper-
ties (2.1)10 and (2.2)10 of a vector ordering. To see that ⪯ is reflexive, use w = 0 in
Equation (5.1). For antisymmetry, consider any [u] and [v] in V/I such that [u] ⪯ [v]
and [v]⪯ [u], and therefore u⪯ v+w and v⪯ u+w′ for some w and w′ in I. This implies,
by repeatedly applying Equation (2.1)10 and the transitivity of the vector ordering onV that w+w′ ⪰ 0. Now, by Axiom I4176, w+w′ ∈ I, and therefore, by Axiom I2176,
w+w′ = 0, implying that u ⪯ v+w and v ⪯ u−w, and therefore also v+w ⪯ u. Hence in-
deed u = v+w and therefore [u] = [v], by the antisymmetry of the vector ordering on V.
For transitivity, consider any [u], [v] and [w] in V/I such that [u] ⪯ [v] and [v] ⪯ [w],
and therefore u ⪯ v+v′ and v ⪯ w+w′ for some v′ and w′ in I. Then v+v′ ⪯ w+w′+v′
by Equation (2.1)10, whence also u ⪯ w+w′ +v′ by the transitivity of the vector order-
ing on V. By coherence [Axiom I4176] also v′ +w′ ∈ I, whence indeed [u] ⪯ [w] by
Equation (5.1)↶.
Next, we prove that ⪯ satisfies Equations (2.1)10 and (2.2)10. Consider any [u1]
and [u2] in V/I such that [u1] ⪯ [u2], implying that u1 ⪯ u2 +u′2 for some u′2 ∈ I. For
Equation (2.1)10, consider any v in V, then also u1+v ⪯ u2+v+u′2, implying that indeed[u1]+ [v] ⪯ [u2]+ [v]. The converse implication follows analogously, by adding −v
rather than v. For Equation (2.2)10, consider any λ in R>0, then also λu1 ⪯ λu2 +λu′2,
implying that indeed λ [u1] ⪯ λ [u2] because λu′2 ∈ I by Axiom I3176. The converse
implication follows analogously, by multiplying with 1λ rather than λ .
We now turn to the second statement. For necessity, consider any u and v in V such
that [u] ≺ [v], so [u] ≠ [v] and u ⪯ v+w for some w in I. [u] ≠ [v] implies that u ≠ v+w
for all w in I. Taken together with u ⪯ v+w for some w, this implies that indeed u ≺ v+w
for some w. For sufficiency, consider any u and v in V such that u ≺ v+w for some w
in I. Assume ex absurdo that [u]⊀ [v], meaning that [u] = [v] or u⪯̸ v+w for all w
in I. The latter possibility is incompatible with the assumption that u ≺ v+w for some w
in I, leaving only the first possibility, which is equivalent to u = v+w′ for some w′ in I.
Then v+w′ ≺ v+w, implying that 0 ≺ w−w′ by Equation (2.1)10. This contradicts the
coherence of I [Axiom I2176] because w−w′ is an element of I by Axiom I4176.
We use the notation A/I ∶= {[u] ∶ u ∈ A} = {u/I ∶ u ∈ A} for the option set
of equivalence classes [u] associated with the options u in an option set A inQ(V). The map ⋅/I is an onto map from Q(V) to Q(V/I) that preserves set
inclusion: (∀A1,A2 ∈Q(V)))A1 ⊆ A2⇒ A1/I ⊆ A2/I. (5.2)
5.3 QUOTIENT SPACES AND SETS OF DESIRABLE OPTIONS
We use the quotient space V/I to prove interesting characterisations of indif-
ference for sets of desirable options.
Proposition 122. A set of desirable options D ⊆ V is compatible with a coher-
ent set of indifferent options I if and only if there is some (representing) set of
desirable options D′ ⊆ V/I such that D = {u ∶ [u] ∈ D′} =⋃D′. Moreover, the
representing set of desirable options is unique and given by D′ = D/I ∶= {[u] ∶
u ∈D}.
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Proof. For necessity, observe that
D+ I = {u+v ∶ u ∈ D and v ∈ I} =⋃{{u}+ I ∶ u ∈ D} =⋃{[u] ∶ u ∈ D} =⋃D/I,
and that compatibility with I guarantees that D + I = D. For sufficiency, assume that
there is some set of desirable options D′ ⊆ V/I such that D = {u ∶ [u] ∈ D′}. Consider
any u in D and any v in I = [0], then u+v ∈ [u]+[0] = [u+0] = [u], and therefore indeed
u+v ∈ D. Then also D/I = {[u] ∶ u ∈ D} = {[u] ∶ [u] ∈ D′} = D′.
This, together with the definition of compatibility, shows that the correspon-
dence between sets of desirable options on V and (their representing) sets of
desirable options on V/I is one-to-one and onto. It also preserves coherence.
Proposition 123. Consider any set of desirable options D ⊆ V that is com-
patible with a coherent set of indifferent options I, and its representing set of
desirable options D/I ⊆ V/I. Then D is coherent if and only if D/I is.
Proof. For the direct implication, assume that D ⊆ V is coherent. We show that D/I ={[u] ∶ u ∈ D} ⊆ V/I satisfies the Axioms D157–D457. For Axiom D157, assume ex
absurdo that [0] ∈ D/I, implying that u ∈ D for some u in [0] = I, but then u ∈ D∩ I and
hence D ∩ I is non-empty, a contradiction. For Axiom D257, consider any [u] in V/I
such that [0] ≺ [u], meaning that 0 ≺ u+w for some w in I. Then u+w ∈ D for some w
in I, by coherence of D [Axiom D257], implying that indeed [u] = [u]+ I = [u]+ [w] =[u+w] ∈ D/I. For Axiom D357, assume that [u] ∈ D/I, and consider any λ in R>0.
Then u ∈ D, implying that λu ∈ D by coherence of D [Axiom D357], whence indeed
λ [u] = [λu] ∈ D/I. For Axiom D457, assume that [u] and [v] belong to D/I, implying
that u and v belong to D. Then u+ v ∈ D by coherence of D [Axiom D457], whence
indeed [u]+ [v] = [u+v] ∈ D/I.
For the converse implication, assume that D/I ⊆ V/I is coherent. We show that D ={u ∶ [u] ∈ D/I} ⊆ V satisfies the Axioms D157–D457. For Axiom D157, infer that 0 ∉ D
since [0] ∉ D/I by coherence of D/I [Axiom D157]. For Axiom D257, consider any u
in V such that 0 ≺ u. Then [0] ≺ [u] by taking for example w = 0 in Proposition 121,
implying that [u] ∈ D/I by coherence of D/I [Axiom D257], whence indeed u ∈ D. For
Axiom D357, assume that u ∈ D, and consider any λ in R>0. Then [u] ∈ D/I, implying
that λ [u] = [λu] ∈ D/I by coherence of D/I [Axiom D357], whence indeed λu ∈ D.
For Axiom D457, assume that u and v belong to D, implying that [u] and [v] belong
to D/I. Then [u]+ [v] ∈ D/I by coherence of D/I [Axiom D457], implying that indeed
u+v ∈ D.
5.4 QUOTIENT SPACES AND CHOICE FUNCTIONS
The discussion above inspires us to combine indifference with choice func-
tions in the following manner: given a coherent set of indifferent options I, we
say that a choice function is compatible with it when it is determined by its
restriction to the quotient space that I induces.
Definition 40 (Compatibility for choice models). We call a choice function
C on V compatible with a coherent set of indifferent options I if there is some
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representing choice function C′ on V/I such that C(A) = {u ∈A ∶ [u] ∈C′(A/I)}
for all A in Q(V).
Compatibility with a set of indifferent options can be defined in terms of re-
jection functions and choice relations as well. We call a rejection function R
on V compatible with I if there is a representing rejection function R′ on V/I
such that R(A) = {u ∈ A ∶ [u] ∈ R′(A/I)} for all A in Q(V). Similarly, we call
a choice relation ⊲ on V compatible with I if there is some representing choice
relation ⊲′ on V/I such that A1 ⊲ A2⇔ A1/I ⊲′ A2/I for all A1 and A2 inQ(V).
Proposition 124. Consider any coherent set of indifferent options I ⊆ V, and
any corresponding choice function C, rejection function R and choice relation⊲ on V. Then the following three statements are equivalent:
(i) C is compatible with I;
(ii) R is compatible with I;
(iii) ⊲ is compatible with I.
Proof. We will prove the following circular chain of implications: (i)⇒(ii)⇒(iii)⇒(i).
To show that (i) implies (ii), because C and R correspond, note that R(A) = A ∖
C(A) for all A in Q(V). Consider any A in Q(V). Assume that C is compatible with
I, so C(A) = {u ∈ A ∶ [u] ∈C′(A/I)} for some choice function C′ on V/I, and therefore
R(A) = {u ∈ A ∶ [u] ∉C′(A/I)}. If we let R′ be rejection function on V/I corresponding
to C′, then R(A) = {u ∈ A ∶ [u] ∉ R′(A/I)}, whence R is indeed compatible with I, with
representing rejection function R′.
To show that (ii) implies (iii), because R and ⊲ correspond, note that A1 ⊲ A2 ⇔
A1 ⊆ R(A1∪A2) for all A1 and A2 inQ(V). Consider any A1 and A2 inQ(V). Assume
that R is compatible with I, so R(A1∪A2) = {u ∈A1∪A2 ∶ [u] ∈R′((A1∪A2)/I)} = {u ∈
A1∪A2 ∶ [u] ∈ R′(A1/I∪A2/I)} for some rejection function R′ on V/I. Infer that then
A1 ⊲ A2⇔ A1 ⊆ {u ∈ A1∪A2 ∶ [u] ∈ R′(A1/I∪A2/I)}⇔ (∀u ∈ A1)[u] ∈ R′(A1/I∪A2/I)⇔ A1/I ⊆ R′(A1/I∪A2/I)⇔ A1/I ⊲′ A2/I
where we let ⊲′ ∶= ⊲R′ be the choice relation on V/I corresponding to R′. Therefore ⊲
is indeed compatible with I, with representing choice relation ⊲′.
Finally, to show that (iii) implies (i), because ⊲ and C correspond, note that C(A) =
A ∖⋃{A′ ⊆ A ∶ A′ ⊲ A} for all A in Q(V). Assume that ⊲ is compatible with I, so
there is some ⊲′ on V/I such that A1 ⊲ A2 ⇔ A1/I ⊲′ A2/I for all A1 and A2 in Q(V).
Consider any A in Q(V) and any u in A. Infer that then
u ∈C(A)⇔ u ∈ A and u ∉⋃{A′ ⊆ A ∶ A′/I ⊲′ A/I}⇔ u ∈ A and [u] ∉⋃{A˜ ⊆ A/I ∶ A˜ ⊲′ A/I}⇔ u ∈ A and [u] ∈ A/I∖⋃{A˜ ⊆ A/I ∶ A˜ ⊲′ A/I}⇔ u ∈ A and [u] ∈C′(A/I),
where we let C′ ∶=C⊲′ be the choice function on V/I corresponding to C′. Therefore C
is indeed compatible with I, with representing choice function C′.
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Definition 40179 allows for characterisations that are similar to the ones for
desirability in Propositions 122178 and 123179. If a choice function on V is
compatible with I then the representing choice function on V/I is necessarily
unique, and we denote it by C/I:
Proposition 125. For any choice function C on V that is compatible with some
coherent set of indifferent options I, the unique representing choice function
C/I on V/I is given by C/I(A/I) ∶=C(A)/I for all A in Q(V). Hence also
C(A) = A∩(⋃C/I(A/I)) for all A in Q(V).
Proof. Let C′ be any representing choice function, and consider any A in Q(V), then
C(A)/I = {[u] ∶ u ∈C(A)} = {[u] ∶ u ∈A,[u] ∈C′(A/I)} =A/I∩C′(A/I) =C′(A/I).
Similarly, the unique representing rejection function R/I on V/I of a rejection
function R on V that is compatible with I, is given by R/I(A/I) ∶= R(A)/I for
all A in Q(V), and the unique representing choice relation ⊲/I on V/I of a
choice relation ⊲ on V that is compatible with I, is (trivially) given by
A1/I(⊲/I)A2/I⇔ A1 ⊲ A2, for all A1 and A2 in Q(V).
Proposition 126. Consider any coherent set of indifferent options I ⊆ V, and
any choice function C on V compatible with I, any rejection function R on V
compatible with I, and any choice relation ⊲ on V compatible with I. Then the
following two statements are equivalent:
(i) C, R and ⊲ correspond;
(ii) C/I, R/I and ⊲/I correspond.
Proof. That (i) implies (ii), follows from the proof of Proposition 124, so it suffices
to show that (ii) implies (i). Consider any choice function C, rejection function R
and choice relation ⊲ on V, all compatible with I, and assume that C/I, R/I and ⊲/I
correspond. We will show that then C, R and ⊲ correspond; by the discussion in Sec-
tion 2.2.215 it suffices to show that R⊲ = RC = R. To prove that RC = R, consider any A
in Q(V) and any u in V, and infer the following chain of equivalences:
u ∈C(A)⇔ u ∈ A and [u] ∈C/I(A/I) by Proposition 125⇔ u ∈ A and [u] ∉ R/I(A/I) because C/I and R/I correspond⇔ u ∈ A and u ∉ R(A) by the compatibility of R with I⇔ u ∈ A∖R(A).
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To prove that R⊲ = R, consider any A in Q(V) and any u in V, and infer the following
chain of equivalences:
u ∈ R⊲(A)⇔ u ∈⋃{A′ ⊆ A ∶ A′ ⊲ A} by Definition 517⇔ (∃A′ ⊆ A)u ∈ A′ and A′ ⊲ A⇔ u ∈ A and {u} ⊲ A by Definition 315⇔ u ∈ A and {[u]}⊲/I A/I by the compatibility of ⊲ with I⇔ u ∈ A and [u] ∈ R/I(A/I) because R/I and ⊲/I correspond⇔ u ∈ R(A) by the compatibility of R with I.
Proposition 125↶, together with the definition of compatibility, shows that
the correspondence between choice functions on V and (their representing)
choice functions on V/I is one-to-one and onto. It also preserves coherence:
Proposition 127. Consider any choice function C on V that is compatible with
a coherent set of indifferent options I, and its representing choice function C/I
on V/I. Then C is coherent if and only if C/I is.
Before we prove Proposition 127, it will be useful to first establish four tech-
nical lemmas about equivalence classes.
Lemma 128. Consider any two option sets A1 in A2 in Q(V), then A2/I ∖
A1/I ⊆ (A2∖A1)/I.
Proof. Consider any u˜ in A2/I∖A1/I, then u˜ = [v2] for some v2 in A2 and u˜ ≠ [v1] for
all v1 in A1, implying that indeed u˜ = [v2] for some v2 in A2∖A1.
Lemma 129. Consider any choice function C on V that is compatible with a
coherent set of indifferent options I, and any option sets A1 and A2 in Q(V)
such that A1 ⊆ A2. Then A1∩C(A2) =∅⇔ A1/I∩C/I(A2/I) =∅.
Proof. First, assume that A1∩C(A2)≠∅, and consider any v in A1∩C(A2). Then [v] ∈
A1/I and [v] ∈C(A2)/I =C/I(A2/I), by Proposition 125↶, so A1/I∩C/I(A2/I) ≠ ∅.
Conversely, assume that A1/I∩C/I(A2/I) ≠∅, and consider any u˜ in A1/I∩C/I(A2/I).
Then there is some v in A1 such that u˜ = [v], and we infer from Proposition 125↶ that
u˜ ∈C(A2)/I, so also v ∈C(A2).
Lemma 130. Consider any rejection function R on V that is compatible with
a coherent set of indifferent options I, and any option sets A1 and A2 in Q(V)
such that A1 ⊆ A2. Then A1 ⊆ R(A2)⇔ A1/I ⊆ R/I(A2/I).
Proof. This follows at once from Lemma 129, taking into account that C and R corre-
spond if and only if C/I and R/I do.
Lemma 131. For all A˜ inQ(V/I), there is some A inQ(V) such that A/I = A˜.
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Proof. For every element u˜ in the finite set A˜, we consider some vector u in V such
that [u] = u˜ [this is always possible since V/I = {[u] ∶ u ∈ V}], and collect these options
in the option set A. Then A belongs to Q(V) because it is a finite subset of V, and
A/I = {[u] ∶ u ∈ A} = A˜.
Proof of Proposition 127. For the direct implication, assume that C is coherent. We
show that C/I satisfies Axioms C120–C4b20.
For Axiom C120, assume ex absurdo that C/I(A˜) =∅ for some A˜ inQ(V/I). Con-
sider any option set A in Q(V) such that A/I = A˜ [there always is such an A, due to
Lemma 131], then C(A) = {u ∈ A ∶ [u] ∈C/I(A˜)} = {u ∈ A ∶ [u] ∈∅} =∅, contradicting
the coherence of C [Axiom C120].
For Axiom C220, consider any [u] and [v] in V/I such that [u] ≺ [v], meaning that
u ≺ v+w for some w in I, by Proposition 121177. Then u ∉C({u,v+w}) by coherence
of C [Axiom C220], and therefore indeed [u] ∉C/I({[u],[v+w]}) =C/I({[u],[v]}),
where the equality holds because w belongs to I.
Axioms C3a20 and C3b20 are more easy to establish in their form of Axioms R3a20
and R3b20, so we consider the rejection function R corresponding to C, which, by
Proposition 124180 is compatible with I. By Proposition 126181 therefore R/I is the
rejection function corresponding to C/I, so it suffices to prove that R/I satisfies Ax-
ioms R3a20 and R3b20.
For Axiom R3a20, consider any A˜1, A˜2 and A˜ inQ(V/I) such that A˜1 ⊆R/I(A˜2) and
A˜2 ⊆ A˜. Consider any option set A inQ(V) such that A/I = A˜, and define the option sets
A2 ∶= {u ∈ A ∶ [u] ∈ A˜2} ∈Q(V) and A1 ∶= {u ∈ A2 ∶ [u] ∈ A˜1} ∈Q(V). Then A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ A,
A2/I = {[v] ∶ v ∈ A2} = {[v] ∶ v ∈ A and [v] ∈ A˜2} = A/I∩{[v] ∶ [v] ∈ A˜2} = A˜ ∩ A˜2 = A˜2
and, similarly, A1/I = {[v] ∶ v ∈A2 and [v] ∈ A˜1}=A2/I∩A˜1 = A˜2∩A˜1 = A˜1, and therefore
A1/I ⊆ R/I(A2/I). Since A1 ⊆ A2, by Lemma 130 therefore A1 ⊆ R(A2). We conclude
from the coherence of R [Axiom R3a20] that A1 ⊆ R(A), whence A1/I ⊆ R(A)/I =
R/I(A/I). Because A˜ = A/I and A˜1 = A1/I, therefore indeed A˜1 ⊆ R/I(A˜).
For Axiom R3b20, consider any A˜1, A˜2 and A˜ in Q(V/I) such that A˜1 ⊆ R/I(A˜2)
and A˜ ⊆ A˜1. Consider any option set A2 in Q(V) such that A2/I = A˜2, and define the
option sets A1 ∶= {u ∈ A2 ∶ [u] ∈ A˜1} ∈Q(V) and A ∶= {u ∈ A1 ∶ [u] ∈ A˜} ∈Q(V). Then
A ⊆ A1 ⊆ A2, and, similarly as above, A1/I = {[v] ∶ v ∈ A2 and [v] ∈ A˜1} = A2/I∩{[v] ∶[v] ∈ A˜1} = A˜2 ∩ A˜1 = A˜1 and A/I = {[v] ∶ v ∈ A1 and [v] ∈ A˜} = A1/I∩ A˜ = A˜1 ∩ A˜ = A˜,
and therefore A1/I ⊆ R/I(A2/I). Since A1 ⊆ A2, by Lemma 130 therefore A1 ⊆ R(A2).
We conclude from the coherence of R [Axiom R3b20] that A1∖A ⊆ R(A2∖A), whence(A1∖A)/I ⊆ R(A2∖A)/I. By Lemma 128 therefore A1/I ∖A/I ⊆ R(A2∖A)/I, and,
using the compatibility of R with I, we find that then A1/I∖A/I ⊆ R/I((A2∖A)/I). We
now prove that (A2∖A)/I = A2/I∖A/I.
That (A2∖A)/I ⊇ A2/I ∖A/I follows from Lemma 128. To show that (A2∖A)/I ⊆
A2/I ∖A/I, consider any u˜ in (A2∖A)/I, meaning that u˜ = [v] for some v in A2 ∖A.
This implies already that u˜ ∈ A2/I. Assume ex absurdo that u˜ ∈ A/I = A˜. Since [v] = u˜,
therefore [v] ∈ A˜, whence v ∈ {u ∈ A2 ∶ [u] ∈ A˜} ⊆ {u ∈ A2 ∶ [u] ∈ A˜1} = A1, and since
we already know that v ∈ A2 ∖A, therefore v ∈ A1 ∩ (A2 ∖A) = A1 ∖A. This implies
that u˜ ∈ (A1∖A)/I, so u˜ = [w] for some w in A1 ∖A. Since u˜ ∈ A˜, therefore [w] ∈ A˜,
whence w ∈ {u ∈ A1 ∶ [u] ∈ A˜} = A, a contradiction with w ∈ A1 ∖A. So we conclude
that (A2∖A)/I = A2/I∖A/I, whence A1/I∖A/I ⊆ R/I(A2/I∖A/I). Because A˜ = A/I,
A˜1 = A1/I and A˜2 = A2/I, therefore indeed A˜1∖ A˜ ⊆ R/I(A˜2∖ A˜).
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For Axioms C4a20 and C4b20, consider any A˜1 and A˜2 in Q(V/I) such that A˜1 ⊆
C/I(A˜2), and consider any λ in R>0 and u˜ in V/I. Consider any option set A2 inQ(V)
such that A2/I = A˜2, let A1 ∶= {u ∈ A2 ∶ [u] ∈ A˜1} ∈Q(V), and consider any u in V such
that [u] = u˜. We first prove that then A1 ⊆C(A2). Indeed, consider any v ∈ A1, meaning
that v ∈ A2 and [v] ∈ A˜1, and therefore also [v] ∈ C/I(A˜2). Proposition 125181 then
guarantees that indeed u ∈C(A2). We now infer from the coherence of C [Axioms C4a20
and C4b20] that λA1 ⊆ C(λA2) and A1 + {u} ⊆ C(A2 + {u}). Hence indeed λ A˜1 =
λA1/I = (λA1)/I ⊆ C/I((λA2)/I) = C/I(λA2/I) = C/I(λ A˜2) and A˜1 + {u˜} = A1/I +{[u]} = (A1+{u})/I ⊆C/I((A2+{u})/I) =C/I(A2/I+{u˜}) =C/I(A˜2 +{u˜}), where
the inclusions follow from Equation (5.2)178 and Proposition 125181.
For the converse implication, assume that C/I is coherent. We show that C satisfies
Axioms C120–C4b20.
For Axiom C120, consider any A in Q(V) and assume ex absurdo that C(A) = ∅.
Then it follows from Proposition 125181 that C/I(A/I) = C(A)/I = ∅/I = ∅, which
contradicts the coherence of C/I [Axiom C120].
For Axiom C220, consider any u and v in V such that u ≺ v. Then [u] ≺ [v] by
letting for example w = 0 in Proposition 121177. The coherence of C/I [Axiom C220]
then guarantees that [u] ∉ C/I({[u],[v]}), implying that u ∉ C({u,v}), by Proposi-
tion 125181.
Axioms C3a20 and C3b20 are more easy to establish in their form of Axioms R3a20
and R3b20, so we consider the rejection function R/I corresponding to C/I, and let, as
usual, R be given by R(A) ∶= {u ∈ A ∶ [u] ∈ R/I(A/I)} for all A in Q(V). Then R is
compatible with I, and, by Proposition 126181 it is the rejection function corresponding
to C/I, so it suffices to prove that R satisfies Axioms R3a20 and R3b20.
For Axiom R3a20, consider any option sets A, A1 and A2 in Q(V) such that A2 ⊆
A and A1 ⊆ R(A2). Lemma 130182 then guarantees that A1/I ⊆ R/I(A2/I). Because
A2 ⊆ A, we have by Equation (5.2)178 that A2/I ⊆ A/I, whence A1/I ⊆ R/I(A/I) by
the coherence of R/I [Axiom R3a20]. Using Lemma 130182 again, we infer that then
indeed A1 ⊆ R(A).
For Axiom R3b20, consider any option sets A, A1 and A2 inQ(V) such that A ⊆ A1
and A1 ⊆ R(A2). Let
A1 ∶= {u ∈ A2 ∶ [u] ∈ A1/I} ⊇ A1 and Aˇ ∶= {u ∈ A1 ∶ [u]∩A1 ⊆ A},
then A1/I =A1/I. Because R is compatible with I, we infer from Lemma 130182 that the
statements A1 ⊆ R(A2), A1 ⊆ R(A2) and A1/I ⊆ R/I(A2/I) are equivalent, and therefore
all hold. Observe that also Aˇ ⊆ A1 ⊆ A2, implying that Aˇ/I ⊆ A1/I ⊆ A2/I by Equa-
tion (5.2)178. That Aˇ/I ⊆ A1/I and A1/I ⊆ R/I(A2/I) implies, together with the coher-
ence of R/I [Axiom R3b20], that A1/I∖ Aˇ/I ⊆ R/I(A2/I∖ Aˇ/I).
We now prove that A2/I ∖ Aˇ/I ⊆ (A2∖A)/I. Consider any u˜ in A2/I ∖ Aˇ/I, and
assume ex absurdo that u˜ ∉ (A2∖A)/I, or in other words, that (∀w ∈ A2)(w ∉ A⇒ u˜ ≠[w]), or equivalently, (∀w ∈ A2)(u˜ = [w]⇒ w ∈ A). This implies that u˜∩A2 ⊆ A, from
which we infer on the one hand that u˜∩A1 ⊆ A since A1 ⊆ A2. On the other hand, we
infer that (u˜∩A2)/I ⊆ A/I by Equation (5.2)178, whence u˜ ∈ A/I because u˜ ∈ A2/I by
assumption, and therefore also u˜ ∈ A1/I = A1/I. Both observations together imply that
u˜ ∈ Aˇ/I, a contradiction with u˜ ∈ A2/I∖ Aˇ/I. Therefore indeed A2/I∖ Aˇ/I ⊆ (A2∖A)/I,
so coherence of R/I [Axiom R3a20; with A˜ ∶= (A2∖A)/I, A˜1 ∶= A1/I ∖ Aˇ/I and A˜2 ∶=
A2/I∖ Aˇ/I] now implies that A1/I∖ Aˇ/I ⊆ R/I((A2∖A)/I).
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We next prove that (A1∖A)/I ⊆A1/I∖Aˇ/I. Consider any u˜ in (A1∖A)/I, so u˜= [v]
for some v in A1 ∖A. This already implies that u˜ ∈ A1/I. Assume ex absurdo that
u˜ ∉ A1/I∖ Aˇ/I, so u˜ ∈ Aˇ/I, whence u˜∩A1 ⊆ A. But we know that v ∈ A1 and v ∈ u˜, so
v ∈ A, a contradiction. We conclude form all this that (A1∖A)/I ⊆ R/I((A2∖A)/I),
whence by Lemma 130182, indeed A1∖A ⊆ R(A2∖A).
For Axioms C4a20 and C4b20, consider any A1 and A2 in Q(V) such that
A1 ⊆ C(A2), and consider any λ in R>0 and u in V. Then A1/I ⊆ C/I(A2/I)
by Equation (5.2)178 and Proposition 125181, implying that (λA1)/I = λA1/I ⊆
C/I(λA2/I) = C/I((λA2)/I) and (A1+{u})/I = A1/I + {[u]} ⊆ C/I(A2/I + {[u]}) =
C/I((A2+{u})/I), where the inclusions follow from the coherence of C/I [Ax-
ioms C4a20 and C4b20 respectively]. This then implies that indeed λA1 ⊆ C(λA2)
and A1+{u} ⊆C(A2+{u}).
To conclude this general discussion of indifference for choice functions,
we mention that it is closed under arbitrary infima, which enables conserva-
tive inference under indifference: we can consider the least informative choice
function that is compatible with some assessments and is still compatible with
a given coherent set of indifferent options.
Proposition 132. Consider any coherent set of indifferent options I, and any
non-empty collection of coherent choice functions {Ci ∶ i ∈ I} that are compati-
ble with I, then its coherent infimum inf{Ci ∶ i ∈ I} is compatible with I as well,
and C/I = inf{Ci/I ∶ i ∈ I}.
Proof. Let us denote C ∶= inf{Ci ∶ i ∈ I}, then C is a coherent choice function by Propo-
sition 4048. We show that it is compatible with I. By assumption, and using Proposi-
tion 125181, we have for all i in I that
Ci(A) = {u ∈ A ∶ [u] ∈Ci/I(A/I)} for all A ∈Q(V).
Hence, for all A ∈Q(V):
C(A) =⋃
i∈ICi(A) =⋃i∈I{u ∈ A ∶ [u] ∈Ci/I(A/I)}= {u ∈ A ∶ (∃i ∈ I)[u] ∈Ci/I(A/I)}= {u ∈ A ∶ [u] ∈⋃
i∈ICi/I(A/I)}= {u ∈ A ∶ [u] ∈ (inf{Ci/I ∶ i ∈ I})(A/I)},
and the stated result now follows from Propositions 4048 and 125181.
In particular, the least informative coherent choice function C that is compat-
ible with a coherent set of indifferent options I corresponds to the case where
the associated choice function C/I on the quotient space V/I is the vacuous one
Cv, meaning that
C(A) = {u ∈ A ∶ [u] ∈Cv(A/I)} = {u ∈ A ∶ (∀v ∈ A)[u]⊀ [v]} = A∩maxA/I
for all A in Q(V).
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5.5 THE RELATION WITH OTHER DEFINITIONS OF INDIFFER-
ENCE
Seidenfeld [63] has a rather different approach to combining a notion of in-
difference with choice functions. After making the necessary translation (see
Section 2.428) from horse lotteries to (abstract) options, it can be summarised
as follows. Rather than, as we have done above, starting out with a notion of
indifference and then looking at which choice functions are compatible with
it, they start from a given choice function C, and associate a binary relation ≈C
on V with it as follows:
u ≈C v⇔ (∀A ∈Q)({u,v} ⊆ A⇒ (u ∈C(A)⇔ v ∈C(A))) for all u and v in V.
(5.3)
The idea behind this definition is that two options are considered to be re-
lated if both options are either chosen or rejected together, whenever both are
available. This relation has the following interesting properties, which are in-
strumental in elucidating the relationship between Seidenfeld’s approach and
ours:
Proposition 133. Let C be a coherent choice function. Then ≈C is an equiva-
lence relation that furthermore satisfies
(i) u ≈C v⇒ u+w ≈C v+w;
(ii) u ≈C v⇒ λu ≈C λv,
for all u, v and w in V, and all λ in R. As a consequence, the set IC ∶= {u ∈ V ∶
u ≈C 0} is a coherent set of indifferent options.
Proof. We first prove that ≈C is an equivalence relation. The reflexivity and symmetry
are an immediate consequence of its definition (5.3). To prove transitivity, consider any
u, v and w in V and assume that u ≈C v and v ≈C w. Consider any A in Q and assume
that {u,w} ⊆ A and u ∈ C(A). It suffices to prove that then also w ∈ C(A). Assume
ex absurdo that w ∉C(A), then we infer from Axiom C3a20 that also w ∉C(A ∪{v}).
Since v ≈C w, we infer from Equation (5.3) that then v ∉C(A∪{v}), and similarly, since
u ≈C v, that u ∉C(A∪{v}), so {u,v} ⊆ (A∪{v})∖C(A∪{v}). Axiom C3b20 then tells
us that u ∉C(A), a contradiction.
To prove (i), assume that u ≈C v, and consider any A ∈Q such that {u+w,v+w} ⊆A
and u+w ∈ C(A). Then it suffices to prove that also v+w ∈ C(A). It follows from
u+w ∈ C(A) and Axiom C4b20 that u ∈ C(A − {w}). Since u ≈C v, we infer from
Equation (5.3) that then also v ∈C(A −{w}), whence, again by Axiom C4b20, indeed
v+w ∈C(A).
To prove (ii), assume that u ≈C v. We first prove that then also −u ≈C −v. Indeed, by
applying (i) with w ∶=−u−v, we find that −v ≈C −u. Now use the symmetry of ≈C . Next,
consider any A ∈Q such that {λu,λv} ⊆ A and λu ∈C(A). Then it suffices to prove
that also λv ∈C(A). The proof is trivial if λ = 0. Because we have just proved that
both u ≈C v and −u ≈C −v, we may now assume without loss of generality that λ > 0.
It follows from λu ∈C(A) and Axiom C4a20 that u ∈C( 1λ A). Since u ≈C v, we infer
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from Equation (5.3) that then also v ∈C( 1λ A), whence, again by Axiom C4a20, indeed
λv ∈C(A).
We complete the proof by showing that IC is a coherent set of indifferent options. To
prove I1176, simply observe that 0 ≈C 0 by reflexivity of ≈C . To prove I2176, it suffices
to consider any u ∈ V≻0, due to (ii). It follows from Axiom C220 that 0 ∉C({0,u}) and,
using Axiom C120, that also u ∈C({0,u}), so we infer from Equation (5.3) that 0 /≈C u,
whence indeed u ∉ IC . To prove I3176, simply use (ii). To prove I4176, simply use (i)
and the transitivity of ≈C .
The coherent set of indifferent options IC turns out to be the largest that C is
compatible with:
Proposition 134. Consider any coherent set of indifferent options I and any
coherent choice function C on V. Then C is compatible with I if and only if I
is a linear subspace of IC .
Proof. Recall that I is a linear space, by Definition 38176. For necessity, assume that
C is compatible with I, and hence
(∀A ∈Q)C(A) = {u ∈ A ∶ [u] ∈C(A)/I}.
We need to prove that I ⊆ IC , so consider any u in I and any A ⊇ {0,u} in Q such that
u ∈C(A) [There always is such an A, for instance A ∶= {0,u}, because u ∈ I and therefore[u] ∈C/I({[u]}) =C/I({0,u}/I) =C({0,u})/I, by compatibility]. Then [u] ∈C(A)/I
and because [u] = [0], we find that [0] ∈C(A)/I, so 0 ∈C(A). Hence indeed u ≈C 0, by
Equation (5.3).
For sufficiency, assume that I is a linear subspace of IC , so I ⊆ IC , then we need to
prove that C is compatible with I. In other words, if we consider any A in Q and any
u ∈ A such that [u] ∈C(A)/I, then we must prove that u ∈C(A). [u] ∈C(A)/I means
that there is some v ∈C(A) such that u− v ∈ I, and therefore, by assumption, u ≈C v.
Since {u,v} ⊆ A and v ∈C(A), we infer from Equation (5.3) that indeed u ∈C(A).
It follows that if C is compatible with I, then C is automatically also compatible
with any subspace of I, and that the largest linear subspace that C is compati-
ble with, is IC . Also, this proposition shows that the smallest set of indifferent
option that is compatible with C, is given by I = {0}, and that this coherent set
of indifferent options is compatible with any coherent choice function. Sei-
denfeld’s approach starts from a choice function, and identifies the coarsest
equivalence—or indifference—relation that is compatible with it. Though we
have seen that it is related, our approach, because it starts out with an indif-
ference relation, goes the other way around, is more constructive, and is better
suited for studying which choice functions are compatible with a given indif-
ference relation, and therefore also for performing conservative inference for
choice functions under indifference. We will come back to this idea in Sec-
tions 5.7190, 5.8191 and 5.9193.
Proposition 134 also shows that our approach is closely connected to
Bradley’s [9, Section 2]: for him, for a choice function to ‘satisfy’—in our
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words: to ‘be compatible with’—an equivalence relation, it must be finer than
Seidenfeld’s ≈C .
Finally, note that a relation analogous to Equation (5.3)186 can be estab-
lished for coherent sets of desirable options D: we simply define u ≈D v⇔
u ≈CD v for all u and v in V. Then
u ≈D v⇔ (∀A ∈Q)({u,v} ⊆ A⇒ (0 ∈CD(A−{u})⇔ 0 ∈CD(A−{v})))⇔ (∀A ∈Q)({u,v} ⊆ A⇒ (A−{u}∩D ≠∅⇔ A−{v}∩D ≠∅))
for all u and v in V, using Axiom C4b20 for the first equivalence and Propo-
sition 5564 for the second one. Because we have defined it as a special ≈C ,
the binary relation ≈D is by Proposition 133186 an equivalence relation, and
ID ∶= {u ∈ V ∶ 0 ≈D u} is a coherent set of indifferent options. As we will see in
Lemma 135, ≈D can be more elegantly represented as:
u ≈D v⇔D+{u} =D+{v}, for all u and v in V.
Lemma 135. Consider any coherent set of desirable options D. Then
(∀A ∈Q)({u,v} ⊆ A⇒ (A−{u}∩D ≠∅⇔ A−{v}∩D ≠∅))⇔D+{u} =D+{v}
for all u and v in V.
Proof. Consider any u and v in V.
For the direct implication, assume that the left-hand side holds. We first prove that
this implies that both u− v ∉ D and v− u ∉ D. Indeed, consider the left-hand side for
the particular choice A ∶= {u,v}, leading to {0,v−u}∩D ≠ ∅⇔ {0,u− v}∩D ≠ ∅, or
equivalently, v−u ∈ D ⇔ u− v ∈ D, because 0 ∉ D by Axiom D157. So, if we had that
u− v ∈ D or v− u ∈ D, this would imply that both u− v and v− u would elements of
D, and therefore also their sum 0 = u− v+ v−u ∈ D by Axiom D457. This contradicts
Axiom D157.
Next, consider any w in V, and consider the left-hand side for the particular choice
A ∶= {u,v,w}. Then A ⊇ {u,v} and therefore A−{u}∩D ≠∅⇔ A−{v}∩D ≠∅, which
can rewritten as {0,v− u,w− u}∩D ≠ ∅⇔ {u− v,0,w− v}∩D ≠ ∅. But 0 ∉ D by
Axiom D157, whence {v−u,w−u}∩D ≠ ∅⇔ {u− v,w− v}∩D ≠ ∅. Since we have
seen above that neither u−v ∈D nor v−u ∈D, this can in turn be rewritten as w−u ∉D⇔
w− v ∉ D. Because the choice of w in V was arbitrary, this tells us that w ∈ D +{u}⇔
w ∈ D+{v} for all w in V, and therefore indeed D+{u} = D+{v}.
For the converse implication, assume that D + {u} = D + {v}. This immediately
allows us to infer that u− v ∉ D and v−u ∉ D. Consider any A ⊇ {u,v}. If A = {u,v}
then A −{u}∩D = ∅ and A −{v}∩D = ∅, and the proof is done. Let n ∶= ∣A∣−2 and
assume therefore that n ≥ 1. Label the elements of A ∖{u,v} as w1, . . . , wn, without
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loss of generality. Then A = {u,v,w1, . . . ,wn}. Infer the following equivalences:
A−{u}∩D ≠∅⇔ {0,v−u,w1−u, . . . ,wn−u}∩D ≠∅⇔ {w1−u, . . . ,wn−u}∩D ≠∅⇔ (∃i ∈ {1, . . . ,n})wi−u ∈ D⇔ (∃i ∈ {1, . . . ,n})wi ∈ D+{u} = D+{v}⇔ (∃i ∈ {1, . . . ,n})wi−v ∈ D⇔ A−{v}∩D ≠∅,
where the second equivalence follows from the fact that 0 ∉ D [by Axiom D157] and
our earlier observation that v−u ∉ D.
5.6 THE RELATION WITH DESIRABILITY
There is an interesting relationship between the coherent choice functions and
the coherent sets of desirable options that are compatible with a fixed coherent
set of indifferent options.
Proposition 136. Consider any coherent set of indifferent options I.
(i) If C is any coherent choice function compatible with I, then the corre-
sponding coherent set of desirable options DC is also compatible with I,
and DC/I =DC/I .
(ii) If D is any coherent set of desirable options compatible with I, then the
corresponding coherent choice function CD is also compatible with I,
and CD/I =CD/I .
Proof. We begin with the first statement. Consider any coherent choice function C that
is compatible with I. We must prove that DC + I ⊆ DC . Observe that for any w in V:
w ∈ DC ⇔ 0 ∉C({0,w})⇔ [0] ∉C/I({[0],[w]})⇔ [w] ∈ DC/I , (5.4)
where the first equivalence follows from Proposition 5361 and the second from the
compatibility of C with I. So, consider any v in DC and any u in I, then [0] ∉
C/I({[0],[v]}) and [u] = [0] = I, implying that [v+u] = [v]+ [u] = [v], and therefore[0] ∉C/I({[0],[v+u]}), implying that indeed v+u ∈ DC . The last statement follows
directly from Equation (5.4).
We turn now towards the second statement. Consider any coherent set of indifferent
options I and any coherent set of desirable options D such that D+I ⊆D. We must prove
that CD(A) = {u ∈ A ∶ [u] ∈CD/I(A/I)} for all A in Q(V). Due to Proposition 5462,
we know that CD(A) = {u ∈ A ∶ (∀v ∈ A)v− u ∉ D} for all A in Q(V), whence, by
Proposition 122178,
CD(A) = {u ∈ A ∶ (∀v ∈ A)[v]− [u] ∉ {[w] ∶ w ∈ D}}= {u ∈ A ∶ (∀v ∈ A)[v]− [u] ∉ D/I}= {u ∈ A ∶ (∀[v] ∈ A/I)[v]− [u] ∉ D/I} = {u ∈ A ∶ [u] ∈CD/I(A/I)},
for all A in Q(V), because CD/I(A/I) = {u˜ ∈ A/I ∶ (∀v˜ ∈ A/I)v˜− u˜ ∉ D/I} for all A/I inQ(V/I). That CD/I =CD/I now follows from Proposition 125181.
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This correspondence allows us to show an equivalent result of Proposi-
tion 134187 for desirability:
Corollary 137. Consider any coherent set of indifferent options I and any
coherent set of desirable options D ⊆ V. Then D is compatible with I if and
only if I is a linear subspace of ID .
Proof. First, note that ID = {u ∈ V ∶ 0 ≈D u} = {u ∈ V ∶ 0 ≈CD u} = ICD , and that Propo-
sition 134187 implies that CD is compatible with I if and only if I ⊆ ICD . So it suffices
to show that CD is compatible with I if and only if D is compatible with I. For neces-
sity, assume that CD is compatible with I. Use Proposition 136↶(i) to infer that DCD is
compatible with I, and Proposition 5866 that DCD = D, whence indeed D is compatible
with I. For sufficiency, assume that D is compatible with I. Use Proposition 136↶(ii)
to infer that then indeed CD is compatible with I.
5.7 EXAMPLE: FAIR COINS
To exhibit the power and simplicity of our definition of indifference, we recon-
sider the example of the finite possibility space X ∶= {H,T} of Example 1085,
where the vector space V is again the two-dimensional vector space L(X) of
real-valued functions on X, or gambles, and the vector ordering ⪯ is the usual
point-wise ordering of gambles.
We want to express indifference between heads and tails, or in other words
between I{H} and I{T}. This means that I{H}− I{T} is considered to be equiv-
alent to the zero gamble, so the linear space of all gambles that are equivalent
to zero—or in other words, the set of indifferent gambles (or options)—is then
given by
I = {λ(I{H}− I{T}) ∶ λ ∈R} = { f ∈L(X) ∶ Ep( f ) = 0},
where Ep is the expectation associated with the uniform mass function p =(1/2,1/2) on {H,T}, associated with a fair coin: Ep( f ) ∶= 12( f (H)+ f (T)). So,
for any gamble f in L(X)—any real-valued function on X:
[ f ] = { f}+ I = {g ∈L(X) ∶ Ep(g) = Ep( f )},
which tells us that the equivalence class [ f ] can be characterised by the com-
mon uniform expectation Ep( f ) of its elements. Therefore, L(X)/I has unit
dimension, and we can identify it with the real line R. The vector ordering
between equivalence classes is given by, using Equation (5.1)177:[ f ] ⪯ [g]⇔ (∃λ ∈R) f ⪯ g+λ(I{H}− I{T})⇔ (∃λ ∈R)( f (H) ≤ g(H)+λ and f (T) ≤ g(T)−λ)⇔ (∃λ ∈R) f (H)−g(H) ≤ λ ≤ − f (T)+g(T)⇔ f (H)−g(H) ≤ − f (T)+g(T)⇔ Ep( f ) ≤ Ep(g),
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and similarly [ f ] ≺ [g]⇔ Ep( f ) < Ep(g) for all f and g in L(X). Hence, the
strict vector ordering ≺ on L(X)/I is total, so we infer from the argumentation
in Example 669 that there is only one representing choice function, namely the
vacuous one. Therefore, there is only one choice function C on L(X) that is
compatible with I, namely, the one that has the vacuous choice function Cv onL(X)/I as its representation C/I. Recall that for any A in Q(L(X)):
Cv(A/I) = {[u] ∶ (∀[g] ∈ A/I)[ f ]⊀ [g]}= {[u] ∶ (∀[g] ∈ A/I)[g] ⪯ [ f ]} = {[u] ∶ (∀[g] ∈ A/I)Ep(g) ≤ Ep( f )},
and therefore
C(A) ∶= { f ∈ A ∶ (∀g ∈ A)Ep(g) ≤ Ep( f )} =CE{p}(A).
The indifference assessment between heads and tails leaves us no choice but
to use an E-admissible model for a probability mass function, associated with
a fair coin.
The choice function C is therefore based on E-admissibility, but is not
compatible with M-admissibility. To see this, consider the set of options
A ∶= {h,0,−h} with h ∶= (h(H),h(T)) = (1,−1), so h(H)+ h(T) = 0. Hence
C(A) =A; but no M-admissible choice function will select 0 in A: observe that
0 ∉CDˆ(A) for all Dˆ ∈D, because 0 ∈CDˆ(A) would imply that {h,−h}∩ Dˆ =∅,
contradicting that Dˆ is a maximal set of desirable options by Proposition 5159.
5.8 CHOICE FUNCTIONS AND SYMMETRY
As another example—and a precursor to Chapter 8247—showing how powerful
our approach to dealing with choice and indifference is, we will prove a sim-
ple and elegant representation result that tells us how to perform conservative
inference with choice functions under a permutation symmetry assessment.
We consider a finite possibility space X, where the vector space V of op-
tions is the finite-dimensional vector space RrX , of Rr-valued functions onX, or vector-valued gambles on the outcome of an uncertain variable X in X.
The vector ordering ⪯ is the usual point-wise ordering of such vector-valued
gambles.1
We assume there is symmetry lurking behind the uncertain variable X, rep-
resented by a group P of permutations of the set of possible outcomes X—the
idea being that a subject assesses that no distinction should be made between an
outcome x and its permutations pix, for pi ∈P—or in other words, between the
variable X and its permutations piX. If we consider any vector-valued gamble
u(X) on the variable X, then the subject will therefore be indifferent between
1The reason why we work here with vector-valued gambles here rather than real-valued ones,
is explained in some detail in Section 2.428.
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the uncertain vector-valued rewards u(X) and u(piX). The smallest coherent2
set of indifferent options IP that corresponds to this indifference assessment,
is therefore given by
IP ∶= span({u−pi tu ∶ u ∈ V and pi ∈P}),
where we define the linear permutation operator pi t on the linear space of op-
tions (vector-valued gambles) V by pi tu = u○pi , or in other words
(pi tu)(x) ∶= u(pix) for all u in V, x in X and pi in P.
Let us, for any x in X, define the permutation invariant atom [x]P containing
x as [x]P ∶= {pix ∶ pi ∈P}.
The permutation invariant atoms constitute a partition of X, and we denote
the set of all of them by AP ∶= {[x]P ∶ x ∈ X}. A vector-valued gamble u is
called P-invariant if pi tu = u for all pi in P, and it is not hard to see that this is
equivalent to u being constant on the invariant atoms. The set of all P-invariant
vector-valued gambles is denoted by VP , and it is a linear subspace of V that
is clearly isomorphic to the linear space of all vector-valued functions on AP ,
whose dimension r∣AP ∣ is typically much lower than that of V.
A choice function that takes the symmetry assessment into account is—as
we have argued—one that is compatible with IP and all of its linear subspaces.
What we will do now, is to investigate how such compatible choice functions
can be represented by choice functions on a typically much lower-dimensional
option space: symmetry reduces complexity. Most of the work for this has
already been done in Definition 40179 and Proposition 125181, which indeed
states that choice functions compatible with IP can be represented uniquely
by choice functions on the lower-dimensional quotient space V/IP . The only
thing that is left for us to do, therefore, is to take a closer look at this quotient
space and its elements.
Let us, to this end, define the transformation invP on V as follows:
invP u ∶= 1∣P∣ ∑pi∈Ppi tu, for all u in V. (5.5)
It satisfies the following very interesting properties:
Proposition 138. invP is a linear transformation of V, and
(i) invP ○pi t = invP = pi t ○ invP for all pi in P;
(ii) invP ○ invP = invP ;
2The requirement that IP ∩V≺0 = ∅—or equivalently IP ∩V≻0 = ∅—is related to the left
amenability of the finite permutation group P [27, 82], and is easily shown to be satisfied.
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(iii) ker(invP) = IP ;
(iv) rng(invP) = VP .
Moreover, for any u and v in V, we have that v ∈ u/IP⇔ invP v = invP u.
Proof. That the transformation invP is linear, is immediate from its definition in Equa-
tion (5.5).
To prove (i), observe that invP ○pit = 1∣P∣∑ϖ∈Pϖ t ○pit = 1∣P∣∑ϖ∈P(pi ○ϖ)t = invP ,
where the last equality holds because P is a group. For the second identity, observe
that pit ○ invP = 1∣P∣∑ϖ∈P pit ○ϖ t = 1∣P∣∑ϖ∈P(ϖ ○pi)t = invP , where the first equality
follows form the linear character of pit and the last equality holds because P is a group.
To prove (ii), observe that
invP ○ invP = 1∣P∣ ∑pi∈P invP ○pit = 1∣P∣ ∑pi∈P invP = invP ,
where the first equality is due to the linearity of invP and the second is due to (i).
To prove (iii), consider any u in ker(invP). Then invP u = 0 and therefore u =
u− invP u = 1∣P∣∑pi∈P(u− pitu) is an element of IP . Conversely, consider any u in
IP , then u =∑nk=1λk(vk −pitkvk) for some n in N, λk in R, vk in V and pik in P. But
then invP u =∑nk=1λk(invP vk − invP(pitkvk)) = 0, where the first equality is due to the
linearity of invP and the last due to (i). Hence indeed u ∈ ker(invP).
To prove (iv), consider any u in rng(invP). Then u = invP v for some v in V, and
therefore pitu = pit(invP v) = (pit ○ invP)v = invP v = u for all pi in P, where the third
equality follows from (i). Hence indeed u ∈ VP . Conversely, consider any u in VP .
Then pitu = u for all pi in P, and therefore u = invP u, whence indeed u ∈ rng(invP).
For the last statement, simply observe that v ∈ u/IP⇔ v−u ∈ IP⇔ invP(v−u) =
0⇔ invP v = invP u, where the second equivalence follows from (iii) and the last from
the linearity of invP .
The various statements in this proposition tell us that invP is a linear projection
operator that maps any vector-valued gamble u to the corresponding uniquelyP-invariant member invP u of the equivalence class u/IP , which is essentially
a vector-valued gamble on AP .
By Proposition 125181, every coherent choice function C on V that is com-
patible with IP therefore has a unique representing coherent choice function
CP on the typically much lower-dimensional linear space of all vector-valued
gambles on AP , with
C(A) = {u ∈ A ∶ invP u ∈CP(invP A)} for all A in Q(V).
5.9 NATURAL EXTENSION UNDER INDIFFERENCE
In Chapter 389 we have found the natural extension of an assessment B ⊆Q0(V): if B avoids complete rejection, then it has a coherent extension,
and the least informative such extension is given by E(B) = RB, defined in
Equation (3.1)92. The type of assessment we considered there—subsets B of
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Q0(V)—is direct, meaning that we directly assess rejections 0 from all the
elements of B. Such assessments do not subsume so-called structural assess-
ments, such as indifference assessments. We will also deal with other kinds of
structural assessments, such as irrelevance, in Section 7.4234. In this section,
given a direct assessment B ⊆Q0(V) and an indifference assessment I in I, we
will find the least informative coherent rejection function that extends B and is
compatible with I: we will find the natural extension of B under I.
As a first example, consider B ∶= ∅, and any I in I. The natural extension
of this assessment can be found easily: it is the coherent rejection function R,
given by
R(A) ∶= {u ∈ A ∶ [u] ∈ Rv(A/I)} for all A in Q(V),
where Rv is the vacuous rejection function on V/I. It is the most conservative
rejection function on V that is compatible with I.
5.9.1 Defining the natural extension under indifference
The natural extension under indifference, if it is coherent, is the least informa-
tive coherent rejection function that extends the assessment B ⊆Q0(V) and is
compatible with the set of indifferent options I.
Definition 41. Given any assessment B ⊆Q0(V) and any coherent set of in-
different options I, the natural extension of B under I is the rejection function
EI(B) ∶= inf{R ∈R(V) ∶(∀B ∈ B)0 ∈ R(B) and (∀A ∈Q(V))R(A) = {u ∈ A ∶ [u] ∈ R(A)/I}}= inf{R ∈R(V) ∶ R extends B and is compatible with I},
where, as usual, we let inf∅ = idQ(V), the identity rejection function that maps
every option set of itself.
Again, we can equivalently define the natural extension under indifference
as a choice function—or a choice relation for that matter—instead of a rejec-
tion function, but that turns out to be notationally more involved. The transla-
tion to the other types of choice models of this notion and other results in this
section, is straightforward.
To help link Definition 41 with a more constructive and explicit expression,
consider the special rejection function RB, I , defined by:
RB, I(A) ∶= {u ∈ A ∶ [u] ∈ RB/I(A/I)} for all A in Q(V), (5.6)
where we let B/I ∶= {B/I ∶ B ∈ B} ⊆Q[0](V/I), being—loosely speaking—the
assessment expressed in the quotient space V/I. Recall that RB, as defined in
Equation (3.1)92, is relative to a given but otherwise arbitrary vector space V.
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Our special rejection function RB, I uses the version RB/I on V/I instead of V.
Explicitly, it is given by
RB/I(A˜) = {u˜ ∈ A˜ ∶ (∃A˜′ ∈Q(V/I))(A˜′ ⊇ A˜ and (∀v˜ ∈ {u˜}∪(A˜′∖ A˜))((A˜′−{v˜})∩V/I≻[0] ≠∅ or (∃B˜ ∈ B/I,∃µ ∈R>0){v˜}+µB˜ ≼ A˜′))}
for all A˜ in Q(V/I).
It can be useful to have a more direct equivalent expression for RB, I:
Lemma 139. Consider any assessment B ⊆ Q0(V) and any coherent set of
indifferent options I ⊆ V. Then RB, I = R′B, I , where we let
R′B, I(A) ∶= {u ∈ A ∶ (∃A′ ∈Q(V))(A′ ⊇ A and (∀v ∈ {u}∪(A′∖A))((A′/I−{[v]})∩V/I≻[0] ≠∅ or (∃B˜ ∈ B/I,∃µ ∈R>0){[v]}+µB˜ ≼ A′/I))}
(5.7)
for all A in Q(V).
Proof. By plugging in the expression for RB/I into Equation (5.6), we find that
RB, I(A) = {u ∈ A ∶ (∃A˜′ ∈Q(V/I))(A˜′ ⊇ A/I and (∀v˜ ∈ {[u]}∪(A˜′∖A/I))((A˜′−{v˜})∩V/I≻[0] ≠∅ or (∃B˜ ∈ B/I,∃µ ∈R>0){v˜}+µB˜ ≼ A˜′))} (5.8)
for all A in Q(V), and therefore also
RB, I(A) = {u ∈ A ∶ (∃A′ ∈Q(V))(A′/I ⊇ A/I and (∀v˜ ∈ {[u]}∪(A′/I∖A/I))((A′/I−{v˜})∩V/I≻[0] ≠∅ or (∃B˜ ∈ B/I,∃µ ∈R>0){v˜}+µB˜ ≼ A′/I))} (5.9)
for all A inQ(V). We will use this expression to prove that RB, I ⊑ R′B, I and R′B, I ⊑ RB, I .
To prove that RB, I ⊑ R′B, I , consider any A inQ(V) and any u in RB, I(A). We show
that u ∈ R′B, I(A). By Equation (5.9), since u ∈ RB, I(A), there is some A′ in Q(V) such
that A′/I ⊇ A/I and
(∀v˜ ∈ {[u]}∪(A′/I∖A/I))((A′/I−{v˜})∩V/I≻[0] ≠∅ or (∃B˜ ∈ B/I,∃µ ∈R>0){v˜}+µB˜ ≼ A′/I). (5.10)
Let A′′ ∶= A ∪ {u ∈ A′ ∶ [u] ∉ A/I} ⊇ A. We state that then {[u]} ∪ (A′/I ∖ A/I) =({u}∪(A′′∖A))/I. To prove this, since ({u}∪(A′′∖A))/I = {u}/I∪ (A′′∖A)/I and{[u]} = {u}/I, it suffices to show that (A′′∖A)/I = A′/I∖A/I. So consider any u˜ in
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V/I, and infer that
u˜ ∈ (A′′∖A)/I⇔ (∃v ∈ u˜)v ∈ A′′∖A⇔ (∃v ∈ u˜)(v ∈ A′′ and v ∉ A)⇔ (∃v ∈ u˜)v ∈ {w ∈ A′ ∶ [w] ∉ A/I}⇔ (∃v ∈ u˜)(v ∈ A′ and [v] ∉ A/I)⇔ (∃v ∈ u˜)v ∈ A′ and u˜ ∉ A/I since (∀v ∈ u˜)[v] = u˜⇔ u˜ ∈ A′/I and u˜ ∉ A/I⇔ u˜ ∈ A′/I∖A/I,
whence indeed (A′′∖A)/I = A′/I∖A/I. Therefore, by Equation (5.10)↶,
(∀v˜ ∈ ({u}∪(A′′∖A))/I)((A′/I−{v˜})∩V/I≻[0] ≠∅ or (∃B˜ ∈ B/I,∃µ ∈R>0){v˜}+µB˜ ≼ A′/I),
whence
(∀v ∈ {u}∪(A′′∖A))((A′/I−{[v]})∩V/I≻[0] ≠∅ or (∃B˜ ∈ B/I,∃µ ∈R>0){[v]}+µB˜ ≼ A′/I).
Remark that A′′/I = A/I∪{[u] ∶ u ∈ A′ and [u] ∉ A/I} = A/I∪ (A′/I∖A/I) = A′/I, and
therefore
(∀v ∈ {u}∪(A′′∖A))((A′′/I−{[v]})∩V/I≻[0] ≠∅ or (∃B ∈ B,∃µ ∈R>0){[v]}+µB/I ≼ A′′/I).
Since A′′ ⊇ A, by Equation (5.7)↶ then indeed u ∈ R′B, I(A).
Conversely, to prove that R′B, I ⊑ RB, I , consider any A in Q(V) and any u in
R′B, I(A). We will show that then u ∈ RB, I(A). By Equation (5.7)↶, since u ∈ R′B, I(A),
there is some A′ ⊇ A in Q(V) such that
(∀v ∈ {u}∪(A′∖A))((A′/I−{[v]})∩V/I≻[0] ≠∅ or (∃B˜ ∈ B/I,∃µ ∈R>0){[v]}+µB˜ ≼ A′/I),
whence
(∀v˜ ∈ ({u}∪(A′∖A))/I)((A′/I−{v˜})∩V/I≻[0] ≠∅ or (∃B˜ ∈ B/I,∃µ ∈R>0){v˜}+µB˜ ≼ A′/I). (5.11)
Let A˜′ ∶= A′/I ⊇ A/I. We state that then {[u]}∪ (A˜′ ∖A/I) ⊆ ({u}∪(A′∖A))/I. To
prove this, since ({u}∪(A′∖A))/I = {u}/I∪(A′∖A)/I and {[u]} = {u}/I, it suffices
to show that A˜′∖A/I ⊆ (A′∖A)/I. So consider any u˜ in V/I, and infer that
u˜ ∈ A˜′∖A/I⇒ u˜ ∈ A˜′ and u˜ ∉ A/I⇒ ((∃v ∈ u˜)v ∈ A′) and ((∀w ∈ u˜)w ∉ A)⇒ (∃v ∈ u˜)(v ∈ A′ and v ∉ A)⇒ (∃v ∈ u˜)v ∈ A′∖A⇒ u˜ ∈ (A′∖A)/I,
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whence indeed A˜′∖A/I ⊆ (A′∖A)/I. Therefore, by Equation (5.11) in particular
(∀v˜ ∈ {[u]}∪(A˜′∖A/I))((A˜′−{v˜})∩V/I≻[0] ≠∅ or (∃B˜ ∈ B/I,∃µ ∈R>0){v˜}+µB˜ ≼ A˜′).
Since A˜′ ⊇ A/I, by Equation (5.8)195 then indeed u ∈ RB, I(A).
Similarly as in Chapter 389, the special rejection function RB, I satisfies a
number of interesting properties:
Lemma 140. Consider any assessment B ⊆Q0(V) and any coherent set of in-
different options I ⊆ V. Then RB, I extends B, is compatible with I, and satisfies
Axioms R220–R420.
Proof. To show that RB, I extends B, we need to prove that 0 ∈ RB, I(B) for every B inB. So consider any B in B. By Equation (5.6)194, RB, I(B) = {u ∈ B ∶ [u] ∈ RB/I(B/I)},
and therefore 0 ∈ RB, I(B)⇔ [0] ∈ RB/I(B/I). By Lemma 7894, we know that RB/I
extends B/I, and therefore [0] ∈ RB/I(B/I). Hence indeed 0 ∈ RB, I(B).
That RB, I is compatible with I, is immediate because it is represented by RB/I
on V/I.
To show that RB, I satisfies Axioms R220–R420, first use Lemma 7792 to infer that
its representing rejection function RB/I satisfies those axioms. Therefore, by Proposi-
tion 127182, RB, I indeed satisfies Axioms R220–R420.
Now we already know that RB, I satisfies the rationality Axioms R220–R420,
extends B, and is compatible with I, but if we want to use it as an expression
for the natural extension, it will help us if we can prove that it is the least
informative such rejection function.
Proposition 141. Consider any assessment B ⊆Q0(V) and any coherent set of
indifferent options I ⊆ V. Then RB, I is the least informative rejection function
that satisfies Axioms R220–R420, extends B , and is compatible with I.
Proof. We already know from Lemma 140 that RB, I satisfies Axioms R220–R420, ex-
tends B, and is compatible with I, so it suffices to show that RB, I is the least informative
such rejection function. Consider any rejection function R′ that satisfies Axioms R220–
R420, extends B and is compatible with I. We will show that RB, I ⊑ R′, or, in other
words, that RB, I(A) ⊆ R′(A) for all A in Q(V). Since both RB, I and R′ satisfy Ax-
iom R4b20, it suffices to show that 0 ∈ RB, I(A)⇒ 0 ∈ R′(A) for all A in Q(V).
Since R′ is compatible with I, by there is some representing choice function R′′
on V/I such that R′(A) = {u ∈ A ∶ [u] ∈ R′′(A/I)} for all A in Q(V). We state that R′′
extends B/I. To see this, consider any B˜ in B/I, and we will show that [0] ∈ R′′(B˜).
Because B˜ belongs to B/I, then B˜ = B/I for some B in B. Since R′ extends B, therefore
0 ∈ R′(B) = {u ∈ B ∶ [u] ∈ R′′(B˜)}, whence [0] ∈ R′′(B˜). Note that the choice of B˜ inB/I was arbitrary, so therefore R′′ indeed extends B/I.
Also, by Proposition 127182, since R
′ satisfies Axioms R220–R420, R′′ on V/I sat-
isfies those axioms as well.
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We now turn to showing that 0 ∈ RB, I(A)⇒ 0 ∈ R′(A) for all A in Q(V). Con-
sider any A in Q(V) and assume that 0 ∈ RB, I(A). Infer already that then 0 ∈ A. By
Lemma 139195 then 0 ∈ R′B, I(A), so there is some A′ ⊇ A in Q(V) such that
(∀v ∈ {0}∪(A′∖A))((A′/I−{[v]})∩V/I≻[0] ≠∅ or (∃B˜ ∈ B/I,∃µ ∈R>0){[v]}+µB˜ ≼ A′/I)
Consider any v in {0}∪(A′∖A), then (A′/I−{[v]})∩V/I≻[0] ≠∅—and therefore [v]≺
u˜ for some u˜ in A′/I, whence by Axiom R220, [v] ∈ R′′({u˜,[v]}), so by Axiom R3a20,[v] ∈ R′′(A′/I)—or {[v]}+µB˜ ≼ A′/I for some B˜ in B/I and µ in R>0—and therefore,
since R′′ extends B/I, [0] ∈ R′′(B˜), so by Axiom R4a20, we have that [0] ∈ R′′(µB˜),
and using Axiom R4b20, that [v] = [0]+ [v] ∈ R′′({[v]}+ µB˜), and therefore finally,
using Proposition 3444, we infer that [v] ∈ R′′(A′/I). So we have shown that [v] ∈
R′′(A′/I)—and by compatibility therefore also that v ∈ R′(A′)—for every v in {0}∪(A′ ∖A). Therefore, since R′ satisfies Axiom R3b20, using Axiom R3b20 [with A˜ ∶=
A′∖A, A˜1 ∶= {0}∪(A′∖A) and A˜2 ∶=A′; then A˜1∖A˜ = {0} since 0 ∈A ⊆A′ and A˜2∖A˜ =A
since A ⊆ A′] we find that then indeed 0 ∈ R′(A).
5.9.2 Assessments avoiding complete rejection under indifference
Recall from our results on the (normal) natural extension that not every assess-
ment is extendible to a coherent rejection function: this is only the case if the
assessment avoids complete rejection. Here too, when we deal with the natural
extension under indifference, something similar occurs.
Definition 42 (Avoiding complete rejection under indifference). Given any
assessment B ⊆Q0(V) and any coherent set of indifferent options I ⊆V, we say
that B avoids complete rejection under I when RB, I satisfies Axiom R120.
Due to the extra indifference assessment, avoiding complete rejection un-
der indifference is typically more difficult to fulfil than avoiding complete re-
jection, as illustrated in the following example.
Example 22. Consider some option u in V such that 0⊀ u⊀ 0,3 the assessmentB ∶= {{0,u}} ⊆Q0(V) and the set of indifferent options I ∶= span{u} = {λu ∶ λ ∈
R}. Then by Corollary 88106, B avoids complete rejection [to see this, consider
for instance the coherent set of desirable options D ∶= posi(V≻0 ∪ {u}); then
indeed (∀B ∈B)D∩B ≠∅] and because I is a linear hull, and λu ∉ V≻0∪V≺0, I
is a coherent set of indifferent options. But B does not avoid complete rejection
under I. Indeed, expressed in the quotient space V/I, the assessment is B/I ={{[0],[u]}} = {{[0]}}, since [u] = [0]. Therefore, since RB/I extends B/I [see
Lemma 7894], [0] ∈RB/I({[0]}), so RB/I does not satisfy Axiom R1. Consider
the option set A ∶= {0,u}. Then A/I = {[0]}, whence by Equation (5.6)194
3Or, in other words, such that u ∉ V≻0 ∪V≺0.
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RB, I(A) = {v ∈ A ∶ [v] ∈ RB/I(A/I)} = {v ∈ {0,u} ∶ [v] ∈ RB/I({[0]})} = {0,u} =
A, so RB, I does not satisfy Axiom R120 either. Therefore indeed B does not
avoid complete rejection under I.
However, avoiding complete rejection under indifference is sufficient for
avoiding complete rejection:
Proposition 142. Consider any assessment B ⊆Q0(V) and any coherent set of
indifferent options I ⊆ V. Then B avoids complete rejection under I if and only
if B/I avoids complete rejection, and both those equivalent conditions imply
that B avoids complete rejection.
Proof. For the first statement, that B avoids complete rejection under I if and only
if B/I avoids complete rejection, we first prove necessity. So assume that B avoids
complete rejection under I. Then, by Definition 42, RB, I satisfies Axiom R120, whence
RB, I(A) = {u ∈ A ∶ [u] ∈ RB/I(A/I)} ≠ A for all A in Q(V). Consider any A in Q(V).
Since A ≠ RB, I(A) there is some u in A such that u ∉ RB, I(A) and by Equation (5.6)194
therefore [u] ∉ RB/I(A/I), whence RB/I(A/I) ≠ A/I. Since the choice of A was ar-
bitrary, this means that RB/I satisfies Axiom R120, and therefore indeed B/I avoids
complete rejection.
For sufficiency, assume that B/I avoids complete rejection, then by Definition 3295,
RB/I satisfies Axiom R120. Consider any A in Q(V). Then, since RB/I satisfies
Axiom R120, we have that RB/I(A/I) ≠ A/I. So there is some u in A such that[u] ∉RB/I(A/I), whence by Equation (5.6)194 u ∉RB, I(A), whence RB, I(A) ≠A. Since
the choice of A was arbitrary, this means that RB, I satisfies Axiom R120, and therefore
indeed B avoids complete rejection under I.
For the last statement, we will prove the contraposition. Assume that B does not
avoid complete rejection. We know from Lemma 7792 that RB satisfies Axioms R220–
R420. By Corollary 2639 therefore 0 ∈ RB({0}), and by Equation (3.1)92 then there is
some A ⊇ {0} in Q(V) such that
(∀u ∈ A)((A−{u})∩V≻0 ≠∅ or (∃B ∈ B,∃µ ∈R>0){u}+µB ≼ A)
Consider any u in A. If (A −{u})∩V≻0 ≠ ∅ then u ≺ v for some v in A, and therefore
also [u] ≺ [v], so this implies that (A/I − {[u]})∩V/I≻[0] ≠ ∅. If {u}+ µB ≼ A for
some B in B and µ in R>0, then, similarly, also {[u]}+µB/I ≼ A/I. Therefore(∀u ∈ A)((A/I−{[u]})∩V/I≻[0] ≠∅ or (∃B ∈ B,∃µ ∈R>0){[u]}+µB/I ≼ A/I).
By Equation (5.7)195 then 0 ∈ R′B, I({0}), and by Lemma 139195 therefore 0 ∈
RB, I({0}). But then RB, I fails to satisfy Axiom R120, so B does not avoids complete
rejection under I, a contradiction.
As a corollary to Corollary 88106, we find the following sufficient condition
for avoiding complete rejection under indifference, that is easier to check:
Corollary 143. Consider any assessment B ⊆Q0(V) and any coherent set of
indifferent options I ⊆V. If (∃D˜ ∈D(V/I))(∀B˜ ∈B/I)B˜∩ D˜ ≠∅, then B avoids
complete rejection under I.
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Proof. Assume that (∃D˜ ∈ D(V/I))(∀B˜ ∈ B/I)B˜ ∩ D˜ ≠ ∅. By using Corollary 88106
with the specific vector space V/I, this implies that B/I avoids complete rejection. By
Proposition 142↶, this indeed implies that B avoids complete rejection under I.
5.9.3 Natural extension under indifference
We now formulate a counterpart to Theorem 8197 for natural extension under
indifference:
Theorem 144 (Natural extension under indifference). Consider any assess-
ment B ⊆Q0 and any coherent set of indifferent options I ⊆V. Then the follow-
ing statements are equivalent:
(i) B avoids complete rejection under I;
(ii) There is a coherent extension of B that is compatible with I:(∀B ∈ B)0 ∈ R(B) and (∀A ∈Q(V))R(A) = {u ∈ A ∶ [u] ∈ R(A)/I}
for some R in R(V);
(iii) EI(B) ≠ idQ(V);
(iv) EI(B) ∈R(V);
(v) EI(B) is the least informative rejection function that is coherent, extendsB, and is compatible with I.
When any (and hence all) of these equivalent statements hold, then EI(B) =
RB, I .
Proof. This is a direct consequence of the Natural Extension Theorem 8197 and the
representation result of coherent choice functions Proposition 132185.
5.9.4 Purely binary assessments
What happens in the case of binary assessments? Consider that, as in Sec-
tion 3.599, a desirability assessment is a subset of V, and consists of options
that the agents find desirable (or strictly preferred to the zero option 0). Any
desirability assessment B ⊆ V can be transformed into an assessment for rejec-
tion functions BB ∶= {{0,u} ∶ u ∈ B}; conversely, given such an assessment BB ,
we can retrieve B as B ∶= (⋃BB)∖{0}.
The corresponding notion of avoiding complete rejection under indiffer-
ence, is avoiding non-positivity under indifference, formulated as follows
Definition 43 (Avoiding non-positivity under indifference [31, Definition 4]4).
4Actually, in Reference [31, Section 4], De Cooman and Quaeghebeur study the natural ex-
tension under exchangeability, which is a special indifference assessment. They do this in the
context of desirability. However, their treatment is sufficiently general to immediately see—by
simply replacing their set DUN with an arbitrary set of indifferent options I—that they actually
give the natural extension under indifference for desirability. Therefore, for more details about the
natural extension under indifference for desirability, we refer to Reference [31, Section 4].
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Given any assessment B ⊆ V and any coherent set of indifferent options I ⊆ V,
we say that B avoids non-positivity under I when I + (V≻0 ∪B) avoids non-
positivity, or, in other words,5 when
posi(I+(V≻0∪B))∩V⪯0 =∅.
Theorem 144 is the counterpart for choice models of the natural extension
theorem under indifference for desirability. To be able to compare the two,
and to make this thesis more self-contained, we next state the natural extension
theorem under indifference for desirability.
Theorem 145 (Natural extension under indifference for desirability [31, The-
orem 13]). Consider any desirability assessment B ⊆ V and any coherent set
of indifferent options I ⊆ V, and define its natural extension as
EDI (B) ∶= inf{D ∈D ∶ B ⊆D}.6
Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) B avoids non-positivity under I;
(ii) B is included in some coherent set of desirable options that is compatible
with I: (∃D ∈D)(B ⊆D and D =⋃D/I);
(iii) EDI (B) ≠ V;
(iv) EDI (B) ∈D(V);
(v) EDI (B) is the least informative set of desirable options that is coherent,
includes B and is compatible with I.
When any (and hence all) of these equivalent statements hold, then EDI (B) =
posi(I+(V≻0∪B)).
Let us go back to the Natural Extension Theorem 144 under indifference
(for choice models) and consider a desirability assessment B ⊆ V, its com-
pletely binary (choice models) assessment BB , and a coherent set of indiffer-
ent options I ⊆ V. If B avoids non-positivity, then we wonder whether we can
retrieve using Theorem 144 the formula ED(B) = posi(I+(V≻0 ∪B)), as The-
orem 145 indicates.
Theorem 146. Consider any desirability assessment B ⊆ V and any coherent
set of indifferent options I ⊆V. Then B avoids non-positivity under I if and only
if BB avoids complete rejection under I, and if this is the case, then EI(BB) =
Rposi(I+(V≻0∪B)).
Proof. We start with the first part, that B avoids non-positivity under I if and only if BB
avoids complete rejection under I. For necessity, since B avoids non-positivity under I,
5See Equation (3.7)99.
6We let inf∅ = V.
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by Theorem 145↶, we have that B ⊆D for some coherent set of desirable options D that
is compatible with I. Consider the coherent rejection function RD . By Theorem 86100
we know already that RD extends BB , and by Proposition 136189 that RD is compatible
with I. Therefore, by Theorem 144200, BB indeed avoids complete rejection under I.
For sufficiency, since BB avoids complete rejection under I, by Theorem 144200(∀u ∈ B)0 ∈ R({0,u}) for some coherent rejection function R on V that is compatible
with I. Consider the coherent set of desirable options DR = {u ∈ V ∶ 0 ∈ R({0,u})}. By
Theorem 86100 we know already that DR extends B, and by Proposition 136189 that
DR is compatible with I. Therefore, by Theorem 145↶, B indeed avoids non-positivity
under I.
We now show the second part, that EI(BB) = Rposi(I+(V≻0∪B)) if B avoids non-
positivity under I. But we have just shown that then BB avoids complete rejection
under I, so EI(BB) = RB, I , and we are left to prove that RB, I = Rposi(I+(V≻0∪B)) Since
both rejection functions are coherent, by Axiom R4b20 it suffices to prove that 0 ∈
RBB, I(A)⇔ 0 ∈ Rposi(I+(V≻0∪B))(A) for all A in Q(V).
So consider any A in Q(V), and infer that
0 ∈ RBB, I(A)⇔ (0 ∈ A and [0] ∈ RBB /I(A/I))⇔ (0 ∈ A and [0] ∈ RBB/I (A/I))⇔ (0 ∈ A and A/I∩posi(V/I≻[0]∪B/I) ≠∅),
where the first equivalence is due to Equation (5.6)194, the second is due to the ob-
servation that BB/I = {{0,u}/I ∶ u ∈ B} = {{[0], u˜} ∶ u ∈ B/I} = BB/I , and the third
holds by Theorem 86100 for the vector space V/I. So it suffices to show that
A/I ∩ posi(V/I≻[0] ∪B/I) ≠ ∅⇔ A ∩ posi(I + (V≻0 ∪B)) ≠ ∅, because, by Proposi-
tion 5564 this together with 0 ∈ A is equivalent to 0 ∈ Rposi(I+(V≻0∪B))(A). Infer that
A/I∩posi(V/I≻[0] ∪B/I) ≠ ∅ is equivalent to [u] ∈ posi(V/I≻[0] ∪B/I) for some u in
A, and therefore, since V/I≻[0] ∪B/I = (V≻0∪B)/I and by Lemma 147, this is in turn
equivalent to u ∈ posi(I+ (V≻0 ∪B)) for some u in A. In other words, this is indeed
equivalent to A∩posi(I+(V≻0∪B)) ≠∅.
Lemma 147. Consider any A ⊆ V and any coherent set of indifferent options
I ⊆ V. Then [u] ∈ posi(A/I)⇔ u ∈ posi(A+ I) for all u in V.
Proof. Consider any u in V. Observe that
[u] ∈ posi(A/I)⇔ (∃n ∈N,∃λ1, . . . ,λn ∈R>0,∃u1, . . . ,un ∈ A)[u] = n∑
k=1λk[uk]
⇔ (∃n ∈N,∃λ1, . . . ,λn ∈R>0,∃u1, . . . ,un ∈ A)[u] = [ n∑
k=1λkuk]
⇔ (∃n ∈N,∃λ1, . . . ,λn ∈R>0,∃u1, . . . ,un ∈ A,∃w ∈ I)u = w+ n∑
k=1λkuk⇔ (∃w ∈ I)u ∈ {w}+posi(A)⇔ u ∈ I+posi(A).
Therefore, since posi(A + I) = posi(A)+posi(I) = posi(A)+ I, this proves the desired
statement.
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Similarly to its counterpart in Section 3.599, Theorem 146201 consists of
three remarkable statements: The first statement is that the natural extension
under indifference (represented by a coherent set of indifferent options I) of
a purely binary assessment BB , for some B ⊆ V, is a rejection function that
is purely binary itself; the second one is that its (binary) behaviour is exactly
given by posi(I+ (V≻0 ∪B)); both statements are conditional on BB avoiding
complete rejection under I—which is furthermore, as a third statement, pre-
cisely equivalent to B avoiding non-positivity under I.
Focusing on the second statement, for any coherent set of indifferent op-
tions I ⊆ V and any desirability assessment B ⊆ V that avoids non-positivity,
the natural extension EI(BB) (for choice models) induces the binary choice
DEI(BB) reflected by posi(I+(V≻0∪B)). To see this, Theorem 146201 guaran-
tees that EI(BB) = Rposi(I+(V≻0∪B)), where by Theorem 145201, posi(I+(V≻0∪
B)) is a coherent set of desirable options and by Proposition 5866, therefore
indeed DE(BB) = posi(I+(V≻0∪B)).
To summarise these statements, consider the following commuting dia-
gram in Figure 5.1—which is the counterpart of Figure 3.1104 for natural ex-
tension under indifference. We used the maps
EDI ∶P(V)→D∶B↦ EDI (B),B⋅∶P(V)→Q0∶B↦ BB ∶= {{0,u} ∶ u ∈ B},EI ∶P(Q0)→R∶B↦ EI(B),
D⋅∶R→D∶R↦DR ∶= {u ∈ V ∶ 0 ∈ R({0,u})},
R⋅∶D→R∶D↦ RD ,
with EDI (B) defined in Theorem 145201, EI(B) in Theorem 144200 and, as
usual, RD given by RD(A) = {u ∈A ∶ (∀v ∈A)v−u ∉D} for all A inQ. The root
of the diagram is any desirability assessment B ⊆ V that avoids non-positivity
under indifference, captured by a coherent set of indifferent options I.
B EDI (B) =DEI(BB)
BB EI(BB) = REDI (B)
EDI
B⋅ D⋅R⋅EI
Figure 5.1: Commuting diagram for the natural extension under indifference
for binary assessments
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Consider a variable X that assumes values in a non-empty possibility space X.
Suppose that we have a belief model about X, be it a coherent choice function
on L, a coherent set of desirable gambles on X, or—less general—a coherent
lower prevision on X, a set of mass functions on X, or just a single mass
function on X. When new information becomes available, in the form of ‘X
assumes a value in some (non-empty) subset E of X ’, we can take this into
account by conditioning our belief model on E.
For some of these belief models, such as coherent lower previsions, and
(sets of) mass functions, conditioning on events of probability zero can be
problematic, because, roughly speaking, Bayes’s Rule typically requires to di-
vide by zero in these situations. However, working with sets of desirable gam-
bles is one way of overcoming this problem. In this chapter, we will see why,
and explain that choice functions do not suffer from this problem either.
We will work with the vector space L(X×R) of vector-valued gambles, in
order to guarantee the connection, explained in Section 2.428, with the choice
functions considered by Seidenfeld et al. [67]. The finite set R serves as a set
of rewards, and is assumed to be fixed throughout.
We will first review how conditioning is done using desirability (see Ref-
erence [31] for more details). After that, we will introduce conditional choice
functions, and study the connection with conditional sets of desirable gam-
bles. We will let any event, except for the (trivially) impossible event ∅,
serve as a conditioning event. We collect the allowed conditioning events inP∅(X) ∶=P(X)∖{∅} = {E ⊆X ∶ E ≠∅}.
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6.1 DESIRABILITY
For sets of desirable gambles conditioning is very elegant, as explained in de-
tail in Reference [31]. We give an outline of the basic ideas here, and at the
same time expand the treatment there to also deal with vector-valued, rather
than real-valued, gambles. There are multiple equivalent definitions for con-
ditioning on an event E in P∅(X). Starting from a coherent set of desirable
gambles D ⊆ L(X ×R), the definitions used in References [13, 55, 82, 83] all
result in a conditional set of desirable gambles D∣E that consists of (vector-
valued) gambles defined on the whole possibility space X. There are a number
of different but equivalent definitions of such conditional sets of gambles on
the whole possibility space; one of them, considered in Reference [31], is mu-
tatis mutandis1 given by
D∣E ∶= { f ∈D ∶ IE×R f = f},
where IE×R is the indicator of E ×R, defined in Section 2.1.212. However, we
will find it more useful and convenient that a conditional model is defined on
vector-valued gambles on E—gambles on E×R—, rather than on X, because,
after getting to know that E occurs, the possibility space becomes effectively
E. Therefore we work with a modified version D⌋E, first considered by De
Cooman and Quaeghebeur in Reference [31]:
D⌋E ∶= { f ∈L(E ×R) ∶ IE f ∈D}.
In this definition, we let2 for any E in P∅(X) and any f in L(E ×R), IE f be
the gamble on X×R given by
IE f (x,r) ∶= ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ f (x,r) if x ∈ E0 if x ∉ E (6.1)
for all x in X and r in R. Note that, for all E in P∅(X), and all f and g inL(E ×R), we have that IE×RIE f = IE f , that
f ≠ g⇔ (∃x ∈ E,r ∈R)( f (x,r) ≠ g(x,r))⇔ (∃x ∈ E,r ∈R)(IE f (x,r) ≠ IEg(x,r))⇔ (∃x ∈X,r ∈R)(IE f (x,r) ≠ IEg(x,r))⇔ IE f ≠ IEg, (6.2)
1Taking into account that we use vector-valued gambles rather than (normal) gambles.
2IE is the indicator (gamble) defined on X, while f is a gamble defined on E ×R: their
domains differ, so their multiplication needs to be defined with some care.
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and that
f < g⇔ ( f ≤ g and f ≠ g)⇔ ((∀x ∈ E,r ∈R)( f (x,r) ≤ g(x,r)) and IE f ≠ IEg)⇔ ((∀x ∈ E,r ∈R)(IE f (x,r) ≤ IEg(x,r)) and IE f ≠ IEg)⇔ ((∀x ∈X,r ∈R)(IE f (x,r) ≤ IEg(x,r)) and IE f ≠ IEg)⇔ (IE f ≤ IEg and IE f ≠ IEg)⇔ IE f < IEg. (6.3)
Both definitions of conditioning are essentially equivalent, since f ∈
D⌋E ⇔ IE f ∈ D ⇔ IE f ∈ D∣E for all f in L(E ×R), and we will only con-
sider the version D⌋E in the remainder of this dissertation.
Proposition 148 ([31, Proposition 8]). Consider any coherent set of desirable
gambles D ⊆ L(X ×R) and any event E in P∅(X). Then D⌋E is a coherent
set of desirable gambles on E ×R.
Proof. Immediate adaptation of the proof in Reference [31, Proposition 8] to deal with
vector-valued gambles.
Equivalently, a preference relation ½ on L(X ×R) can be conditioned on
any event E in P∅(X). There are again different definitions. Some versions
yield preference relations on (a subset of) L(X ×R), but here we will focus
on a version that yields a preference relation on L(E ×R), because, again, we
will find it more useful and convenient that conditional models are defined on
vector-valued gambles on E rather than on X. We let ½⌋E be the preference
relation conditional on E, defined by
f ½⌋E g⇔ IE f ½ IEg, for all f and g in L(E ×R).
It turns out that the definitions of conditioning for sets of desirable gambles
and for preference relations are essentially equivalent:
Proposition 149. Consider a coherent set of desirable gambles D ⊆L(X×R),
a coherent preference relation ½ on L(X ×R) and a conditioning event E inP∅(X). Then ½D⌋E = ½D⌋E and D½⌋E = D½⌋E . As a consequence, ½⌋E is
coherent.
Proof. To avoid notational overload and confusion, we will use the notations ½′ ∶=½⌋E
and ½′D ∶= ½D⌋E, and show that ½′D = ½D⌋E and D½⌋E = D½′ .
For the first statement, consider any f and g in L(E ×R), and infer, by the defini-
tion of conditional preference relations and the definition of ½D (see Section 2.8.256),
that f ½′D g⇔ IE f ½D IE g⇔ IE(g− f ) ∈D. By the definition of conditional sets of de-
sirable gambles, this is equivalent to g− f ∈ D⌋E, and using the definition of ½D again,
therefore indeed also to f ½D⌋E g.
For the second statement, observe that indeed D½⌋E = { f ∈L(E×R) ∶ IE f ∈D½} ={ f ∈ L(E ×R) ∶ 0 ½ IE f} = { f ∈ L(E ×R) ∶ 0 ½′ f} = D½′ , where the first equality is
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due to the definition of conditional sets of desirable gambles, the second and the fourth
equalities result from the definition of D½ (see Section 2.8.256), and the third equality
is due to the definition of conditional preference relations.
For the consequence, we know from the discussion in Section 2.8.256 that the co-
herence of ½ implies the coherence of D½ , and by Proposition 148↶, we have that
D½⌋E is a coherent set of desirable gambles, and therefore ½D½ ⌋E is a coherent pref-
erence relation. We have just shown that D½⌋E = D½⌋E , so ½D½ ⌋E = ½⌋E, so ½⌋E is
indeed a coherent preference relation.
This proposition is summarised in the commuting diagram of Figure 6.1,
where we use the maps
D⋅∶P→D∶½↦D½ ,½⋅∶D→ P∶D↦½D ,
and ⋅⌋E, to denote conditioning a set of desirable gambles D or a preference
relation ½.
D ½
D⌋E ½⌋E
D⋅½⋅⋅⌋E ⋅⌋E
D⋅½⋅
Figure 6.1: Commuting diagram for conditioning desirability models: Start
with a coherent set of desirable gambles D and its corresponding preference
relation ½ on L(X×R). Conditioning them on E result in a conditional set of
desirable gambles D⌋E and a preference relation ½⌋E on L(E ×R) that again
correspond.
6.2 CHOICE MODELS
For choice models, conditioning can defined using the same simple underlying
ideas.
Definition 44 (Conditional choice function). Given any choice function C onL(X×R) and any conditioning event E in P∅(X), we define the choice func-
tion C⌋E on L(E ×R) as
C⌋E(A) ∶= { f ∈ A ∶ IE f ∈C({IE f ∶ f ∈ A})} for all A in Q(L(E ×R)),
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and will also call it a conditional choice function.
From here on, we will use the simplifying notational convention that
IEA ∶= {IE f ∶ f ∈ A} ∈ Q(L(X ×R)) for any A in Q(L(E ×R)), where, by
Equation (6.1)206, IE f is the gamble on X×R, that is equal to f on E ×R and
to 0 on Ec×R. Using this notational convention,
C⌋E(A) = { f ∈ A ∶ IE f ∈C(IEA)} for all A in Q(L(E ×R)),
or equivalently,
f ∈C⌋E(A)⇔ IE f ∈C(IEA), for all A in Q(L(E ×R)) and all f in A.
Proposition 150. Consider any choice function C on L(X×R), and any event
E in P∅(X). Then, for any property C∗ in
{C120,C220,C3a20,C3b20,C4a20,C4b20,C525,C625},
if C satisfies C∗, then C⌋E satisfies C∗. As a consequence, if C is coherent,
then so is C⌋E.
Proof. For Axiom C120, consider any option set A of gambles on E ×R. Since
C(IE A) ≠∅, indeed also C⌋E(A) ≠∅.
For Axiom C220, consider any f and g in L(E ×R) for which f < g. Then
IE f < IE g by Equation (6.3)207, so IE f ∉ C({IE f ,IE g}), and therefore indeed f ∉
C⌋E({ f ,g}).
For Axiom C3a20, consider any A, A1 and A2 inQ(L(E×R)) such that C⌋E(A2)⊆
A2 ∖A1 and A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ A. Then C(IE A2) ⊆ IE(A2 ∖A1) = IE A2 ∖ IE A1—using Equa-
tion (6.2)206 in the equality—and IE A1 ⊆ IE A2 ⊆ IE A, and therefore, C(IE A) ⊆ IE A ∖
IE A1. But then indeed C⌋E(A) ⊆ A∖A1.
For Axiom C3b20, consider any A, A1 and A2 in Q(L(E ×R)) such that
C⌋E(A2) ⊆ A2 ∖A1 and A ⊆ A1. Then C(IE A2) ⊆ IE(A2 ∖A1) = IE A2 ∖ IE A1—using
Equation (6.2)206 in the equality—and IE A ⊆ IE A1, and therefore, C(IE(A2 ∖A)) =
C(IE A2∖ IE A) ⊆ IE A2∖ IE A1 = IE(A2∖A1). But then indeed C⌋E(A2∖A) ⊆ A2∖A1.
For Axiom C4a20, consider any A1 and A2 in Q(L(E ×R)) and any λ in R>0 for
which A1 ⊆C⌋E(A2). Then IE A1 ⊆C(IE A2), and therefore, IEλA1 ⊆C(IEλA2). But
then indeed λA1 ⊆C⌋E(λA2).
For Axiom C4b20, consider any A1 and A2 inQ(L(E×R)) and any f inL(E×R)
for which A1 ⊆C⌋E(A2). Then IE A1 ⊆C(IE A2), and therefore, IE(A1+{ f}) = IE A1+{IE f}⊆C(IE A2+{IE f})=C(IE(A2+{ f})). But then indeed λA1+{ f}⊆C⌋E(λA2+{ f}).
For Property C525, consider any A and A1 in Q(L(E ×R)) such that A ⊆ A1 ⊆
conv(A). Then IE A ⊆ IE A1 ⊆ conv(IE A), whence C(IE A) ⊆C(IE A1), and therefore
indeed C⌋E(A) ⊆C⌋E(A1).
For Property C625, consider any n in N, any λ1, . . . , λn in R>0 and any f1, . . . , fn
in L(E ×R) such that 0 ∈C⌋E({0, f1, . . . , fn}). Then 0 ∈C({0,IE f1, . . . ,IE fn}), and
therefore 0 ∈C({0,IEλ1 f1, . . . ,IEλn fn}), whence indeed 0 ∈C⌋E({0, f1, . . . , fn}).
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Remark that there are no constraints on the conditioning event E in Proposi-
tion 150↶: if C is coherent, then C⌋E is coherent for every conditioning event
E in P∅(X). This means that, using choice functions, we can condition on
every event, even if this event has probability zero for some of the linear pre-
visions in the set of linear previsions corresponding to the lower prevision PC
associated with the choice function C through Equation (2.25)72.
For rejection sets, the definition of conditioning on an event E in P∅(X)
is very similar. Since R(A) = A∖C(A) for all A inQ(L(E ×R)), we find that
R⌋E(A) = A∖C⌋E(A) = A∖{ f ∈ A ∶ IE f ∈C(IEA)} = { f ∈ A ∶ IE f ∈ R(IEA)}
for all A in Q(L(E ×R)). Therefore, by Proposition 150↶, if R is a coherent
rejection function on L(X ×R) and E a conditioning event in P∅(X), then
R⌋E is a coherent rejection function on L(E ×R).
Definition 45 (Conditional choice relation). Given any choice relation ⊲ onL(X×R) and any conditioning event E in P∅(X), we define the choice rela-
tion ⊲⌋E conditional on E as
A1 ⊲⌋E A2⇔ IEA1 ⊲ IEA2, for all A1 and A2 in Q(L(E ×R)).
Definition 45 is conceptually a reformulation of Definition 44208: they are
essentially identical, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 151. Consider any coherent choice function C on L(X ×R),
any coherent choice relation ⊲ on L(X ×R) and any conditioning event E
in P∅(X). Then ⊲C⌋E = ⊲C⌋E and C⊲⌋E =C⊲⌋E . As a consequence, ⊲⌋E is
coherent.
Proof. For the first statement, consider any A1 and A2 inQ(L(E×R)), and infer from
Definition 45 and Equation (2.19)61 that A1 ⊲C⌋E A2 ⇔ IE A1 ⊲C IE A2 ⇔ C(IE A1 ∪
IE A2) ⊆ IE A2∖IE A1 = IE(A2∖A1). By Definition 44208, this is equivalent to C⌋E(A1∪
A2) ⊆ A2∖A1, and using Equation (2.19)61 therefore indeed also A1 ⊲C⌋E A2.
For the second statement, consider any A in Q(L(E ×R)), and infer that indeed
C⊲⌋E(A) = { f ∈ A ∶ IE f ∈C⊲(IE A)} = { f ∈ A ∶ {IE f} ⋪ IE A} = { f ∈ A ∶ { f}⋪⌋E A} =
C⊲⌋E(A), where the first equality is due to Definition 44208, the second and the fourth
equalities are by Definition 416, and the third equality is due to Definition 45.
For the consequence, by Proposition 1322 we know that the coherence of ⊲ implies
the coherence of C⊲ , and by Proposition 150↶, we have that C⊲⌋E is a coherent choice
function on L(E ×R), and therefore ⊲C⊲ ⌋E is a coherent choice relation. We have just
shown that C⊲⌋E = C⊲⌋E , so ⊲C⊲ ⌋E = ⊲⌋E, whence ⊲⌋E is indeed a coherent choice
relation.
Conditioning preserves the ordering between choice functions.
Proposition 152. Consider coherent choice functions C1 and C2 on L(X×R)
and a conditioning event E in P∅(X). If C1 ⊑C2 then C1⌋E ⊑C2⌋E.
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Proof. Consider any A in Q(L(E ×R)) and any f in C2⌋E(A). We will show that
then f ∈C1⌋E(A). Since f ∈C2⌋E(A), by Definition 44208 we infer that IE f ∈C2(IE A),
and therefore also IE f ∈C1(IE A), because C1 ⊑ C2. By Definition 44208, we see that
then indeed f ∈C1⌋E(A).
As a consequence, Propositions 151 and 152 together imply that ⊲1⌋E ⊑ ⊲2⌋E
for all coherent choice relations ⊲1 and ⊲2 on L(E×R) for which ⊲1 ⊑ ⊲2, and
every conditioning event E in P∅(X).
6.2.1 Relation with desirability
Is Definition 44208—or the equivalent version Definition 45—a suitable def-
inition of conditioning? One of the useful properties our definition has, is
that it preserves coherence, as shown in Proposition 150209. But does it also
generalise the definition in Section 6.1206 of conditional sets of desirable gam-
bles, or in other words, do Definitions 44208 and 45 reduce to the definition
of conditioning sets of desirable gambles in Section 6.1206 when only con-
sidering binary choice? Of course, to investigate this, we must keep in mind
the connection between choice models and desirability, explained in detail in
Section 2.855.
For our two conditioning rules—the one for desirability and the one for
choice models—to be a match, there are definitively two conditions to be met:
(i) the conditioning rule for choice functions should revert to the known condi-
tioning rule for the corresponding sets of desirable gambles, and (ii) in the
special case of purely binary choice, the conditioning for choice functions
should coincide with the conditioning rule for desirability. We proceed to
show that both these requirements are satisfied. Mathematically, (i) means that
DC⌋E = DC⌋E for every coherent choice function C on L(X ×R) and condi-
tioning event E in P∅(X), and (ii) means that CD⌋E =CD⌋E for every coherent
set of desirable gambles D ⊆L(X×R) and conditioning event E in P∅(X).
Proposition 153. Consider any coherent choice function C on L(X×R), any
coherent set of desirable gambles D ⊆L(X×R) and any conditioning event E
in P∅(X). Then DC⌋E =DC⌋E and CD⌋E =CD⌋E .
Proof. For the first statement, derive the following equalities, from the definition of
conditional sets of desirable gambles and Proposition 5361:
DC⌋E = { f ∈L(E ×R) ∶ IE f ∈ DC} = { f ∈L(E ×R) ∶ 0 ∉C({0,IE f})}.
But by Definition 44208 0 ∉ C({0,IE f})⇔ 0 ∉ C⌋E({0, f}), and therefore indeed
DC⌋E = { f ∈ L(E ×R) ∶ 0 ∉C⌋E({0, f})} = DC⌋E , using Proposition 5361 for the last
equality.
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For the second statement, consider any A in Q(L(E ×R)), then
CD⌋E(A) = { f ∈ A ∶ IE f ∈CD(IE A)} = { f ∈ A ∶ (∀g ∈ IE A)g− IE f ∉ D}= { f ∈ A ∶ (∀g ∈ A)IE g− IE f ∉ D}= { f ∈ A ∶ (∀g ∈ A)g− f ∉ D⌋E} =CD⌋E(A),
where the first equality follows from Definition 44208, the second and the fifth equali-
ties are due to Proposition 5462, and the fourth equality follows from the definition of
conditional sets of desirable gambles.
As a consequence, by Propositions 149207 and 151210, also D⊲⌋E = D⊲⌋E
and ½⊲⌋E = ½⊲⌋E for every coherent choice relation ⊲ on L(X ×R), and½C⌋E = ½C⌋E for every coherent choice function C on L(X ×R). Likewise,
consequently also CD⌋E =CD⌋E and ⊲D⌋E = ⊲D⌋E for every coherent set of de-
sirable gambles D ⊆L(X×R), and ⊲½⌋E = ⊲½⌋E for every coherent preference
relation ½ on L(X×R).
The interplay between choice models and desirability leads to a similar
result as in Corollary 5967:
Corollary 154. Consider any coherent set of desirable gambles D ⊆L(X×R),
any coherent choice function C on L(X×R) and any conditioning event E inP∅(X). Then D⌋E =DCD ⌋E and C⌋E ⊒CDC⌋E .
Proof. For the first statement, use Proposition 153↶ with C ∶=CD , and Corollary 5967.
For the second statement, use Proposition 153↶ with D ∶= DC to find that CDC⌋E =
CDC ⌋E, and infer that, using Corollary 5967 and Proposition 152210, therefore indeed
C⌋E ⊒ CDC⌋E .
We can obtain similar properties by substituting ½ for D and ⊲ for C.
These statements are summarised in the commuting diagram of Figure 6.2,
where we use the maps
D⋅∶C→D∶C↦DC,
C⋅∶D→C∶D↦CD ,
and ⋅⌋E, to denote conditioning a set of desirable gambles D or a choice func-
tion C.
6.3 INFIMA OF CHOICE MODELS
Let us now investigate how conditioning fits into the framework of different
classes of choice functions, such as M-admissible and E-admissible choice
functions. If we have a collection C of coherent choice functions on L(X ×R), by Proposition 4048 its infimum infC is again a coherent choice function
on L(X ×R), and therefore so is infC⌋E, for every E in P∅(X). But can
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C C⌋E ⊒CDC⌋E
DC DC⌋E =DC⌋E
⋅⌋E
D⋅ C⋅D⋅⋅⌋E
Figure 6.2: Commuting diagram for conditioning with choice models and de-
sirability: Start with a coherent choice function C. Conditioning it on E di-
rectly leads to a more informative model than going to the corresponding set
of desirable gambles, and perform the conditioning there, before going back to
the corresponding choice function.
we retrieve infC⌋E also by conditioning every choice function in C? By the
next proposition, it turns out that we can: we obtain a similar result as in the
discussion in Section 2.646.
Proposition 155. Consider any collection C of coherent choice functions onL(X×R), and any conditioning event E in P∅(X). Then infC⌋E = inf{C⌋E ∶
C ∈ C}.
Proof. Consider any A in Q(L(E ×R)) and any f in A. By Definition 44208, we see
that f ∈ infC⌋E(A)⇔ IE f ∈ infC(IE A)=⋃C∈CC(IE A), or, equivalently, IE f ∈C(IE A)
for some C in C. By Definition 44208, we also have the following equivalences(∃C ∈ C)IE f ∈C(IE A)⇔ (∃C ∈ C) f ∈C⌋E(A)⇔ f ∈ ⋃
C∈CC⌋E(A) = (inf{C⌋E ∶C ∈ C})(A),
so f ∈ infC⌋E(A) ⇔ f ∈ (inf{C⌋E ∶ C ∈ C})(A), and therefore indeed infC⌋E =
inf{C⌋E ∶C ∈ C}.
Therefore, in particular, for the collection CD ∶= {CD ∶ D ∈ D} of coherent
choice functions based on a collection D ⊆ D of coherent sets of desirable
(vector-valued) gambles, we have infCD⌋E = inf{CD⌋E ∶D ∈D} for every E inP∅(X). But due to Proposition 153211, infCD⌋E is now easy to find: it is equal
to inf{CD⌋E ∶D ∈D}, so it suffices to condition every set of desirable gambles
in D.
Let us take this one step further, and investigate an example of conditioning
choice functions based on {Dp ∶ p ∈M}, where M is an arbitrary subset of
ΣX , where X is now assumed to be finite. Remember from Section 2.1081 that
we call such choice functions inf{CDp ∶ p ∈M} E-admissible with respect toM, and that we denote them by CEM, or equivalently, by CEK when we use,
instead ofM, the corresponding setK of linear previsions on X, introduced in
Section 2.855.
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Example 23. Consider a setM of mass functions on X and a set U of utilities
on R—real-valued maps on R that attach a specific utility to every r in R.
With each mass function p inM and with each utility u in U , we let correspond
an expectation operator—or linear prevision—Ep,u on L(X×R):
Ep,u( f ) ∶= ∑
x∈X ∑r∈R p(x)u(r) f (x,r) for all f in L(X×R).
We collect these expectation operators in the setK ∶= {Ep,u ∶ p ∈M,u ∈U}, and
we can associate with K an E-admissible choice function (see Section 2.1081),
in the usual way:
CEK(A) ∶= ⋃
E∈KCE{E}(A) = ⋃E∈K{ f ∈A ∶ (∀g ∈A)(E(g) ≤E( f ) and f /< g)} (6.4)
for all A in Q(L(X×R)).
Consider any event B in P∅(X) and let us find the conditioned E-
admissible choice function CEK⌋B. Consider any option set A in Q(L(B×R))
and any f in A. Infer using Definition 44208 that
f ∈CEK⌋B(A)⇔ IB f ∈CEK(IBA) = ⋃
E∈KCE{E}(IBA),
and, using Equation (6.4), also that
f ∈CEK⌋B(A)⇔ (∃E ∈K)(∀g ∈ A)(E(IBg) ≤ E(IB f ) and f /< g).
We distinguish between two possibilities: (i) E(IB×R) > 0 for all E inK, or (ii)
E(IB×R) = 0 for some E in K. If (i) (∀E ∈K)E(IB×R) > 0 then, since Bayes’s
Rule tells us that3 E(h⌋B) = E(IBh)E(IB×R) for every gamble h on B×R and any E
in K,
f ∈CEK⌋B(A)⇔ (∃E ∈K)(∀g ∈ A)(E(g⌋B) ≤ E( f ⌋B) and f /< g).
This means that we obtain the same result as if we were to condition every
element of K directly by Bayes’s Rule. To simplify the notation, we introduceK⌋B as a short-hand notation for {E(⋅⌋B) ∶ E ∈K}. Then
f ∈CEK⌋B(A)⇔ (∃E ∈K⌋B)(∀g ∈A)(E(g)≤E( f ) and f /< g)⇔ f ∈CEK⌋B(A),
3For the expectation operator Ep ,u that corresponds to the mass function p and the util-
ity u, we let its conditional variant Ep ,u(⋅⌋B) be the one that corresponds to the conditional
mass function p(⋅⌋B) and the utility u. By Bayes’s Rule—the conditioning rule for precise
probabilities—this conditional mass function p(⋅⌋B) is given by p(x)∑y∈B p(y) for every x in B.
Since∑y∈B p(y) = Ep ,u(IB×R) therefore Ep ,u( f ⌋B) = 1Ep ,u(IB×R )∑x∈B∑r∈R p(x)u(r) f (x,r) =
1
Ep ,u(IB×R )∑x∈X∑r∈R p(x)u(r)(IB f )(x,r) = Ep ,u(IB f)Ep ,u(IB×R ) for every f in L(B×R).
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so CEK⌋B =CEK⌋B if E(IB×R) > 0 for all E in K.
If (ii) (∃E ∈ K)E(IB×R) = 0 then, for this E, by linearity we find
E(IBh) = E(∑x∈B∑r∈R h(x,r)I{x}×R) =∑x∈B∑r∈R h(x,r)E(I{x}×R) = 0 for
every gamble h on B, since 0 = minI{x}×R ≤ E(I{x}×R) ≤ E(IB×R) = 0 for
every x in B, and therefore
f ∈CEK⌋B(A)⇔ (∀g ∈ A) f /< g⇔ f ∈maxA⇔ f ∈Cv(A).
Therefore CEK⌋B =Cv is the vacuous choice function on L(B×R). Translating
this back to sets of linear previsions, since we have seen in Example 1186 that
Cv ⊏ CEPB , with PB ∶= {Ep,u ∶ p ∈ ΣB,u ∈ U} the set of all expectation operators
corresponding with U , and therefore CEK⌋B ⊏ CEPB , this means that even con-
sidering the set of all linear previsions on B is not uninformative enough to
describe K⌋B. But PB is the unique least informative set of linear previsions,
so the best we can do, is let K⌋B correspond with PB.
In conclusion, we retrieve natural extension [8, 18, 82] as a conditioning
rule: K⌋B = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩{E(⋅⌋B) ∶ E ∈K} if E(IB×R) > 0 for all E in K,PB otherwise,
and we find that CEK⌋B =CEK⌋B if E(IB×R) > 0 for all E in K, and CEK⌋B =Cv ⊏
CEK⌋B =CEPX if E(IB×R) = 0 for some E in K. If K = {E} with E(IB×R) > 0,
then we recover Bayes’s Rule as a special case of our conditioning rule for
choice functions. ◊
6.4 THE COIN EXAMPLE REVISITED
We revisit the “coin example” (Example 1085) to show that allowing for non-
archimedeanity is important in a conditioning context. As in Example 1085,
we will work with real-valued gambles L(X), which can be identified with
vector-valued gambles L(X×R) with ∣R∣ = 1.
Let us consider again the situation of Example 1085 where we have a coin
with two identical sides of unknown type: either both sides are heads (H), or
both sides are tails (T). In order to be able to obtain non-trivial conditional
uncertainty models, we need to extend the binary possibility space {H,T} to
some ternary set, at least. We therefore consider the possibility that the coin
lands on its side, indicated by S, yielding the possibility space X = {H,T,S}.
We consider two events to condition on: {H,T}, and {H,S}.
As we explained in some detail in Example 1085, desirability is not very
well suited for modelling this situation. Instead, we will use the more powerful
choice function languages.
As a first attempt, we consider E-admissible choice functions, based on the
set K ∶= {EH,ET} consisting of the two degenerate linear previsions EH( f ) =
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f (H) and ET( f ) = f (T) for every gamble f on X, expressing certainty about
H and T, respectively. Letting C1 ∶=CEK we find that for all A in Q(L(X)):
0 ∈ R1(A)⇔ 0 ∈ RE{EH}(A)∩RE{ET}(A)⇔ A∩L>0 ≠∅ or ((∃ f1, f2 ∈ A)0 < f1(H) and 0 < f2(T)).
Conditioning an E-admissible choice function on an event E for which P(IE) >
0 for all P in K, corresponds by Example 23214 to conditioning the set of lin-
ear previsions it is derived from. To find C1⌋E, with E one of our two envi-
sioned events {H,T} and {H,S}, all we have to do is find K⌋E. For K⌋{H,T},
both EH({H,T}) = I{H,T}(H) = 1 > 0 and ET({H,T}) = 1 > 0 are positive, and
therefore K⌋{H,T} = {P(⋅⌋{H,T}) ∶ P ∈ K}. But EH( f ⌋{H,T}) = f (H) and
ET( f ⌋{H,T}) = f (T) for all gambles f on {H,T}, so we find that
0 ∈ R1⌋{H,T}(A)⇔ A∩L>0 ≠∅ or ((∃ f1, f2 ∈ A)0 < f1(H) and 0 < f2(T))
for all A in Q(L({H,T})), corresponding to the E-admissible model for the
original coin example (Example 1085). On the other hand, for K⌋{H,S}, re-
mark that ET({H,S}) = I{H,S}(T) = 0. But then, by Example 23214, C1⌋{H,S}
is the vacuous choice function on L({H,S}). So E-admissible choice func-
tions seem too restrictive to model this situation: conditioning on {H,S} re-
sults in a vacuous model, even though the conditioning event does not contra-
dict the assumptions of the example. The following table summarises what C1
conditioned on {H,T} and {H,S} expresses:
⌋{H,T} ⌋{H,S}
C1 certainty about H or T vacuous
E-admissible choice functions—based on linear previsions—therefore
seem to be not ideally suited for this example, but we now show that M-
admissible choice functions—based on maximal sets of desirable gambles—
behave more appropriately. The coherent sets of desirable gambles L>0∪{ f ∈L(X) ∶ f (H) > 0} and L>0 ∪ { f ∈ L(X) ∶ f (T) > 0} correspond to EH and
ET respectively—and therefore express certainty about H or about T—in the
sense that they are the least-committal sets of desirable gambles that in-
duce EH and ET, respectively.4 But to get to an M-admissible choice func-
tion, we need to consider two coherent maximal sets of desirable gambles
DˆH ⊇ L>0 ∪{ f ∈ L(X) ∶ f (H) > 0} and DˆT ⊇ L>0 ∪{ f ∈ L(X) ∶ f (T) > 0}, ex-
pressing maximal beliefs that induce the linear previsions EH and ET respec-
4In Section 2.855 we explain in some detail the connection between desirability and probabil-
ity.
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tively. In this example, we consider for instance
DˆH ∶=L>0∪{ f ∈L(X) ∶ f (H) > 0 or f (H) = 0 < f (T)}, (6.5)
DˆT ∶=L>0∪{ f ∈L(X) ∶ f (T) > 0 or f (T) = 0 < f (H)}. (6.6)
Actually, DˆH and DˆT are lexicographic sets of desirable gambles. DˆH cor-
responds to the lexicographic probability system (pH, pT, p) of the two de-
generate probability mass functions pH = I{H} and pT = I{T} and the arbitrary
probability mass function p for which p(S) > 0—for instance p = pS ∶= I{S} is
a good choice for p—, and DˆT to (pT, pH, p).
Lemma 156. The sets of desirable gambles DˆH and DˆT as defined in Equa-
tions (6.5) and (6.6) are coherent and maximal.
Proof. By Proposition 103139, it suffices to show that kerEH ∩ kerET ∩ kerP = {0},
where P is the linear prevision associated with p: P( f ) = p(H) f (H)+ p(T) f (T)+
p(S) f (S) for every gamble f . Since kerEH = kerI{H} = { f ∈L ∶ f (H) = 0} and, simi-
larly kerET = { f ∈L ∶ f (T) = 0}, we have already that kerEH∩kerET = { f ∈L ∶ f (H) =
f (T) = 0}. Note that therefore kerEH∩kerET∩kerP≠ {0} if and only if there is some
gamble f such that f (H) = f (T) = 0 ≠ f (S) in kerP, which contradicts that p(S) > 0.
Therefore indeed kerEH∩kerET∩kerP= {0}.
The M-admissible choice function C2 that models this situation is then
given by C2 ∶= inf{CDˆH ,CDˆT}. To find C2⌋E, with E one of our two envisioned
events {H,T} and {H,S}, thanks to Propositions 153211 and 155213, all we
have to do is find DˆH⌋E and DˆT⌋E. So let us calculate DˆH⌋E and DˆT⌋E for
the first envisioned conditioning event E = {H,T}. By definition, DˆH⌋{H,T} ={ f ∈ L({H,T}) ∶ I{H,T} f ∈ DˆH}. Remark that I{H,T} f evaluated in S is 0, so
I{H,T} f ∈ DˆH⇔ ( f ∈L>0 or f (H) > 0 or f (H) = 0 < f (T)). If f (H) = 0 < f (T)
then f ∈L>0, and therefore DˆH⌋{H,T} =L>0∪{ f ∈L({H,T}) ∶ f (H) > 0}, so
conditioning DˆH on {H,T} leads to a maximal set of desirable gambles that
expresses only commitment towards H: any gamble that has a positive value
in H is considered desirable. Similarly, DˆT⌋{H,T} = L>0 ∪ { f ∈ L({H,T}) ∶
f (T) > 0}. But on the binary possibility space {H,T} the only coherent sets
of desirable gambles that induce the degenerate linear previsions EH and ET
respectively, are L>0 ∪ { f ∈ L ∶ f (H) > 0} and L>0 ∪ { f ∈ L ∶ f (T) > 0}, so
C2⌋{H,T} =C1⌋{H,T}, and behaves therefore also as expected under condi-
tioning on {H,T}.
To condition C2 on the other envisioned conditioning event {H,S}—recall
from the discussion above that conditioning C1 on {H,S} leads to the vacuous
choice function C1⌋{H,S}, which may be considered too uninformative—it
suffices again to find DˆH⌋{H,S} and DˆT⌋{H,S}. By definition, DˆH⌋{H,S} ={ f ∈ L({H,S}) ∶ I{H,S} f ∈ DˆH}. The gamble I{H,S} f evaluated in T is 0,
so I{H,S} f ∈ DˆH ⇔ ( f ∈ L>0 or f (H) > 0 or f (H) = 0 < f (T)). Therefore
DˆH⌋{H,S} =L>0∪{ f ∈L({H,S}) ∶ f (H) > 0} is very similar to DˆH⌋{H,T}: it
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is again a maximal set of desirable gambles that expresses only commitment
towards H. For DˆT, by definition DˆT⌋{H,S} = { f ∈L({H,S}) ∶ I{H,S} f ∈ DˆT}.
Note that I{H,S} f evaluated in T is 0, and therefore I{H,S} f ∈ DˆT ⇔ ( f ∈L>0 or f (H) > 0). Then DˆT⌋{H,S} = DˆH⌋{H,S} again we obtain a maximal
set of desirable gambles that expresses only commitment towards H. This is as
expected because we know the lexicographic probability system (pT, pH, p)
it corresponds to: if the first layer—corresponding to pT—has probability
zero, the next thing to do is consider the second layer—corresponding to pH.
So C2⌋{H,S} is the infimum of two equal choice functions CDˆH⌋{H,S} and
CDˆT⌋{H,S}. It is given by
C2⌋{H,S}(A) = argmax{ f (H) ∶ f ∈ A}∩Cv(A) for all A in Q(L({H,S})),
so it is a maximal choice function. Compare this with the, in our view unnec-
essarily, vacuous C1⌋{H,S}.
The following table summarises the behaviour C2 conditioned on {H,T}
and {H,S}, and compares it with that of C1.⌋{H,T} ⌋{H,S}
C1 certainty about H or T vacuous
C2 certainty about H or T certainty about H
In analogy with the comparable situation for desirability, the non-Archimedean
nature of the maximal choice functions here allows us to preserve non-trivial
conditional preferences, and therefore represents non-vacuous conditional in-
formation. This is not the case for the Archimedean E-admissible choice func-
tion C1.
6.5 CONCLUSION
We have defined how to condition choice models on an event. This is done
using the same simple underlying ideas as conditioning sets of desirable gam-
bles. We have established the useful result that the infimum of a collectionC of coherent choice functions can be conditioned using the coherent choice
functions in C directly. This implies that the infimum of a collection CD of
coherent purely binary choice functions can be conditioned using the coherent
sets of desirable vector-valued gambles in D directly. As we have shown in
Example 23214, this also shows that when using conditioning for choice mod-
els we retrieve the natural extension as a conditioning rule for sets of linear
previsions.
The connection between conditioning for choice models and for desirabil-
ity models is established in Proposition 153211: it guarantees that a purely
binary choice function can be conditioned using its defining set of desirable
vector-valued gambles. Coherent sets of desirable gambles—or coherent pref-
erence relations for that matter—on L(X ×R) have the property that, for any
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partition T ofX, if f ∈D⌋E for every E in T , then also f ∈D unconditionally—
this is a direct consequence of the fact that f =∑E∈T IE f and Axiom D457. In
other words, if f is preferred to 0 conditionally on every E in T , then f is pre-
ferred to 0 unconditionally. For choice models, however, one straight-forward
generalisation of this—((∀E ∈ T ){0}⊲⌋E A)⇒ {0} ⊲ A—does not generally
hold.
To see why, let X ∶= {H,T} and T ∶= {{H},{T}} a partition of X, and
consider the following figure.
H
T
f
g
I{H} f
I{T} f
I{T}g
I{H}g
Collect the gambles f and g in A. Note that I{T} f > 0, so {0}⊲⌋{T}A, and
similarly, I{H}g > 0, so {0} ⊲⌋{H}A for any coherent choice relation, while not
necessarily {0} ⊲ A: consider for instance the E-admissible choice function
CE{E} with uniform prevision E(h) ∶= 12(h(H)+h(T)). Imposing the additional
axioms considered in Reference [67] does not help: indeed, CE{E} =CDE and
DE is a lexicographic set of desirable gambles, so by Proposition 91127, CE{E}
satisfies Property C525, and, moreover, it is an E-admissible choice function,
so it is Archimedean as well (see Reference [45, Lemma 6]).
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MULTIVARIATE CHOICE FUNCTIONS
In this chapter, we will generalise the concepts of marginalisation, weak (cylin-
drical) extension and irrelevant natural extension introduced by De Cooman
and Miranda from sets of desirable gambles [29] to choice models. To avoid
notational difficulties and to streamline the argument, we will work with
vector-valued gambles. We will build on the previous chapters, where we have
shown how to work with choice models on arbitrary vector spaces, and demon-
strated how choice models on vector-valued gambles are a particular case of
them.
We will provide the linear space of vector-valued gambles, on which we
define our choice models, with a more complex structure: we will consider the
vector space of all gambles whose state part1 of its domain is a Cartesian prod-
uct of a finite number of finite possibility spaces. More specifically, consider
n in N variables X1, . . . , Xn that assume values in the finite possibility spacesX1, . . . , Xn, respectively. Belief models about these variables X1, . . . , Xn—be
they choice models or desirability models—will work with the vector-valued
gambles on X1, . . . , Xn: with elements of L(X1 ×R), . . . , L(Xn ×R). The
vector spaces L(X1 ×R), . . . , L(Xn ×R) are ordered by the standard point-
wise vector ordering ≤: for any k in {1, . . . ,n}, and any f and g in L(Xk ×R),
we have that
f ≤ g⇔ (∀xk ∈Xk,r ∈R) f (xk,r) ≤ g(xk,r)⇔ (∀xk ∈Xk) f (xk,⋅) ≤ g(xk,⋅).
We can define gambles also on the Cartesian product (⨉nk=1Xk)×R, giving rise
1In the definition of vector-valued gambles, Definition 928, we have defined the state part of
the domain as X, and the reward part as R. In this chapter, we assume that the reward pard R is
fixed throughout.
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to the particular (∏nk=1∣Xk∣)∣R∣-dimensional linear space L((⨉nk=1Xk)×R) of
gambles on (⨉nk=1Xk)×R—or vector-valued gambles on ⨉nk=1Xk.
As this chapter builds heavily on results of De Cooman and Miranda [29]
for sets of desirable gambles, we follow the notation established there. Further-
more, the flow of the arguments presented here for choice models is roughly
the same as that for desirability in their paper.
7.1 BASIC NOTATION AND CYLINDRICAL EXTENSION
For every non-empty subset I ⊆ {1, . . . ,n} of indices, we let XI be the tuple of
variables that takes values in XI ∶=⨉r∈IXr. This Cartesian product is the set of
all maps xI from I to⋃i∈IXi such that xi ∶= xI(i) ∈Xi for all i in I. We will denote
generic elements of XI as xI or zI , with corresponding components xi ∶= xI(i)
or zi ∶= zI(i), for all i in I. The set L(XI ×R) of all vector-valued gambles onXI is a linear space. When I = {1, . . . ,n}, we will use as a shorthand notation
X1∶n ∶= X{1,...,n}, taking values in X1∶n ∶= X{1,...,n} and whose generic elements
are denoted by x1∶n ∶= x{1,...,n} = (x1, . . . ,xn).
We assume that the variables X1, . . . , Xn are logically independent, meaning
that for each non-empty subset I or {1, . . . ,n}, xI may assume every value inXI .
It will be useful for any vector-valued gamble f on X1∶n, any non-empty
proper subset I of {1, . . . ,n} and any xI in XI , to interpret the partial map2
f (xI ,⋅,⋅) as a vector-valued gamble on XIc , whose value in every xIc of XIc
is given by f (xI ,xIc ,⋅), where Ic ∶= {1, . . . ,n}∖ I. Likewise, for any set A of
gambles on X1∶n, we let A(xI ,⋅) ∶= { f (xI ,⋅) ∶ f ∈ A} be a corresponding set of
vector-valued gambles on XIc .
For every non-empty subset I of {1, . . . ,n}, the linear space L(XI ×R) is
also ordered by a vector ordering ≤. Given any two gambles f and g on XI ,
we let f ≤ g⇔ (∀xI ∈ XI ,r ∈ R) f (xI ,r) ≤ g(xI ,r). As a particular case, if
I = {1, . . . , i} for some i ≤ n, since XI =⨉i∈IXi, we denote this equivalently also
as (∀x1 ∈ X1, . . . ,xi ∈ Xi,r ∈R) f (x1, . . . ,xi,r) ≤ g(x1, . . . ,xi,r). Similarly, we
have that f < g⇔ ((∀xI ∈XI ,r ∈R) f (xI ,r)≤ g(xI ,r) and f ≠ g). For any O ⊆ I,
this is equivalent to ((∀xO ∈XO) f (xO ,⋅) ≤ g(xO ,⋅) and (∃zO ∈XO) f (zO ,⋅) <
g(zO ,⋅)).
We will need a way to relate gambles on different domains:
Definition 46 (Cylindrical extension). Given two disjoint and non-empty sub-
sets I and I′ of {1, . . . ,n} and any vector-valued gamble f on XI , we let its
cylindrical extension f ∗ to XI∪I′ be defined by
f ∗(xI ,xI′ ,r) ∶= f (xI ,r) for all xI in XI , xI′ in XI′ , and r in R.
2The rightmost placeholder refers to the reward part. When no confusion can arise, we will
treat the reward part in the same way as the state part, and write f (xI ,⋅) to mean a vector-valued
gamble on XIc , or, in other words, a gamble on XIc ×R.
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Similarly, given any set of gambles A ⊆L(XI ×R), we let its cylindrical exten-
sion A∗ ⊆L(XI∪I′ ×R) be defined as A∗ ∶= { f ∗ ∶ f ∈ A}.
Formally, f ∗ belongs toL(XI∪I′×R) while f belongs toL(XI×R). However,
f ∗ is completely determined by f and vice versa: they clearly only depend
on the value of XI ×R, and as such, they contain the same information and
correspond to the same transaction. They are therefore indistinguishable from
a behavioural point of view.
Remark 7.1. As is done in References [20,29], we will frequently use the sim-
plifying device of identifying a vector-valued gamble f on XI with its cylin-
drical extension f ∗ on XI∪I′ , for any disjoint and non-empty subsets I and I′
of the index set {1, . . . ,n}. This convention allows us for instance to identifyL(XI ×R) with a subset of L(X1∶n ×R), and, as another example, for any
set A ⊆ L(X1∶n ×R), to regard A ∩L(XI ×R) as those vector-valued gambles
in A that depend on the value of XI only. Therefore, for any event E ⊆ XI
we can identify the gamble IE with IE×X{1,...,n}∖I , and hence also the event E
with E ×X{1,...,n}∖I . This device for instance also allows us to write, for any
f on XI ×R and f ′ on XI∪I′ ×R with I and I′ disjoint and non-empty subsets
of the index set {1, . . . ,n}, that f ≤ f ′⇔ (∀xI ∈ XI ,xI′ ∈ XI′ ,r ∈R) f (xI ,r) ≤
f ′(xI ,xI′ ,r), and more generally, for any A ⊆L(XI×R) and A′ ⊆L(XI∪I′ ×R),
that
A ≼A′⇔ (∀ f ∈A)(∃ f ′ ∈A′)(∀xI ∈XI ,xI′ ∈XI′ ,r ∈R) f (xI ,r) ≤ f ′(xI ,xI′ ,r).◊
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Suppose we have a choice function C on L(X1∶n ×R) modelling a subject’s
beliefs about the variable X1∶n. What is the information that C contains about
XO , where O is some non-empty subset of the index set {1, . . . ,n}? Finding
this information can be done through marginalisation.
Definition 47 (Marginalisation). Given any non-empty subset O of {1, . . . ,n}
and any choice function C on L(X1∶n ×R), its marginal choice function
margOC is determined by
margOC(A) ∶=C(A) for all A in Q(L(XO ×R)).
Without using our simplifying device (see Remark 7.1) of identifying gambles
with their cylindrical extension, and instead explicitly denoting the cylindrical
extension by an asterisk as in Definition 46, marginalisation looks as follows
margOC(A) = { f ∈ A ∶ f ∗ ∈C(A∗)} for all A in Q(L(XO ×R)).
As it will be always clear on which vector-valued gambles the joint choice
function C is defined, the use of our simplifying devices cannot lead to con-
fusion, and hence, in the remainder of this chapter, we will work with the
notation used in Definition 47.
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It follows at once from the definition that marginalisation preserves the ‘at
most as informative as’ relation:
C1 ⊑C2⇒margOC1 ⊑ margOC2
for all choice functions C1 and C2 on L(X1∶n×R).
Marginalisation can be defined for rejection functions and choice rela-
tions as well. We let the marginal rejection function margOR of some rejec-
tion function R on L(X1∶n ×R) be given by margOR(A) ∶= R(A) for all A inQ(L(XO ×R)). Similarly, we let the marginal choice relation ⊲′ =margO⊲ of
some choice relation ⊲ on L(X1∶n×R) be given by A1 ⊲′ A2⇔ A1 ⊲ A2 for all
A1 and A2 in Q(L(XO ×R)). These definitions are essentially equivalent:
Proposition 157. Consider any non-empty subset O of {1, . . . ,n}, any cor-
responding choice function C, rejection function R and choice relation ⊲ onL(X1∶n×R), and any corresponding choice function C′, rejection function R′
and choice relation ⊲′ on L(XO ×R). Then the following three statements are
equivalent:
(i) C′ =margOC;
(ii) R′ =margOR;
(iii) ⊲′ =margO⊲.
As a consequence, margOC =CmargO R =CmargO⊲ , margOR = RmargOC = RmargO⊲
and margO⊲ = ⊲margOC = ⊲margO R .
Proof. For the first part—that (i), (ii) and (iii) are equivalent—we will show
that (i)⇔(ii) and (ii)⇔(iii). To show (i)⇔(ii), note that R(A) = A ∖C(A) and
R′(A) = A∖C′(A) for all A in Q(L(XO ×R)), and recall the following equivalences:
C′ = margOC⇔ (∀A ∈Q(L(XO ×R)))C′(A) =C(A)⇔ (∀A ∈Q(L(XO ×R)))R′(A) = A∖C′(A) = A∖C(A) = R(A)⇔ R′ = margOR.
To show (ii)⇔(iii), note that A1 ⊲ A2⇔ A1 ⊆ R(A1∪A2) and A1 ⊲′ A2⇔ A1 ⊆ R′(A1∪
A2) for all A1 and A2 in Q(L(XO ×R)). Recall the following equivalences:
R′ = margO R⇔ (∀A ∈Q(L(XO ×R)))R′(A) = R(A)⇔ (∀A1,A2 ∈Q(L(XO ×R)))(A1 ⊆ R′(A1∪A2)⇔ A1 ⊆ R(A1∪A2))⇔ (∀A1,A2 ∈Q(L(XO ×R)))(A1 ⊲′ A2⇔ A1 ⊲ A2)⇔ ⊲′ = margO⊲.
For the second part, because C, R and ⊲ are compatible, it suffices to prove only
one of the three double identities. We will show the first one, that margOC =CmargO R =
CmargO⊲ . To this end, let the choice function C′ ∶= margOC on L(XO ×R), and there-
fore, using that R′ = RC′ = RmargOC and ⊲′ = ⊲C′ = ⊲margOC , and since we just have
shown that in particular (i)⇒(ii) and (i)⇒(iii), this implies that RmargOC =margO R and⊲margOC = margO⊲. Because C, R and ⊲ are compatible therefore indeed margOC =
CmargO R and margOC =CmargO⊲ .
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Now that marginalisation has been defined for all types of choice models,
and their connection is clear, we can focus on any one of them. In what follows,
we will work with choice or rejection functions, and use them interchangeably.
Observe that repeated marginalisation, with non-empty subsets O1 and O2 of{1, . . . ,n} such that O1∩O2 ≠∅ is the same as marginalisation with O1∩O2:
margO1 ○margO2 =margO2 ○margO1 =margO1∩O2 .
Coherence is preserved under marginalisation:
Proposition 158. Consider any choice function C on L(X1∶n ×R), and con-
sider any non-empty subset O of {1, . . . ,n}. Then, for any property C∗ in{C120,C220,C3a20,C3b20,C4a20,C4b20,C525,C625}, if C satisfies C∗, then
margOC satisfies C∗. As a consequence, if C is coherent, then so is margOC.
Proof. This proposition follows immediately, once we realise that A1 = ∅⇔ A∗1 = ∅,
f < g⇔ f ∗ < g∗, A1 ⊆ A2 ⇔ A∗1 ⊆ A∗2 , f ∈ A1 ⇔ λ f ∗ ∈ λA∗1 , f ∈ conv(A1)⇔ f ∗ ∈
conv(A∗1 ), and f +g ∈ A1 ⇔ f ∗ +g∗ ∈ A∗1 for all f and g in L(XO ×R) whose cylin-
drical extensions are f ∗ and g∗, any A1 and A2 in Q(L(XO ×R)) whose cylindrical
extensions are A∗1 = {h∗ ∶ h ∈ A1} and A∗2 = {h∗ ∶ h ∈ A2}, and any λ in R>0.
Let us compare with desirability. We trivially generalise Reference [29]
in defining, for any non-empty subset O of {1, . . . ,n} and any set of desirable
(vector-valued) gambles D ⊆L(XO ×R), its marginal set of desirable (vector-
valued) gambles margOD as
f ∈margOD⇔ f ∈D, for all f in L(XO ×R).
Therefore, we can find margOD explicitly as
margOD = { f ∈L(XO ×R) ∶ f ∈D} =D∩L(XO ×R). (7.1)
Let us ascertain that the definition of marginalisation for choice models
reduces, in the case of pairwise choice, to the one for desirability:
Proposition 159. Consider any non-empty subset O of {1, . . . ,n}, any choice
function C on L(X1∶n×R), and any set of desirable gambles D ⊆L(X1∶n×R).
Then margOCD =CmargO D and DmargOC =margODC .
Proof. For the first statement, consider any A in Q(L(XO ×R)), and observe that
margOCD(A) =CD(A) = { f ∈ A ∶ (∀g ∈ A)g− f ∉ D}= { f ∈ A ∶ (∀g ∈ A)g− f ∉ D∩L(XO ×R)}= { f ∈ A ∶ (∀g ∈ A)g− f ∉ margOD} =CmargO D(A)
where the first equality follows from Definition 47223, the second and the last one from
Proposition 5462, the third one from the fact that every gamble in A is an element
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of L(XO ×R), and finally, the fourth one from Equation (7.1)↶. Therefore indeed
margOCD =CmargO D .
For the second statement, observe that indeed
DmargOC = { f ∈L(XO ×R) ∶ 0 ∉ margOC({0, f})}= { f ∈L(XO ×R) ∶ 0 ∉C({0, f})} = { f ∈L(XO ×R) ∶ f ∈ DC} = margODC ,
where the first and third equalities follow from Proposition 5361, the second one
from Definition 47223, and the fourth one from Equation (7.1)↶.
Corollary 160. Consider any non-empty subset O of {1, . . . ,n}, any coherent
choice function C on L(X1∶n ×R), and any coherent set of desirable gambles
D ⊆L(X1∶n×R). Then margOD =DmargOCD and margOC ⊒CmargO DC .
Proof. For the first statement, use Proposition 159↶ with C ∶=CD , and Corollary 5967.
For the second statement, use Proposition 159↶ with D ∶= DC to find that
margOCDC = CmargO DC , and infer that, using that marginalisation preserves the ‘at
most as informative as’ relation and Corollary 5967, therefore indeed margOC ⊒
CmargO DC .
Now that marginalisation is in place, and that we know that it coincides
with the eponymous concept for desirability in the case of pairwise choice, we
are ready to look for some kind of inverse operation to it. To fix the discussion,
we will work with rejection functions, but the same ideas apply to the other
types of choice models. Suppose we have a coherent rejection function RO onL(XO ×R) modelling a subject’s beliefs about XO , where O is a non-empty
subset of {1, . . . ,n}. We want to extend this to a coherent rejection function
on L(X1∶n ×R) that represents the same beliefs. So we are looking for a co-
herent rejection function R on L(X1∶n ×R) such that margOR = RO and that
is as uninformative as possible. If it exists, then we call this least informative
extension R the weak extension of RO .3
We now study this notion of weak extension in detail. Given a non-empty
subset O of {1, . . . ,n} and a rejection function RO on L(XO ×R), an assess-
ment based on it that is important for the weak extension, is
B1∶nRO ∶= {A∗ ∶ A ∈Q(L(XO ×R)) and 0 ∈ RO(A)} ⊆Q0(L(X1∶n×R)). (7.2)
To make clear that B1∶nRO is a collection of sets of gambles on X1∶n, we have
made the ‘range of the’ cylindrical extension explicit in its expression. Using
3De Cooman and Miranda [29] have called its counterpart for desirability cylindrical exten-
sion, thereby overloading the meaning of this term. Moral [55] calls the analogous notion in a
very similar context—whose only difference is that 0 is considered desirable—weak extension. In
order to avoid confusion with the cylindrical extension for gambles, we have decided in favour of
the name ‘weak extension’ here.
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our simplifying device of identifying gambles with their cylindrical extensions,
we can equivalently write B1∶nRO = {A ∈Q(L(XO ×R)) ∶ 0 ∈ RO(A)}—and we
will do this throughout—, which we interpret as a subset ofQ0(L(X1∶n×R)),
and therefore as an assessment for choice models on L(X1∶n×R).
It turns out that the weak extension always exists.
Proposition 161 (Weak extension). Consider any non-empty subset O of{1, . . . ,n} and any coherent rejection function RO on L(XO ×R). Then the
least informative coherent rejection function on L(X1∶n×R) that marginalises
to RO is given by
ext1∶n(RO) ∶= RB1∶nRO ,
and it satisfies
margO(ext1∶n(RO)) = RO .
Proof. Use Proposition 7995 to find that RB1∶nRO is the least informative rejection func-
tion that extends B1∶nRO and satisfies Axioms R220–R420.
We will first show that any coherent rejection function R′ on L(X1∶n ×R) that
marginalises to RO must be at least as informative as ext1∶n(RO). To establish this,
since R′ marginalises to RO , note that
R′(A) = RO(A) for all A in Q(L(XO ×R)).
Since both R′ and RO satisfy Axiom R4b20, this is equivalent to
0 ∈ R′(A)⇔ 0 ∈ RO(A), for all A in Q(L(XO ×R)).
Therefore, in particular, 0 ∈ RO(A)⇒ 0 ∈ R′(A) for every A in Q(L(XO ×R)), so
by Definition 2990, R
′ extends B1∶nRO = {A ∈ Q(L(XO ×R)) ∶ 0 ∈ RO(A)}, and since
ext1∶n(RO) is the least informative extension of B1∶nRO that satisfies Axioms R220–R420,
therefore indeed ext1∶n(RO) = ext1∶n(RO) ⊑ R′.
So we already know that any coherent rejection function that marginalises to RO
must be at least as informative as ext1∶n(RO). It therefore suffices to prove that
ext1∶n(RO) is coherent and that it marginalises to RO . To show that ext1∶n(RO) is co-
herent, it suffices to show that B1∶nRO avoids complete rejection. Assume ex absurdo that
this is not the case. By Lemma 8096 there is some A
′ in Q(L(X1∶n ×R)) such that
0 ∈ A′ = maxA′ and
(∀g ∈ A′)(∃B ∈ B1∶nRO ,∃µ ∈R>0){g}+µB ≼ A′,
or, in other words,
(∀g ∈ A′)(∃B ∈Q(L(XO ×R)),∃µ ∈R>0)(0 ∈ RO(B) and {g}+µB ≼ A′).
Since RO is coherent, by Lemma 1221 it satisfies 0 ∈ RO(B)⇔ 0 ∈ RO(µB) for every
B in Q(L(XO ×R)) and µ in R>0, and therefore(∀g ∈ A′)(∃B ∈Q(L(XO ×R)))(0 ∈ RO(B) and {g}+B ≼ A′),
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or, using Proposition 3343(v),
(∀g ∈ A′)(∃B ∈Q(L(XO ×R)))(0 ∈ RO(B) and B ≼ A′−{g}).
Let I ∶= {1, . . . ,n}∖O and fix any xI inXI—so for every g in A′, the partial map g(xI ,⋅)
is a vector-valued gamble on XO (a gamble on XO ×R), and A′(xI ,⋅) = {h(xI ,⋅) ∶ h ∈
A′} is a set of vector-valued gambles on XO—then
(∀g ∈ A′)(∃B ∈Q(L(XO ×R)))(0 ∈ RO(B) and B ≼ A′(xI ,⋅)−{g(xI ,⋅)}).
Use Proposition 3444 to infer that then
(∀g ∈ A′)0 ∈ RO(A′(xI ,⋅)−{g(xI ,⋅)}).
By the coherence of RO—more specifically, by Axiom R4b20—we find that then
(∀g ∈ A′)g(xI ,⋅) ∈ RO(A′(xI ,⋅)),
or, in other words, that
A′(xI ,⋅) ⊆ RO(A′(xI ,⋅)),
which contradicts the coherence [Axiom R120] of RO . So B1∶nRO avoids complete rejec-
tion, and therefore ext1∶n(RO) is indeed coherent by Theorem 8197.
To complete the proof, we show that ext1∶n(RO) marginalises to RO —that
ext1∶n(RO)(A) = RO(A) for every A inQ(L(XO ×R)). Because both ext1∶n(RO) and
RO are coherent rejection functions, Axiom R4b20 guarantees that it suffices to show
that
0 ∈ ext1∶n(RO)(A)⇔ 0 ∈ RO(A), for all A in Q(L(XO ×R)).
For sufficiency, consider any A in Q(L(XO ×R)) such that 0 ∈ RO(A). Then A ∈B1∶nRO , and since we already know that ext1∶n(RO) extends B1∶nRO , therefore indeed 0 ∈
ext1∶n(RO)(A).
For necessity, consider any A in Q(L(XO ×R)) such that 0 ∈ ext1∶n(RO)(A). If
A ∩L(XO ×R)>0 ≠ ∅, then 0 ∈ RO(A) by the coherence of RO [more specifically,
Axioms R220 and R3a20] and the proof is done, so assume that A∩L(XO ×R)>0 =∅.
Taking Equation (3.1)92 and the reasoning above into account, there is now some A
′ ⊇A
in Q(L(X1∶n×R)) such that
(∀g ∈ {0}∪(A′∖A))((A′−{g})∩L(X1∶n×R)>0 ≠∅ or(∃B ∈Q(L(XO ×R)))(0 ∈ RO(B) and {g}+B ≼ A′)). (7.3)
Without loss of generality, let A = {0, f1, . . . , fm} and A′ = A ∪{g1, . . . ,g`} for some m
and ` inZ≥0, f1, . . . , fm gambles onXO ×R, and g1, . . . , g` gambles onX1∶n×R, where
we may assume without loss of generality that all the gambles involved differ from
each other. As before, let I ∶= {1, . . . ,n}∖O, fix any xI in XI and let A′O ∶= A′(xI ,⋅) =
A∪{g1(xI ,⋅), . . . ,g`(xI ,⋅)} ∈Q0(L(XO ×R)). If we can prove that {0}∪(A′O ∖A) ⊆
RO(A′O), then Axiom R3b20 will imply [with A˜ ∶= A′O ∖A, A˜1 ∶= {0}∪ (A′O ∖A) and
A˜2 ∶= A′O ; then A˜1∖ A˜ = {0} since 0 ∈ A and hence 0 ∉ A˜, and A˜2∖ A˜ = A′O ∩(A′O c∪A) =
A′O ∩A = A] that 0 ∈ RO(A), completing the proof.
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To establish this, we will show that g ∈ RO(A′O) for every g in {0}∪ (A′O ∖A).
Consider first g = 0. Use Equation (7.3) to infer that A′ ∩L(X1∶n ×R)>0 ≠ ∅ or (∃B ∈Q(L(XO ×R)))(0 ∈ RO(B) and B ≼ A′). In the latter case we find that, since B ≼ A′
implies that B ≼ A′O , by Proposition 3444, 0 ∈ RO(A′O) and the proof is done. In the
former case, A′ ∩L(X1∶n ×R)>0 ≠ ∅, so h > 0 for some h in A′. From A ∩L(XO ×R)>0 =∅—and hence A∩L(X1∶n×R)>0 =∅ because A ⊆L(XO ×R)—we infer that
h ∉A. Then h ∈A′∖A, and we may assume without loss of generality that h ∈ (maxA′)∖
A: indeed, if this were not the case, then there would be some h′ in maxA′ such that 0 <
h< h′, which therefore also is no element of A (since we have assumed that A′∩L>0 =∅
and therefore also A ∩L>0 = ∅). Since h belongs to (maxA′)∖A, by Equation (7.3)
then necessarily 0 ∈ RO(B) and {h}+B ≼ A′ for some B in Q(L(XO ×R)). Since
h > 0, we have that B ≼ {h}+B, and by Proposition 3343(ii) therefore B ≼ A′. This
implies that B ≼ A′O , so by Proposition 3444, we find again that then 0 ∈ RO(A′O).
Next, we will consider any g in A′O ∖A and show that g ∈RO(A′O). Now g= gi(xI ,⋅)
for some i in {1, . . . ,`}. If (A′O −{g})∩L(XO ×R)>0 ≠ ∅, then g ∈ RO(A′O) by the
coherence [more specifically, by Axioms R220 and R3a20] of RO , and the proof is
done. So assume that (A′O −{g})∩L(XO ×R)>0 =∅, and therefore, since A′O −{g} ⊆L(XO ×R), also (A′O −{g})∩L(X1∶n×R)>0 =∅. (7.4)
Use Equation (7.3) to infer that (A′ −{gi})∩L(X1∶n ×R)>0 ≠∅ or (∃B ∈Q(L(XO ×R)))(0 ∈RO(B) and {gi}+B ≼A′). In the latter case, by a similar argument as before,
we find that g = gi(xI ,⋅) ∈ RO(A ∪{g1(xI ,⋅), . . . ,g`(xI ,⋅)}) = RO(A′O) and the proof
is done. In the former case, (A′ −{gi})∩L(X1∶n ×R)>0 ≠ ∅, so h > gi for some h in
A′. We may assume without loss of generality that h belongs to maxA′: indeed, if this
were not the case, then there would be some h′ in maxA′ such that h < h′, and hence
also gi < h′. By Equation (7.4), therefore h ∉ A′O , so in particular h ∉ A and therefore
h ∈ A′ ∖A. Since (A′O −{h})∩L(X1∶n ×R)>0 = ∅, by Equation (7.3) then necessarily
0 ∈ RO(B) and {h}+B ≼ A′ for some B in Q(L(XO ×R)). Since gi < h, therefore{gi}+B ≼ A′, so a similar argument as before shows than then indeed g = gi(xI ,⋅) =
h(xI ,⋅) ∈ RO(B).
Note that ext1∶n preserves the ‘at most as informative as’ relation:
Proposition 162. Consider any non-empty subset O of {1, . . . ,n}, and two
coherent rejection functions R1 and R2 on L(XO ×R). If R1 ⊑ R2, then
ext1∶n(R1) ⊑ ext1∶n(R2).
Proof. We will first show that the assessment B1∶nR2 is at least as strong as B1∶nR1 . By
Definition 3091 it suffices to show that B1∶nR1 ⊆ B1∶nR2 . Consider any B ∈ B1∶nR1 , then 0 ∈
R1(B) and, since R1 ⊑ R2, therefore 0 ∈ R2(B). Then B ∈B1∶nR2 , so B1∶nR1 ⊆B1∶nR2 . Now, use
Corollary 7692 to infer that then indeed ext1∶n(R1) = RB1∶nR1 ⊑ RB1∶nR2 = ext1∶n(R2).
Let us compare our conclusions with the ones obtained for desirability in
the literature. De Cooman and Miranda [29, Proposition 7] show that, given
any non-empty subset O of {1, . . . ,n} and any coherent set of desirable gam-
bles DO ⊆L(XO ×R), its weak extension extD1∶n(DO) ⊆L(X1∶n×R)—the least
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informative coherent set of desirable gambles on X1∶n×R that marginalises to
DO—exists and is given by
extD1∶n(DO) ∶= posi(L(X1∶n×R)>0∪DO). (7.5)
Let us ascertain that we can retrieve the weak extension for desirability from
Proposition 161227:
Proposition 163. Consider any non-empty subset O of {1, . . . ,n}, any co-
herent choice function R on L(XO ×R), and any coherent set of desirable
gambles D ⊆ L(XO ×R). Then ext1∶n(RD) = RextD1∶n(D). As a consequence,
extD1∶n(D) =Dext1∶n(RD). Moreover, extD1∶n(DR) ⊆Dext1∶n(R).
Proof. For the first statement—that ext1∶n(RD) = RextD1∶n(D)—, we first show that
ext1∶n(RD) ⊑ RextD1∶n(D). As an intermediate result, we will first establish that the
purely binary assessment BextD1∶n(D) ∶= {{0, f} ∶ f ∈ extD1∶n(D)} ⊆ Q0(L(X1∶n ×R))
is at least as strong as B1∶nRD . Definition 3091 says we need to show that (∀B ∈B1∶nRD )(∃B′ ∈ BextD1∶n(D))B′ ≼ B, so consider any B in B1∶nRD —then we know already by
Equation (7.2)226 that 0 ∈ B and 0 ∈ RD(B), whence, by Proposition 5564, B ∩D ≠ ∅,
so g ∈ D—and therefore also g ∈ extD1∶n(D)—for some g in B. Hence B′ ∶= {0,g} ∈BextD1∶n(D). Since also 0 ∈ B, therefore B′ ⊆ B, whence, by Proposition 3343(i), B′ ≼ B.
We conclude that BextD1∶n(D) is indeed at least as strong an assessment as B1∶nRD , whence
by Corollary 7692, ext1∶n(RD) = RB1∶nRD ⊑ E(BextD1∶n(D)). Furthermore, since extD1∶n(D)
is coherent, Theorem 86100 implies that E(BextD1∶n(D)) = RED(extD1∶n(D)) = RextD1∶n(D). We
find that indeed ext1∶n(RD) ⊑ RextD1∶n(D).
Let us establish the converse inequality—that RextD1∶n(D) ⊑ ext1∶n(RD)=RB1∶nRD . Since
they are both coherent rejection functions, it suffices by Axiom R4b20 to show that
0 ∈ RextD1∶n(D)(A)⇒ 0 ∈ RB1∶nRD (A), for all A in Q(L(X1∶n×R)).
So consider any A inQ(L(X1∶n×R)) such that 0 ∈ RextD1∶n(D)(A). By Proposition 5564
then A ∩ extD1∶n(D) ≠ ∅, so f ∈ extD1∶n(D) = posi(L(X1∶n ×R)>0 ∪D) for some f in A.
Use Lemma 111 to infer that then f ∈ L(X1∶n ×R)>0 ∪D ∪ (L(X1∶n ×R)>0 +D). If
f ∈L(X1∶n×R)>0, then by the coherence of RB1∶nRD [more specifically, by Axioms R220
and R3a20], indeed 0 ∈RB1∶nRD (A). If f ∈D∪(L(X1∶n×R)>0+D) =L(X1∶n×R)≥0+D,
then f ≥ fD for some fD in D. Since fD belongs to D, Proposition 5564 guarantees that
0 ∈ RD({0, fD}). Furthermore, by Proposition 161227, ext1∶n(RD) = RB1∶nRD marginalises
to RD , so we find that 0 ∈RB1∶nRD ({0, fD}), and therefore, by Proposition 3041(ii), that 0 ∈
RB1∶nRD ({0, f}). Hence, by the coherence of ext1∶n(RD) [more specifically Axiom R3a20]
we find that then indeed 0 ∈ RB1∶nRD (A).
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For the second statement—that extD1∶n(D) = Dext1∶n(RD)—, infer from the first one
that Dext1∶n(RD) = DRextD1∶n(D) . By Corollary 5967, the latter is equal to extD1∶n(D), and
therefore indeed extD1∶n(D) = Dext1∶n(RD).
The final statement—that extD1∶n(DR) ⊆ Dext1∶n(R)—can be obtained by plugging
the specific set of desirable gambles DR into the second statement: we find that then
extD1∶n(DR) =Dext1∶n(RDR ). Now use Corollary 5967 and Proposition 162229 to infer that
ext1∶n(RDR ) ⊑ ext1∶n(R), whence by Proposition 6068, Dext1∶n(RDR ) ⊆ Dext1∶n(R). There-
fore indeed extD1∶n(DR) ⊆ Dext1∶n(R).
Proposition 163 implies that the weak extension of a purely binary rejec-
tion function RD for some coherent set of desirable gambles D, is a rejection
function that is itself purely binary. To summarise this, consider the following
commuting diagram in Figure 7.1, where we have used the maps
extD1∶n∶D(L(XO ×R))→D(L(X1∶n×R))∶D↦ extD1∶n(D),
R⋅∶D→R∶D↦ RD ,
ext1∶n∶C(L(XO ×R))→C(L(X1∶n×R))∶C↦ ext1∶n(C),
D⋅∶R(L(X1∶n×R))→D(L(X1∶n×R))∶R↦DR ,
with extD1∶n(D) as defined in Equation (7.5), ext1∶n(C) in Proposition 161227,
DR = { f ∈ L(X1∶n ×R) ∶ 0 ∈ R({0, f})}, and, as usual, RD given by RD(A) ={u ∈ A ∶ (∀v ∈ A)v−u ∉ D} for all A in Q, whose domain Q we leave unspec-
ified, since RD works either on vector-valued gambles on X1∶n or XO , with O
a non-empty subset of {1, . . . ,n}. The root of the diagram is any coherent set
of desirable gambles D ⊆ L(XO ×R). Taking the weak extension (for desir-
ability) of it, commutes with performing the same operation in the language of
choice models.
D extD1∶n(D) =Dext1∶n(RD)
RD ext1∶n(RD) = RextD1∶n(D)
extD1∶n
R⋅ D⋅R⋅
ext1∶n
Figure 7.1: Commuting diagram for the weak extension
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7.3 CONDITIONING ON VARIABLES
In Chapter 6205, we have seen how we can condition choice functions on
events. Here, we take a closer look at conditioning in a multivariate context.
Suppose we have a choice function Cn on L(X1∶n ×R), representing an
agent’s beliefs about the value of X1∶n. Assume now that we obtain the in-
formation that the I-tuple of variables XI—where I is a non-empty subset of{1, . . . ,n}—assumes a value in a certain non-empty subset EI of XI—so EI be-
longs to P∅(XI).4 There is no new information about the other variables XIc ,
where Ic ∶= {1, . . . ,n}∖I. How can we condition Cn using this new information?
This is a particular instance of Definition 44208, with the following specifi-
cations: X =X1∶n and E = EI ×XIc .
The indicator IE of the conditioning event E = EI ×XIc satisfies
IE(x1∶n) = IEI×XIc (x1∶n) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩1 if xI ∈ EI0 if xI ∉ EI
for all x1∶n in X1∶n, and, taking Remark 7.1223 into account, therefore IE =
IEI×XIc = IEI and E =EI ×XIc =EI . Equation (6.1)206 defines the multiplication
of a gamble f on EI ×XIc×R with IEI to be a gamble IEI f on X1∶n ×R, given
by
IEI f (x1∶n,r) = IEI×XIc f (x1∶n,r) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ f (x1∶n,r) if x1∶n ∈ EI ×XI
c
0 if x1∶n ∉ EI ×XIc
= ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ f (x1∶n,r) if xI ∈ EI0 if xI ∉ EI (7.6)
for all x1∶n in X1∶n and r inR, and the multiplication of IEI with a set A of gam-
bles on EI×XIc ×R results in a set IEI A = {IEI f ∶ f ∈A} of gambles onX1∶n×R.
Now that we have instantiated all the relevant aspects of Definition 44208,
we are ready to find the conditional choice function Cn⌋EI , given a joint choice
function Cn on L(X1∶n×R):
Cn⌋EI(A) = { f ∈ A ∶ IEI f ∈Cn(IEI A)} for all A in Q(L(EI ×XIc ×R)),
and, equivalently,
f ∈Cn⌋EI(A)⇔ IEI f ∈Cn(IEI A), for all A in Q(L(EI ×XIc ×R)) and f in A.
4This is a more general type of information than what is usually considered in this context:
for instance, in their treatment [29], De Cooman and Miranda only condition their models on
singletons. The reasons why we need this more general approach will become clear later on.
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The conditional choice function Cn⌋EI is defined on vector-valued gambles
on EI ×XIc . However, usually—see, for instance, References [18, 29]—
conditioning on information about XI results in a model on vector-valued gam-
bles onXIc —being (identified with) a subset of EI×XIc . We therefore consider
margIc(Cn⌋EI)(A) = { f ∈ A ∶ IEI f ∈Cn(IEI A)} for all A in Q(L(XIc ×R))
as the choice function that represents the conditional beliefs about XIc , given
XI ∈ EI . The multiplication IEI f of IEI and f in this context is defined through
Equation (7.6):
IEI f (x1∶n,r) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ f (xI
c ,r) if xI ∈ EI
0 if xI ∉ EI
for all x1∶n in X1∶n and r in R.
Note that, in the particular case of conditioning on a singleton—then, say,
EI = {xI} for some xI in XI—the choice function5 Cn⌋xI works on gambles f
on {xI}×XIc . Such f can be uniquely identified with a gamble f (xI,⋅) onXIc , and therefore {xI}×XIc can be identified with XIc . So the resulting choice
function Cn⌋xI can be identified with its marginal margIc(Cn⌋xI).
Proposition 164. Consider any choice function Cn on L(X1∶n ×R), any non-
empty subset I of {1, . . . ,n} and any EI in P∅(XI). Then, for any property
C∗ in {C120,C220,C3a20,C3a20,C4a20,C4b20,C525,C625}, if Cn satisfies C∗,
then margIc(Cn⌋EI) satisfies C∗. As a consequence, if Cn is coherent, then so
is margIc(Cn⌋EI).
Proof. It is a direct consequence of Proposition 150209—after the instantiation
of X = X1∶n and E = EI = EI × XIc —that, if Cn satisfies a certain property in{C120,C220,C3a20,C3a20,C4a20,C4b20,C525,C625}, then so does Cn⌋EI , and using
Proposition 158225, therefore indeed so does margO(Cn⌋EI).
As is the case for desirability (see Reference [29, Proposition 9]), the order
of marginalisation and conditioning can be reversed, under some conditions:
Proposition 165. Consider any coherent choice function Cn on L(X1∶n ×R)
and any disjoint and non-empty subsets I and O of {1, . . . ,n}. Then
margO(Cn⌋EI) =margO((margI∪OCn)⌋EI) for all EI in P∅(XI).
5Actually, since the conditioning event is {xI}, we should write Cn⌋{xI} rather than Cn⌋xI ,
but since no confusion can arise, and for notational simplicity, we will use the latter notation. A
similar choice has been made by De Cooman and Miranda in Reference [29].
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Proof. Consider any A inQ(L(XO ×R)), and consider the following chain of equal-
ities:
margO(Cn⌋EI)(A) =Cn⌋EI(A) = { f ∈ A ∶ IEI f ∈Cn(IEI A)}= { f ∈ A ∶ IEI f ∈ margI∪OCn(IEI A)}= (margI∪OCn)⌋EI(A)= margO((margI∪OCn)⌋EI)(A).
7.4 IRRELEVANT NATURAL EXTENSION
Now that the basic operations of multivariate choice functions—marginalisa-
tion, weak extension and conditioning—are in place, we are ready to look at
a simple type of structural assessment. In Section 5.9193 we have already
worked with a structural assessment, namely that C should be compatible with
some coherent set of indifferent options. Here, the assessment that we will
consider, is that of epistemic irrelevance. All the results in this section build
on the corresponding results for desirability, as established by De Cooman and
Miranda in Reference [29, Section 6].
Definition 48 (Epistemic (subset-)irrelevance). Let I and O be two disjoint
and non-empty subsets of {1, . . . ,n}. We say that XI is epistemically irrelevant
to XO when learning about the value of XI does not influence or change our
subject’s beliefs about XO . A choice function Cn on L(X1∶n ×R) is said to
satisfy epistemic irrelevance of XI to XO when
margO(Cn⌋EI) =margOCn for all EI in P∅(XI). (7.7)
The idea behind this definition is that observing that XI belongs to EI turns Cn
into the conditioned choice function Cn⌋EI on L(EI ×XIc ×R) ⊇ L(XO ×R),
so requiring that learning that XI belongs to EI does not affect the subject’s
beliefs about XO , amounts to requiring that the marginal models of Cn and
Cn⌋EI should be equal.
Equivalently, Definition 48 can be expressed in terms of other choice mod-
els as well. For instance, we say that a rejection function Rn on L(X1∶n ×R)
satisfies epistemic irrelevance of XI to XO when margO(Rn⌋EI) =margORn for
all EI in P∅(XI). Similarly, we say that a choice relation ⊲n on L(X1∶n ×R)
satisfies epistemic irrelevance of XI to XO when margO(⊲n⌋EI) =margO ⊲n for
all EI in P∅(XI).
This type of irrelevance is what De Bock [18] calls epistemic subset-
irrelevance, since the epistemic irrelevance condition is imposed for every
(non-empty) subset of XI . This contrasts the more conventional approach—
which De Bock [18] refers to as epistemic value-irrelevance—of requiring that
margO(Cn⌋xI) =margOCn for all xI in XI ,
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and we distinguish it from the epistemic (subset-)irrelevance from Defini-
tion 48.
The counterpart of Definition 48 for desirability (see Reference [18, Sec-
tion 4.3.2]) is:
margO(Dn⌋EI) =margODn for all EI in P∅(XI), (7.8)
and this is epistemic subset-irrelevance for the set of desirable gambles Dn ⊆L(X1∶n×R). However, in the literature (see, for instance, References [14, 29,
82]), mostly epistemic value-irrelevance is considered: a set Dn of desirable
gambles on X1∶n×R satisfies epistemic value-irrelevance of XI to XO when
margO(Dn⌋xI) =margODn for all xI in XI .
The eponymous concepts for choice models and desirability coincide:
Proposition 166. Consider any two disjoint and non-empty subsets I and O of{1, . . . ,n}, any coherent choice function Cn on L(X1∶n×R), and any coherent
set of desirable gambles Dn ⊆ L(X1∶n ×R). If Cn satisfies epistemic subset-
irrelevance of XI to XO , then so does DCn , and conversely, if Dn satisfies epis-
temic subset-irrelevance of XI to XO , then so does CDn . Moreover, if Cn satisfies
epistemic value-irrelevance of XI to XO , then so does DCn , and conversely, if
Dn satisfies epistemic value-irrelevance of XI to XO , then so does CDn .
Proof. For the first statement—if Cn satisfies epistemic subset-irrelevance of XI to
XO , then so does DCn —, it suffices by Equation (7.8) to prove that margO(DCn⌋EI) =
margODCn for all EI in P∅(XI). Consider any EI in P∅(XI) and recall the following
chain of equalities:
margO(DCn⌋EI) = margO(DCn⌋EI ) by Proposition 153211= DmargO(Cn⌋EI) by Proposition 159225= DmargOCn since Cn satisfies epistemic subset-irrelevance= margODCn by Proposition 159225.
For the second statement—if Dn satisfies epistemic subset-irrelevance of XI to
XO , then so does CDn —, by Definition 48 it suffices to prove that margO(CDn⌋EI) =
margOCDn for all EI in P∅(XI). Consider any EI in P∅(XI) and recall the following
chain of equalities:
margO(CDn⌋EI) = margO(CDn⌋EI ) by Proposition 153211=CmargO(Dn⌋EI) by Proposition 159225=CmargO Dn since Dn satisfies epistemic subset-irrelevance= margOCDn by Proposition 159225.
The final statements follow now at once since {xI} ∈P∅(XI) for every xI inXI .
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Clearly, epistemic subset-irrelevance implies epistemic value-irrelevance.
As shown by De Bock [18, Example 2] for desirability, the converse does not
hold: epistemic subset-irrelevance is strictly stronger than epistemic value-
irrelevance for desirability, and therefore, since choice models have desirability
as a particular case, also for choice models.
Unlike epistemic value-irrelevance, epistemic subset-irrelevance requires
all information about the value of XI to be irrelevant for XO , including partial
information like XI ∈ EI , where EI is a non-empty subset of XI . For instance,
as shown for desirability by De Bock [18] in the same Example 2, if ∣XI ∣ ≥ 3,
observing that XI is not equal to some xI in XI , can influence our beliefs about
XO even if we consider XI to be epistemically value-irrelevant to XO . Since
choice models have desirability as a particular case, this therefore also holds
for choice models. This would be impossible if XI were epistemically subset-
irrelevant to XO . We therefore follow De Bock [18] in considering epistemic
subset-irrelevance to be the more natural and compelling of the two concepts,
and hence, in the remainder, we will only consider epistemic subset-irrelevance
(Definition 48234), and will simply call this condition epistemic irrelevance.
Epistemic irrelevance can be reformulated in an interesting and slightly
different manner:
Proposition 167. Consider a coherent rejection function Rn on L(X1∶n ×R),
and any disjoint and non-empty subsets I and O of {1, . . . ,n}. Then the follow-
ing statements are equivalent:
(i) margO(Rn⌋EI) =margORn for all EI in P∅(XI);
(ii) 0 ∈Rn(A)⇔ 0 ∈Rn(IEI A) for all A inQ(L(XO ×R)) and EI inP∅(XI).
Proof. To show that (i) implies (ii), consider any A in Q(L(XO ×R)) and any EI inP∅(XI), and recall the following equivalences:
0 ∈ Rn(A)⇔ 0 ∈ margORn(A) = margO(Rn⌋EI)(A) by Definition 47223 and (i)⇔ 0 ∈ Rn⌋EI(A) by Definition 47223⇔ 0 ∈ Rn(IEI A) by Definition 44208.
To show that (ii) implies (i), consider any A in Q(L(XO ×R)) and any EI inP∅(XI), and recall the following equivalences:
0 ∈ margO(Rn⌋EI)(A)⇔ 0 ∈ Rn⌋EI(A) by Definition 47223⇔ 0 ∈ Rn(IEI A) by Definition 44208⇔ 0 ∈ Rn(A) by (ii)⇔ 0 ∈ margORn(A) by Definition 47223,
since both margO(Rn⌋EI) and margORn are coherent rejection functions, by Ax-
iom R4b20 this implies that indeed margO(Rn⌋EI) = margO Rn.
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Epistemic irrelevance assessments are useful in constructing rejection
functions on larger domains from other ones on smaller domains, in a sim-
ilar way as in Chapter 389 for incomplete assessments. Suppose we have a
rejection function RO on L(XO ×R), and an assessment that XI is epistemi-
cally irrelevant to XO , where I and O are disjoint and non-empty subsets of{1, . . . ,n}. How can we combine RO and this irrelevance assessment into a co-
herent rejection function on L(XI∪O ×R), or more generally, on L(X1∶n×R)?
We want this new rejection function furthermore to be as least informative as
possible. The following assessment will play a crucial role:
BI→ORO ∶= {IEI A ∶ A ∈Q(L(XO ×R)) and 0 ∈ RO(A) and EI ∈P∅(XI)}.
Observe that BI→ORO ⊆Q0(L(XI∪O ×R)), so we interpret it as an assessment onL(XI∪O ×R), based on a given coherent rejection function RO on L(XO ×R)
and an epistemic irrelevance statement. The multiplication of a gamble f onXO ×R with IEI is defined through Equation (7.6)232:
IEI f (xI,xO ,r) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ f (xO ,r) if xI ∈ EI0 if xI ∉ EI
for all xI in XI , xO in XO and r in R. We first establish three basic facts about
this assessment BI→ORO , in the form of Lemmas 168–170239.
Lemma 168. Consider any disjoint and non-empty subsets I and O of{1, . . . ,n}, and any coherent rejection function RO on L(XO ×R). Then
0 ∈ RBI→ORO (A)⇒ 0 ∈ RO({ ∑xI∈XI h(xI,⋅) ∶ h ∈ A})
for all A in Q(L(XI∪O ×R)).
Proof. Assume that 0 ∈ RBI→ORO (A). By Equation (3.1)92, there is some A′ ⊇ A inQ(L(XI∪O ×R)) such that
(∀g ∈ {0}∪(A′∖A))((A′−{g})∩L(XI∪O ×R)>0 ≠∅ or(∃B ∈ BI→ORO ,∃µ ∈R>0){g}+µB ≼ A′).
By Axiom R4b20, 0 ∈ RO(µB)⇔ 0 ∈ RO(B) for all µ in R>0, and therefore
(∀g ∈ {0}∪(A′∖A))((A′−{g})∩L(XI∪O ×R)>0 ≠∅ or(∃B ∈Q(L(XO ×R)),∃EI ∈P∅(XI))(0 ∈ RO(B) and {g}+ IEI B ≼ A′)).
Consider any g in {0}∪ (A′ ∖A). Then there are two possibilities: (i) (A′ − {g})∩L(XI∪O ×R)>0 ≠ ∅, and (ii) 0 ∈ RO(B) and {g}+ IEI B ≼ A′ for some EI in P∅(XI)
and B in Q(L(XO ×R)).
237
MULTIVARIATE CHOICE FUNCTIONS
In case (i), (A′ − {g})∩L(XI∪O ×R)>0 ≠ ∅, and then g < h for some h in A′.
Therefore g(zI ,⋅) < h(zI ,⋅) for some zI in XI , and g(xI ,⋅) ≤ h(xI ,⋅) for all xI inXI ∖ {zI}, whence ∑xI∈XI∖{zI} g(xI ,⋅) ≤ ∑xI∈XI∖{zI} h(xI ,⋅). Combining this with
g(zI ,⋅) < h(zI ,⋅), we find that ∑xI∈XI g(xI ,⋅) < ∑xI∈XI h(xI ,⋅). Since RO is coher-
ent, by Axiom R220 therefore∑xI∈XI g(xI ,⋅) ∈ RO({∑xI∈XI g(xI ,⋅),∑xI∈XI h(xI ,⋅)}),
whence, by Axiom R3a20,
∑
xI∈XI g(xI ,⋅) ∈ RO({ ∑xI∈XI h(xI ,⋅) ∶ h ∈ A′}).
In case (ii), 0 ∈ RO(B) and {g}+ IEI B ≼ A′ for some B in Q(L(XO ×R)) and EI
in P∅(XI), and then for every f in B, there is some h in A′ such that g+IEI f ≤ h, or, in
other words, such that(∀xI ∈XI ,xO ∈XO ,r ∈R)g(xI ,xO ,r)+ IEI f (xI ,xO ,r) ≤ h(xI ,xO ,r),
whence f ≤ h(xI ,⋅)− g(xI ,⋅) for all xI in EI , and 0 ≤ h(zI ,⋅)− g(zI ,⋅) for every zI
in EcI . Therefore ∣EI ∣ f ≤∑xI∈EI [h(xI ,⋅)−g(xI ,⋅)] and 0 ≤∑zI∈EcI [h(zI ,⋅)−g(zI ,⋅)],
whence f ≤ 1∣EI ∣∑xI∈XI [h(xI ,⋅)−g(xI ,⋅)], so we find in particular that
B ≼ 1∣EI ∣ { ∑xI∈XI h(xI ,⋅)− ∑xI∈XI g(xI ,⋅) ∶ h ∈ A′}
= 1∣EI ∣ { ∑xI∈XI h(xI ,⋅) ∶ h ∈ A′}− 1∣EI ∣ { ∑xI∈XI g(xI ,⋅)}.
Use Proposition 3444 to infer that, since 0 ∈ RO(B),
0 ∈ RO( 1∣EI ∣ { ∑xI∈XI h(xI ,⋅) ∶ h ∈ A′}− 1∣EI ∣ { ∑xI∈XI g(xI ,⋅)}),
and since RO is a coherent rejection function, by Axiom R420 here too
∑
xI∈XI g(xI ,⋅) ∈ RO({ ∑xI∈XI h(xI ,⋅) ∶ h ∈ A′}),
being the same conclusion as in (i).
So we have shown that
(∀g ∈ {0}∪(A′∖A)) ∑
xI∈XI g(xI ,⋅) ∈ RO({ ∑xI∈XI h(xI ,⋅) ∶ h ∈ A′}).
Use Axiom R3b20 with
A˜ ∶= { ∑
xI∈XI h(xI ,⋅) ∶ h ∈ A′∖A and ∑xI∈XI h(xI ,⋅) ≠ 0},
A˜1 ∶= { ∑
xI∈XI h(xI ,⋅) ∶ h ∈ {0}∪(A′∖A)},
A˜2 ∶= { ∑
xI∈XI h(xI ,⋅) ∶ h ∈ A′},
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[then A˜1 ⊆ RO(A˜2), A˜ ⊆ A˜1, A˜1∖ A˜ = {0}, and
A˜2∖ A˜ = { ∑
xI∈XI h(xI ,⋅) ∶ h ∈ A′ and (h ∉ A′∖A or ∑xI∈XI h(xI ,⋅) = 0)}
= { ∑
xI∈XI h(xI ,⋅) ∶ h ∈ A or (h ∈ A′ and ∑xI∈XI h(xI ,⋅) = 0)}
= { ∑
xI∈XI h(xI ,⋅) ∶ h ∈ A},
where the second equality follows from the fact that A ⊆ A′ and the third one from the
fact that 0 ∈ A] to conclude that therefore indeed
0 ∈ RO({ ∑
xI∈XI h(xI ,⋅) ∶ h ∈ A}).
Lemma 169. Consider any disjoint and non-empty subsets I and O of{1, . . . ,n}, and any coherent rejection function RO on L(XO ×R). Then BI→ORO
avoids complete rejection. As a consequence, its natural extension E(BI→ORO )—
a rejection function on L(XI∪O ×R)—is coherent and equal to RBI→ORO .
Proof. We will provide a proof by contradiction. Assume ex absurdo that RBI→ORO does
not avoid complete rejection. By Lemma 8096 then 0 ∈RBI→ORO ({0}). By Lemma 168237
therefore 0 ∈ RO({∑xI∈XI 0}) = RO({0}), a contradiction with the coherence [Ax-
iom R120] of RO . So RBI→ORO does satisfy Axiom R120, so BI→ORO indeed avoids complete
rejection. That its natural extension is coherent and equal to RBI→ORO then follows at once
from Theorem 8197.
Lemma 170. Consider any disjoint and non-empty subsets I and O of{1, . . . ,n}, and any coherent rejection function RO on L(XO ×R). Then
margOE(BI→ORO ) = RO .
Proof. By Lemma 169 we know that E(BI→ORO ) is coherent and equal to RBI→ORO .
By Definition 47223, we have to show that E(BI→ORO )(A) = RO(A) for every A inQ(L(XO ×R)). Since also RO is coherent, it suffices to prove that
0 ∈ RBI→ORO (A)⇔ 0 ∈ RO(A), for all A in Q(L(XO ×R)).
For necessity, consider any A in Q(L(XO ×R)) such that 0 ∈ RBI→ORO (A). By
Lemma 168237 therefore 0 ∈ RO({∑xI∈XI h(xI ,⋅) ∶ h ∈ A}). Since A is a set of gambles
on XO , therefore {∑xI∈XI h(xI ,⋅) ∶ h ∈ A} = {∑xI∈XI h ∶ h ∈ A} = {∣XI ∣h ∶ h ∈ A} = ∣XI ∣A,
whence 0 ∈ RO(∣XI ∣A). Since RO is coherent, by Axiom R4a20 therefore indeed
0 ∈ RO(A).
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For sufficiency, consider any A in Q(L(XO ×R)) such that 0 ∈ RO(A). Then
A = IXI A and XI ∈P∅(XI), so A ∈ BI→ORO , and since we know by Proposition 7995 that
RBI→ORO extends BI→ORO , therefore indeed 0 ∈ RBI→ORO (A).
We are now ready to find the least informative coherent rejection function
that marginalises to RO and that satisfies epistemic irrelevance of XI to XO . We
call it the irrelevant natural extension, just as its counterpart for desirability in
Reference [29, Theorem 13].
Theorem 171 (Irrelevant natural extension). Consider any disjoint and non-
empty subsets I and O of {1, . . . ,n}, and any coherent rejection function RO onL(XO ×R). The least informative coherent rejection function on L(X1∶n×R)
that marginalises to RO and that satisfies epistemic irrelevance of XI to XO is
given by
ext1∶n(E(BI→ORO )) = ext1∶n(RBI→ORO ).
Proof. Use Lemma 169↶ to find already that E(BI→ORO ) is coherent, and Proposi-
tion 161227 to conclude that therefore ext1∶n(E(BI→ORO )) is coherent as well.
We will first show that any coherent rejection function R′ on L(X1∶n ×R) that
marginalises to RO and that satisfies epistemic irrelevance of XI to XO must be at least
as informative as ext1∶n(E(BI→ORO )). Consider any B in BI→ORO , then B = IEI A for some
EI in P∅(XI) and A in Q(L(XO ×R)) such that 0 ∈ RO(A). Since R′ marginalises
to RO , therefore also 0 ∈ R′(A). Furthermore, since R′ satisfies epistemic irrelevance
of XI to XO , by Proposition 167236 therefore also 0 ∈ R′(IEI A) = R′(B). We conclude
that B ∈ BI→ORO ⇒ 0 ∈ R′(B)⇔ 0 ∈ margI∪OR′(B) for every B in Q(L(XI∪O ×R)),
so by Definition 2990, margI∪OR′ extends the assessment BI→ORO . Since by Proposi-
tion 7995, E(BI→ORO ) is the least informative rejection function onL(XI∪O ×R) that ex-
tends BI→ORO and that satisfies axioms R220–R420, we find that E(BI→ORO ) ⊑ margI∪O R′.
Now, use Proposition 162229 to infer that then ext1∶n(E(BI→ORO )) ⊑ ext1∶n(margI∪OR′),
and, since by Proposition 161227, ext1∶n(margI∪OR′) is the least informative co-
herent rejection function on L(X1∶n ×R) that marginalises to margI∪O R′, therefore
ext1∶n(margI∪OR′) ⊑ R′. This implies that indeed ext1∶n(E(BI→ORO )) ⊑ R′.
It therefore suffices to prove that ext1∶n(E(BI→ORO )) (i) marginalises to RO and (ii)
satisfies epistemic irrelevance of XI to XO . To prove (i), consider the following chain
of equalities:
margO(ext1∶n(E(BI→ORO )))= margO(margI∪O(ext1∶n(E(BI→ORO ))))= margO(E(BI→ORO )) by Proposition 161227= RO by Lemma 170239.
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To prove (ii) observe that by Proposition 167236 it suffices to show that 0 ∈
ext1∶n(E(BI→ORO ))(A)⇔ 0 ∈ ext1∶n(E(BI→ORO ))(IEI A) for all A in Q(L(XO ×R))
and EI in P∅(XI). For necessity, consider any EI in P∅(XI) and any A inQ(L(XO ×R)) such that 0 ∈ ext1∶n(E(BI→ORO ))(A). Since we just have shown that
margO(ext1∶n(E(BI→ORO ))) = RO , therefore equivalently 0 ∈ RO(A), whence IEI A ∈BI→ORO . Since E(BI→ORO ) = E(BI→ORO ) extends BI→ORO , therefore 0 ∈ E(BI→ORO )(IEI A),
whence by Proposition 161227 indeed also 0 ∈ ext1∶n(E(BI→ORO ))(IEI A).
For sufficiency, consider any A inQ(L(XO ×R)) and EI in P∅(XI) such that 0 ∈
ext1∶n(E(BI→ORO ))(IEI A). Since by Proposition 161227, ext1∶n(E(BI→ORO )) marginalises
to E(BI→ORO ), therefore 0 ∈ E(BI→ORO )(IEI A). Use Lemma 168237 to infer that then
0 ∈ RO({∑xI∈XI h(xI ,⋅) ∶ h ∈ IEI A}) = RO({∑xI∈XI IEI f (xI ,⋅) ∶ f ∈ A}) = RO({∣EI ∣ f ∶
f ∈ A}) = RO(∣EI ∣A). Since RO is coherent, [Axiom R4a20] 0 ∈ RO(A), and, since we
already know that ext1∶n(E(BI→ORO )) marginalises to RO , this implies that indeed indeed
0 ∈ ext1∶n(E(BI→ORO ))(A).
As we did for the weak extension, let us compare our results here with
the ones obtained for pairwise choice in the literature. De Cooman and Mi-
randa [29, Theorem 13] show that, given any disjoint and non-empty subsets I
and O of {1, . . . ,n} and any coherent set DO of desirable vector-valued gam-
bles on XO , its irrelevant natural extension from XI to XO—the least informa-
tive coherent set of desirable vector-valued gambles on X1∶n that marginalises
to DO and that satisfies epistemic irrelevance of XI to XO—exists and is given
by
extD1∶n(BI→ODO ) = posi(L(X1∶n×R)>0∪BI→ODO ) (7.9)
where BI→ODO is the set of desirable vector-valued gambles on XI∪O that is given
by6
BI→ODO ∶= posi{IEI f ∶ f ∈DO and EI ∈P∅(XI)}.
Lemma 172. Consider any disjoint and non-empty subsets I and O of{1, . . . ,n}, and any coherent set of desirable gambles DO ⊆L(XO ×R). Then
BI→ODO is a coherent set of desirable gambles on XI∪O ×R.7
6Actually, since De Cooman and Miranda [29] deal with the weaker notion of epistemic value-
irrelevance rather than epistemic subset-irrelevance—which we use here—their version B˜I→ODO of
BI→ODO is given by B˜I→ODO ∶= posi{I{xI} f ∶ f ∈ DO and xI ∈ XI}. What De Cooman and Miranda
prove is that the value-irrelevant natural extension for desirability exists, and that it is given by
extD1∶n(B˜I→ODO ). We will show that, as a consequence of Theorem 171, the subset-irrelevant natural
extension for desirability exists, and that it is given by extD1∶n(BI→ODO ).
7In Reference [29, Lemma 11] it is shown that B˜I→ODO is coherent, which does not immediately
imply that BI→ODO is coherent. Also, we are working in the slightly more general context of vector-
valued gambles.
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Proof. We will show that BI→ODO satisfies all the rationality axioms D157–D457. For
Axiom D157, assume ex absurdo that 0 ∈ BI→ODO . Then ∑mk=1λkIEk fk = 0 for some m
in N, f1, . . . , fm in DO , E1, . . . , Em in P∅(XI), and λ1, . . . , λm in R>0, and there-
fore also ∑xI∈XI ∑mk=1λkIEk fk(xI ,⋅) =∑mk=1∑xI∈Ek λkIEk fk(xI ,⋅) =∑mk=1λk ∣Ek ∣ fk = 0.
Since ∣Ek ∣ ≥ 1 for every k in {1, . . . ,m}, this means that a positive linear combination
of elements of DO is equal to 0, which contradicts its coherence. Therefore indeed
0 ∉ BI→ODO .
For Axiom D257, consider any h in L(XI∪O ×R)>0. Let EI ∶= {zI ∈XI ∶ h(zI ,⋅) >
0} ⊆ XI . Observe that EI ≠ ∅, since h > 0. Then h(zI ,⋅) > 0 for all zI in EI , and
since h ≥ 0, hence also h(xI ,⋅) = 0 for all xI in EcI . Therefore f ∶= ∑zI∈XI h(zI ,⋅) =∑zI∈EI h(zI ,⋅) > 0, and since DO is coherent [Axiom D257] we find that f ∈ DO . Since
1∣EI ∣ > 0, Axiom D357 guarantees that 1∣EI ∣ f ∈ DO . Note that h =∑xI∈XI I{xI}h(xI ,⋅) =∑xI∈EI I{xI}h(xI ,⋅) = 1∣EI ∣∑xI∈EI IEI h(xI ,⋅) = IEI 1∣EI ∣∑xI∈EI h(xI ,⋅) = IEI 1∣EI ∣ f , where
the second equality follow from the fact that h(xI ,⋅) = 0 for every xI in EcI . Since
f ∈ DO and EI ∈P∅(XI), indeed h ∈ BI→ODO .
That BI→ODO satisfies Axioms D357 and D457 follows readily from posi○posi = posi.
Lemma 173. Consider any disjoint and non-empty subsets I and O of{1, . . . ,n}, and any coherent set of desirable gambles on DO ⊆ L(XO ×R).
Then margOB
I→O
DO
=DO .8
Proof. That DO ⊆ margOBI→ODO follows at once from Equation (7.9)↶ with EI = XI .
It therefore suffices to show that h ∈ BI→ODO ⇒ h ∈ DO for every h in L(XO ×R). So
consider any h in L(XO ×R) such that h ∈ BI→ODO . Then h =∑mk=1λkIEk fk for some m
in N, f1, . . . , fm in DO , E1, . . . , Em in P∅(XI), and λ1, . . . , λm in R>0. Therefore∣XI ∣h = ∑xI∈XI h = ∑xI∈XI h(xI ,⋅) = ∑xI∈XI ∑mk=1λkIEk fk(xI ,⋅) = ∑mk=1λk ∣Ek ∣ fk, so h
is a positive linear combination of elements of DO . Because DO is coherent [more
specifically, by Axioms D357 and D457], indeed h ∈ DO .
Theorem 174. Consider any disjoint and non-empty subsets I and O of{1, . . . ,n}, any coherent rejection function RO on L(XO ×R), and any co-
herent set of desirable gambles on D ⊆ L(XO ×R). Then ext1∶n(E(BI→ORD )) =
RextD1∶n(BI→OD ). As a consequence, extD1∶n(BI→OD ) = Dext1∶n(E(BI→ORD )). Moreover,
extD1∶n(BI→ODR ) ⊆Dext1∶n(E(BI→OR )).
8In Reference [29, Lemma 12] it is shown that margO B˜
I→O
DO
=DO , which does not immediately
imply that margO B
I→O
DO
=DO . Also, we are working in the slightly more general context of vector-
valued gambles.
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Proof. We begin with the first statement—ext1∶n(E(BI→ORD )) = RextD1∶n(BI→OD ). To show
that ext1∶n(E(BI→ORD )) ⊑ RextD1∶n(BI→OD ), as an intermediate result, we will first estab-
lish that the purely binary assessment BI→OD ∶= {{0,IEI f} ∶ f ∈ D and EI ∈ P∅(XI)} ⊆Q0(L(XI∪O ×R)) is at least as strong as BI→ORD . To show this, by Definition 3091
we need to show that (∀B ∈ BI→ORD )(∃B′ ∈ BI→OD )B′ ≼ B, so consider any B in BI→ORD .
Then B = IEI A for some EI in P∅(XI) and A in Q(L(XO ×R)) such that 0 ∈ RD(A),
whence, by Proposition 5564, A∩D ≠∅, so g ∈D for some g in A. Then 0 ∈RD({0,g}),
so IEI g ∈ B, and let B′ ∶= {0,IEI g} ∈ BI→OD . Since also 0 belongs to A and hence to B,
B′ ⊆ B, whence, by Proposition 3343(i), B′ ≼ B. So BI→OD is indeed at least as strong an
assessment as BI→ORD , whence by Corollary 7692, E(BI→ORD ) ⊑ E(BI→OD ). Furthermore,
since BI→OD ⊆ BBI→OD ∶= {{0, f} ∶ f ∈ BI→OD } = {{0, f} ∶ f ∈ posi{IEI g ∶ g ∈ D and EI ∈P∅(XI)}}, BBI→OD is in turn at least as strong an assessment as BI→OD , whence, by
Corollary 7692, E(BI→OD ) ⊑ E(BBI→OD ). Therefore E(BI→ORD ) ⊑ E(BBI→OD ). But BBI→OD
is the purely binary assessment based on BI→OD , which is a coherent set of desirable
gambles by Lemma 172241. We can interpret the latter as a desirability assessment, soED(BI→OD ) = BI→OD . Since it is coherent, it avoids non-positivity, and therefore Theo-
rem 86100 implies that E(BBI→OD ) = RED(BI→OD ) = RBI→OD . So we have that E(BI→ORD ) ⊑
RBI→OD . By Proposition 162229, then, ext1∶n(E(BI→ORD )) ⊑ ext1∶n(RBI→OD ), and by Propo-
sition 163230, ext1∶n(RBI→OD ) = RextD1∶n(BI→OD ). Therefore indeed ext1∶n(E(BI→ORD )) ⊑
RextD1∶n(BI→OD ).
To establish the converse inequality, namely that RextD1∶n(BI→OD ) ⊑ ext1∶n(E(BI→ORD )),
since they are both coherent rejection functions, it suffices by Axiom R4b to show that
0 ∈ RextD1∶n(BI→OD )(A)⇒ 0 ∈ ext1∶n(E(BI→ORD ))(A), for all A in Q(L(X1∶n×R)).
So consider any A in Q(L(X1∶n ×R)) such that 0 ∈ RextD1∶n(BI→OD )(A). By Proposi-
tion 5564 then A ∩ extD1∶n(BI→OD ) ≠ ∅, so f ∈ extD1∶n(BI→OD ) = posi(L(X1∶n ×R)>0 ∪
BI→OD ) for some f in A. Use Lemma 111 to infer that then f ∈ L(X1∶n ×R)>0 ∪
BI→OD ∪(L(X1∶n ×R)>0 +BI→OD ) = L(X1∶n ×R)>0 ∪(L(X1∶n ×R)≥0 +BI→OD ). If f ∈L(X1∶n×R)>0, then by the coherence [more specifically, by Axioms R220 and R3a20]
of ext1∶n(E(BI→ORD )), indeed 0 ∈ ext1∶n(E(BI→ORD ))(A). If f ∈ L(X1∶n ×R)≥0 +BI→OD ,
then f ≥ f ′ for some f ′ in BI→OD . Since f ′ belongs to BI→OD , by Proposition 5564,
we find that 0 ∈ RBI→OD ({0, f ′}) Note that BI→OD = ED(B) where we let B ∶= {IEI f ∶
f ∈ D and EI ∈ P∅(XI)} ⊆ L(XI∪O ×R), and by Theorem 85100 therefore RBI→OD =E(BB). Then BB = {{0,IEI h} ∶ h ∈ D and EI ∈ P∅(XI)} ⊆ {IEI A ∶ 0 ∈ A and A ∩D ≠∅ and EI ∈ P∅(XI)} = {IEI A ∶ 0 ∈ RD(A) and EI ∈ P∅(XI)} = BI→ORD , so BI→ORD is at
least as strong an assessment as BB , whence by Corollary 7692, E(BB) ⊑ E(BI→ORD ),
and therefore RBI→OD ⊑ E(BI→ORD ). Since we already know that 0 ∈ RBI→OD ({0, f ′}),
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we get that 0 ∈ E(BI→ORD )({0, f ′}). Since by Proposition 161227, ext1∶n(E(BI→ORD ))
marginalises to E(BI→ORD ), this tells us that 0 ∈ ext1∶n(E(BI→ORD ))({0, f ′}). Since f ≥ f ′,
by Proposition 3041(ii), 0 ∈ ext1∶n(E(BI→ORD ))({0, f}), and since it is coherent, indeed
0 ∈ ext1∶n(E(BI→ORD ))(A).
For the second statement—extD1∶n(BI→OD ) = Dext1∶n(E(BI→ORD ))—infer from the first
one that Dext1∶n(E(BI→ORD )) = DRextD1∶n(BI→OD ) . By Corollary 5967, the latter is equal to
extD1∶n(BI→OD ), and therefore indeed extD1∶n(BI→OD ) = Dext1∶n(E(BI→ORD )).
The final statement—extD1∶n(BI→ODR ) ⊆ Dext1∶n(E(BI→OR ))—can be obtained by plug-
ging the specific set of desirable gambles DR into the second statement: we find that
then extD1∶n(BI→ODR ) = Dext1∶n(E(BI→ORDR )). Use Corollary 5967 to infer that RDR ⊑ R and
therefore BI→ORDR ⊆ BI→OR . So BI→OR is at least as strong an assessment as BI→ORDR , and
therefore E(BI→ORDR ) ⊑ E(BI→OR ). By Proposition 162229 therefore ext1∶n(E(BI→ORDR )) ⊑
ext1∶n(E(BI→OR )), so by Proposition 6068, Dext1∶n(E(BI→ORDR )) ⊆ Dext1∶n(E(BI→OR )). There-
fore indeed extD1∶n(BI→ODR ) ⊆ Dext1∶n(E(BI→OR )).
Theorem 174242 implies that the irrelevant natural extension of a purely
binary rejection function RD is a rejection function that is purely binary it-
self. This claim is by no means trivial: it implies that, when working in the
framework of choice models, epistemic (subset-)irrelevance assessments pre-
serve pairwise behaviour, and—even stronger—preserves the property of being
purely binary.
7.5 CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have introduced multivariate choice functions and their basic
operations: marginalisation, weak extension and conditioning. Furthermore,
we have shown how to model an epistemic irrelevance assessment, and found
the natural extension of such an assessment.
Credal networks (see, for instances, References [15, 18, 26] for a good in-
troduction) have been—and still are—the subject of intense research. A credal
network is a global uncertainty model for a finite number of variables. This
global model is obtained by combining local uncertainty models using inde-
pendence statements, such as, for instance, epistemic irrelevance. We can use
this global uncertainty model to make specific inferences about some variables.
The material in this chapter is the first necessary stepping stone to be able
to work—at least on a theoretical level—with simple credal networks using
choice functions as local models, and epistemic irrelevance as the associated
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independence notion. As a simple example, forward irrelevance9 combines a
number of epistemic irrelevance assessments, and, in principle, all the tools
needed to study this type of assessment with choice models are in place.
However, studies of more general but still quite basic credal networks—
such as networks whose graphs are trees—are not (yet) in the range of what
is currently feasible with multivariate choice functions. Such networks mostly
have symmetric irrelevances embedded in their structure: an irrelevance state-
ment from one variable to another, and vice versa. Such symmetric statements
are called epistemic independence statements. Therefore, an expression for—
and the guarantee of the existence of—the independent natural extension is
necessary to find the joint choice function of a general credal network whose
local models are choice functions. In Reference [29], De Cooman and Miranda
have found this natural extension for desirability. For choice models, however,
the independent natural extension has received no attention thus far.
Let us go into a bit more detail. The variables X1, . . . , Xn are called in-
dependent when learning about the values of any number of them does not
influence or change our beliefs about the remaining ones:10 for any two dis-
joint and non-empty subsets I and O of {1, . . . ,n}, XI is epistemically irrelevant
to XO . A coherent choice function C on L(X1∶n ×R) is called epistemically
(subset-)independent11 if
margO(C⌋EI) =margOC
for all disjoint and non-empty subsets I and O of {1, . . . ,n}, and EI in P∅(XI).
Suppose we have n coherent rejection functions Rk on L(Xk ×R), one
for every k in {1, . . . ,n}, and an assessment that the variables X1, . . . , Xn
are epistemically independent. The independent natural extension is the least
informative coherent rejection R function that is independent and such that
marg{k}R = Rk for every k in {1, . . . ,n}. The results in Reference [29] lead me
to suspect that the independent natural extension is the natural extension of the
following assessment:B ∶= ⋃
k∈{1,...,n}{IEkc A ∶ A ∈Q(L(Xk ×R)) and 0 ∈ Rk(A) and Ekc ∈P∅(Xkc)},
and that this assessment avoids complete rejection. However, to prove thatE(B) is even coherent—let alone that it marginalises to Rk or is independent—
a more profound study of the properties of the rejection function RB, as defined
in Equation (3.1)92, shall be needed. This is beyond the scope of this disserta-
tion.
9See Reference [28] for a treatment of forward irrelevance with coherent lower previsions.
10This is called many-to-many independence, as opposed to the less stringent many-to-one
independence; for more information, see Reference [30].
11The epistemically value-independence requirement would be margO(C⌋xI) = margOC for
all disjoint and non-empty subsets I and O of {1, . . . ,n}, and xI in XI .
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EXCHANGEABILITY
In this chapter, we study how to model exchangeability, using choice functions.
This work builds on earlier results by De Cooman et al. [31, 32] for sets of
desirable gambles.
Exchangeability is a structural assessment on a sequence of variables that
is important for inference purposes. Loosely speaking, making a judgement
of exchangeability means that the order in which the variables are observed,
is considered irrelevant. This irrelevancy is typically modelled through an in-
variance or indifference assessment. The first detailed study of exchangeabil-
ity was given by de Finetti [34]. We refer to the paper by De Cooman and
Quaeghebeur [31, Section 1] for a brief historical overview.
In Section 8.1, we derive de Finetti-like Representation Theorems for a
finite sequence that is exchangeable. We take this one step further in Sec-
tion 8.2263, where we consider countable exchangeable sequences and derive a
representation theorem for them as well. To compare with earlier work by De
Cooman and Quaeghebeur [31], we also provide corresponding representation
theorems for sets of desirable gambles.
8.1 FINITE EXCHANGEABILITY
Consider n in N variables X1, . . . , Xn taking values in a non-empty finite set X.
The possibility space of the uncertain sequence X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) is X n.
We denote by x = (x1, . . . ,xn) an arbitrary element of X n. For any n in N
we let Pn be the group of all permutations of the index set {1, . . . ,n}. There
are ∣Pn∣ = n! such permutations. With any such permutation pi , we associate
a permutation of X n, also denoted by pi , and defined by (pix)k ∶= xpi(k) for
every k in {1, . . . ,n}, or in other words, pi(x1, . . . ,xn) = (xpi(1), . . . ,xpi(n)): pix is
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obtained from x by permuting the indices of its components. Similarly, we lift
pi to a permutation pi t on L(X n ×R) by letting (pi t f )(x,r) ∶= f (pix,r) for all
x in X n and r inR. Observe that pi t is a linear permutation of the vector spaceL(X n×R) of all vector-valued gambles on X n.
If a subject assesses that the sequence of variables X inX n is exchangeable,
this means that he is indifferent between any gamble f in L(X n ×R) and
its permuted variant pi t f , for all pi in Pn. This leads to the following set of
indifferent gambles:
IPn ∶= span{ f −pi t f ∶ f ∈L(X n×R) and pi ∈Pn}. (8.1)
Definition 49 (Finite exchangeability). A choice function C on L(X n ×R)
is called (finitely) exchangeable if it is compatible with IPn . Similarly, a set
of desirable gambles D ⊆ L(X n ×R) is called (finitely) exchangeable if it is
compatible with IPn .
Of course, so far, we do not yet know whether this notion of exchangeability
is well-defined: indeed, we do not know yet whether IPn is a coherent set of
indifferent gambles, in the sense of Definition 38176. In the next section, we
will show that this is indeed the case. But once we have established that IPn
is a coherent set of indifferent gambles, exchangeability is nothing more fancy
than compatibility with IPn . The notion of compatibility of choice functions
and sets of desirable gambles with a set of indifferent gambles was studied in
some detail in Chapter 5175. Proposition 124180 there gives a representation
result in terms of equivalence classes of (vector-valued) gambles on X n. What
we will do below, is use this general representation result to obtain a particular
equivalent representation result for exchangeable choice functions, in terms of
(vector-valued) gambles on count vectors.
8.1.1 Count vectors
Let us now provide the tools necessary to prove that IPn is a coherent set of
indifferent gambles, as introduced in Definition 38176.
The permutation invariant atoms [x] ∶= {pix ∶ x ∈X n}, with x in X n, are the
smallest permutation invariant subsets of X n. We consider the counting map
T ∶X n→N n∶x↦ T (x)
where T (x) is called the count vector of x. It is the X-tuple with components
Tz(x) ∶= ∣{k ∈ {1, . . . ,n} ∶ xk = z}∣ for all z in X, so Tz(x) is the number of times
that z occurs in the sequence x1, . . . , xn. The range of T —the setN n—is called
the set of possible count vectors and is given by
N n ∶= {m ∈ZX≥0 ∶ ∑
x∈Xmx = n}.
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Applying any permutation to x leaves its result under the counting map un-
changed:
T (x) = T (pix) for al x in X n and pi in Pn.
For any x in X n, if m = T (x) then [x] = {y ∈X n ∶ T (y) =m}, so the permutation
invariant atom [x] is completely determined by the count vector m of all its
elements, and is therefore also denoted by [T (x)] = [m]. Remark that {[m] ∶
m ∈N n} partitions X n into disjoint parts with constant count vectors, and that∣[m]∣ = (nm) ∶= n!∏z∈X mz! .
In order to extend the application of the count vectors for use with gambles,
let us define the set of all permutation invariant vector-valued gambles as
LPn(X n×R) ∶= { f ∈L(X n×R) ∶ (∀pi ∈Pn)pi t f = f} ⊆L(X n×R),
and a special transformation invPn of the linear space L(X n×R) given by
invPn ∶L(X n×R)→L(X n×R)∶ f ↦ invPn( f ) ∶= 1n! ∑pi∈Pnpi t f ,
which, as we will see in the following proposition, is closely linked withLPn(X n×R) (see also References [31,78]). To see how this comes about, note
that invPn is a special case of the transformation invP defined in Section 5.8191.
The following result is a direct consequence of Proposition 138192:
Proposition 175. invPn is a linear transformation of L(X n×R), and
(i) invPn ○pi t = invPn = pi t ○ invPn for all pi in P;
(ii) invPn ○ invPn = invPn ;
(iii) ker(invPn) = IPn ;
(iv) rng(invPn) =LPn(X n×R).
Moreover, for any f and g in L(X n ×R), we have that g ∈ f /IPn ⇔ invPng =
invPn f .
So we see that invPn is a linear projection operator that renders a vector-valued
gamble insensitive to permutation (or permutation invariant) by replacing it
with the uniform average of all its permutations. As a result, it assumes the
same value for all vector-valued gambles that can be related to each other
through some permutation: invPn( f ) = invPn(g) if f = pi tg for some pi in Pn,
for all f and g in L(X n×R). Furthermore, for any f in L(X n×R), its trans-
formation invPn( f ) is permutation invariant and therefore constant on the per-
mutation invariant atoms [m]: (invPn( f ))(x,r)= (invPn( f ))(y,r) if [x]= [y],
for all x and y in X n, and r in R. We can use the properties of invPn to prove
that IPn is coherent and therefore well suited for our definition of exchange-
ability.
Proposition 176. For any n in N, the set IPn , defined in Equation (8.1), is a
coherent set of indifferent vector-valued gambles.
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Proof. For Axiom I1176, since IPn is a linear hull by its Definition (8.1)248, 0 is in-
cluded in IPn . For Axiom I2176, consider any f in IPn and assume ex absurdo that
f ∈ L(X n ×R)>0 ∪L(X n ×R)<0. If f ∈ L(X n ×R)>0 then pit f ∈ L(X n ×R)>0 for
all pi in Pn, and therefore invPn( f ) > 0, a contradiction with Proposition 175↶(iii).
If f ∈ L(X n ×R)<0 then, similarly invPn( f ) < 0, again a contradiction with Proposi-
tion 175↶(iii). Axioms I3176 and I4176 are satisfied because IPn is a linear hull.
Since IPn is coherent, exchangeability is well-defined: a choice function Cn
on L(X n ×R) and a set of desirable vector-valued gambles Dn ⊆ L(X n ×R)
are exchangeable if they are compatible with the coherent set of indifferent
vector-valued gambles IPn . By Definition 40179, Cn is therefore represented by
a choice function C′ on L(X n×R)/IPn , and similarly, by Definition 39176 Dn
is represented by a set of desirable gambles D′ ⊆ L(X n ×R)/IPn . So we can
focus on the quotient space and its elements: equivalence classes of mutually
indifferent vector-valued gambles.
But before we do that in the next section, it will pay to further explore the
notions we have introduced thus far. Consider any f in L(X n ×R). What is
the constant value that invPn( f ) assumes on a permutation invariant atom [m]?
To answer this question, consider any x in [m], then
(invPn( f ))(x,⋅) = 1n! ∑pi∈Pn f (pix,⋅) = 1n! ∣Pn∣∣[m]∣ ∑y∈{pix∶pi∈Pn} f (y,⋅)= 1(nm) ∑y∈[x] f (y,⋅) = 1(nm) ∑y∈[m] f (y,⋅)
where we used the fact that ∣Pn∣ = n! and ∣[m]∣ = (nm). Therefore, for all r in R,(invPn( f ))(⋅,r) = ∑
m∈N n Hn( f (⋅,r)∣m)I[m], (8.2)
where Hn(⋅∣m) is the linear expectation operator associated with the uniform
distribution on the invariant atom [m]:
Hn(g∣m) ∶= 1(nm) ∑y∈[m]g(y) for all g in L(X n) and m in N n. (8.3)
It characterises a (multivariate) hyper-geometric distribution [44], associated
with random sampling without replacement from an urn with n balls of
types X, whose composition is characterised by the count vector m.
The result of subjecting a gamble f on X n×R to the map
Hn∶L(X n×R)→L(N n×R)∶ f ↦Hn( f )
with (Hn( f ))(m,r) ∶=Hn( f (⋅,r)∣m) for all m in N and r in R, (8.4)
is the gamble Hn( f ) on N n ×R that assumes the value 1(nm)∑y∈[m] f (y,r) in
every m in N n and r in R.
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8.1.2 Exchangeable equivalence classes of gambles
We already know that exchangeable choice functions are represented by choice
functions on the quotient space L(X n ×R)/IPn , and similarly for sets of de-
sirable gambles. In the quest for an elegant representation theorem, we thus
need to focus on the quotient space L(X n ×R)/IPn and its elements, which
are ‘exchangeable’ equivalence classes of vector-valued gambles.
In this section we investigate how the representation of permutation in-
variant gambles helps us find a representation result for exchangeable choice
functions. This representation will use equivalence classes [ f ] ∶= f /IPn ={ f}+ IPn of gambles, for any f in L(X n ×R). Recall that the quotient spaceL(X n×R)/IPn ∶= {[ f ] ∶ f ∈ L(X n×R)} is a linear space itself, with additive
identity [0] = IPn , and therefore any element f˜ of L(X n ×R)/IPn is invari-
ant under addition of IPn : f˜ + IPn = f˜ . Elements of L(X n ×R)/IPn will be
generically denoted by f˜ or g˜.
Proposition 177. Consider any f and g in L(X n×R). Then [ f ] = [g] if and
only if Hn( f ) =Hn(g).
Proof. By Proposition 175249 we have that [ f ] = [g]⇔ invPn f = invPn g, so it suffices
to show that invPn f = invPn g⇔Hn( f ) = Hn(g). Observe that
invPn f = invPn g⇔ (∀r ∈R)invPn( f )(⋅,r) = invPn(g)(⋅,r)⇔ (∀r ∈R) ∑
m∈N n Hn( f (⋅,r)∣m)I[m] = ∑m∈N n Hn(g(⋅,r)∣m)I[m]⇔ (∀m ∈N n,r ∈R)Hn( f (⋅,r)∣m) = Hn(g(⋅,r)∣m)⇔ (∀m ∈N n,r ∈R)Hn( f )(m,r) = Hn(g)(m,r)⇔Hn( f ) = Hn(g),
where the second equivalence follows from Equation (8.2) and the fourth one from
Equation (8.4).
Therefore, Hn is constant on the exchangeable equivalence classes of
vector-valued gambles: for any f˜ in L(X n ×R)/IPn , we have that Hn( f ) =
Hn(g) for all f and g in f˜ . This means that the map H˜n, defined by:
H˜n∶L(X n×R)/IPn →L(N n×R)∶ f˜ ↦Hn( f ) for any f in f˜ . (8.5)
is well defined. Then Proposition 177 guarantees that elements of L(X n ×R)/IPn can also be characterised using H˜n, in the sense that f˜ = { f ∈ L(X n ×R) ∶Hn( f ) = H˜n( f˜ )} for all f˜ in L(X n×R)/IPn .
The map H˜n takes as an argument any equivalence class of gambles, and
maps it to some representing gamble on the count vectors. It will be useful
later on to consider the map H˜−1n :
H˜−1n ∶L(N n×R)→L(X n×R)/IPn ∶h↦ [ ∑
m∈N n h(m,⋅)I[m]]. (8.6)
251
EXCHANGEABILITY
The notation of H˜−1n is suggestive: as it turns out, H˜n and H˜−1n indeed are each
other’s inverses, and are therefore bijective.
Proposition 178. The maps H˜n as defined in Equation (8.5)↶ and H˜−1n as
defined in Equation (8.6)↶ are each other’s inverses.
Proof. This proof is structured as follows: we show that (i) H˜−1n ○H˜n = idL(X n×R)/IPn ,
and (ii) H˜n ○ H˜−1n = idL(N n×R), together implying that H˜n and H˜−1n are each other’s
inverses.
For (i), consider any f˜ in L(X n ×R)/IPn . We need to show that then
H˜−1n (H˜n( f˜ )) = f˜ . Let h be an arbitrary element of f˜ , and f ∶= invPn(h). By Propo-
sition 175249(ii) then invPn( f ) = invPn(h), so f belongs to f˜ as well. Therefore H˜n( f˜ )
assumes the value Hn( f )(m,⋅) = 1(nm)∑y∈[m] f (y,⋅) on every m in N n. But f is con-
stant on every permutation invariant atom [m], so Hn( f )(m,⋅) = 1(nm) ∣[m]∣ f (x,⋅) =
f (x,⋅) for every x in [m], and therefore
f = ∑
m∈N n Hn( f )(m,⋅)I[m] = ∑m∈N n H˜n( f˜ )(m,⋅)I[m], (8.7)
where the second equality holds by Equation (8.5)↶ and since f ∈ f˜ . Then indeed
H˜−1n (H˜n( f˜ )) = [∑m∈N n H˜n( f˜ )(m,⋅)I[m]] = [ f ] = f˜ , where the first equality follows
from Equation (8.6)↶, the second one from Equation (8.7), and the last one from the
fact that f ∈ f˜ and therefore [ f ] = f˜ .
For (ii), consider any h in L(N n×R). We need to show that then H˜n(H˜−1n (h)) = h.
Let f ∶= ∑m∈N n h(m,⋅)I[m], a gamble on X n ×R. Then H˜−1n (h) = [ f ] by Equa-
tion (8.6)↶, so H˜n(H˜−1n (h)) = H˜n([ f ]), and since f ∈ [ f ], we find using Equa-
tion (8.5)↶ that H˜n([ f ]) = Hn( f ) and therefore H˜n(H˜−1n (h)) = Hn( f ). The proof is
finished if we can show that Hn( f ) = h. Consider any m′ in N n, and observe that
Hn( f )(m′,⋅) = 1( nm′) ∑y∈[m′] f (y,⋅) = 1( nm′) ∑y∈[m′] ∑m∈N n h(m,⋅)I[m](y)
= ∑
m∈N n h(m,⋅) 1( nm′) ∑y∈[m′]I[m](y)= ∑
m∈N n h(m,⋅)I{m}(m′) = h(m′,⋅),
where the first equality follows from Equation (8.3)250 and the penultimate one from
the facts that {[m] ∶m ∈N n} partitions X n and ∣[m′]∣ = ( nm′), so
1( nm′) ∑y∈[m′]I[m](y) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩1 if m
′ = m
0 otherwise
= I{m}(m′).
Therefore indeed h = Hn( f ) = H˜n(H˜−1n (h)).
The importance of Proposition 178 lies in the fact that now, H˜n is a bi-
jection between L(X n×R)/IPn and L(N n×R), and therefore, exchangeable
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L(X n×R) L(N n×R)
L(X n×R)/IPn
Hn
[⋅]
H˜n
Figure 8.1: Commuting diagram for Hn and H˜n
equivalence classes of gambles are in a one-to-one correspondence with gam-
bles on count vectors.
The commuting diagram of Figure 8.1 above illustrates the surjections[⋅]∶L(X n ×R) → L(X n ×R)/IPn ∶ f ↦ [ f ] and Hn (indicated with a single
arrow), and the bijection H˜n (indicated with a double arrow). Since the repre-
senting choice function C′ is defined from Cn through [⋅]—working point-wise
on sets—this already suggests that C′ can be transformed into a choice function
on L(N n×R). To prove that they preserve coherence, there is only one miss-
ing link: the discussion in Section 2.754 shows that it suffices that the map H˜n
is linear and preserves the ordering between L(X n×R)/IPn and L(N n×R).
Therefore, to define the ordering ⪯ on L(X n ×R)/IPn , as usual, we let ⪯
be inherited by the ordering ≤ on L(X n×R):
f˜ ⪯ g˜⇔ (∃ f ∈ f˜ ,∃g ∈ g˜) f ≤ g (8.8)
for all f˜ and g˜ in L(X n ×R)/IPn , turning L(X n ×R)/IPn into an ordered
linear space. It turns out that this vector ordering on L(X n ×R)/IPn also can
be represented elegantly using the map H˜n:
Proposition 179. Consider any f˜ and g˜ in L(X n ×R)/IPn , then f˜ ⪯ g˜ if and
only if H˜n( f˜ ) ≤ H˜n(g˜).
Proof. For necessity, assume that f˜ ⪯ g˜. Then, by Equation (8.8), f ≤ g for some f in
f˜ and g in g˜. Consider any m inN n, and infer that Hn( f )(m,⋅) = 1(nm)∑y∈[m] f (y,⋅) ≤
1(nm)∑y∈[m] g(y,⋅) = Hn(g)(m,⋅). Then Hn( f ) ≤ Hn(g), and therefore, by Equa-
tion (8.5)251, indeed H˜n( f˜ ) ≤ H˜n(g˜).
For sufficiency, assume that H˜n( f˜ ) ≤ H˜n(g˜). Then, by Equation (8.5)251 and
Proposition 177251, Hn( f ) ≤ Hn(g) for all f in f˜ and g in g˜. Consider any f in
f˜ and g in g˜ and let f ′ ∶= invPn( f ) and g′ ∶= invPn(g). Then invPn( f ′) = invPn( f )
and invPn(g′) = invPn(g) by Proposition 175249(ii), so Proposition 177251 implies
that f ′ ∈ f˜ and g′ ∈ f˜ , and therefore Hn( f ′) ≤ Hn(g′). Then, by Equations (8.4)250
and (8.3)250,
1(nm)∑y∈[m] f ′(y,⋅) ≤ 1(nm)∑y∈[m] g′(y,⋅) for every m in N n. But f ′ and
g′ are constant on every [m], so f ′(y,⋅) ≤ g′(y,⋅) for every y in [m] and every m inN n. Then f ′ ≤ g′, and therefore indeed f˜ ⪯ g˜.
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Propositions 178252 and 179↶ imply that H˜n is a linear order isomorphism
between L(X n ×R)/IPn and L(N n ×R), and therefore, by the discussion
in Section 2.754, every coherent choice function on L(X n ×R)/IPn can be
identified with a coherent choice function on L(N n ×R). We will use this
interesting conclusion in the next section.
8.1.3 A representation theorem
Now that the preparatory work is done, we are ready to establish representation
for coherent and exchangeable choice functions.
Theorem 180 (Finite representation). Consider any choice function Cn onL(X n ×R). Then Cn is exchangeable if and only if there is a unique repre-
senting choice function C˜ on L(N n×R) such that
Cn(A) = { f ∈ A ∶Hn( f ) ∈ C˜(Hn(A))} for all A in Q(L(X n×R)).
Furthermore, in that case, C˜ is given by C˜(Hn(A)) = Hn(Cn(A)) for all A inQ(L(X n×R)). Finally, Cn is coherent if and only if C˜ is. We call C˜ the count
representation of Cn.
Similarly, consider any set of desirable gambles Dn ⊆ L(X n ×R). Then
Dn is exchangeable if and only if there is a unique representing set of desirable
gambles D˜ ⊆L(N n×R) such that Dn =⋃H˜−1n (D˜). Furthermore, in that case,
D˜ is given by D˜ = Hn(Dn). Finally, Dn is coherent if and only if D˜ is. We call
D˜ the count representation of Dn.
Proof. We begin with the representation of choice functions. For the first statement,
note that Cn is exchangeable is equivalent to Cn is compatible with IPn , by Defi-
nition 49248. Equivalently, by Definition 40179, there is some representing choice
function C′ on L(X n ×R)/IPn such that Cn(A) = { f ∈ A ∶ [ f ] ∈ C′(A/IPn)} for all
A in Q(L(X n ×R)). We use the linear order isomorphism H˜n to define a choice
function C˜ on L(N n ×R): we let [ f ] ∈ C′(A/IPn)⇔ H˜n([ f ]) ∈ C˜(H˜n(A/IPn))
for all f in L(X n ×R) and A in Q(L(X n ×R)). Since f ∈ [ f ], use Proposi-
tion 177251 and Equation (8.5)251 to infer that H˜n([ f ]) = Hn( f ). Similarly, infer
that H˜n(A/IPn) = {H˜n([g]) ∶ g ∈ A} = {Hn(g) ∶ g ∈ A} =Hn(A), so [ f ] ∈C′(A/IPn)⇔
Hn( f ) ∈ C˜(Hn(A)). Then indeed
Cn(A) = { f ∈ A ∶Hn( f ) ∈ C˜(Hn(A))} for all A in Q(L(X n×R)).
To show that C˜ is unique, use that C′ is unique and H˜n is a bijection.
For the second statement, consider any A in Q(L(X n ×R)) and infer, using the
definition of C˜, that C˜(H˜n(A/IPn)) = H˜n(C′(A/IPn)) , and therefore C˜(Hn(A)) =
H˜n(C′(A/IPn)) by Equation (8.5)251. By compatibility [Proposition 125181], we have
C′(A/IPn) =Cn(A)/IPn , so we find H˜n(C′(A/IPn)) = H˜n(Cn(A)/IPn) = Hn(Cn(A)),
by Equation (8.5)251, and therefore indeed C˜(Hn(A)) = Hn(Cn(A)).
For the third statement, the compatibility with IPn [Proposition 127182] guarantees
that Cn is coherent if and only if its representing choice function C′ on L(X n×R)/IPn
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is coherent. But since C˜ is defined from C′ using the linear order isomorphism Hn, we
have immediately that C˜ is coherent if and only if C′ is coherent.
The representation of sets of desirable gambles is a trivial extension to vector-
valued gambles of the proof given in Reference [31, Theorem 17].
The number of occurrences of any outcome in a sequence (x1, . . . ,xn) is fixed
by its count vector m in N n. If we impose an exchangeability assessment on
it, then we see, using Theorem 180, that the joint model on X n is characterised
by a model on L(N n×R). So an exchangeable choice function Cn essentially
represents preferences between gambles on the unknown composition m of an
urn with n balls of types X: the choice Cn(A) between the gambles in A is
based on m.
This representation result immediately translates to rejection functions and
choice relations. A rejection function R on L(X n×R) is exchangeable if and
only if there is a unique representing rejection function R˜ on L(N n×R), given
by R˜(Hn(A)) = Hn(R(A)) for all A in Q(L(X n ×R)), that represents R, and
that is coherent if and only if R is. Similarly, a choice relation ⊲ on L(X n×R)
is exchangeable if and only if there is a unique representing choice relation⊲˜ on L(N n ×R), given by Hn(A1) ⊲˜Hn(A2)⇔ A1 ⊲ A2 for all A1 and A2 inQ(L(X n×R)), that represents ⊲, and that is coherent if and only if ⊲ is.
8.1.4 Exchangeable natural extension
We use the same notations and ideas as in Reference [31, Sections 4.4&4.6]
for desirability, and generalise it to choice models.
Suppose our subject has an assessment B ⊆Q0(L(X n ×R)). What is, if
it exists, the least informative coherent and exchangeable choice function that
extends B, or, in other words, what is
Enex(B) ∶= inf{R ∈R(L(X n×R)) ∶ R is exchangeable and extends B}? (8.9)
Because, as we have seen, exchangeability is a special indifference assessment,
this coincides with the natural extension of B under IPn , and the following
result is an immediate consequence of Theorem 144200.
Theorem 181 (Exchangeable natural extension). Consider any assessmentB ⊆Q0(L(X n×R)). Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) B avoids complete rejection under IPn ;
(ii) There is a coherent and exchangeable extension of B:
(∀B ∈ B)0 ∈ R(B) and(∀A ∈Q(L(X n×R)))R(A) = { f ∈ A ∶ [ f ] ∈ R(A)/IPn}
for some R in R(L(X n×R));
(iii) Enex(B) ≠ idQ(L(X n×R));
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(iv) Enex(B) ∈R(L(X n×R));
(v) Enex(B) is the least informative rejection function that is coherent, ex-
changeable and extends B.
When any (and hence all) of these equivalent statements hold, then Enex(B) =
RB, IPn , defined in Equation (5.6)194 for generic sets of indifferent options I.
For desirability, the exchangeable natural extension is easy to calculate
in terms of the count representation, as shown by De Cooman and Quaeghe-
beur [31, Theorem 19]. For choice functions, we have the following simple
result that has important consequences for practical implications of reasoning
and inference under exchangeability:
Theorem 182. Consider any assessment B ⊆Q0(L(X n×R)). Then
(i) B avoids complete rejection under IPn if and only if Hn(B) ∶= {Hn(B) ∶
B ∈ B} avoids complete rejection;
(ii) Hn ○Enex(B) = E(Hn(B))○Hn.
Proof. For the first statement, observe using Proposition 7995 that RHn(B) satis-
fies Axioms R220–R420, and using Proposition 141197 that RB, IPn , too, satisfies Ax-
ioms R220–R420. By Definition 3295 and Corollary 2639, Hn(B) avoids complete
rejection if and only if 0 ∉ RHn(B)({0}), and by Definition 42198, B avoids com-
plete rejection under IPn if and only if 0 ∉ RB, IPn ({0}). So it suffices to show that
0 ∉ RHn(B)({0})⇔ 0 ∉ RB, IPn ({0}). Use the fact that H˜n is a linear order iso-
morphism [Propositions 178252 and 179253] to infer that 0 ∉ RHn(B)({0})⇔ [0] ∉
RB/IPn ({[0]}), and Equation (5.6)194 to infer that 0 ∉ RB, IPn ({0})⇔ 0 ∉ { f ∈ {0} ∶[ f ] ∈ RB/IPn ({[0]})}⇔ [0] ∉ RB/IPn ({[0]}), whence indeed 0 ∉ RHn(B)({0})⇔ 0 ∉
RB, IPn ({0}).
For the second statement, we show that Hn(Enex(B)(A)) = E(Hn(B))(Hn(A)) for
all A inQ(L(X n×R)). There are two possibilities: either B avoids complete rejection
under IPn (and then, by the first statement, Hn(B) avoids complete rejection), or B does
not avoid complete rejection under IPn (and then, by the first statement, Hn(B) does not
avoid complete rejection). IfB avoids complete rejection under IPn , by Theorems 181↶
and 8197, it suffices to show that
0 ∈ Hn(RB, IPn (A))⇔ 0 ∈ RHn(B)(Hn(A)) for all A in Q(L(X n×R)),
taking the coherence of RB, IPn and RHn(B) into account. Consider any A inQ(L(X n×R)) and observe the following equivalences:
0 ∈ Hn(RB, IPn (A))⇔ [0] ∈ RB, IPn (A)/IPn H˜n is a linear order isomorphism⇔ [0] ∈ RB/IPn (A/IPn) Equation (5.6)194⇔ 0 ∈ RHn(B)(Hn(A)) H˜n is a linear order isomorphism.
If B does not avoid complete rejection under IPn , use Theorems 181↶ and 8197
to infer that then indeed Hn(Enex(B)(A)) = Hn(A) = E(Hn(B))(Hn(A)) for all A inQ(L(X n×R)).
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8.1.5 Conditioning exchangeable models
We use the same notation and ideas as in Reference [31, Section 4.4] for desir-
ability, and generalise it to choice models.
Consider an exchangeable and coherent choice function C on L(X n×R),
and assume that we have observed the values xˇ ∶= (xˇ1, . . . , xˇnˇ) of the first nˇ
variables X1, . . . , Xnˇ, and that we want to make inferences about the remaining
nˆ ∶= n− nˇ variables. To do this, we simply condition the choice function C on
the singleton {xˇ}:
f ∈C⌋xˇ(A)⇔ I{xˇ} f ∈C(I{xˇ}A), for all A in Q(L(X nˆ×R)) and f in A,
following the general discussion in Section 7.3232.
Proposition 183. Consider any xˇ in X nˇ and any coherent and exchangeable
choice function C on L(X n ×R). Then C⌋xˇ is a coherent and exchangeable
choice function on L(X nˆ×R).
Proof. That C⌋xˇ is coherent, follows from Proposition 164233. It therefore suffices
to show that C⌋xˇ is exchangeable. By Definition 49248, we need to show that C⌋xˇ is
compatible with IPnˆ . By Proposition 134187, this is equivalent to
(∀g ∈ IPnˆ)(∀A ∈Q(L(X nˆ×R)))({0,g} ⊆ A⇒ (0 ∈C⌋xˇ(A)⇔ g ∈C⌋xˇ(A))).
So consider any g in IPnˆ and any A in Q(L(X nˆ ×R)) such that {0,g} ⊆ A. It suf-
fices to show that then 0 ∈C(I{xˇ}A)⇔ I{xˇ}g ∈C(I{xˇ}A). Since C is exchangeable—
compatible with IPn —and again using Proposition 134187, this will be the case if we
can prove that I{xˇ}g belongs to IPn . To show this, since g ∈ IPnˆ , observe by Equa-
tion (8.1)248 that g =∑mi=1λi( fi− pˆiti fi) for some m in N, λ1, . . . , λm in R, f1, . . . , fm inL(X nˆ×R), and pˆi1, . . . , pˆim in Pnˆ. For every i in {1, . . . ,m}, let pii ∈Pn be defined as
pii(k) ∶= ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩k if k ∈ {1, . . . , nˇ}nˇ+ pˆii(k− nˇ) if k ∈ {nˇ+1, . . . ,n} for all k in {1, . . . ,n}.
Then I{xˇ}pˆiti fi = piit(I{xˇ} fi) for every i in {1, . . . ,m}, whence
I{xˇ}g = m∑
i=1λi(I{xˇ} fi− I{xˇ}pˆiti fi) =
m∑
i=1λi(I{xˇ} fi−piit(I{xˇ} fi)),
so I{xˇ}g indeed belongs to IPn .
We also introduce another type of conditioning, where we observe a count
vector mˇ in N nˇ, and we condition the choice function C on all the possible
sequences [mˇ] with these counts, to obtain C⌋[mˇ]. The domain of this con-
ditional choice function is Q(L([mˇ]×X nˆ ×R)), and we are interested in its
marginal margnˆ(C⌋[mˇ]), given by
margnˆ(C⌋[mˇ])(A) ∶=C⌋[mˇ](A) for all A in Q(L(X nˆ×R))
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about the nˆ remaining variables Xnˇ+1, . . . , Xn. Therefore
f ∈ (margnˆ(C⌋[mˇ]))(A)⇔ I[mˇ] f ∈C(I[mˇ]A),
for all A in Q(L(X nˆ×R)) and f in A.
To simplify the notation, we will let C⌋mˇ ∶= margnˆ(C⌋[mˇ]). Interestingly, the
count vector mˇ for an observed sample xˇ is a sufficient statistic in the sense
that it extracts from xˇ all the information that is needed to characterise the
conditional model:
Proposition 184 (Sufficiency of the observed count vector). Consider any co-
herent and exchangeable choice function C on L(X n ×R), and any xˇ and yˇ
inX nˇ. If [xˇ] = [yˇ], or in other words, if T (xˇ) =T (yˇ) =∶ mˇ, then C⌋xˇ =C⌋yˇ =C⌋mˇ.
Proof. From [xˇ] = [yˇ], infer that yˇ = pˇi xˇ for some pˇi in Pnˇ, and from T (xˇ) = T (yˇ) = mˇ,
infer that xˇ ∈ [mˇ] and yˇ ∈ [mˇ]. We will first show the intermediate result that then
Hn(I{xˇ}A) = Hn(I{yˇ}A) = 1∣[mˇ]∣Hn(I[mˇ]A) for all A in Q(L(X nˆ×R)).
Consider any A in Q(L(X nˆ×R)). Define the permutation pi in Pn as
pi(k) ∶= ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩pˇi
−1(k) if k ∈ {1, . . . , nˇ}
k if k ∈ {nˇ+1, . . . ,n} for all k in {1, . . . ,n}.
We claim that then pit(I{xˇ} f ) = I{yˇ} f for all f in A. To establish this, consider any
zˇ = (zˇ1, . . . , zˇn) in X n and any r in R, and observe that indeed
(pit(I{xˇ} f ))(zˇ,r) = I{xˇ} f (pi(zˇ),r) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ f (pi(zˇnˇ+1, . . . , zˇn),r) if pi(zˇ1, . . . , zˇnˇ) = xˇ0 if pi(zˇ1, . . . , zˇnˇ) ≠ xˇ
= ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ f (zˇnˇ+1, . . . , zˇn,r) if (zˇ1, . . . , zˇnˇ) = pˇi xˇ0 if (zˇ1, . . . , zˇnˇ) ≠ pˇi xˇ= I{pˇi xˇ} f (zˇ,r) = I{yˇ} f (zˇ,r).
So we see that pit(I{xˇ} f ) = I{yˇ} f and therefore I{xˇ} f − I{yˇ} f ∈ IPn , whence [I{xˇ} f ] =[I{yˇ} f ]. By Proposition 177251, observe that then Hn(I{xˇ} f ) = Hn(I{yˇ} f ) for all f in
A, whence Hn(I{xˇ}A) = Hn(I{yˇ}A). To show that this is also equal to 1∣[mˇ]∣Hn(I[mˇ]A),
observe that [mˇ] = {ϖˇ xˇ ∶ ϖˇ ∈Pnˇ}, and therefore for any zˇ in [mˇ], we can select a pˇizˇ inPnˇ such that pˇizˇxˇ= zˇ. With this pˇizˇ we construct a permutation pizˇ in the manner described
above, which satisfies pitzˇ(I{xˇ} f ) = I{zˇ} f for every f in A. Use I[mˇ] f =∑zˇ∈[mˇ] I{zˇ} f for
every f in A to infer that indeed Hn(I[mˇ]A) = Hn(∑zˇ∈[mˇ] I{zˇ}A) =∑zˇ∈[mˇ] Hn(I{zˇ}A) =∣[mˇ]∣Hn(I{xˇ}A), where the last equation holds because we have already shown that
Hn(I{zˇ}A) = Hn(I{xˇ}A) for every zˇ in [xˇ] = [mˇ].
Now we are ready to show that C⌋xˇ =C⌋yˇ =C⌋mˇ. Since they are coherent, it suffices
to show that
0 ∈C⌋xˇ(A)⇔ 0 ∈C⌋yˇ(A)⇔ 0 ∈C⌋mˇ(A), for all A in Q(L(X nˆ×R)),
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and therefore, taking into account that C⌋mˇ = margnˆ(C⌋[mˇ]), that
0 ∈C(I{xˇ}A)⇔ 0 ∈C(I{yˇ}A)⇔ 0 ∈C(I[mˇ]A), for all A in Q(L(X nˆ×R)).
Because C is exchangeable, by Theorem 180254 it suffices to show that
0 ∈C(Hn(I{xˇ}A))⇔ 0 ∈C(Hn(I{yˇ}A))⇔ 0 ∈C(Hn(I[mˇ]A)),
for all A in Q(L(X nˆ×R)). But we have shown above that Hn(I{xˇ}A) = Hn(I{yˇ}A) =
1∣[mˇ]∣Hn(I[mˇ]A), so taking coherence [and more specifically, Axiom C4a20] into ac-
count, this is indeed the case.
8.1.6 Finite representation in terms of polynomials
In Section 8.2263, we will prove a similar representation theorem for infinite
sequences. Since it no longer makes sense to count in such sequences, we
first need to find a equivalent representation theorem in terms of something
that does not depend on counts. More specifically, we need, for every n in N
another order-isomorphic linear space to L(X n ×R)/IPn , that allows for em-
bedding: the linear space for any n1 ≤ n2 (both in N) must be a subspace of the
one for n2.
All the maps in this section have been introduced by De Cooman et al. [31,
32]. We use their ideas and work with polynomials on the X-simplex ΣX ∶={θ ∈ RX ∶ θ ≥ 0,∑x∈X θx = 1}. We consider the special subset V(ΣX ×R) ofL(ΣX ×R): V(ΣX ×R) are the polynomial vector-valued gambles on ΣX ×R,
which are those gambles h such that for every r in R, h(⋅,r) is the restriction
to ΣX of a multivariate polynomial pr on RX , in the sense that h(θ ,r) = pr(θ)
for all θ in ΣX . We call pr then a representation of h(⋅,r). It will be useful to
introduce a notation for polynomial vector-valued gambles with fixed degree n
in N: Vn(ΣX ×R) is the collection of all polynomial vector-valued gambles h
such that for every r inR, h(⋅,r) has at least one representation whose degree
is not higher than n. As shown in References [20, 31], both V(ΣX ×R) andVn(ΣX ×R) are linear subspaces of L(ΣX ×R), and, as wanted, for n1 ≤ n2,Vn1(ΣX ×R) is a subspace of Vn2(ΣX ×R).
Special polynomial gambles are the Bernstein gambles:
Definition 50 (Bernstein gambles). Consider any n in N and any m in N n.
Define the Bernstein basis polynomial Bm on RX as Bm(θ) ∶= (nm)∏x∈X θmxx
for all θ in RX . The restriction of Bm to ΣX is called a Bernstein gamble,
which we also denote as Bm.
As mentioned by De Cooman and Quaeghebeur [31] and proved explicitly by
De Bock et al. [20], the set of all Bernstein gambles constitutes a basis for the
linear space Vn(ΣX):
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Proposition 185 ([31, Appendix B], [20, Proposition 14]). Consider any n in
N. The set of Bernstein gambles {Bm ∶m ∈N n} constitutes a basis for the linear
space Vn(ΣX). Therefore, each element p of Vn(ΣX ×R) can be uniquely
written as p(θ ,r) =∑m∈N n α(m,r)Bm(θ) for every θ in ΣX and r in R.
As we have seen, to preserve coherence between two ordered linear spaces,
we need a linear order isomorphism. So we wonder whether there is one be-
tween L(X n×R)/IPn and Vn(ΣX ×R). In Section 8.1.2251 we have seen that
there is one between L(X n×R)/IPn and L(N n×R), namely H˜n. Therefore,
it suffices to find one between L(N n×R) and Vn(ΣX ×R). Consider the map
CoMn∶L(N n×R)→ Vn(ΣX ×R)∶h↦ ∑
m∈N n h(m,⋅)Bm.
Before we can establish that CoMn is a linear order isomorphism, we need to
provide the linear space Vn(ΣX ×R) with an order ⪯nB . We use the proper cone{0}∪posi({Bm ∶m ∈N n}) to define the order ⪯nB :
h1 ⪯nB h2⇔ (∀r ∈R)h2(⋅,r)−h1(⋅,r) ∈ {0}∪posi({Bm ∶m ∈N n}),
for all h1 and h2 in Vn(ΣX ×R).
The following proposition is essentially due to De Cooman and Quaeghe-
beur [31]: it suffices to apply their result point-wise, for every r in R.
Proposition 186 ([31, Section 4.9], [20, Section 4.5]). Consider any n in N.
Then the map CoMn is a linear order isomorphism between the ordered linear
spaces L(N n×R) and Vn(ΣX ×R).
The linear order isomorphism CoMn helps us to define a linear order iso-
morphism between the linear spaces L(X n×R) and Vn(ΣX ×R), a final tool
needed for a representation theorem in terms of polynomial gambles. Indeed,
consider the map Mn ∶=CoMn ○Hn:
Mn∶L(X n×R)→ Vn(ΣX ×R)∶ f ↦Mn( f )
where Mn( f )(θ ,r) ∶= Mn( f (⋅,r)∣θ) for all θ in ΣX and r in R. Mn(⋅∣θ)
is the linear expectation operator associated with the multinomial distribution
whose parameters are n and θ , and is for every g inL(X n) given by Mn(g∣θ) ∶=∑m∈N n∑y∈[m]g(y)∏x∈X θmxx . We introduce its version
M˜n ∶=CoMn ○ H˜n, (8.10)
mapping L(X n ×R)/IPn to Vn(ΣX ×R). M˜n is a composition of two linear
order isomorphisms, and is therefore a linear order isomorphism itself. Due to
Proposition 177251, considering any f˜ in L(X n×R)/IPn , Mn is constant on f˜ ,
and the value it takes on any element of f˜ is exactly M˜n( f˜ ).
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L(X n×R)
L(N n×R) Vn(ΣX ×R)
L(X n×R)/IPn
Hn Mn
[⋅]
CoMn
M˜nH˜n
Figure 8.2: Commuting diagram for CoMn, M˜n and H˜n
The commuting diagram in Figure 8.2 illustrates the surjections [⋅], Hn
and Mn, and the bijections H˜n, M˜n and CoMn. It shows that both L(N n ×R)
and Vn(ΣX ×R) are order-isomorphic to L(X n ×R)/IPn , so they are both
suitable to define a representing choice function on: in Theorem 180254 we
used the space L(N n ×R), and here, in Theorem 187, we will use the other
equivalent space Vn(ΣX ×R).
Theorem 187 (Finite polynomial representation). Consider any choice func-
tion Cn on L(X n×R). Then Cn is exchangeable if and only if there is a unique
representing choice function C˜ on Vn(ΣX ×R) such that
Cn(A) = { f ∈ A ∶Mn( f ) ∈ C˜(Mn(A))} for all A in Q(L(X n×R)).
Furthermore, in that case, C˜ is given by C˜(Mn(A)) = Mn(Cn(A)) for all A
in Q(L(X n ×R)). Finally, Cn is coherent if and only if C˜ is. We call C˜ the
frequency representation of Cn.
Similarly, consider any set of desirable gambles Dn ⊆ L(X n ×R). Then
Dn is exchangeable if and only if there is a unique representing set of desirable
gambles D˜ ⊆ Vn(ΣX ×R) such that Dn = ⋃M˜−1n (D˜). Furthermore, in that
case, D˜ is given by D˜ =Mn(Dn). Finally, Dn is coherent if and only if D˜ is. We
call D˜ the frequency representation of Dn.
Proof. The part for desirability has essentially already been proved in Reference [31,
Theorem 21]. Here, we give a shorter alternative proof that also works for choice
functions.
Let C′′ on L(N n ×R) and D′′ ⊆ L(N n ×R) be the representing choice function
and set of desirable gambles from Theorem 180254, and let C˜ be defined by
CoMn( f ) ∈ C˜(CoMn(A))⇔ f ∈C′′(A)
for all A inQ(L(N n×R)) and f in A, and D˜ ∶=CoMn(D′′). Since CoMn is a linear or-
der isomorphism, C˜ and D˜ are unique, and Mn( f ) ∈ C˜(Mn(A))⇔Hn( f ) ∈C′′(Hn(A))
for all A in Q(L(X n)×R) and f in A, and D˜ = CoMn(Hn(Dn)) = Mn(Dn), and all
the coherence properties are preserved, from which the statements follow.
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8.1.7 Conditioning in terms of polynomials
It turns out that conditioning an exchangeable choice function can be done
very easily using the frequency representation. Assume that we observe a
count vector mˇ in N nˇ, and we condition the choice function C on [mˇ], to
obtain the conditional choice function C⌋mˇ ∶= margnˆ(C⌋[mˇ]) on L(X nˆ ×R),
that is exchangeable by Propositions 183257 and 184258. What is its frequency
representation?
Proposition 188. Consider any coherent and exchangeable choice function C
on L(X n×R), and any mˇ in N n. If C˜ on Vn(ΣX ×R) is the frequency repre-
sentation of C, then the frequency representation of C⌋mˇ is the choice function
C˜⌋mˇ on V nˆ(ΣX ×R), defined by
hˆ ∈ C˜⌋mˇ(Aˆ)⇔ Bmˇhˆ ∈ C˜(BmˇAˆ), for all Aˆ in Q(V nˆ(ΣX ×R)) and hˆ in Aˆ.
Proof. Since C is exchangeable with frequency representation C˜, by Theorem 182256
we have that
C(A) = { f ∈ A ∶Mn( f ) ∈ C˜(Mn(A))} for all A in Q(L(X n×R)).
Consider any xˇ in [mˇ]. Then C⌋mˇ =C⌋xˇ by Proposition 184258, so
C⌋mˇ(Aˆ) =C⌋xˇ(Aˆ) = { fˆ ∈ Aˆ ∶Mn(I{xˇ} fˆ ) ∈ C˜(Mn(I{xˇ}Aˆ))} for all Aˆ in Q(L(X nˆ×R)).
It suffices to show that Mn(I{xˇ} fˆ ) = 1∣[mˇ]∣BmˇMnˆ( fˆ ) and Mn(I{xˇ}Aˆ) = 1∣[mˇ]∣BmˇMnˆ(Aˆ),
since then indeed
C⌋mˇ(Aˆ) = { fˆ ∈ Aˆ ∶Mn(I{xˇ} fˆ ) ∈ C˜(Mn(I{xˇ}Aˆ))}= { fˆ ∈ Aˆ ∶ ∣[mˇ]∣Mn(I{xˇ} fˆ ) ∈ C˜(∣[mˇ]∣Mn(I{xˇ}Aˆ))}= { fˆ ∈ Aˆ ∶ BmˇMnˆ( fˆ ) ∈ C˜(BmˇMnˆ(Aˆ))}= { fˆ ∈ Aˆ ∶Mnˆ( fˆ ) ∈ C˜⌋mˇ(Mnˆ(Aˆ))} for all Aˆ in Q(L(X nˆ×R)),
taking coherence of C˜ [more specifically, Axiom C4a20] into account, so C˜⌋mˇ is the
frequency representation of C⌋mˇ. Since Mn works element-wise on I{xˇ}Aˆ, it even suf-
fices to show that Mn(I{xˇ} fˆ ) = 1∣[mˇ]∣BmˇMnˆ( fˆ ) for every fˆ in Aˆ. Lemma 189 establishes
this.
Lemma 189. Consider any nˇ < n, mˇ in N nˇ, xˇ in mˇ and fˆ in L(X nˆ×R). Then
Mn(I{xˇ} fˆ ) = 1∣[mˇ]∣BmˇMnˆ( fˆ )
Proof. Consider any fˆ in Aˆ, any θ in ΣX and any r in R. Then
Mn(I{xˇ} fˆ )(θ ,r) = ∑
m∈N n ∑y∈[m]I{xˇ} fˆ (y,r)∏z∈X θmzz .
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Consider some m in N . Since
I{xˇ} fˆ (y,r) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ fˆ (ynˇ+1, . . . ,yn,r) if (y1, . . . ,xnˇ) = xˇ0 if (y1, . . . ,xnˇ) ≠ xˇ for all y = (y1, . . . ,yn) in [m]
(8.11)
we have that m ≥ mˇ⇔∑y∈[m] I{xˇ} fˆ (y,r) ≠ 0, so
Mn(I{xˇ} fˆ )(θ ,r) = ∑
m∈N n
m≥mˇ
∑
y∈[m]I{xˇ} fˆ (y,r)∏z∈X θmzz .
Consider some m inN n. Then m ≥ mˇ if and only if mˆ ∶=m− mˇ ≥ 0, so m ≥ mˇ if and only
if mˆ ∈N nˆ. In that case, mˆ is a count vector itself. Assume that m ≥ mˇ. Then
∑
y∈[m]I{xˇ} fˆ (y,r) = ∑(y1,...,yn)∈[m]I{xˇ} fˆ (y1, . . . ,yn,r)= ∑(y1,...,ynˇ)=xˇ ∑(ynˇ+1,...,yn)∈[mˆ]I{xˇ} fˆ (y1, . . . ,yn,r)= ∑(ynˇ+1,...,yn)∈[mˆ] fˆ (ynˇ+1, . . . ,yn,r) = ∑y∈[mˆ] fˆ (y,r),
where the third equality follows from Equation (8.11). Furthermore,
∏
z∈X θ
mz
z =∏
z∈X θ
mˇz+mˆz
z =∏
z∈X θ
mˇz
z ∏
z∈X θ
mˆz
z = 1∣[mˇ]∣Bmˇ(θ)∏z∈X θ mˆzz .
Taking these observations into account, we find that
Mn(I{xˇ} fˆ )(θ ,r) = 1∣[mˇ]∣Bmˇ(θ) ∑mˆ∈N nˆ ∑y∈[mˆ] fˆ (y,r)∏z∈X θ mˆzz = 1∣[mˇ]∣Bmˇ(θ)Mnˆ( fˆ )(θ ,r).
Since our choice of θ in ΣX and r in R was arbitrary, therefore indeed Mn(I{xˇ} fˆ ) =
1∣[mˇ]∣BmˇMnˆ( fˆ ).
Interestingly, as we have seen, for conditioning frequency representations, the
Bernstein gambles play the role of indicators.
8.2 COUNTABLE EXCHANGEABILITY
In the previous section, we assumed a finite sequence X1,. . . , Xn to be ex-
changeable, and inferred representation theorems. Here, we will consider the
countable sequence X1, . . . , Xn, . . . to be exchangeable, and derive representa-
tion theorems for such assessments. We will call XN ∶=⨉ j∈NX, the set of all
possible countable sequences where each variable takes values in X.
First, we need a way to relate gambles on different domains. As in Chap-
ter 7221, this will be done using cylindrical extension. We extend Defini-
tion 46222 to countable sequences:
f ∗(x,r) ∶= f (x1, . . . ,xn,r) for all x ∶= (x1, . . . ,xn, . . .) in XN and r in R.
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for any gamble f on X n×R.
Formally, f ∗ belongs to L(XN×R) while f belongs to L(X n×R). How-
ever, they contain the same information, and therefore, are indistinguishable
from a behavioural point of view. We will resort to our simplifying device
from Remark 7.1223 of identifying f with its cylindrical extension f ∗.
Next, we need a way to relate choice functions and sets of desirable gam-
bles on different domains: We will base ourselves again on Chapter 7221 and do
this using marginalisation. We extend Definition 47223 to infinite sequences:
Given any choice function C on L(XN ×R) and any n in N, its X n-marginal
Cn is determined by
Cn(A) ∶=C(A) for all A in Q(L(X n)×R). (8.12)
Similarly, given any set of desirable gambles D ⊆ L(XN ×R) and any n in N,
its X n-marginal Dn is Dn ∶=D∩L(X n×R).
Coherence is preserved under marginalisation [it is an immediate conse-
quence of the definition; see, amongst others, Reference [29, Proposition 6]
for sets of desirable gambles].
Proposition 190. Consider any coherent choice function C on L(XN×R) and
any coherent set of desirable gambles D ⊆L(XN×R). Then for every n in N,
their X n-marginals Cn and Dn are coherent.
8.2.1 Vector-valued gambles of finite structure
Before we can explain what it means to assess a countable sequence to be ex-
changeable, we need to realise that now there are infinitely many variables.
From an operational point of view, it will be impossible to describe choice be-
tween gambles that depend upon an infinite number of variables. Indeed, since
we can never observe the actual outcome in a finite time, gambles will never
be actually paid off, and hence every assessment is essentially without any
risk. But, it does make operational and behavioural sense to consider choices
between gambles of finite structure: gambles that each depend on a finite num-
ber of variables only. See Reference [20, Section 3.2] for a discussion.
Definition 51 (Gambles of finite structure). We will call any vector-valued
gamble that depends only on a finite number of variables a vector-valued gam-
ble of finite structure. We collect all such gambles in the set L(XN×R):L(XN×R) ∶= { f ∈L(XN×R) ∶ (∃n ∈N) f ∈L(X n×R)} = ⋃
n∈NL(X n×R).
L(XN ×R) is a linear space, with the usual ordering ≤: for any f and g inL(XN×R), f ≤ g⇔ f (x,r) ≤ g(x,r) for all x in XN and r in R.
Due to our finitary approach, we can even establish a converse result to
Proposition 190, whose proof is a straightforward verification of all the axioms.
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Proposition 191. Consider any choice function C on L(XN×R), and any set
of desirable gambles D ⊆ L(XN ×R). If for every n in N, its X n-marginal Cn
on L(X n×R) is coherent, then C is coherent. Similarly, if for every n in N, itsX n-marginal Dn ⊆L(X n×R) is coherent, then D is coherent.
Proof. We restrict ourselves to proving this for choice functions; the proof for desir-
ability can be found in Reference [20, Proposition 4]. Consider any A in Q(L(XN ×R)). Then any f in A depends—besides on the value of R—on a finite number of
variables n f ∈N. Let n ∶=max{n f ∶ f ∈A}, which is a well-defined natural number since
A is finite. Every (cylindrical extension of) f in A is then a gamble on X n. It follows
then from Equation (8.12) that C(A) =Cn(A).
The proof follows readily once we realise that, following the procedure above, for
every option set A there is some n in N such that C(A) =Cn(A); for Axiom C320, we
need to consider A∪A1∪A2 rather than A.
8.2.2 Set of indifferent gambles
If a subject assesses the sequence of variables X1, . . . , Xn, . . . to be exchange-
able, this means that he is indifferent between any gamble f in L(XN×R) and
its permuted variant pi t f , for any pi in Pn, where n now is the (finite) number
of variables that f depends upon: his set of indifferent gambles is
IP ∶= { f ∈L(XN×R) ∶ (∃n ∈N) f ∈ IPn} = ⋃
n∈NIPn .
If we want to use IP to define countable exchangeability, it must be a coherent
set of indifferent gambles.
Proposition 192. The set IP is a coherent set of indifferent gambles.
Proof. For Axiom I1176, since, by Proposition 176249, 0 ∈ IPn for every n in N, also
0 ∈ IP . For Axiom I2176, consider any f in IP , then there is some n in N for which
f ∈ IPn . By Proposition 176249, we infer that indeed f /< 0 and f /> 0. For Axioms I3176
and I4176, consider any f1, f2 and f3 in IP and any λ in R. Then there are ni in N
such that fi ∈ IPni , for every i in {1,2,3}. Let n ∶= max{n1,n2,n3}. Then f1, f2 and f3
are elements of IPn , so λ f1 ∈ IPn and f2 + f3 ∈ IPn by Proposition 176249. Then indeed
λ f1 ∈ IP and f2+ f3 ∈ IP , so IP is indeed a linear hull.
Countable exchangeability is now easily defined, similar to the definition for
the finite case.
Definition 52. A choice function C on L(XN ×R) is called (countably) ex-
changeable if C is compatible with IP . Similarly, a set of desirable gambles
D ⊆L(XN×R) is called (countably) exchangeable if it is compatible with IP .
This definition is closely related to its finite counterpart:
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Proposition 193. Consider any coherent choice function C on L(XN ×R).
Then C is exchangeable if and only if for every choice of n in N, the X n-
marginal Cn of C is exchangeable. Similarly, consider any coherent set of
desirable gambles D ⊆ L(XN ×R). Then D is exchangeable if and only if for
every choice of n in N, the X n-marginal Dn of D is exchangeable.
Proof. The proof for sets of desirable real-valued gambles, in the more general context
of partial exchangeability, can be found in Reference [20, Proposition 18], and can be
trivially extended to vector-valued gambles.
We give the proof for choice functions. For necessity, assume that C is exchange-
able, or equivalently, that C is compatible with IP . Use Proposition 134187 to infer that
then, equivalently,
(∀h˜ ∈ IP)(∀A˜ ∈Q(L(XN×R)))({0, h˜} ⊆ A˜⇒ (0 ∈C(A˜)⇔ h˜ ∈C(A˜))). (8.13)
Consider any n in N. We need to prove that then Cn is compatible with IPn , or equiva-
lently, that
(∀h ∈ IPn)(∀A ∈Q(L(X n×R)))({0,h} ⊆ A⇒ (0 ∈Cn(A)⇔ h ∈Cn(A))). (8.14)
So consider any A inQ0(L(X n×R)) and h in A. Then A is an element ofQ(L(XN×R)) and h an element of L(XN ×R), so 0 ∈C(A)⇔ h ∈C(A) by Equation (8.13).
Therefore, after marginalising, 0 ∈Cn(A)⇔ h ∈Cn(A), so Cn is compatible with IPn ,
and by Definition 52↶ therefore indeed exchangeable.
For sufficiency, assume that Cn is exchangeable for every n in N—so it satisfies
Equation (8.14) for every n in N. We need to prove that then C is exchangeable. Using
Equation (8.13), it suffices to consider any A˜ in Q(L(XN ×R)) such that 0 ∈ A˜, and
any h˜ in A˜, and prove that 0 ∈C(A˜)⇔ h˜ ∈C(A˜). Since A˜ ∪{h˜} consists of gambles
of finite structure, there is some (sufficiently large) n in N for which A˜ ∈Q(L(X n ×R)), and therefore also h˜ ∈ L(X n ×R). Then by Equation (8.14), 0 ∈Cn(A˜)⇔ h˜ ∈
Cn(A˜), so 0 ∈C(A˜)⇔ h˜ ∈C(A˜), whence C is compatible with IP , and therefore indeed
exchangeable.
8.2.3 A representation theorem for countable sequences
We will look for a representation result that is similar to the one in Sec-
tion 8.1.6259. However, since we no longer deal with finite sequences of
length n, now the representing choice function will no longer be defined onVn(ΣX ×R), but instead on V(ΣX ×R).
Consider the commuting diagram of Figure 8.3, where a dashed line repre-
sents an embedding: for every n inN, Vn(ΣX×R) is a subspace of V(ΣX×R).
This shows the importance of the polynomial representation.
As we have seen, in order to define coherent choice functions on some
linear space, we need to provide it with a vector ordering. Similar to what we
did before, we use the proper cone {0}∪posi({Bm ∶m ∈N n,n ∈N}) to define
the order ⪯B on V(ΣX ×R):
h1 ⪯B h2⇔ (∀r ∈R)h2(⋅,r)−h1(⋅,r) ∈ {0}∪posi({Bm ∶m ∈N n,n ∈N})
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L(X n×R)
L(N n×R) Vn(ΣX ×R)
L(X n×R)/IPn V(ΣX ×R)
Hn Mn
[⋅]
CoMn
M˜nH˜n
Figure 8.3: Commuting diagram for countable exchangeability
for all h1 and h2 in V(ΣX ×R).
Keeping Propositions 190264 and 191265 in mind, the following results are
not surprising.
Proposition 194. Consider any choice function C′ on V(ΣX ×R). Then C′
is coherent if and only if for every n in N the choice function C′n, defined by
C′n(A) ∶=C′(A) for all A in Q(Vn(ΣX ×R)), is coherent.
Proof. We only prove sufficiency, since necessity is trivial. So consider any C′ onV(ΣX ×R) such that for every n inN, C′n is coherent. We prove that then C′ is coherent.
For Axiom C120, consider any A in Q(V(ΣX ×R)). Then every polynomial in
the finite set A has a certain degree; let n be the maximum of those degrees. Then
A ∈Q(Vn(ΣX ×R)), whence indeed C′(A) =C′n(A) ≠∅, since C′n is coherent.
For Axiom C220, consider any h1 and h2 in V(ΣX ×R) such that h1 ⪯B h2. Then for
every r in R, h2(⋅,r)−h1(⋅,r) ∈ posi({Bm ∶m ∈N n,n ∈N}). Consider, for every r inR, a representing polynomial pr of h1(⋅,r), and let n1 be the degree of the representing
polynomial in the finite set {pr ∶ r ∈R} with highest degree. Then, for every r in R,
h1(⋅,r) is represented by a polynomial in Vn1(ΣX ×R). Similarly, we find that, for
every r in R, h2(⋅,r) is represented by a polynomial in Vn2(ΣX ×R) for some n2 in
N. Let n ∶= max{n1,n2}. Then, for every r in R, there is a representing polynomial of
h2(⋅,r)− h1(⋅,r) whose degree is not higher than n, so h2 − h1 ∈ Vn(ΣX ×R) and
therefore h2(⋅,r)− h1(⋅,r) ∈ posi({Bm ∶ m ∈ N n}). This guarantees that h1 ⪯nB h2,
whence indeed {h2} =C′n({h1,h2}) =C′({h1,h2}), since C′n is coherent.
For Axiom C320, consider any A, A1 and A2 in V(ΣX ×R). Using the similar
construction as for Axiom C220, we find that then A∪A1∪A2 ⊆ Vn(ΣX ×R), for some
n in N. Then A, A1 and A2 all are elements of Q(Vn(ΣX ×R)). For Axiom C3a20,
assume that C′(A2) ⊆ A2 ∖A1 and A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ A. Then C′n(A2) ⊆ A2 ∖A1 and therefore,
since C′n is coherent, indeed C′(A) =C′n(A) ⊆ A ∖A1. For Axiom C3b20, assume that
C′(A2)⊆A2∖A1 and A ⊆A1. Then C′n(A2)⊆A2∖A1 and therefore, since C′n is coherent,
indeed C′(A2∖A) =C′n(A2∖A) ⊆ A2∖A1.
For Axiom C420, consider any h in V(ΣX ×R), any λ in R>0 and any A1 and A2
in Q(V(ΣX ×R)). Using the similar construction as for Axiom C220, we find that
then {h}∪A1 ∪A2 ⊆ Vn(ΣX ×R), for some n in N. Then h ∈ Vn(ΣX ×R) and A1 and
A2 both are elements of Q(Vn(ΣX ×R)). Assume that A1 ⊆C′(A2) =C′n(A2), then,
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since C′n is coherent, indeed λA1 ⊆C′n(λA2) =C′(λA2) and A1+{h} ⊆C′n(A2+{h}) =
C′(A2+{h}).
Theorem 195 (Countable representation). Consider any choice function C onL(XN ×R). Then C is coherent and exchangeable if and only if there is a
coherent representing choice function C˜ on V(ΣX ×R) such that, for every n
in N, the X n-marginal Cn of C is determined by
Cn(A) = { f ∈ A ∶Mn( f ) ∈ C˜(Mn(A))} for all A in Q(L(X n×R)). (8.15)
In that case, C˜ is uniquely determined via its corresponding rejection func-
tion R˜ by R˜(A˜) ∶=⋃n∈N R˜n(A˜∩Vn(ΣX ×R)) for all A˜ in Q(V(ΣX ×R)), with
R˜n(Mn(A)) ∶= Mn(Rn(A)) for every A in Q(L(X n ×R)), and where we let
R˜n(∅) ∶=∅ for notational convenience. We call C˜ the frequency representation
of C.
Similarly, consider any set of desirable gambles D ⊆ L(XN ×R). Then
D is coherent and exchangeable if and only if there is a unique representing
D˜ ⊆ V(ΣX ×R) such that, for every n in N, the X n-marginal Dn is given by
Dn =⋃M˜−1n (D˜∩Vn(ΣX ×R)). In that case, D˜ is given by D˜ =⋃n∈NMn(Dn).
Proof. We begin with the representation of choice functions. That C is exchangeable
is, by Proposition 193266, equivalent to Cn is exchangeable, for every n inN. Therefore,
by Theorem 187261 this is equivalent to:(∀n ∈N)Cn(A) = { f ∈ A ∶Mn( f ) ∈ C˜n(Mn(A))} for all A in Q(L(X n×R)),
where, as a consequence, for every n in N, C˜n is uniquely given by
C˜n(Mn(A)) = Mn(Cn(A)) for all A in Q(L(X n×R)). (8.16)
That C is coherent, is by Propositions 190264 and 191265 equivalent to Cn is coherent,
for every n in N, and using Theorem 187261, to C˜n is coherent, for every n in N. We
prove that this is necessary and sufficient for the existence of some coherent choice
function C˜ on V(ΣX ×R) that, for every n in N, satisfies Equation (8.15).
We start by showing the converse implication (sufficiency). Assume that there is
some coherent choice function C˜ on V(ΣX ×R) that for every n in N satisfies Equa-
tion (8.15). Consider any n in N. By Proposition 194↶, then the choice function C˜n
on Vn(ΣX ×R), determined by C˜n(A˜n) = C˜(A˜n) for every A˜n in Q(Vn(ΣX ×R)), is
coherent. Furthermore, by Equation (8.15), it satisfies indeed
Cn(A) = { f ∈ A ∶Mn( f ) ∈ C˜n(Mn(A))} for all A in Q(L(X n×R)).
Since C˜n(A˜n) = C˜(A˜n) for every A˜n in Q(Vn(ΣX ×R)), we find that also
R˜(A˜n) = R˜n(A˜n) for all A˜n in Q(Vn(ΣX ×R)). (8.17)
Next, we show that then R˜(A˜) =⋃n∈N R˜n(A˜∩Vn(ΣX ×R)) for all A˜ inQ(V(ΣX ×R)), thus making it unique. Consider any A˜ in Q(V(ΣX ×R)). Then, by the defini-
tion of a polynomial gamble, there is some n∗ in N such that A˜ ∈Q(Vn∗(ΣX ×R)),
268
8.2 COUNTABLE EXCHANGEABILITY
whence A˜ = A˜ ∩ Vn∗(ΣX ×R) and therefore R˜(A˜) = R˜(A˜ ∩ Vn∗(ΣX ×R)). By
Equation (8.17) therefore R˜(A˜) = R˜n∗(A˜ ∩ Vn∗(ΣX ×R)), whence indeed R˜(A˜) ⊆⋃n∈N R˜n(A˜∩Vn(ΣX ×R)). Conversely, consider any h in ⋃n∈N R˜n(A˜∩Vn(ΣX ×R)).
Then h ∈ R˜n∗(A˜ ∩Vn∗(ΣX ×R)) for some n∗ in N, and therefore, by Equation (8.17),
h ∈ R˜(A˜∩Vn∗(ΣX ×R)). By Axiom R3a20, therefore indeed h ∈ R˜(A˜).
We complete the proof by showing the direct implication (necessity). Assume that
(∀n ∈N)Cn(A) = { f ∈ A ∶Mn( f ) ∈ C˜n(Mn(A))} for all A in Q(L(X n×R)),
and that C˜n is coherent for every n in N. Let the rejection function R˜ on V(ΣX ×R)
by determined by R˜(A˜) ∶= ⋃n∈N R˜n(A˜ ∩Vn(ΣX ×R)) for all A˜ in Q(V(ΣX ×R)).
The proof is finished if we can show that it satisfies Equation (8.17) for every n in
N, because, if it does, Equation (8.15) is then satisfied, and furthermore, by Propo-
sition 194267 it is then coherent. Consider any n
∗ in N. We need to show that⋃n∈N R˜n(A˜n∗ ∩ Vn(ΣX ×R)) = R˜n∗(A˜n∗) for all A˜n∗ in Q(Vn∗(ΣX ×R)). Ob-
serve that A˜n∗ ∩ Vn(ΣX ×R) = A˜n∗ for every n ≥ n∗, whence by Lemma 196,⋃n∈N R˜n(A˜n∗ ∩ Vn(ΣX ×R)) = ⋃n≤n∗ R˜n(A˜n∗ ∩ Vn(ΣX ×R)). Furthermore, since
A˜n∗ ∩Vn1(ΣX ×R) ⊆ A˜n∗ ∩Vn2(ΣX ×R) whenever n1 ≤ n2, also R˜n1(A˜n∗ ∩Vn1(ΣX ×R)) = R˜n2(A˜n∗ ∩Vn1(ΣX ×R)) ⊆ R˜n2(A˜n∗ ∩Vn2(ΣX ×R)), where the first equality
follows from Lemma 196, and the second one from Axiom R3a20. This implies that
indeed ⋃n≤n∗ R˜n(A˜n∗ ∩Vn(ΣX ×R)) = R˜n∗(A˜n∗ ∩Vn∗(ΣX ×R)) = R˜n∗(A˜n∗).
The representation of sets of desirable gambles is a trivial extension to vector-
valued gambles of the proof given in Reference [20, Theorem 22].
Lemma 196. Consider any coherent choice function C on L(XN ×R) and
assume that, for every n in N, its X n-marginal Cn is given by
Cn(A) = { f ∈ A ∶Mn( f ) ∈ C˜n(Mn(A))} for all A in Q(L(X n×R)), (8.18)
where C˜n is a coherent choice function on Vn(ΣX ×R). Then, for every n1 ≤ n2
in N and A˜n1 in Vn1(ΣX ×R):
C˜n1(A˜n1) = C˜n2(A˜n1).
Proof. Since Mn1 is surjective, we can find An1 in Q(L(X n1 ×R)) such that
Mn1(An1) = A˜n1 . We will show that R˜n1(A˜n1) = R˜n2(A˜n1).
To show that R˜n1(A˜n1) ⊆ R˜n2(A˜n1), consider any h in R˜n1(A˜n1), and let fn1 be an
element of An1 such that Mn1( fn1) = h. Then fn1 ∈ Rn1(An1) by Equation (8.18). If we
denote the cylindrical extension of An1 to X n2 by An2 —and the cylindrical extension of
fn1 by fn2 —, then fn2 ∈ Rn2(An2) because Rn1 and Rn2 are related through marginalisa-
tion. But Rn2(An2) = { f ∈ An2 ∶ Mn2( f ) ∈ R˜n2(Mn2(An2))} by Equation (8.18), and by
Lemma 197↷, Rn2(An2) = { f ∈ An2 ∶Mn2( f ) ∈ R˜n2(Mn1(An1))}. Since fn2 ∈ Rn2(An2),
indeed h = Mn1( fn1) = Mn2( fn2) ∈ R˜n2(Mn1(An1)) = R˜n2(A˜n1).
The proof that also R˜n2(A˜n1) ⊆ R˜n1(A˜n1) is completely similar [with the same no-
tation, h ∈ R˜n2(A˜n1) implies that fn1 ∈ Rn2(An1) by Equation (8.18), which implies that
fn1 ∈ Rn1(An1) because Rn1 and Rn2 are related through marginalisation, which in turn
implies that h ∈ R˜n1(A˜n1)].
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Lemma 197 ([20, Lemma 27]). Consider any n1 ≤ n2 in N, and any gam-
ble fn1 in L(X n1 ×R). Denote its cylindrical extension to X n2 by fn2 . Then
Mn1( fn1) =Mn2( fn2).
8.2.4 Conditioning and countable representation
We use the same notation and ideas as in Reference [31, Section 5.2] for desir-
ability, and generalise it to choice models.
Suppose we have a coherent and exchangeable choice function C onL(XN ×R) with associated frequency representation C˜ on V(ΣX ×R). Sup-
pose that we observe the values xˇ of the first nˇ variables, with associated count
vector mˇ ∶= T (xˇ). We have seen in Proposition 193266 that, for every n in N,
the X n-marginal Cn is exchangeable, and in Proposition 183257 that Cn⌋mˇ is
exchangeable (if n > mˇ). But what about C⌋mˇ?
Theorem 198. Consider any coherent and exchangeable choice function C onL(XN ×R) with associated frequency representation C˜ on V(ΣX ×R). After
conditioning on a sample with count vector mˇ inN nˇ, C⌋mˇ is still exchangeable
and coherent, and has frequency representation C˜⌋mˇ, defined by
h ∈ C˜⌋mˇ(A˜)⇔ Bmˇh ∈ C˜(BmˇA˜), for every A˜ in V(ΣX ×R) and h in A˜. (8.19)
Proof. Use Theorem 195268 to infer that C˜ is coherent. We first show that C˜⌋mˇ is
coherent. For Axiom C120, consider any A˜ in V(ΣX ×R). Since C˜(BmˇA˜) ≠∅, indeed
also C˜⌋mˇ(A˜) ≠∅.
For Axiom C220, consider any h1 and h2 in V(ΣX ×R) such that h1 ≺B h2—
meaning h1 ⪯B h2 and h1 ≠ h2. Then (∀r ∈ R)h1(⋅,r)− h2(⋅,r) ∈ posi({Bm ∶ m ∈N n,n ∈ N}). Consider any r in R. Then h1(⋅,r)− h2(⋅,r) =∑`i=1λiBmi for some `
in N, λ1, . . . , λ` in R>0, n1, . . . , n` in N and m1 ∈N n1 , . . . , m` ∈N n` , and therefore(h1(⋅,r)−h2(⋅,r))Bmˇ =∑`i=1λiBmi Bmˇ. Use the result that, for any θ in ΣX ,
Bmi+mˇ(θ) = ∣[mi+ mˇ]∣∏
z∈X θ
miz+mˇz
z = ∣[mi+ mˇ]∣(∏
z∈X θ
miz
z )(∏
z∈X θ
mˇz
z )
= ∣[mi+ mˇ]∣∣[mi]∣∣[mˇ]∣Bmi(θ)Bmˇ(θ),
so Bmi+mˇ = ∣[mi+mˇ]∣∣[mi]∣∣[mˇ]∣Bmi Bmˇ, to infer that
(h1(⋅,r)−h2(⋅,r))Bmˇ = `∑
i=1λi
∣[mi]∣∣[mˇ]∣∣[mi+ mˇ]∣ Bmi+mˇ,
so Bmˇh1(⋅,r)−Bmˇh2(⋅,r) ∈ posi({Bm ∶ m ∈N n,n ∈ N}). Since the choice of r in R
was arbitrary, Bmˇh1 ≺B Bmˇh2, so Bmˇh1 ∉ C˜({Bmˇh1,Bmˇh2}) and therefore indeed h1 ∉
C˜⌋mˇ({h1,h2}).
For Axiom C3a20, consider any A˜, A˜1 and A˜2 in Q(V(ΣX ×R)) such that
C˜⌋mˇ(A˜2) ⊆ A˜2 ∖ A˜1 and A˜1 ⊆ A˜2 ⊆ A˜. Then C˜(BmˇA˜2) ⊆ Bmˇ(A˜2 ∖ A˜1) = BmˇA˜2 ∖BmˇA˜1
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and BmˇA˜1 ⊆ BmˇA˜2 ⊆ BmˇA˜, and therefore, by coherence, C˜(BmˇA˜) ⊆ BmˇA˜ ∖BmˇA˜1. But
then indeed C˜⌋mˇ(A˜) ⊆ A˜∖ A˜1.
For Axiom C3b20, consider any A˜, A˜1 and A˜2 in Q(V(ΣX ×R)) such that
C⌋mˇ(A˜2) ⊆ A˜2 ∖ A˜1 and A˜ ⊆ A˜1. Then C(BmˇA˜2) ⊆ Bmˇ(A˜2 ∖ A˜1) = BmˇA˜2 ∖BmˇA˜1 and
BmˇA˜ ⊆ BmˇA˜1, and therefore, C(Bmˇ(A˜2 ∖ A˜)) = C(BmˇA˜2 ∖ BmˇA˜) ⊆ BmˇA˜2 ∖ BmˇA˜1 =
Bmˇ(A˜2∖ A˜1). But then indeed C⌋mˇ(A˜2∖ A˜) ⊆ A˜2∖ A˜1.
For Axiom C4a20, consider any A˜1 and A˜2 in Q(V(ΣX ×R)) and any λ in R>0
for which A˜1 ⊆C⌋mˇ(A˜2). Then BmˇA˜1 ⊆C(BmˇA˜2), and therefore, Bmˇλ A˜1 ⊆C(Bmˇλ A˜2).
But then indeed λ A˜1 ⊆C⌋mˇ(λ A˜2).
For Axiom C4b20, consider any A˜1 and A˜2 inQ(V(ΣX ×R)) and any h in V(ΣX ×R) for which A˜1 ⊆C⌋mˇ(A˜2). Then BmˇA˜1 ⊆C(BmˇA˜2), and therefore, Bmˇ(A˜1 +{h}) =
BmˇA˜1 +{Bmˇh} ⊆C(BmˇA˜2 +{Bmˇh}) =C(Bmˇ(A˜2 +{h})). But then indeed λ A˜1 +{h} ⊆
C⌋mˇ(λ A˜2+{h}).
To finish the proof, it suffices to show that C˜⌋mˇ is the frequency representation of
C⌋mˇ. To establish this, we will show that, for every n in N such that n > nˇ, the X n-
marginal Cn⌋mˇ of C conditional on mˇ, is given by
Cn⌋mˇ(Aˆ) = { f ∈ Aˆ ∶Mnˆ( f ) ∈ C˜⌋mˇ(Mnˆ(Aˆ))} for all Aˆ in Q(L(X nˆ×R)),
where nˆ ∶= n− nˇ > 1.
Consider any n in N such that n > nˇ. Since C is exchangeable, by Theorem 195268,
we get
Cn(A) = { f ∈ A ∶Mn( f ) ∈ C˜(Mn(A))} for all A in Q(L(X n×R)).
Therefore
Cn⌋mˇ(Aˆ) = { f ∈ Aˆ ∶Mn(I[mˇ] f ) ∈ C˜(Mn(I[mˇ]Aˆ))} for all Aˆ in Q(L(X nˆ×R)).
By Lemma 189262, we have that then
Cn⌋mˇ(Aˆ) = { f ∈ Aˆ ∶ BmˇMnˆ( f ) ∈ C˜(BmˇMnˆ(Aˆ))} for all Aˆ in Q(L(X nˆ×R)),
and by Equation (8.19), therefore indeed
Cn⌋mˇ(Aˆ) = { f ∈ Aˆ ∶Mnˆ( f ) ∈ C˜⌋mˇ(Mnˆ(Aˆ))} for all Aˆ in Q(L(X nˆ×R)).
8.3 CONCLUSION
We have studied exchangeability and we have found counterparts to de Finetti’s
finite and countable representation results, in the general setting of choice func-
tions. We have shown that an exchangeability assessment is a particular indif-
ference assessment, where we identified the set of indifferent options. The
main idea that made (finite) representation possible is the linear order isomor-
phism H˜−1n between the quotient space and the set of gambles on count vectors,
indicating that (finitely) exchangeable choice functions can be represented by a
choice function that essentially represents preferences between gambles on the
unknown composition m of an urn with n balls of types X. Alternatively, for
the countable case, we have shown that there is a polynomial representation.
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CONCLUSIONS
The main conclusion of this dissertation is that with coherent choice functions,
we are able to generalise surprisingly many existing concepts in imprecise
probabilities, and more specifically, for sets of desirable gambles. We have
introduced an axiomatisation of coherent choice that is compatible with de-
sirability. Reduced to pairwise comparison, the rationality criteria for choice
functions imply the rationality criteria for desirability. Below, I will highlight
some of the most important results, and will look ahead at a number of inter-
esting problems that still remain.
An important property of coherent choice functions, is that coherence is
preserved under arbitrary infima. Its proof is basic, but the result is nevertheless
crucial: it allows for conservative reasoning with coherent choice functions.
We apply this essential property widely in this dissertation. For instance, we
use it to find an explicit expression for the natural extension of a partially
specified choice function. As it turns out, the natural extension for choice
functions reduces to its well-known counterpart for sets of desirable gambles.
Furthermore, if we start out from a purely binary assessment, the result of
our natural extension (for choice functions) is a purely binary choice function
itself. Even though this seems fairly natural, this result is not at all obvious,
and it seems to suggest that our axiomatisation is well suited for the connection
between choice functions and desirability.
The additional Property C525 (which Seidenfeld et al. [67] use as ra-
tionality axiom) that we consider, is also preserved under arbitrary infima.
It furthermore is also a productive axiom—just as Axioms C220–C420—as
can be clearly seen from its version (2.30)78 for rejection sets. However,
finding a manageable, constructive, expression for the natural extension un-
der convexity—the least informative coherent ‘convex’ extension of a given
assessment—remains an open problem. Obvious modifications to the natural
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extension RB of an assessment B that avoids complete rejection turn out not to
be up for the job: it seems that another idea will be necessary. Similar remarks
hold for the weaker Property C625.
Another example that uses the idea of conservative reasoning, is our treat-
ment of indifference: given a coherent set of indifferent options, we find the
least informative coherent choice function that is compatible with it. It suffices
to consider as a representing choice function the vacuous choice function on
the (representing) quotient space. We combine this with a direct assessment as
well: this leads to the natural extension under indifference.
Our ability to treat indifference in the light of conservative reasoning
should be credited to the fact that we can define choice functions on arbitrary
options that form a linear space. Furthermore, in this way, under some mild
conditions, we can also embed Seidenfeld et al.’s [67] account of choice func-
tions into our framework. However, we are less general in one respect: they
allow for possibly infinite but closed option sets, while we only consider finite
option sets. Many of our proofs depend on the option sets being finite; con-
sider for instance the proofs of some of the direct consequences of coherence:
Propositions 2438, 2539, 3142 and 3444, as well as the result in Lemma 4352
that is crucial for proving that coherence is preserved for suprema of chains
of coherent choice functions, and on which the proof that there are maximal
choice functions depends.
Next to choice functions and rejection functions, we consider the equiva-
lent model of choice relations. They are sometimes more elegant to work with,
and help in clarifying the connection with desirability. But in Section 2.976 we
see yet another equivalent model: rejection sets. They seem to have an even
tighter connection with desirability: consider for instance Proposition 6878 that
establishes that the rejection set of a purely binary choice function is deter-
mined by the rejection set that consists of option sets of cardinality two. It is an
interesting open question whether some concepts or discussions in this disser-
tation can be simplified by adopting a different mathematical language. An ex-
ample where the use of rejection sets—or rather its variant of coordinate rejec-
tion sets—turns out to be very useful, is the characterisation in Section 4.4146
of coherent (and convex) choice functions on binary possibility spaces, and
the counterexample in the same section, showing that Property C525 does not
guarantee representation in terms of lexicographic choice functions. One of the
crucial observations that makes this possible, is the result in Proposition 117162
that choice functions on binary possibility spaces that satisfy Property C625,
are completely determined by their (coordinate) rejection sets, whose elements
consist of option sets of three elements. It is an open question whether such
easy characterisation of coherent choice functions generalises to more than bi-
nary possibility spaces. However, Example 880 shows that, even for ternary
possibility spaces, there is no limit on the size of the elements of the rejection
sets, which therefore will tend to complicate matters considerably.
Another interesting open problem is that of representation of coherent
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choice functions, in terms of maximal (or other) choice functions. Ideally,
we would like to establish the following two properties. We would like to
have representation in terms of maximal choice functions, in the sense that ev-
ery coherent choice function is an infimum of its dominating maximal choice
functions. Moreover, we would like the maximal choice functions to be purely
binary choice functions corresponding to maximal sets of desirable options.
Even though none of these properties is established, we have showed that not
both can hold: the coherent rejection function in Example 16109 is no infimum
of purely binary rejection functions. It is an interesting open problem to find
out whether one of these two properties holds, and, if so, which one.
With respect to finding the maximal choice functions, we feel that rejection
sets might help, too. For desirability, an important property that helps finding
the maximal sets of desirable options, is u ∉ D ⇒ 0 ∉ posi(D ∪{−u}) for any
coherent set of desirable gambles D and non-zero option u. We have a strong
intuition that this may be generalised in some way to choice models by using
rejection sets, and we suspect that Lemma 8096 will play a role.
But there is an end to all human endeavour, and my work on this disserta-
tion, however much I’ve enjoyed it, has run its course. It is my firm hope that
my findings here may help me (at some later time) or others solve these and
other important open questions.
275

BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Mark A. Aizerman. New problems in the general choice theory. Social
choice and Welfare, 2(4):235–282, 1985.
[2] Jose´ Carlos R. Alcantud and Susana Dı´az. Rational fuzzy and sequen-
tial fuzzy choice. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 315:76 – 98, 2017. Theme:
Preference Modeling and Decision.
[3] Francis J. Anscombe and Robert J. Aumann. A definition of subjective
probability. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 34:199–205, 1963.
[4] Kenneth J. Arrow. Social choice and individual values. Cowles Founda-
tion Monographs Series. Yale University Press, 1951.
[5] Sheldon J. Axler. Linear Algebra Done Right. Undergraduate Texts in
Mathematics. Springer, New York, 1997.
[6] Alessio Benavoli, Alessandro Facchini, Marco Zaffalon, and Jose´
Vicente-Pe´rez. A polarity theory for sets of desirable gambles. In
Alessandro Antonucci, Giorgio Corani, Ine´s Couso, and Se´bastien
Destercke, editors, Proceedings of the Tenth International Symposium
on Imprecise Probability: Theories and Applications, volume 62 of Pro-
ceedings of Machine Learning Research, pages 37–48. PMLR, 10–14 Jul
2017.
[7] Lawrence Blume, Adam Brandenburger, and Eddie Dekel. Lexicographic
probabilities and choice under uncertainty. Econometrica: Journal of the
Econometric Society, pages 61–79, 1991.
[8] Jasper De Bock and Gert de Cooman. Conditioning, updating and lower
probability zero. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 67:1
– 36, 2015.
[9] Seamus Bradley. How to choose among choice functions. In Thomas
Augustin, Serena Doria, Enrique Miranda, and Erik Quaeghebeur, edi-
tors, ISIPTA ’15: Proceedings of the Ninth International Symposium on
Imprecise Probability: Theories and Applications, pages 57–66, Pescara,
2015. SIPTA.
277
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[10] Arne Brøndsted. An Introduction to Convex Polytopes. Graduate Texts in
Mathematics. Springer, 1983.
[11] Herman Chernoff. Rational selection of decision functions. Economet-
rica, 22(4):422–443, 1954.
[12] Giulianella Coletti and Barbara Vantaggi. Possibility theory: Conditional
independence. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 157(11):1491 – 1513, 2006.
[13] Ine´s Couso and Serafı´n Moral. Sets of desirable gambles: condition-
ing, representation, and precise probabilities. International Journal of
Approximate Reasoning, 52(7):1034–1055, 2011.
[14] Ine´s Couso, Serafı´n Moral, and Peter Walley. A survey of concepts of in-
dependence for imprecise probabilities. Risk Decision and Policy, 5:165–
181, 2000.
[15] Fabio G. Cozman. Credal networks. Artificial Intelligence, 120:199–233,
2000.
[16] Fabio G. Cozman. Some remarks on sets of lexicographic probabilities
and sets of desirable gambles. In Thomas Augustin, Serena Doria, En-
rique Miranda, and Erik Quaeghebeur, editors, ISIPTA ’15: Proceedings
of the Ninth International Symposium on Imprecise Probability: Theories
and Applications, pages 87–96, Pescara, 2015. SIPTA.
[17] Brian A. Davey and Hilary A. Priestley. Introduction to Lattices and
Order. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990.
[18] Jasper De Bock. Credal Networks under Epistemic Irrelevance: Theory
and algorithms. PhD thesis, Ghent University, 2015.
[19] Jasper De Bock and Gert de Cooman. Credal networks under epistemic
irrelevance: the sets of desirable gambles approach. International Jour-
nal of Approximate Reasoning, 56(B):178–207, 2015.
[20] Jasper De Bock, Arthur Van Camp, Ma´rcio Alves Diniz, and Gert
de Cooman. Representation theorems for partially exchangeable random
variables. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 284:1–30, 2016.
[21] Cedric De Boom, Jasper De Bock, Arthur Van Camp, and Gert
de Cooman. Robustifying the viterbi algorithm. In Linda C. van der
Gaag and Ad J. Feelders, editors, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence,
volume 8754, pages 160–175. Springer, 2014.
[22] Gert de Cooman. Possibility theory I–III. International Journal of Gen-
eral Systems, 25:291–371, 1997.
278
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[23] Gert de Cooman. Belief models: an order-theoretic investigation. Annals
of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 45(1–2):5–34, 2005.
[24] Gert de Cooman, Jasper De Bock, and Ma´rcio Alves Diniz. Coherent
predictive inference under exchangeability with imprecise probabilities.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 52:1–95, 2015.
[25] Gert de Cooman, Jasper De Bock, and Arthur Van Camp. Recent ad-
vances in imprecise-probabilistic graphical models. In Frontiers in Ar-
tificial Intelligence and Applications, Volume 242 (Proceedings of ECAI
2012), pages 27–32, 2012.
[26] Gert de Cooman, Filip Hermans, Alessandro Antonucci, and Marco Zaf-
falon. Epistemic irrelevance in credal nets: the case of imprecise Markov
trees. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 51(9):1029–
1052, 2010.
[27] Gert de Cooman and Enrique Miranda. Symmetry of models versus mod-
els of symmetry. In W. L. Harper and G. R. Wheeler, editors, Probability
and Inference: Essays in Honor of Henry E. Kyburg, Jr., pages 67–149.
King’s College Publications, 2007.
[28] Gert de Cooman and Enrique Miranda. Forward irrelevance. Journal of
Statistical Planning and Inference, 139(2):256–276, 2009.
[29] Gert de Cooman and Enrique Miranda. Irrelevance and independence
for sets of desirable gambles. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research,
45:601–640, 2012.
[30] Gert de Cooman, Enrique Miranda, and Marco Zaffalon. Independent
natural extension. Artificial Intelligence, 175(12–13):1911–1950, 2011.
[31] Gert de Cooman and Erik Quaeghebeur. Exchangeability and sets of
desirable gambles. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning,
53(3):363–395, 2012. Precisely imprecise: A collection of papers dedi-
cated to Henry E. Kyburg, Jr.
[32] Gert de Cooman, Erik Quaeghebeur, and Enrique Miranda. Exchange-
able lower previsions. Bernoulli, 15(3):721–735, 2009.
[33] Gert de Cooman and Matthias C. M. Troffaes. Dynamic programming
for deterministic discrete-time systems with uncertain gain. International
Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 39:257–278, 2005.
[34] Bruno de Finetti. La pre´vision: ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives.
Annales de l’Institut Henri Poincare´, 7:1–68, 1937. English translation
in Reference [47].
279
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[35] Arthur P. Dempster. Upper and lower probabilities induced by a multi-
valued mapping. Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 38:325–339, 1967.
[36] Ma´rcio Alves Diniz, Jasper De Bock, and Arthur Van Camp. Character-
izing dirichlet priors. The American Statistician, 70(1):9–17, 2016.
[37] Peter C. Fishburn. The Foundations of Expected Utility. Theory and
Decision Library 31. Springer Netherlands, 1982.
[38] Paul R. Halmos. Naive Set Theory. Undergraduate Texts in Mathematics.
Springer New York, 1998.
[39] Joseph Y. Halpern. Lexicographic probability, conditional probability,
and nonstandard probability. Games and Economic Behavior, 68, 2010.
[40] Preston C. Hammer. Maximal convex sets. Duke Mathematical Journal,
22:103–106, 1955.
[41] Peter J. Hammond. Elementary non-archimedean representations of
probability for decision theory and games. Patrick Suppes: Scientific
Philosopher, pages 25–61, 1994.
[42] Junnan He. A generalized unification theorem for choice theoretic:
Avoiding the necessity of pairs and triplets. Economics Discussion Paper
2012-23, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, 2012.
[43] Richard B. Holmes. Geometric Functional Analysis and Its Applications.
Springer-Verlag, New York, 1975.
[44] Norman L. Johnson, Samuel Kotz, and Narayanaswamy Balakrishnan.
Discrete Multivariate Distributions. Wiley Series in Probability and
Statistics. John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1997.
[45] Joseph B. Kadane, Mark J. Schervish, and Teddy Seidenfeld. A Rubi-
nesque theory of decision. Institute of Mathematical Statistics Lecture
Notes-Monograph Series, 45:45–55, 2004.
[46] Peter H. Krauss. Representation of conditional probability measures on
boolean algebras. Acta Mathematica Academiae Scientiae Hungaricae,
19(3-4):229–241, 1968.
[47] Henry E. Kyburg Jr. and Howard E. Smokler, editors. Studies in Sub-
jective Probability. Wiley, New York, 1964. Second edition (with new
material) 1980.
[48] Isaac Levi. The Enterprise of Knowledge. MIT Press, London, 1980.
[49] Juan Enrique Martı´nez-Legaz. Exact quasiconvex conjugation.
Zeitschrift fu¨r Operations-Research, 27(1):257–266, 1983.
280
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[50] Juan Enrique Martı´nez-Legaz and Jose´ Vicente-Pe´rez. Lexicographical
representation of convex sets. Journal of Convex Analysis, 19(2):485–
496, 2012.
[51] Enrique Miranda. A survey of the theory of coherent lower previsions.
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 48(2):628–658, 2008.
[52] Enrique Miranda and Gert de Cooman. Lower previsions. In Thomas Au-
gustin, Frank P. A. Coolen, Gert de Cooman, and Matthias C. M. Trof-
faes, editors, Introduction to Imprecise Probabilities, chapter 2, pages
28–55. John Wiley & Sons, 2014.
[53] Enrique Miranda, Arthur Van Camp, and Gert de Cooman. Choice func-
tions and rejection sets. In M. A. Gil, J. Gil, and E. Gil, editors, The
mathematics of the Uncertain, pages 289–298. Springer, 2018.
[54] Enrique Miranda and Marco Zaffalon. Notes on desirability and coher-
ent lower previsions. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence,
60(3–4):251–309, 2010.
[55] Serafı´n Moral. Epistemic irrelevance on sets of desirable gambles. An-
nals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 45(1–2):197–214, 2005.
[56] Erik Quaeghebeur. Learning from samples using coherent lower previ-
sions. PhD thesis, Ghent University, 2009.
[57] Erik Quaeghebeur. Desirability. In Thomas Augustin, Frank P. A.
Coolen, Gert de Cooman, and Matthias C. M. Troffaes, editors, Intro-
duction to Imprecise Probabilities, chapter 1, pages 1–27. John Wiley &
Sons, 2014.
[58] Erik Quaeghebeur, Gert de Cooman, and Filip Hermans. Accept & reject
statement-based uncertainty models. International Journal of Approxi-
mate Reasoning, 57:69–102, 2015.
[59] Herman Rubin. A weak system of axioms for “rational” behavior and
the nonseparability of utility from prior. Statistics & Risk Modeling, 5(1-
2):47–58, 1987.
[60] Leonard J. Savage. The Foundations of Statistics. Dover, New York,
1972. Second revised edition, first published 1954.
[61] Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld, Joseph B. Kadane, and Isaac Levi.
Extensions of expected utility theory and some limitations of pairwise
comparisons. In J.-M. Bernard, T. Seidenfeld, and M. Zaffalon, editors,
ISIPTA ’03 – Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Im-
precise Probabilities and Their Applications, pages 496–510. Carleton
Scientific, 2003.
281
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[62] Thomas Schwartz. Rationality and the myth of the maximum. Nouˆs,
6(2):97–117, 1972.
[63] Teddy Seidenfeld. Decision theory without independence or without or-
dering. Economics and Philosophy, 4:267–290, 1988.
[64] Teddy Seidenfeld, Mark J. Schervish, and Joseph B. Kadane. Decisions
without ordering. In W. Sieg, editor, Acting and reflecting, volume 211
of Synthese Library, pages 143–170. Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1990.
[65] Teddy Seidenfeld, Mark J. Schervish, and Joseph B. Kadane. A represen-
tation of partially ordered preferences. The Annals of Statistics, 23:2168–
2217, 1995. Reprinted in Reference [66], pp. 69–129.
[66] Teddy Seidenfeld, Mark J. Schervish, and Joseph B. Kadane. Rethinking
the Foundations of Statistics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1999.
[67] Teddy Seidenfeld, Mark J. Schervish, and Joseph B. Kadane. Coherent
choice functions under uncertainty. Synthese, 172(1):157–176, 2010.
[68] Amartya Sen. Choice functions and revealed preference. The Review of
Economic Studies, 38(3):307–317, 1971.
[69] Amartya Sen. Social choice theory: A re-examination. Econometrica,
45:53–89, 1977.
[70] Glenn Shafer. A Mathematical Theory of Evidence. Princeton University
Press, Princeton, NJ, 1976.
[71] Matthias C. M. Troffaes. Decision making under uncertainty using im-
precise probabilities. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning,
45(1):17–29, 2007.
[72] Matthias C. M. Troffaes and Gert de Cooman. Lower previsions. Wiley
series in probability and statistics. John Wiley and Sons, 2014.
[73] Hirofumi Uzawa. Note on preference and axioms of choice. Annals of
the Institute of Statistical Mathematics, 8:35–40, 1956.
[74] Arthur Van Camp and Gert de Cooman. A new method for learning im-
precise hidden Markov models. In Salvatore Greco, Bernadette Bouchon-
Meunier, Giulianella Coletti, Benedetto Matarazzo, and Ronald R R
Yager, editors, Proceedings of IPMU ’12, pages 460–469, 2012.
[75] Arthur Van Camp and Gert de Cooman. Modelling practical certainty
and its link with classical propositional logic. In Fabio Cozman, Thierry
Denœux, Se´bastien Destercke, and Teddy Seidenfeld, editors, ISIPTA
282
BIBLIOGRAPHY
’13: Proceedings of the Eighth International Symposium on Imprecise
Probability: Theories and Applications, pages 365–374, Compie`gne,
2013. SIPTA.
[76] Arthur Van Camp and Gert de Cooman. Exchangeable choice functions.
In Alessandro Antonucci, Giorgio Corani, Ine´s Couso, and Se´bastien
Destercke, editors, Proceedings of the Tenth International Symposium
on Imprecise Probability: Theories and Applications, volume 62 of Pro-
ceedings of Machine Learning Research, pages 346–357. PMLR, 2017.
[77] Arthur Van Camp, Gert de Cooman, and Enrique Miranda. Lexicographic
choice functions. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning. Ac-
cepted for publication.
[78] Arthur Van Camp, Gert de Cooman, Enrique Miranda, and Erik Quaeghe-
beur. Coherent choice functions, desirability and indifference. Fuzzy sets
and systems. Accepted for publication.
[79] Arthur Van Camp, Gert de Cooman, Enrique Miranda, and Erik Quaeghe-
beur. Modelling indifference with choice functions. In Thomas Augustin,
Serena Doria, Enrique Miranda, and Erik Quaeghebeur, editors, ISIPTA
’15: Proceedings of the Ninth International Symposium on Imprecise
Probability: Theories and Applications, pages 305–314, Pescara, 2015.
SIPTA.
[80] Arthur Van Camp, Enrique Miranda, and Gert de Cooman. Lexicographic
Choice Functions Without Archimedeanicity, pages 479–486. Springer
International Publishing, Cham, 2017.
[81] John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. Theory of Games and Eco-
nomic Behaviour. Princeton University Press, 3rd edition, 1972.
[82] Peter Walley. Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities. Chap-
man and Hall, London, 1991.
[83] Peter Walley. Towards a unified theory of imprecise probability. Interna-
tional Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 24(2–3):125–148, 2000.
[84] Peter M. Williams. Notes on conditional previsions. Technical report,
School of Mathematical and Physical Science, University of Sussex, UK,
1975. Revised journal version: Reference [85].
[85] Peter M. Williams. Notes on conditional previsions. International Jour-
nal of Approximate Reasoning, 44(3):366–383, 2007. Revised journal
version of Reference [84].
283
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[86] Marco Zaffalon and Enrique Miranda. Axiomatising incomplete prefer-
ences through sets of desirable gambles. Journal of Artificial Intelligence
Research, 60:1057–1126, 2017.
284


